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ABSTRACT
Liturgy, Theurgy, and Active Participation:
On Theurgic Participation in God
Kjetil Kringlebotten
This thesis, providing a metaphysical grounding for liturgical participation, argues that ‘active 
participation’ in the liturgy must be understood principally as our participation in God’s act and 
particularly in the act of Christ and only secondarily as our ritual involvement. Engaging Thomas 
Aquinas, Joseph Ratzinger, and Catherine Pickstock, as well as Neoplatonist philosophy, both 
Pagan and Christian, this thesis proposes that this should be understood in terms of theurgy, which 
is the human participation in divine action, which finds its consummation in the Incarnation.
This thesis argues that without the Incarnation, all acts will remain extrinsic and imposed but that 
acts can become real and intrinsic precisely because the Incarnation makes possible true union with 
the divine, a metaphysical union-in-distinction, without confusion, because this union is not 
extrinsic. It is rooted in one person or suppositum, the incarnate Logos. Through union with Christ, 
as the one common focus of the divine-human relation, we can have true union with God and may 
offer true worship. In order to make sense of active participation, then, we need to understand 
theology in theurgic terms, where theurgy is understood not as a mechanical ‘coercion’ of God but 
as a participation in His act, in creation and through Christ as the true theurgist, the ‘master 
theurgist,’ whose work transforms our act and the liturgy.
Doing so, we find a theological and philosophical basis of how we may participate in the liturgy as 
a divine work, without either ‘collapsing’ into God, and consequently denying their real and 
substantial, though derived, integrity, or divorcing our works from their divine source. This thesis, 
therefore, explores, liturgically, the relation between grace and nature, noting that in order to obtain 
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The Second Vatican Council’s constitution on the Sacred Liturgy expresses a central idea of
liturgical theology, that “all the faithful should be led to that fully conscious, and active partic-
ipation in liturgical celebrations which is demanded by the very nature of the liturgy,” and that
such participation “is their right and duty by reason of their baptism.”1 This can be understood
in different ways. Some have understood this in principally practical-functional ways, calling
for active (practical) involvement of the faithful in concrete liturgical celebrations, while not
denying the importance of a grounding in God, based partly on the fact that this is a participa-
tion to which we are to “be led” (implying that it is active and not static).2 Others, while not
denying the importance of the active (practical) involvement of the faithful, have understood
this principally as a metaphysical concept, calling for our participation in a divine work.3 This
discussion opens up to some important questions: who is active in the liturgy, and what does it
1 Sacrosanctum Concilium (hereafter: SC), 14, cf. Alcuin Reid, ed., T&T Clark Companion to Liturgy (Lon-
don: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016), 513-514. On Vatican II documents, see abbreviations, p.5, n4.
2 Anscar J. Chupungco, Cultural Adaptation of the Liturgy (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1982); Anscar J.
Chupungco, “The Implementation of Sacrosanctum Concilium,” in T&T Clark Companion to Liturgy, ed.,
Reid, 279-295; Anscar J. Chupungco, “The Vision of the Constitution on the Liturgy,” in T&T Clark Com-
panion to Liturgy, ed., Reid, 261-277; Anscar J. Chupungco, ed. Handbook for Liturgical Studies, 5 vols.
(Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1997-2000); Godfried Danneels, “Liturgy Forty Years After the Second
Vatican Council: High Point or Recession,” in Liturgy in a Postmodern World, ed., Keith Pecklers (London:
Bloomsbury T&TClark/Continuum, 2003), 8, 10-17, 24-25; Massimo Faggioli, “The Liturgical Reform from
1963 until Today . . . and Beyond” (Toronto Journal of Theology 32:2, 2016), 209-213; Clare V. Johnson,
“From Organic Growth to Liturgico-Plasticity: Reconceptualizing the Process of Liturgical Reform” (The-
ological Studies 76:1, 2015), 87-111; Léon Ngoy Kalumba, “The Zairean Rite: The Roman Missal for the
Dioceses of Zaire (Congo),” in Liturgy in a Postmodern World, ed., Pecklers, 94-98; Peter C. Phan, “Liturgi-
cal Inculturation: Unity in Diversity in the Postmodern Age,” in Liturgy in a PostmodernWorld, ed., Pecklers,
75-79.
3 Joseph Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, commemorative ed. (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 2018), 185-
191; Joseph Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy: The Sacramental Foundation of Christian Existence (San
Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 2014), 541-557; Alcuin Reid, “In Pursuit of Participation—Liturgy and Liturgists in
EarlyModern and Post Enlightenment Catholicism,” in T&TClark Companion to Liturgy, ed., Reid, 133-151;
Alcuin Reid, “On the Council Floor: The Council Fathers’ Debate of the Schema on the Sacred Liturgy,” in
Authentic Liturgical Renewal in Contemporary Perspective, ed., Uwe Michael Lang (London: Bloomsbury
T&T Clark, 2017), 125-143; Alcuin Reid, The Organic Development of the Liturgy, 2nd. ed. (San Francisco,
CA: Ignatius, 2005); Richard J. Schuler, “Participation” (Sacred Music 114:4, 1987), 7-10.
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mean to engage in it? How should we understand the relationship between divine and human
agency in Christian practices, and particularly in the liturgical action? If God is the supreme
agent of the liturgical act, how do we understand human participation in the same? How is it
even possible to speak of human agency in this context, and why is it even necessary?
In this thesis, I aim to argue that this is best understood in principally dogmatic or meta-
physical terms, calling for our participation in the divine work. If not, the ceremonies become
isolated events at a particular time and place that some people just happen to be involved in,
rather than a participation in the divinely given order in creation and its relation to God. We
can see this expressed when the Constitution states that the liturgy is “an exercise of the priestly
office of Jesus Christ” and that “in the liturgy the whole public worship is performed by the
Mystical Body of Jesus Christ, that is, by the Head and His members” (SC, 7). The constitu-
tion, therefore, does not reduce ‘active participation’ to mere occasional or wilful involvement
but presupposes participation in Christ, in the divine work, whereby he offers Himself (Hebrews
8:1-6). While the constitution notes that “all the faithful should be led to that fully conscious,
and active participation in liturgical celebrations which is demanded by the very nature of the
liturgy,”4 which implies a level of practicality, any practical involvement follows from our ba-
sic participation as creatures in God and as children of God through faith in Christ. The one
who leads us must be God, if mediated through intermediaries.5 But, as I will argue more later,
this is not static in the first place. When we participate in the divine, this can grow and come
to expression is many ways.6 The aim, however, is not to argue for a dogmatic and metaphys-
4 SC, 14, emphasis added.
5 See more in chapter five, pp.183-185.
6 See chapter one, pp.40-49, cf. Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Power of God (Quaestiones Dis-
putatae de potentia Dei, hereafter: De pot.), q.3, a.7. For notes on the Thomistic corpus, see abbreviations,
p.4, n1. This participatory approach has gotten an upswing in later decades, both in philosophy and theology.
See Arthur Macdonald Allchin, Participation in God: A Forgotten Strand in Anglican Tradition (London:
Darton, Longman and Todd, 1988); J. Todd Billings, Calvin, Participation, and the Gift: The Activity of
Believers in Union with Christ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Hans Boersma, Heavenly Partic-
ipation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011); Andrew Davison,
Participation in God: A Study in Christian Doctrine and Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
9
ical approach over and against a ritualistic one, but to reconcile them. As we are embodied
creatures, existing in specific places, liturgy always exists in particular ritual contexts.7 Con-
fessio Augustana (hereafter: CA), for instance, teaches that the Church, though she exists and
is organised outside its local context, is constituted most particularly in the celebrated liturgy.
She is “the assembly of saints (Lt. congregatio sanctorum) in which the gospel is taught purely
and the sacraments are administered rightly” (VII, cf. VII, XXVIII).8 My goal here is to find
a framework in which to understand this active participation and I propose that this framework
should be a Christian theurgic Neoplatonism. But what is theurgic Neoplatonism?
InGreek antiquity, particularly inNeoplatonic circles, a form of ritualistic philosophy emerged,
advocating for ‘theurgy’ or ‘divine work’ (Gk. theourgía), formed from Gk. theós (‘god’) and
érgon (‘work’).9 Inspired by Platonic philosophy and Babylonian and Egyptian religious prac-
Press, 2019); Cornelio Fabro, “The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of Par-
ticipation” (The Review of Metaphysics 27:3, 1974), 449-491; Jorge N. Ferrer and Jacob H., Sherman, eds.,
The Participatory Turn: Spirituality, Mysticism, Religious Studies (Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press, 2008); John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, eds., Radical Orthodoxy: A new
theology (London: Routledge, 1999), 1-20; Simon Oliver, “Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: from participa-
tion to late modernity,” in The Radical Orthodoxy Reader, eds., Simon Oliver and John Milbank (New York,
NY: Routledge, 2009), 3-27, esp. 13-21; Fran O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the metaphysics of Aquinas
(New ed. Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005); Adrian Pabst, Metaphysics: The Creation of
Hierarchy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012); Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek
Patristic Tradition (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2004); JohnMichael Rziha, PerfectingHumanActions:
St. Thomas Aquinas on Human Participation in Eternal Law (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University
of America Press, 2009); Klyne Snodgrass, “The Gospel of Participation,” in Earliest Christianity within the
Boundaries of Judaism: Essays in Honor of Bruce Chilton, eds., Alan J. Avery-Peck, Craig A. Evans, and
Jacob Neusner (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 413-430; Olli-Pekka Vainio, Justification and Participation in Christ:
The Development of the Lutheran Doctrine of Justification from Luther to the Formula of Concord (1580)
(Leiden: Brill, 2008); Rudi A. te Velde, Aquinas on God: The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa Theologiae
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 139-142, 160-165, 171-178; Rudi A. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality
in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill, 1995), esp. 35-43, 164-183; John Webster, “Perfection and Participa-
tion,” in The Analogy of Being: Invention of the Antichrist or the Wisdom of God?, ed., Thomas Joseph
White (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 379-394; A. N. Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in
Aquinas and Palamas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought
of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 2000), 94-131.
7 Juliette J. Day, Reading the Liturgy: An exploration of texts in Christian worship (London: Bloomsbury T&T
Clark, 2014), 16-20, 45-51, 110, 145-165; Alexander Schmemann, For the Life of the World: Sacraments
and Orthodoxy, 2nd ed. (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 1997), 135-151, esp. 136-138, cf. chapter three,
pp.112-114.
8 For notes on the Lutheran confessions, see abbreviations, p.5, n3. If not otherwise noted, quotations from
CA follow the translation of the Latin text.
9 There has been a significant amount of research on theurgy, in both Pagan and Christian contexts, in the 20th
century and beyond, especially since the 1980s onwards. For a few discussions and introductions, see Crystal
Addey, Divination and Theurgy in Neoplatonism: Oracles of the Gods (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016); Eu-
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tices, this has in turn influenced Pagans and Christians alike. This tradition finds its roots among
the so-called Chaldeans, who wrote, or at least compiled, a sacred second century AD text, the
Chaldean Oracles, at times called ‘the Bible of Neoplatonists.’10 This text focuses specifically
on ‘anagogy’ (Gk. anagōgē), on the ascent of the human spirit or soul (and possibly the body
as well) to the gods, through a so-called ‘sacrament of immortality.’11 There are tendencies,
in the Chaldean tradition, towards a spiritualistic and coercive understanding of theurgy, often
called magic or sorcery,12 maintaining that there exists a ‘sympathy’ between a heavenly realm
and ours, permitting “the theurgist, or “god-worker,” to use the earthly to manipulate the heav-
enly, that is, to use special elements and words in rituals in order to compel the gods to do our
bidding.”13 Later, with Iamblichus, arguably the most central (critical) interpreter of this tradi-
gene Afonasin, John Dillon, and John F. Finamore, eds., Iamblichus and the Foundations of Late Platonism
(Leiden: Brill, 2012); Riccardo Chiaradonna and Adrien Lecerf, “Iamblichus,” in The Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy, Fall 2019 Edition (ed., Edward N. Zalta); Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The
Neoplatonism of Iamblichus (2nd ed. Angelico Press/Sophia Perennis, 2014); Charles M. Stang, Apophasis
and Pseudonymity in Dionysius the Areopagite: “No Longer I” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012);
Peter T. Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies: Iamblichus, Pseudo-Dionysius, Religion and Magic in Late
Antiquity” (Ancient World 32:2, 2001), 25-38; Ilinca Tanaseanu-Döbler, Theurgy in Late Antiquity: The In-
vention of a Ritual Tradition (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013); Algis Uždavinys, Philosophy
and Theurgy in Late Antiquity (Kettering: Angelico Press/Sophia Perennis, 2014); Sarah Klitenic Wear and
John Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition: Despoiling the Hellenes (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2007), esp. 1-13.
10 Ruth Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles: Text, Translation, and Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 1989, hereafter:
TCO), 2, cf. 1-46, 138-221; Hans Lewy, Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy: Mysticism Magic and Platonism
in the Later Roman Empire (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 2011), 741; Anne Sheppard, “Proclus’
Attitude to Theurgy” (The Classical Quarterly 31:1, 1982), 212. For notes on the Chaldean Oracles, see
abbreviations, p.5, n5.
11 Alan Philip Darley, “Ritual as erotic anagogy in Pseudo-Dionysius: a Reformed critique” (International
Journal of Philosophy and Theology 79:3, 2018), 262; Lewy, Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy, 177-226,
276-278, 305, 487-489; Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles, 30-46, 199-200; Tanaseanu-Döbler, Theurgy in
Late Antiquity, 21-44, 56-95. From TCO, frag. 158, there are some disagreements among scholars. Some
hold that matter will be perfected and other that it will perish. See Lewy, Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy,
219; Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles, 199-200; Tanaseanu-Döbler, Theurgy in Late Antiquity, 39.
12 If possible, I avoid using the term ‘magic’ in this thesis. As a first-order term, it is rejected by the central actors
in both Pagan and Christian theurgy, as a second-order term it is notoriously hard to define and practically
useless, and it is usually (at least in modern parlance) meant to mean something evil, bad or irrational, i.e.
as a description of what ‘the others’ are doing. See Addey, Divination and Theurgy, 32-38, 171-213; Kevin
Corrigan and L. Michael Harrington, “Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite,” 4.2, in The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, Summer 2019 Edition (ed., Edward N. Zalta); Wouter. J. Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the
Academy: Rejected Knowledge and Western Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 164-
177.
13 Charles M. Stang, “Dionysius, Paul and the Significance of the Pseudonym” (Modern Theology 24:4, 2008),
544.
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tion,14 we see a shift. Though Iamblichus affirms that the ultimate end is to be freed from the
body in anagogical ascent, anagogy happens, paradoxically, by a further kenotic descent into
matter, which is not evil. Challenging Plotinus’s emphasis on inner contemplation as a means
to achieve unity (Gk. hénōsis) with the One, his rejection of matter as evil or bad, and his idea
that the soul is not fully descended, Iamblichus upholds (alongside Proclus) the importance of
ritual practice, holding that created reality, including materiality, becomes absolutely central
for human ascent and that rather than compelling the divine to do our bidding, we “step into the
stream of divine work and are thereby deified.”15 In this tradition, contact with the divine, and
recollection, is always given through physical creation and through the body (which is not evil),
though it should also be noted that Iamblichus still regards the body as less noble than the soul
and holds that the the ultimate goal, for those who are able, is to transcend matter. Iamblichean
Neoplatonists see theurgy first and foremost as a ritual and embodied enactment or participation
in a work that is already divine (which was also adopted by Christians, though in a transformed
manner), and not as a ‘manipulation’ of divine forces, in contrast to some earlier tendencies
14 Afonasin, Dillon, and Finamore, eds., Iamblichus and the Foundations of Late Platonism; Chiaradonna and
Lecerf, “Iamblichus”; María Jesús Hermoso Félix, “Philosophy and Theurgy in the Thought of Iamblichus,”
in Greek Philosophy and Mystery Cults, eds., María José Martin-Velasco and María José Garcia Blanco
(Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), 171-186; Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul. For
Iamblichus’s main works, see De Anima, Greek and English, trans. and comm. John F. Finamore and John
M. Dillon (Leiden: Brill, 2002) andDe mysteriis, Greek and English, intro. and trans. Emma C. Clarke, John
M. Dillon, and Jackson P. Hershbell (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003, hereafter: DM). DM
is the most central work.
15 Stang, “Dionysius, Paul and the Significance of the Pseudonym,” 544, cf. Addey, Divination and Theurgy,
79-80, 98-102, 252-255; R. M. van den Berg, “Plotinus’ Attitude to Traditional Cult: A Note on Porphyry
VP c. 10” (Ancient Philosophy 19, 1999), 345-360 (esp. 358-359); Radek Chlup, Proclus: An Introduction
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 47-136, 163-184; Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson, “Plotinus’
doctrine of badness as matter in Ennead I.8 [51],” in Platonism and Christian Thought in Late Antiquity, eds.,
Panagiotis G. Pavlos et al. (London: Routledge, 2019), 78-99; Wayne J. Hankey, God In Himself: Aquinas’
Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae (Reprinted ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004), 48-49; John Milbank and Aaron Riches, “Neoplatonic Theurgy and Christian Incarnation,” (foreword
to Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul), xiv-xvi; Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, xxviii, 26, 34-35, 104, 108-109, 126,
154, 173-182, 232-233, 267. Addey, Divination and Theurgy, 173-180, 199-211 notes that the Plotinian
doctrine is not ‘anti-ritualistic.’ While Plotinus holds that the soul is not fully descended, he still values ritual
as an inner concept. Arguments to the contrary, Addey argues, are based on a modern dichotomy between
thought and action. This, of course, reveals some central similarities but also central divergences, from a
Christian view. The Christian hope is not to be freed from the body but for it to be resurrected. But this hope
is not a hope for mere reconstruction but for a perfected material existence, a perfecting which also includes
the soul (cf. 1 Corinthians 15).
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to emphasises that we can ‘compel’ the divine.16 As Peter Struck puts it, commenting on the
Iamblichean notion of theurgy: “Theurgy is a divine act, a θεῖον ἔργον, insofar as it is action,
established by gods, put into use by humans, whose effect is to bring the material world (in-
cluding that part of the celebrant which is material) into harmony with the divine order.”17 A
central feature of this worldview, which we also find later in Aquinas, is the distinction between
monos, prodos, and epistrophe, “the plenitudinous source, the coming forth, and the return (or
‘revision’).”18 The monos is the source or the One, while prodos and epistrophe represents the
participatory emanation from the One and the return to Him.19 In the Iamblichean tradition,
theurgy is this return, happening through ritual and the use of certain symbols, which “the Pa-
ternal Intellect has sown … throughout the cosmos,” to quote the Chaldean Oracles.20 This
tradition was highly influential on Christianity, particularly on Pseudo-Dionysius.21 Before I
go on to explain why I propose a Christian theurgic framework, however, I need to address an
important question: is theurgy not Pagan?
Exploring the reasons why people hold that theurgy, as understood in the Iamblichean tra-
dition, is necessarily Pagan, we see that they tend to fall into one of three categories: (1) A
Christian rejection of theurgy and theurgic language as a whole, often from an Augustinian
16 See the introduction, xxvi (part 3), to DM (cf. pp.xiii-lii); Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles, 199-200; Stang,
“Dionysius, Paul and the Significance of the Pseudonym,” 544.
17 Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 30.
18 Davison, Participation in God, 64.
19 Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 2nd ed., reprint, ed., trans., intro., and comm. E.R. Dodds (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1971), props. 25-39, cf. 1-13, 23-24. In Aquinas, this is expressed through the binary pair
of exitus, emanating or coming forth from God (God as the beginning of a thing), and reditus, turning or
returning to God (God as the end or telos of a thing), though he understands the two as participating in God
(the monos) as their source. See Brendan Thomas Sammon, “Redeeming Chenu? A Reconsideration of the
Neoplatonic Influence on Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae” (The Heythrop Journal, 20 June 2017), 1-17. Also
see chapter one, pp.28-29, 33.
20 TCO, frag. 108, cf. DM V, 18, 24; VI, 6. Also see Addey, Divination and Theurgy, 79-80, 283-290; Už-
davinys, Philosophy and Theurgy, 204-228.
21 Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity; Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies”; Wear and Dillon, Dionysius
the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition. Pseudo-Dionysius’s works are The Divine Names (De Di-
vinis Nominibus, hereafter: DN), The Celestial (or heavenly) Hierarchy (De coelesti hierarchia, hereafter:
CH), The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy (De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, hereafter: EH), The Mystical Theology
(De Mystica Theologia, hereafter: MT), and The Letters/Epistles (Epistulae, hereafter: Ep.). For notes on
the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus, see abbreviations, p.4, n2.
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perspective, presupposing that there can be no Christian foundation for theurgy;22 (2) a Pagan
re-interpretation of the Pseudo-Dionysian tradition, arguing that Christian theurgy, especially
in this tradition, is covertly non-Christian;23 and (3) a Christian re-interpretation of Pseudo-
Dionysius, arguing that while he uses Neoplatonic and theurgic language, his use differs sig-
nificantly enough from the Iamblichean and Procleans traditions that it boils down to a mere
borrowing of terminology.24 I take issue with all three. While theurgy is, in some sense, Pa-
gan, as it has its background in Greek philosophy, the same can be said of many other con-
cepts that have informed Christian theology throughout history: the use of Logos in Jewish and
Christian thought,25 the Nicene use of homooúsion tō Patrí (“of one Being with the Father”),26
Aquinas’s use of Aristotle, Proclus, or Islamic and Jewish philosophers,27 and the Christian
22 Augustine states that theurgy “promises a fraudulent purification of souls by the invocation of demons,” in
City of God, trans. David S. Wiesen et al., in Loeb Classical Library, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, vols. 411-417
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957-1972), X, c.10. Also see Augustine, Confessions, trans.
Carolyn J. B. Hammond, in Loeb Classical Library, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, vols. 26-27 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2014, 2016), X, c.42 (67); James K. A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy:
Mapping a Post-secular Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), 112, n85; James K. A. Smith,
Speech and Theology: Language and the logic of incarnation (London: Routledge, 2002), 170-176, cf.
Addey, Divination and Theurgy, 4, 18, 21, 47-48, 85-88, 106, 152-157, 180-183 (cf. 83-126).
23 In his introduction to Proclus, The Elements of Theology, xii, xxvi-xxxiii, Eric R. Dodds argues that Pseudo-
Dionysius was an unknown crypto-Pagan Proclean Neoplatonist, while Tuomo Lankila, “The Corpus Are-
opagiticum as a Crypto-Pagan Project” (Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 5, 2011), 14-40 and
Carlo Maria Mazzucchi, “Damascio, autore del Corpus Dionysiacum, e il dialogo Περὶ πολιτικῆς ἐπιστήμης”
(Aevum 80, 2006), 299-334 take this further, arguing that he was actually Damascius, the last head of the Neo-
platonist School in Athens. Lankila, for example, argues that we should ignore Pseudo-Dionysius’s ‘overt
claim of Christianity,’ seeing the corpus as a crypto-Pagan project, where the author was looking forward
to a moment when the polytheistic religion could be resurrected. While Lankila claims that his argument
is not about what counts as ‘genuine Christianity,’ or whether or not Christianity could be Neoplatonist, it
is hard to see what other reasons one would have of putting forward the thesis in the first place, especially
considering the author’s ‘overt claim of Christianity.’ For arguments against this, see Gioacchino Curiello,
“Pseudo-Dionysius and Damascius: An Impossible Identification” (Dionysius 31, 2013), 101-116.
24 Andrew Louth, “Pagan Theurgy and Christian Sacramentalism” (The Journal of Theological Studies, new
series, 27:2, 1986), 432-438; Pseudo-Dionysius: TheCompleteWorks, trans. ColmLuibheid, in collaboration
with Paul Rorem (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987), 52, n11; Paul E. Rorem, “Iamblichus and the Anagogical
Method in Pseudo-Dionysian Liturgical Theology,” in Studia Patristica, vol. XVIII (part one), ed., Elizabeth
A. Livingstone (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), 456.
25 George R. Beasley-Murray, John (Dallas, TX: Word Books, 1999), 6-10; Erich S. Gruen, Constructs of
Identity in Hellenistic Judaism: Essays on Early Jewish Literature and History (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2016),
esp. 21-75, 113-131.
26 The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, eds. Robert Kolb and Timothy
J. Wengert (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2000), 22 (cf. 19-20, 22-23); J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds,
3rd ed. (London: Continuum, 2006).
27 Rahim Acar, Talking about God and Talking about Creation: Avicenna’s and Thomas Aquinas’ Positions
(Leiden: Brill, 2005); Edward Booth, “Thomas Aquinas: The ‘Aufhebung’ of Radical Aristotelian Ontology
into a Pseudodionysian-Proclean Ontology of ‘Esse’,” in Edward Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in
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re-interpretation of the Greek notion of leitourgía.28 We do not claim that liturgy is Pagan, so
why is theurgy necessarily so? Furthermore, Pseudo-Dionysius is so reliant on Iamblichean and
Proclean thought that we cannot divorce his use of theurgy from its Neoplatonism sources. The
Pagan and Christian theurgic traditions understands theurgy to mean basically the same thing.29
There is, however, a central difference: Jesus Christ.
For Pagans, theurgy can in theory be performed by anyone, though it is understood in elitist
terms. The Chaldean Oracles distinguish between ‘the theurgists’ (Gk. hoi theourgoí), who
are privy to a certain hidden knowledge, and ‘the herd’ (Gk. hē agélē) or ‘the mass of men’
(Gk. tò plēthos tȭn anthrṓpōn), who are ‘subject to Destiny’ and who are not privy to this
knowledge.30 For Christians, however, when we worship or pray, we do so through Christ, in
the Holy Spirit, as a participation in His self-offering, as we read in Hebrews 9:13-14: “For if
the blood of goats and bulls, with the sprinkling of the ashes of a heifer, sanctifies those who
have been defiled so that their flesh is purified, how much more will the blood of Christ, who
Islamic and Christian Thinkers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 205-267; David B. Burrell,
Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1986); Idit Dobbs-Weinstein, Maimonides and St. Thomas On the Limits of Reason (Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press, 1995); Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering, eds., Aristotle in Aquinas’s
Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Wayne J. Hankey, “Aquinas, Pseudo-Denys, Proclus and
Isaiah VI. 6” (Archives D’histoire Doctrinale Et Littéraire Du Moyen Âge 64, 1997), 59-93.
28 Matthew R. Christ, “Liturgy Avoidance and Antidosis in Classical Athens” (Transactions of the American
Philological Association 120, 1990), 147-169, cf. Romans 15:16; Philippians 2:17; Hebrews 8:2; 8:6; 9:21,
and others.
29 Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 143-152 notes that to ask whether or not Pseudo-Dionysius is a Chris-
tian or a Neoplatonist introduces a false dichotomy. Also see Dylan Burns, “Proclus and the Theurgic Liturgy
of Pseudo-Dionysius” (Dionysius 22, 2004), 111-132; Corrigan and Harrington, “Pseudo-Dionysius the Are-
opagite,” 4.2; Rebecca Coughlin, “Spiritual Motion and the Incarnation in the Divine Names of Dionysius
The Areopagite,” in Proclus and his Legacy, eds., David D. Butorac and Danielle A. Layne (Berlin/Boston,
MS: de Gruyter, 2017), 161-173; Alexander Golitzin, Et Introibo ad Altare Dei: The Mystagogy of Diony-
sius Areopagita, with Special Reference to its Predecessors in the Eastern Christian Tradition (Thessalonica:
Patriarchikon Idryma Paterikon Meleton, 1994); Alexander Golitzin, “Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary
on the Texts and an Introduction to Their Influence by Paul Rorem” (Mystics Quarterly 21:1, 1995), 28-38;
Ernesto Sergio Mainoldi, “The Transfiguration of Proclus’ Legacy: Pseudo-Dionysius and the Late Neopla-
tonic School of Athens,” in Proclus and his Legacy, eds., Butorac and Layne, 199-217; Henri-Dominique
Saffrey, “New Objective Links Between the Pseudo-Dionysius and Proclus,” in Neoplatonism and Christian
Thought, ed., Dominic J. O’Meara (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1982), 64-74, 246-248;
Stang, “Dionysius, Paul and the Significance of the Pseudonym,” 554, n15; Sarah Klitenic Wear, “Pseudo-
Dionysius and Proclus on Parmenides 137d: On Parts andWholes,” in Proclus and his Legacy, eds., Butorac
and Layne, 219-231; Wear and Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition, 101.
30 TCO, frag. 153-154, 194, cf. DM V, 18; Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles, 20, 198, 212, cf. my discussion
in chapter three, pp.115-117.
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through the eternal Spirit offered himself without blemish to God, purify our conscience from
dead works to worship the living God!”31 For Pseudo-Dionysius, theurgy is defined principally
as the works of God and particularly the divine-human (or ‘theandric’) works of Christ. He is
seen as “exercising for us a certain new God-incarnate energy (Gk. theandrikḗn enérgeian) of
God having become man.”32 To use Struck’s words, He is the ‘master theurgist.’33 And accord-
ing to Pseudo-Dionysius, we become theourgikoì, co-workers with God or initiates in His work
through baptism, because we participate in Christ.34 Through Christ, and only through Him, we
can celebrate, participate in, and re-enact the divine works in liturgy, prayers, service, and the
sacramental life of the Church.35 And precisely because Christian theurgy is rooted in one per-
son, to whom many relate, it is communal, not individualistic or elitist. It is accessible for any-
one, regardless of age, capability, or anything else. AsMark A.McIntosh puts it, “a Neoplatonic
itinerary has been re-contextualized in the sacramental life of the community.”36 What happens
in the Christian theurgic tradition is not the uncritical adoption of theurgic Neoplatonism as a
replacement of Christian theology but its Christian consummation and re-interpretation.37 As I
will argue particularly later, without the Incarnation, with regards to union with the divine, all
acts that we perform will remain extrinsic and imposed, even if divinely sanctioned.38 These
31 Cf. Romans 8; Galatians 2:19-20; 4:6; Hebrews 7; 8:1-6; 9:6-14; 1 Peter 2:5. Unless otherwise noted,
quotations from Scripture in this thesis follow The Holy Bible: The New Revised Standard Edition, Catholic
Edition, Anglicized (Nashville, TN: Catholic Bible Press, 1995).
32 Ep. IV (1072C), cf. Panagiotis G. Pavlos, “Theurgy in Dionysius the Areopagite,” in Platonism and Chris-
tian Thought in Late Antiquity, eds., Pavlos et al., 157; Stang, “Dionysius, Paul and the Significance of the
Pseudonym,” 545; Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 31-33, 37-38.
33 Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 31-33, 37-38.
34 EH, I, 1 (372B), cf. III, 15 (445BC).
35 1 Corinthians 5:7-8; 10:16-17; 11:23-26; Galatians 2:19-20; Hebrews 7; 8:1-6; 9:6-14; 1 Peter 2:5.
36 Mark A. McIntosh, Mystical Theology: The Integrity of Spirituality and Theology (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1998), 45, cf. 44-56.
37 See Curiello, “Pseudo-Dionysius and Damascius”; Darley, “Ritual as erotic anagogy”; Wayne J. Hankey,
“Denys and Later Platonic Traditions,” in The Oxford Handbook of Catholic Theology, eds., Lewis Ayres
and Medi Ann Volpe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 496-510; Louth, “Pagan Theurgy and Chris-
tian Sacramentalism”; Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 186-198, 213-215, 241-246; Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 129-170; Gre-
gory Shaw, “Neoplatonic Theurgy and Dionysius the Areopagite” (Journal of Early Christian Studies 7:4,
1999), 573-599; Wear and Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition, esp. 11-13,
85-115.
38 Chapter four, pp.140-146, cf. Colossians 1:15-20; 2:6-15.
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acts, and our union with God, become real and intrinsic in Christ precisely because the In-
carnation makes possible true union with the divine “without confusion, change, division, or
separation.”39 While theurgy gives us a philosophical framework through which we can under-
stand human participation in, and ritual celebration of, divine work, Christian theology explains
why we need the incarnation to make sure that this participation is a real union between God
and humanity (and, through humanity, with creation as a whole). Without the hypostatic union,
which is not an extrinsic union but a true metaphysical union-in-distinction, rooted in one per-
son or suppositum, the Incarnate Logos, who is both true God and true man, any union will
remain voluntary and contractual, rather than metaphysical. In Christ, then, we find both the
divine work and its human re-enactment, in perfect harmony. And through union with Christ,
as the one common focus of the divine-human relation, to which we can relate or in which we
can participate, we have true union with the divine and may offer true worship. Theurgy is first
and foremost our reception, by grace, of the divine gift, God’s actions for us, particularly in
Christ, which allows us, also by grace, to offer ourselves and the world back to God, in wor-
ship and service, but always with grace as the priority. As Yves Congar notes, commenting on
the relation between the sacramental life of the Church and the self-worship of God, which is
mediated down to us as a gift, and which is always prior to our (upwards) response: “Before
being latreutic,40 and in order to be latreutic, the Christian sacramental cult is theurgic and so-
teriological: it does not consist at first in offering, in making something rise up from us to God,
but in receiving the effective gift of God.”41 When we understand our relation to God in line
with Neoplatonic metaphysics, distinguishing between the divine source, the emanation from
39 The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, trans., introd. and notes, Richard Price and Michael Gaddis (3 vols.,
Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2005, 2007), II, 204, cf. Michael J. Gorman, Aquinas on the Meta-
physics of the Hypostatic Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 73-125.
40 I.e. a service or an act of praise rendered unto God.
41 Yves Congar, “Le sacerdoce du Nouveau Testament: mission et culte,” in Les Prêtres, eds., Jean Frisque and
Yves Congar (Paris: Cerf, 1968), 254, quoted (and translated) in Guy Mansini and Lawrence J. Welch, “The
Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests, Presbyterorum Ordinis,” in Vatican II, eds., Lamb and Levering,
222, n19, 224, n45, cf. 208, 212.
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Him, and the return to Him (monos, prodos, and epistrophe),42 we see that everything is rooted
in the creative act of God. It comes from Him as a gift and because of this gift, we may return to
Him in Christ, by grace. This thesis explores the liturgical manifestations of this return. How,
then, do I define theurgy, in this Christian sense? Looking back to Sacrosanctum Concilium’s
definition of liturgy and Peter Struck’s definition of theurgy,43 I offer this rephrase: Theurgy is
an act of the triune God for us, put into use by Christ as the God-man, and the Church as His
body, whose effect is to reconcile the world to God and make humans capable of worship and
service through participation in Him.
Before going on, however, I must note that while this thesis focuses specifically on the
Christological foundations of Christian theurgy, more research is needed on its pneumatolog-
ical dimensions. One area in particular seems to be a fitting candidate for further study: the
Epiclesis.44 This is central to the Eastern liturgical tradition but has increased in importance
in the West. It emphasises the fact that the Spirit is the one through whom Christ acts in the
Eucharist, which reveals some avenues for future research.45 Where Pagan theurgists called
God down into statues,46 the Church calls down the Holy Spirit on bread and wine, on Christ’s
own promise, so that they “may be to us the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ.”47
42 Davison, Participation in God, 64.
43 SC, 7; Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 30.
44 For some research on the Epiclesis and Pneumatology, see Yves Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit (3
vols. London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1983) III, 228-274; David J. Kennedy, Eucharistic Sacramentality in an
Ecumenical Context: The Anglican Epiclesis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008); Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic
Theology (3 vols. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991, 1994, 1998) III, 282-324 (cf. 1-27); Robert F. Taft,
“Problems in Anaphoral Theology: “Words of Consecration” versus “Consecratory Epiclesis”” (St Vladimir’s
Theological Quarterly 57:1, 2013), 37-65.
45 Jason B. Parnell, The Theurgic Turn in Christian Thought: Iamblichus, Origen, Augustine and the Eucharist
(PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 2009), 27-28, n30 draws some similarities between the Epiclesis
and Platonic and Greek magic formulae but does not mention it further.
46 DM, I, 9; Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles, 26-27; Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, 100, n4, 152, 188-190;
Tanaseanu-Döbler, Theurgy in Late Antiquity, 41-42.
47 CommonWorship: Services and Prayers for the Church of England (London: Church House, 2000, hereafter:
CW ), 189, cf. Gudsteneste med rettleiingar (Stavanger: Eide, 2020, hereafter: GDNK 2020), 175, 186;
Missale Romanum, Editio Typica Tertia (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2008), 100-101, 109, 118;
The Roman Missal, third typical edition (Washington, D.C.: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops,
2011), 100-101, 109, 118. If not otherwise noted, citations from Missale Romanum and Roman Missal use
paragraph numbers (which are identical in the two), not page numbers.
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If we understand liturgical theology in theurgic terms, where theurgy is understood not as a
mechanical ‘coercion’ of the divine but as a participation in and imitation of the divine act, in
creation and through Christ as the true theurgist, the ‘master theurgist,’ we can make sense of
active participation. Theurgy provides a theological and philosophical basis for our participa-
tion in the liturgy as a divine work, without either ‘collapsing’ into God or divorcing our works
from their divine source,48 and it helps us understand liturgy and ritual, not only culturally or
sociologically, butmetaphysically. It explains how liturgy is both a gift received and something
we may offer back, though the offering back is always also a divine work in us, a participation
in God’s self-worship. To put this in terms of grammar, while you could read theourgía as an
objective genitive (‘a work addressed to the divine’), the Iamblichean and Pseudo-Dionysian
traditions explicitly sees it as a subjective genitive (‘a work of the divine’).49 From this, I at-
tempt to reconcile dogmatic, metaphysical, and ritualistic approaches to liturgy. While there
have been some studies on the dogmatic nature of liturgy and Christian practices, especially in
connection to youth ministry,50 studies on liturgical reforms have tended to focus on the histor-
ical background of the liturgies, their ‘external side,’ and particularly the practical involvement
of the congregation(s),51 While historical and practical studies of liturgy are crucial, proper
48 Davison, Participation in God, 42-83, 217-238.
49 Stang, “Dionysius, Paul and the Significance of the Pseudonym,” 554, n15; Struck, “Pagan and Christian
Theurgies,” 26-30; Wear and Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition, 101. On the
difference between subjective and objective genitives, see HerbertWeir Smyth,Greek Grammar, rev. Gordon
M. Messing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), #1330–1331.
50 Bård Norheim, Practicing Baptism: A Theological Investigation of the Presence of Christ in Christian Prac-
tices in the Context of Youth Ministry (PhD dissertation, MF Norwegian School of Theology, Oslo, 2011).
51 Chupungco, “Implementation,” 283-288, 292-294; Chupungco, “The Vision of the Constitution on the
Liturgy,” 265-274; GDNK 2020, 290-293, 300-321; Geir Hellemo, “Liturgisk teologi for Den norske kirke,”
inGudstjeneste på ny, ed., Geir Hellemo (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2014), 13-31; Elisabeth Tveito Johnsen,
“Gudstjenestelæring gjennom deltagelse,” in Gudstjeneste på ny, ed., Hellemo, 151-179; Elisabeth Tveito
Johnsen, ed.,Gudstjenester med konfirmanter: En praktisk-teologisk dybdestudie med teoretisk bredde (Oslo:
IKO-forlaget, 2017); Martin Modéus, Menneskelig gudstjeneste: Om gudstjenesten som relation og ritual,
trans. and comm. Anita Hansen Engdahl (København: Alfa, 2011), esp. 25-70, 128-245, 274-287; Hallvard
Olavson Mosdøl, “Strategier for involvering i gudstjenesten: En casestudie av to menigheter,” in Gudstjen-
este á la carte: Liturgireformen i Den norske kirke, eds., Anne Haugland Balsnes, et al. (Oslo: Verbum
akademisk, 2015), 155-172; Hallvard Olavson Mosdøl and Anne Haugland Balsnes, “Mer enn ord – om gud-
stjenestereformen og sanselighet,” in Gudstjeneste á la carte, eds., Balsnes, et al., 210-229; Gunnfrid Ljones
Øierud, “Inkluderende gudstjenestekommunikasjon,” in Gudstjeneste på ny, ed., Hellemo, 180-194; Marit
Rong, Det liturgiske møte: Språk og gudsmetaforer i Den norske kirkes høymesse (PhD dissertation, Univer-
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systematic and metaphysical understandings of participation are needed.
2 Argument
As noted, the main question of this project concerns the nature of liturgical participation. When
we speak of active participation in the liturgy, what do we mean by it? Is the concept primarily
practical-functional or metaphysical? This thesis proposes that, in order to make sense of this
participation, we ought to understand it as a Christian theurgy, as a participation in the divine
work, rooted in God’s descent in the Incarnation and connected specifically to concrete rituals
that we re-enact, non-identically. In order to argue for this vision, this thesis particularly engages
the contributions of Thomas Aquinas, Joseph Ratzinger, and Catherine Pickstock.
Aquinas, in his decisive synthesis of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy in the explication
of sacra doctrina, proposes the metaphysics of participation as the central aspect of the doctrine
of creation and, consequently, the liturgical and sacramental life of the church.52 While he
does not define his approach as theurgic, and only uses the term once, in principally negative
terms,53 he was indebted to both Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysius, and to their metaphysics.54 I
have chosen to use Aquinas not because he is explicitly theurgic in his approach, though I will
argue that his approach can be interpreted in that way, but that I can, through him, establish the
sity of Bergen, 2009), 51; Kari Veiteberg, “Gudstenesta som ei hending med handlingar,” in Gudstjeneste på
ny, ed., Hellemo, 73-88; Finn Wagle, “Etterord: …liv fra kilder utenfor oss selv,” in Gudstjeneste á la carte,
eds., Balsnes, et al., 283-293 (esp. 287-292), cf. Andrew Davison and Alison Milbank, For the Parish: A
Critique of Fresh Expressions (London: SCM Press, 2010); Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 173-191.
52 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (hereafter: ST) I, qq.2–6; q.13; qq.44–45; I-II, qq.6–21, 49-70; III,
qq.60–83; De pot., q.3, a.7, cf. Booth, “Thomas Aquinas”; Alan Philip Darley, “Predication or Participation?
What is the Nature of Aquinas’ Doctrine of Analogy?” (The Heythrop Journal 57, 2016), 312-324; Hankey,
God In Himself ; Matthew Levering, “Aquinas on the Liturgy of the Eucharist,” in Aquinas on Doctrine:
A Critical Introduction, eds., Thomas Weinandy, Daniel Keating, and John Yocum (London: T&T Clark,
2004), 183-197; te Velde, Participation and Substantiality; Liam G. Walsh, “Sacraments,” in The Theology
of Thomas Aquinas, eds., Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press, 2005), 326-364; John P. Yocum, “Sacraments in Aquinas,” in Aquinas on Doctrine, eds.,
Weinandy, Keating, and Yocum, 159-181.
53 ST II-II, q.96, a.1.
54 Booth, “Thomas Aquinas”; Hankey, “Aquinas, Pseudo-Denys, Proclus and Isaiah VI. 6”; Sammon, “Re-
deeming Chenu?”
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central aspects of a participatory metaphysics, and its liturgical and sacramental implications,
which will in turn lay the groundwork for a proper understanding of theurgy.
Ratzinger, who represents the tradition of ressourcement, specifically addresses the nature
of active participation in the liturgy, maintaining that it must be understood principally as a
participation in the divine act in Christ.55 I have chosen to work with him specifically because
he understands his theology within a Platonic framework, consummated in Christ,56 and be-
cause he sees liturgy as a participation in the divine work, as this reveals that his approach is
theurgic, even if he does not explicitly say so himself. He notes that after Vatican II, ‘active
participation’ was “very quickly misunderstood to mean something external, entailing a need
for general activity, as if as many people as possible, as often as possible, should be visibly en-
gaged in action,” while he emphasises that the “real “action” in the liturgy in which we are all
supposed to participate is the action of God himself” and that what is “new and distinctive about
the Christian liturgy” is that “God himself acts and does what is essential. He inaugurates the
new creation, makes himself accessible to us, so that, through the things of the earth, through
our gifts, we can communicate with him in a personal way.”57
Themetaphysics of participation, Christian Platonism, and a liturgical approach to theology,
have been central to the work of Catherine Pickstock and radical orthodoxy (RO). She notes
55 Joseph Ratzinger, The Feast Of Faith: Approaches to a Theology of the Liturgy, trans. Graham Harrison
(San Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 1986); Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy; Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy,
cf. Lewis Ayres, Patricia Kelly, and Thomas Humphries, “Benedict XVI: A Ressourcement Theologian?,”
in Ressourcement: A Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology, eds., Gabriel Flynn
and Paul D. Murray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 423-439; Thomas G. Dalzell, “Eucharist,
Communion, and Orthopraxis in the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger” (Irish Theological Quarterly 78:2, 2013),
103-122; Emery de Gaál, The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI: The Christocentric Shift (New York, NY:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 239-301; Scott W. Hahn, Covenant and Communion: The Biblical Theology of
Pope Benedict XVI (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Brazos Press, 2009), 41-62, 137-185; Kjetil Kringlebotten,
«Do this in remembrance of me…» The Sacrificial Aspect of the Eucharist in the Systematic Theology of
Wolfhart Pannenberg and Joseph Ratzinger (Master’s thesis, NLAUniversity College, Bergen, 2013), 37-63;
Roland Millare, “The Sacred Is Still Beautiful: The Liturgical and Theological Aesthetics of Pope Benedict
XVI” (Logos 16:1, 2013), 101-125; Aidan Nichols, The Thought of Pope Benedict XVI: An Introduction to
the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger, new ed. (London: Burns & Oates, 2007), 147-159; Tracey Rowland,
Ratzinger’s Faith: The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 123-143.
56 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 140-141.
57 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 185, 187, cf. 185-191.
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that “the Eucharistic liturgy, which represents the event of Christ as the advent of truth, is the
theurgic performance and realisation of this double vision: the bringing about and recognition
of the divine truth of all things.”58 I have chosen to engage her work precisely because she sees
liturgy first and foremost as our participation in the divine work, particularly that of Christ, and
because she understands this as a form of theurgy.
These three all have a particular emphasis on liturgy and our participation in God, for being
and existence and consequently for action and worship, and it is from this perspective we will
discuss how the particular, extraordinary, and extrinsic nature of the liturgy ought to be under-
stood. Both ressourcement and RO are indebted to Aquinas, and to the Thomistic tradition,
while RO is also indebted to ressourcement.59
Engaging Aquinas, Ratzinger, and Pickstock, I argue that a theurgic and participatory view
of liturgy (and of Christian life as a whole), where everything is rooted in the divine act, provides
a way to understand better a genuine Christian perspective on liturgy, on the sacraments and
gifts of God, and our return of this in praise and thanksgiving, understood as a participation
in (or repetition or imitation of) the work of God. I emphasise that through Christ and in the
Holy Spirit, humans are incorporated into the very life of God, so that we, by his grace, can
participate, in a distinct way, in His act. This may help us understand that liturgy as such is
connected to concrete and recognisable rituals which are not primarily a human invention but
are gifts given by God in which we may participate. But they are, nonetheless, enacted and
repeated non-identically, in different rites and traditions, and they reveal something to us about
58 Catherine Pickstock, Aspects of Truth: A New Religious Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2020), 280-281, cf. Milbank, Pickstock, and Ward, eds., Radical Orthodoxy; Catherine Pickstock,
“Ritual. An introduction” (International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 79:3, 2018), 217-221; Cather-
ine Pickstock, “The Ritual Birth of Sense” (Telos 162, 2013), 29-55; Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy,
30-122.
59 Stephen M. Fields, “Ressourcement and the Retrieval of Thomism for the Contemporary World,” in
Ressourcement, eds., Flynn and Murray, 355-371; Simon Oliver, “Henri de Lubac and Radical Orthodoxy,”
in T&T Clark Companion to Henri de Lubac, ed., Jordan Hillebert (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017),
393-418.
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reality as such and of God’s working in it. While any human work may become liturgical or an
act of worship, it can do so only because of a rootedness in a sacramental worship, and because
it participates in the divine work.
3 Outline
This thesis will have six chapters, followed by a general conclusion.
In chapter one, I particularly engage Thomas Aquinas. First, I examine his notion of par-
ticipation by discussing his basic metaphysics, emphasising the nature of being, existence, and
essence, and his use of analogical language, arguing that this establishes God as the centre of
existence and our dependence on Him. Secondly, I investigate Aquinas’s conception of partic-
ipation and human action, arguing that we cannot act unless we participate in God as the first
cause and that any supernatural acts are furthermore only granted through divine grace. This,
however, does not mean that secondary causality is unreal or unsubstantial. Thirdly, I turn to
Aquinas’s views on the nature of worship and the sacraments, arguing that this is only possible
because we participate in God through Christ, and that this finds its highest liturgical expression
in the Eucharist. This helps us in our contemporary discussion of liturgical participation. While
Aquinas himself does not define his theology as explicitly theurgic, his theology, and especially
his metaphysics, is highly indebted to both Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysius.60 The engagement
with Aquinas will serve as a springboard to my engagement with Ratzinger and Pickstock, as
they both make use of Aquinas, as do their respective traditions (ressourcement and radical or-
thodoxy), and because his views on participation are central to the Catholic metaphysical and
liturgical tradition.
In chapter two, engaging Joseph Ratzinger, I employ Aquinas’s participatory metaphysics in
60 ST II-II, q.96, a.1, cf. Booth, “Thomas Aquinas”; Hankey, “Aquinas, Pseudo-Denys, Proclus and Isaiah VI.
6.”
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a discussion of Ratzinger’s claim that ‘active participation’ must be understood principally as a
participation in the divine work and only secondarily as the active involvement in the liturgy.61
First, I scrutinise his largely Platonic understanding of participation, focusing on his notion
of beauty, arguing that it must be understood in Christian theurgic terms, something which is
also central for Pseudo-Dionysius.62 Secondly, I investigate his understanding of the Paschal
mystery and our participation in Christ and in His sacrifice, both of which I will argue must
be understood theurgically, because this is the centre not only of the life and ministry of Christ
but of Christian theology as a whole (1 Corinthians 2:1-2). Through participation in Christ’s
offering, we can offer our rational service (Romans 12:1). This is significant because it helps
us give liturgical participation a metaphysical and Christological grounding.
In chapter three, engaging Catherine Pickstock, I develop my argument further. While I
argued that Christ is the ground for our rational service in the previous chapter, with Pickstock
I will develop this in a more explicitly theurgic and philosophical direction, arguing that Chris-
tian theurgy is neither the opposite nor the destruction of philosophy or reason, but its ritual
consummation. First, discussing the philosophical dimension of our ritual participation in God,
I emphasise St. Paul’s treatment of order in the liturgy (1 Corinthians 14:26-40), arguing that
ritual is rational and a defining characteristic of humanity. Because, as we see from the previ-
ous chapters, the liturgy is a participation in God through the incarnate Logos, in the ground of
reason, our ritual acts are rational, as they are ordered to Him. Secondly, developing further my
defense of transubstantiation in chapter one, I root it in a metaphysics of participation and anal-
ogy, arguing that this is the centre of a Christian account of theurgy, as a mode of philosophy.
Exploring how our liturgical imitation and involvement (expressed through the Platonic notion
of mímēsis) is rooted in a deeper metaphysical participation (expressed through the Platonic
61 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 185-191.
62 DN, IV, 7 (704A).
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notion of méthexis), I argue that this points to creation’s telos, as union with God.
In chapter four, I argue that Christ is the ‘master theurgist’ in whomwe participate, develop-
ing further the discussions of the previous chapters. I argue this by first presenting a conception
of the metaphysics of Christology and the hypostatic union, informed by Aquinas’s Christology,
showing that in Christ we find the divine consummation of human activity, real metaphysical
union between God and creation. Secondly, I argue that this finds expression most particularly
in Christ’s high priestly acts, through which He gives Himself for us. And thirdly, developing
further the argument made in the previous chapter, that we are ordered to God, I argue that this
must be grounded Christologically, as a Christological and theurgic approach gives us a way to
explicate how we participate in Christ and are thereby enabled to offer our own worship. We
are ordered towards Christ, who is the common focus of the divine-human union because He is
simultaneously divine and human, “without confusion, change, division, or separation.”63
In chapter five, I explore the sacramental and liturgical implication of the Christological
argument of the previous chapter, that the hypostatic union makes Christian theurgy possible.
First, developing my discussion of analogical language from chapter one, I provide an account
of the metaphysics of worship, arguing that God is always mediated to us, and unites Himself
with us, through symbols and words and that this approach is best explained and defended if
we assume an analogical rather than univocal approach to being, where Christ becomes a kind
of ‘primordial sacrament.’ Secondly, I argue that while this may be expressed in many ways,
its fullest expression is in the celebration of the Eucharist and particularly in a proper doctrine
of transubstantiation, in critique of John Calvin’s Eucharistic doctrine, showing how such a
doctrine not only provides the most coherent way of holding together real presence, divine act,
and an analogical understanding of reality, but that it also preserves the place of nature, as
nature, in a concrete cultural context.
63 The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, II, 204.
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In chapter six, I apply the previous arguments on the latest reform of the Church of Nor-
way, partly in relation to reforms in the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church,
by scrutinising its methodological tools – the ordo, as a principle of unity, and three so-called
core values flexibility, involvement, and localised contextuality (No., fleksibilitet, involvering,
and stadeigengjering/stedegengjøring).64 First, I will investigate how the reform understands
the ordo, arguing that it is reduced to a formal unity which presupposes a horizontal and imma-
nentist understanding of order and emphasises human autonomy and creativity in such a way
that the revealed or given nature of the liturgy is deemphasised. Secondly, I examine the em-
phasis on flexibility and involvement, arguing that the reform envision liturgical participation in
an activistic sense, rather than as participation in God. Against this, I will argue that liturgical
participation is only possible through participation in divine agency. And thirdly, analysing the
emphasis on localised contextuality, I argue that the reform tends to a congregationalist under-
standing of communion, which deemphasises the catholic or universal nature of the Church,
and that this is also partly where some of these attempts at reform ‘failed,’ leading to a less
‘congregationalist’ liturgy. I will explore to what extent my theurgic approach to liturgical the-
ology finds expression in the reform and liturgies and how it may be used as a critical voice,
making a contribution not only to the scholarly field but also to those working with reforms in
the various churches.
Though this project does not involve any empirical research of celebrated liturgies,65 and
64 See Balsnes, et al., ed., Gudstjeneste á la carte; Hellemo, ed., Gudstjeneste på ny. By ‘Roman Catholic’ I
mean all those who are in communion with the Roman Pontiff, including Eastern rite Catholics. There is a
precedence for this use in two of the encyclicals of pope Pius XII; Mystici Corporis Christi, where he states
that “[the] true Church of Jesus Christ” is “the One, Holy, Catholic, Apostolic and Roman Church” (§13),
and Humani generis, where he states that “the Mystical Body of Christ and the Roman Catholic Church are
one and the same thing” (§27, my emphasis in both). The encyclicals are found in Enchiridion symbolorum,
3800-3822, 3875-3899, eds. H. Denzinger and P. Hünermann (Denzinger-Hünermann), Latin-English, 43rd
ed. (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press 2012). They are directed at all those in communion with the pope.
My intention is, then, not to use this as a ‘slur’ but to point out that the term ‘Catholic’ is not exclusive to
Rome.
65 For some empirical research, see Johnsen, ed.,Gudstjenester med konfirmanter; Robert Lilleaasen,Old Paths
and New Ways: A Case Study of the Negotiation between Tradition and the Quest for Relevance in Two
Worship Practices (PhD dissertation, MF Norwegian School of Theology, Oslo, 2016); Thomas Quartier,
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therefore remain somewhat idealised, it may help us shape better liturgies in the future, it may
inform the liturgical practice of our churches, and it may give people a better understanding of
why we celebrate liturgy in the first place. Through a theurgic reading of theology and liturgy,
grounded in a theology of Incarnation, we may get a better understanding of what liturgical
participation entails. In order to obtain a deeper understanding of the liturgical act we also
need a deeper understanding of its actor (and actors), and how to relate everything to God, who
creates us and sustains us.
“Liturgy Participant’s Perspective: Exploring the Attitudes of Participants at Roman Catholic Funerals with
Empirical Methods” (Liturgy 21:3, 2006), 21-29; Jorunn Raddum, Variety is the Spice of Life? Forandring
fryder? The Church of Norway 2011 liturgical reform: A study of the concept of contextuality in Nord-
Gudbrandsdal (Master’s Thesis, MF Norwegian School of Theology, Oslo, 2015); Fraser Watts, “Experi-
encing Liturgy” (Liturgy 21:3, 2006), 3-9; Cas Wepener, “The object and aim of multi-disciplinary liturgical
research” (Scriptura 93, 2006), 384-397.
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CHAPTER ONE
Participation, emanation, and return
1 Introduction
For Thomas Aquinas, the object of theology as a science, a system of knowledge, is always God,
as “all things [in theology] are treated of under the aspect of God: either because they are God
Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end.”1 In his theological system,
this finds a particular expression through his distinction between exitus, emanating or coming
forth from God (God as the beginning of a thing), and reditus, turning or returning to God (God
as the end or telos of a thing). Some have suggested that this exitus-reditus scheme represents
the structural element of the Summa.2 While that may be overplayed as a structural device,
especially if understood in an overly strict and precise manner,3 it does reveal how for Aquinas,
all created things are treated, theologically, in relation to God, and it also brings attention to the
Neoplatonic nature of his thought. The notion of emanation and return is a central aspect of
Neoplatonism, though expressed in a triadic (rather than binary) manner, asmonos, prodos, and
epistrophe, “the plenitudinous source, the coming forth, and the return (or ‘revision’).”4 The
1 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (hereafter: ST) I, q.1, a.7, corp., cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra
Gentiles (hereafter: SCG) I, c.70:8, 94:3; LiamG.Walsh, “Sacraments,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas,
eds., Rik VanNieuwenhove and JosephWawrykow (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005),
326. For notes on the Thomistic corpus, see abbreviations, p.4, n1. For a summary of Aquinas’s approach to
the nature, and the task, of theology, see Bruce D. Marshall, “Quod Scit Una Uetula: Aquinas on the Nature
of Theology,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, eds., Van Nieuwenhove and Wawrykow, 1-35.
2 Marie Dominique Chenu, “The Plan of St. Thomas’s Summa Theologiae” (CrossCurrents 2:2, 1952), 67-79;
Wayne J. Hankey, Aquinas’s Neoplatonism in the Summa Theologiae om God: A Short Introduction (South
Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2019), 16, 75-77, 88-92. Unless otherwise noted, whenever I say ‘the
Summa,’ I am referring to ST, not SCG.
3 See Andrew Davison, Participation in God: A Study in Christian Doctrine and Metaphysics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2019), 64; Brendan Thomas Sammon, “Redeeming Chenu? A Reconsideration
of the Neoplatonic Influence on Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae” (The Heythrop Journal, 20 June 2017), 1-17;
Rudi A. te Velde, Aquinas on God: The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa Theologiae (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2006), 10-31, esp. 10-18.
4 Davison, Participation in God, 64, cf. Sammon, “Redeeming Chenu?,” 1, cf. 5-8.
28
former is central because without it, the latter two are impossible. They participate in it.5 While
Aquinas emphasises prodos and epistrophe, expressed as exitus and reditus, Brendan Thomas
Sammon argues that he still retains this triadic structure.6 This is important because it represents
both a participatory and a theurgic framework. Aquinas treats God as the plenitudinous source;
creation, as it emanates from God, is preserved in Him and returns to Him.
While Aquinas is Neoplatonic, he is also Aristotelian. He is a synthetic thinker, emphasising
both participation and substantiality, though giving priority to the participatory framework.7
His metaphysics is central to his overall philosophical project, dealing with “the most universal
principles,” i.e. “being (Lt. ens) and those things which naturally accompany being, such as
unity and plurality, potency and act.”8 ‘Being’ is here understood as ‘being in general’ (Lt. ens
commune or esse commune).9 Although philosophy (which includes both philosophy proper and
what is now called ‘the sciences’ in Anglo-American parlance), is ‘the handmaiden of theology,’
it has its own independence and integrity, a ‘quasi-autonomy,’ distinct from revealed faith, and
5 Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 2nd ed., reprint, ed., trans., intro., and comm. E.R. Dodds (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1971), props. 25-39, cf. 1-13, 23-24.
6 See Sammon, “Redeeming Chenu?,” 3-5, 7-15, esp. 9-14, cf. Davison, Participation in God, 64; Thomas
Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth (Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, hereafter: De ver.), q.20, a.4.
7 Rudi A. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill, 1995), esp. x-xiv, 3-
83, cf. Bernard Blankenhorn, The Mystery of Union with God: Dionysian Mysticism in Albert the Great
and Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2015); Edward Booth,
“Thomas Aquinas: The ‘Aufhebung’ of Radical Aristotelian Ontology into a Pseudodionysian-Proclean On-
tology of ‘Esse’,” in Edward Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in Islamic and Christian Thinkers (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 205-267; Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering, eds., Aristotle in
Aquinas’s Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Hankey, Aquinas’s Neoplatonism; Wayne J.
Hankey, “Aquinas, Pseudo-Denys, Proclus and Isaiah VI. 6” (Archives D’histoire Doctrinale Et Littéraire Du
Moyen Âge 64, 1997), 59-93; AndrewHofer, “Dionysian Elements in Thomas Aquinas’s Christology: ACase
of the Authority and Ambiguity of Pseudo-Dionysius” (The Thomist 72:3, 2008), 409-442; Fran O’Rourke,
Pseudo-Dionysius and the metaphysics of Aquinas (New ed. Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
2005), esp. 5-50; Adrian Pabst, Metaphysics: The Creation of Hierarchy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
2012), 5-53, 445-455; Rudi A. te Velde, “Participation: Aquinas and His Neoplatonic Sources,” in Chris-
tian Platonism: A History, eds., Alexander J. B. Hampton and John Peter Kenney (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2021), 122-139.
8 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Metaphysics (hereafter: In Metaph.) prol., book 4, lesson 1.
9 Jan A. Aertsen, Nature and Creature: Thomas Aquinas’s Way of Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1988), esp. 54-91;
Davison, Participation in God, 143; Simon Oliver, Creation: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Blooms-
bury T&T Clark, 2017), 72; te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 188-194; te Velde, “Participation,”
130, n18; John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated
Being (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 44-62, 109-134, 591-592.
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it may even inform our understanding of the latter.10 Following Pseudo-Dionysius, Aquinas
notes that God reveals Himself through sensible and intelligible symbols that may be grasped
by the mind, through the senses.11 For Aquinas, nothing comes to the mind except through the
senses and divine speech is unintelligible for us without philosophical thought, and the latter
may also reveal God as creator, as we see in Romans 1:19-20a: “For what can be known about
God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the world
his eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they are, have been understood and seen
through the things he has made.” For Aquinas, in order to reach your human telos, you do not
need to (or rather, you cannot) ‘bypass’ or ‘break with’ your corporeal nature. Rational human
activity is not internalised but embodied intellection.12 This quasi-empirical method is partly
Aristotelian, partly Pseudo-Dionysian and Neoplatonic,13 maintaining that we can grasp divine
truths through philosophy, which comes first through the senses.
Aquinas emphasises participation, though understood as both derived and real and substan-
tial. As Andrew Davison notes, we can talk of a ‘derived solidity,’ where both Plato and Aristo-
tle may provide insight.14 According to Wayne J. Hankey, “Thomas unites Plato and Aristotle,
joining causation and participation in the very first article of the questions considering the pro-
cession of creatures.”15 In this, he follows Pseudo-Dionysius, to an extent. For the Areopagite,
10 ST I, q.1, a.5, esp. sed contra and ad 2, cf. Hankey, Aquinas’s Neoplatonism, 51-70. This also mirrors the
relationship between nature and grace. The latter does not destroy the former but perfects it (ST I, q.1, a.8,
ad 2).
11 De ver., q.10, a.12; ST I, qq.77-78; II-II, q.167, a.1, ad 3. Following Iamblichus, Aquinas sees a relation
between the natural and the supernatural (or the rational and supra-rational), where the former can inform
the latter. See Hankey, Aquinas’s Neoplatonism, 64-66, cf. Crystal Addey, Divination and Theurgy in Neo-
platonism: Oracles of the Gods (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 188, cf. 29-32, 41-42, 188-189, 273-275,
281-283, 286.
12 See Therese Marie Ignacio Bjørnaas, “Imago Dei og kroppsliggjort væren: En funksjonshemmingsteologi i
lys av Thomas Aquinas,” in Religiøst medborgerskap: Funksjonshemming, likeverd og menneskesyn, eds.,
Inger Marie Lid and Anna Rebecca Solevåg (Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk, 2020), 269-286, esp. 280-
281.
13 Davison, Participation in God, 141-146, 150-152; Hankey, Aquinas’s Neoplatonism, 13-21 (cf. 5-12); Han-
key, “Aquinas, Pseudo-Denys, Proclus and Isaiah VI. 6,” 59-60; Wayne J. Hankey, “Participatio divini lu-
minis: Aquinas’ doctrine of the Agent Intellect: Our Capacity for Contemplation” (Dionysius 22, 2004),
152-157.
14 Davison, Participation in God, 65-83.
15 Wayne J. Hankey, God In Himself: Aquinas’ Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae
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God is ‘beyond being’ or even ‘non-being.’16 As he notes in his first epistle, God is “highly
established above mind, and above essence, by the very fact of His being wholly unknown,
and not being, both is super-essentially, and is known above mind.”17 Aquinas agrees that this
is true, epistemologically speaking. As human beings and creatures of God, we cannot grasp
Him or understand Him like a created object. If being is understood as graspable, then God,
being incomprehensible, is beyond being.18 Pseudo-Dionysius can hold that God is, in some
sense, while maintaining that he is beyond being, while for Aquinas, ens commune or esse com-
mune is distinct from God as being itself, which is not ‘a’ being.19 Both Pseudo-Dionysius and
Aquinas, then, have an apophatic approach to God. Despite this agreement, however, there are
some differences of emphasis. Unlike Pseudo-Dionysius, who follows a classic Neoplatonic
emphasis on the Good (and sees God is ‘beyond being’ or ‘non-being’), Aquinas emphasises
that God is Being itself.20 Only He is in Himself, only He is the focus of reality. God is Be-
ing, while we have being (by participation). The being of creatures is not identical to God, as
Being itself, in a univocal sense, and they do not exist in themselves but only in relation to
(Reprinted ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 138. While Aquinas rejects the Platonic notion
that creation simply flows out of the divine automatically, emphasising God’s freedom in general and his
freedom in the act of creation (SCG I, c.81-83, 88), he still uses Platonic language, noting that creation is
“the emanation of things from the First Principle” (ST I, q.45, prol., cf. Sammon, “Redeeming Chenu?,”
8; te Velde, “Participation,” 134-138). It should be mentioned, though, that although Aquinas is in many
ways Aristotelian, this emphasis on participation represents a break with this tradition. Aristotle rejected this
understanding of participation, noting that to “say that the Forms are patterns, and that other things partici-
pate in them, is to use empty phrases and poetical metaphors.” SeeMetaphysics, trans. Hugh Tredennick, in
Loeb Classical Library, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, vol. 271 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933),
991a21-23, cf. 991a19-26. We see, interestingly, in Edward Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contempo-
rary Introduction (Heusenstamm: Editiones Scholasticae, 2014), 117-118, that Feser, a central populariser of
Thomistic and Aristotelian thought, downplays the importance of participation in Aquinas, though without
rejecting it, by similarly pointing out that Aquinas fuses Platonic and Aristotelian categories.
16 O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the metaphysics of Aquinas, 65-84, esp. 76-84.
17 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Letters (Epistulae, hereafter: Ep.), I (1065A). For notes on the Pseudo-Dionysian
corpus, see abbreviations, p.4, n2.
18 ST I, q.12, a.1, ad 3; q.13, a.5, cf. Hankey, Aquinas’s Neoplatonism, 16; Hankey, God in Himself, 44, n30,
86-87.
19 Laurence Paul Hemming, “Nihilism: Heidegger and the grounds of redemption,” in Radical Orthodoxy:
A new theology, eds., John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward (London: Routledge, 1999),
94-95, esp. n17.
20 Hankey, Aquinas’s Neoplatonism, 88-117; Hankey, God in Himself ; Oliver, Creation, 43-53; O’Rourke,
Pseudo-Dionysius and the metaphysics of Aquinas, 56-58, 85-113.
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God: “Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on account of agreement in form accord-
ing to the formality of the same genus or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch
as God is essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation.”21 Though I use
the language of ‘participation in God’ or ‘participation in the divine’ throughout this thesis, it
needs to be noted that this is a shorthand for participation in the likeness of God, participation
‘through similitude.’22 It does not mean that we participate in the divine essence. As Aquinas
notes,23 the divine essence is uncommunicated, incommunicable, and unparticipated, as God by
His very nature cannot be known or participated directly but only by similitude or analogously.
According toWisdom 14:21, cited by Aquinas, idolatrous people “bestowed on objects of stone
or wood the incommunicable name.”24 As noted by Davison, citing Gregory T. Doolan,25 this
is also found in Plato, who distinguishes between ‘participant’ or ‘recipient’ (Gk. metéchon)
and ‘what is participated in’ (Gk. metechómenon), while Iamblichus adds another level, distin-
guishing between ‘participant,’ ‘participated,’ and ‘unparticipated’ (Gk. améthekton), allowing
him to distinguish between the source and that which comes from it. The metéchon and the
metechómenon are knowable, while the améthekton is not.26 Furthermore, Pseudo-Dionysius,
following Iamblichus, distinguishes between ‘participant,’ ‘participation,’ and ‘principle of par-
ticipation,’ the latter of which can also be called the ‘unparticipated,’ ‘unparticipating,’ or ‘un-
shared’ (améthekton).27 We, therefore, must participate in God by analogy or similitude.28
In this chapter, I argue that when we speak of ‘active participation,’ such involvement (or
21 ST I, q.4, a.3, ad 3, cf. Aertsen, Nature and Creature, 79-89 (cf. 54-91).
22 Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures (Quaestiones Disputatae de spiritualibus crea-
turis, hereafter: De spir. creat.), a.1, corp., cf. ST I, q.104, a.1. Also see te Velde, Participation and
Substantiality, 92-93, n2; te Velde, “Participation,” 130, n18, 134-135, n26, 136-138.
23 ST I, q.13, a.9, cf. II-II, q.94, a.4; q.97, a.4 ad 3.
24 After A New English Translation of the Septuagint, eds. Albert Pietersma and Benjamin Wright (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007), 709, cf. ST I, q.13, a.9, sed contra.
25 Davison, Participation in God, 155-164; Gregory T. Doolan, “Aquinas on esse subsistens and the ThirdMode
of Participation” (The Thomist 82:4, 2018), 611-642.
26 Cf. Proclus, Elements, props. 1-13, 23-24.
27 See Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names (De Divinis Nominibus, hereafter: DN), XI, 6 and XII, 4 (956AB
and 972B); Ep., IX, 2 (1065A).
28 See below, pp.40-44.
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involvement in any act whatsoever) is only intelligible when understood within such a partic-
ipatory account of being, as a participation in God’s act. Without a fundamental grounding in
a metaphysics of participation, we cannot properly understand liturgical participation. What
emerges is a theurgic perspective, as we find it in Pseudo-Dinonysius and other Neoplatonic
thinkers. Matthew D. Walz notes that we can align “Thomas’s thinking with numerous Neo-
platonists who regarded their philosophical endeavors to be essentially religious in character,
inasmuch as their contemplation of reality was meant to be dispositive toward theurgical ac-
tion.”29 While it is true that Aquinas, as far as I know, does not treat theurgy as such and
only uses the term ‘theurgy’ (or ‘theurgic’) once, in principally negative terms, as superstition
or ‘magic,’30 he was also highly indebted to Proclus, though read through (or together with)
Aristotle and Pseudo-Dionysius.31 Central to this we find, as noted above, the idea that we
come from God and can return to Him (exitus-reditus or monos-prodos-epistrophe). This is
important because it is central to both Aquinas’s cosmology and the philosophical framework
of theurgic Neoplatonism.32 The central point of theurgy is not the ritual reenactment itself but
the divine act it participates in, which on the Thomistic account of divine simplicity cannot be
distinguished from God in Himself,33 and the union facilitated by participation in this act. As
Peter Struck puts it: “Theurgy is a divine act, a θεῖον ἔργον, insofar as it is action, established by
gods, put into use by humans, whose effect is to bring the material world (including that part of
the celebrant which is material) into harmony with the divine order.”34 The argument is not that
Aquinas uses the term ‘theurgy’ to describe his own approach to theology but that if we under-
29 Matthew D. Walz, “Foreword,” in Hankey, Aquinas’s Neoplatonism, xi, cf. ix-xxii.
30 ST II-II, q.96, a.1. On why I avoid using the term ‘magic,’ see introduction, p.11, n12.
31 The latter, whose emphasis is on a theurgic reading of the sacraments, is cited 1,700 times in the Summa. See
Kevin F. Doherty, “St. Thomas and the Pseudo-Dionysian Symbol of Light” (The New Scholasticism 34:2,
1960), 170-189.
32 Proclus, Elements, props. 1-13, 23-39; Sammon, “Redeeming Chenu?,” cf. Booth, “Thomas Aquinas.”
33 ST I, q.3.
34 Peter T. Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies: Iamblichus, Pseudo-Dionysius, Religion and Magic in Late
Antiquity” (Ancient World 32:2, 2001), 30, cf. 31-33, 37-38; Charles M. Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity
in Dionysius the Areopagite: “No Longer I” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 81-152, esp. 106-110.
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stand theurgy as a participation in the divine act, rather than a coercive ‘manipulation’ of God,35
it fits Aquinas’s understanding of our metaphysical participation in God and its manifestation
in worship and human work. God’s act, His theurgy, particularly the act of Christ, is gifted to
us and we are made partakers of it.36 For Aquinas, however, this harmonisation, this return to
God, is only possible through Christ. As Hankey points out, Christ is “uniting the two,” divinity
and humanity, “and thus perfecting the human movement into its source.”37 Exploring how we
might read Aquinas in a theurgic manner, this chapter will be divided in three sections.
First, I will examine Aquinas’s doctrine of participation by discussing his basic metaphysics,
particularly the nature of being, existence, and essence, and his use of analogical language about
God. I will argue that this explains both the contingency of creation and the need for something
whose essence is its existence. This is important because how we understand both the rela-
tion between essence and existence and language about God, informs how we understand our
relation to God, as the giver of life. A thorough understanding of analogy and participation
is essential for a proper doctrine of the divine-human union and, consequently, for our under-
standing of theurgy as a participation of human beings, on behalf of creation as a whole, in the
divine act, in God.
Secondly, I will discuss participation and human action, focusing on the relation between
primary (divine) and secondary (creaturely) causality and the nature of grace. I will argue that
while secondary causality only exists as it participates in primary causality, it is still real and
substantial, and that while grace operates like other (accidental) perfections, it differs from them
by orientating humans beyond nature, though without destroying it. This is important because
35 Addey, Divination and Theurgy, 32-38, 171-213; Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 81-152 (esp. 106-
110); Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” esp. 31-33, 37-38.
36 Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Power of God (Quaestiones Disputatae de potentia Dei, here-
after: De pot.), q.3, a.7; ST III, qq.60-90.
37 Hankey, Aquinas’s Neoplatonism, 90. In chapter four, pp.140-146, I argue that in order for this union to be
real, and not merely something imposed and extrinsic, it must be grounded in the Incarnation.
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it provides a metaphysical framework to understand human participation in the divine act (or in
God in Himself) and how our acts can simultaneously be real and derived at the same time.
Thirdly, having discussed the participatory nature of human action in general, I will shift
the focus to worship and the sacraments. I will first present an argument for the centrality of the
sacraments in general, arguing that our return to God, which is central to theurgic Neoplatonism,
comes through Christ and is offered to us in the sacraments and the liturgy of the Church. I will
then argue that the centre of this is found in the Eucharist and particularly the real presence
of Christ. Discussing the doctrine of transubstantiation, I will argue that this doctrine holds
together the spiritual reality of God with nature and culture without downplaying either. In this
section we see particularly how Aquinas’s sacramental theology is theurgic in nature.
Together, these three sections help us to understand how Aquinas may be understood in
theurgic terms and how we might apply his contribution to our contemporary discussion(s)
of ‘active participation.’ This chapter will not deal as explicitly with theurgy as later chapters.
Rather, this chapter attempt to establish the central aspects of a participatorymetaphysics, and its
liturgical and sacramental implications, as this lays the groundwork for a proper understanding
of theurgy, as theurgical participation is an aspect of the doctrine of creation.
2 The metaphysics of participation
2.1 Being, essence, and existence
In Aquinas’s conception of metaphysics, we find three central terms: ‘being,’ ‘existence,’ and
‘essence’ (Lt. ens, esse, and essentia).38 These terms are first and foremost related grammatical
constructs. Ens (‘being’) is the present participle of esse (‘to be’), while essentia is constructed
from esse as a translation of the Greek noun ousía, which is itself constructed from ōn (‘being’),
38 See Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence (De ente et essentia, hereafter: De ente), c.1, cf. In Metaph.,
prol., book 4, lesson 1. For a fairly popularised presentation, see Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics, 177-291.
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the present participle of eimí (‘to be’). Essentia signifies “that through which something has
being as a particular kind of thing,”39 while ens, which is that which possesses existence (esse),
implies a concrete manifestation of what it is ‘to be,’ like ‘cooking’ or ‘writing’ are concrete
manifestations of what it is ‘to cook’ and ‘to write.’40 The concrete actus essendi (‘act of being’
or ‘act of existence’) gives existence to an essence, distinguishing the individual from other
individuals, making it real. For Aquinas, this is “the actuality of all acts, and therefore the
perfection of all perfections.”41 ‘Being’ (ens) indicates something actual, existing “inasmuch as
it participates in an act of being [Lt. actum essendi].”42 For Aquinas, then, ens is a concrete and
composite being, containing a subsistence or subject (who it is), essence (what it is), and act or
existence (that it is), where subsistence and act are related by means of the essence, determining
them and acting as an ‘intermediate.’43 The central point, however, lies in the fact that for
Aquinas, ‘actual being’ (esse in actu) is “the proper effect of the first agent, namely God.”44
Or, as he notes in the the Summa: “Now among all effects the most universal is being itself: and
hence it must be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, and that is God.”45 At
the heart of this participatory account of created being, we find the distinction between esse and
essentia. We can grasp a thing’s being without knowing anything about its concrete existence.
We grasp horses as concrete beings but we can also imagine phoenixes, mermaids, dragons, or
nifflers. When esse and essentia are not distinguished, we have a being who is actus purus,
‘pure act,’ and whose essence is his existence. Anything else is metaphysically composite.46
39 De ente, c.1, 4.
40 SCG I, c.22:9.
41 De pot., q.7, a.2, ad 9.
42 Thomas Aquinas, An Exposition of the On the Hebdomads of Boethius (Expositio libri Boetii De ebdo-
madibus, hereafter: In De Hebd.), c.2, 50, cf. De ente, c.1; De pot., q.7, a.2, ad 9; De ver., q.1, a.1; SCG I,
c.22:9, III, c.6:4; ST I, q.5, a.1, ad 1; q.45, a.5. Also see te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 76-83,
200-201; Wippel,Metaphysical Thought, 33, 34, 99-100, 123.
43 te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 201-202, cf. 201-206. On the subject (Lt. suppositum), see ST I,
q.29, a.2, corp., cf. Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics, 267-284.
44 SCG III, c.66:4.
45 ST I, q.45, a.5, corp.
46 De ente, c.4-5; ST I, q.4, a.2; q.3, a.2-8; q.9, a.1; q.54, a.1, corp.; q.54, a.3, ad 2, cf. Feser, Scholastic
Metaphysics, 34-45; Hankey, God in Himself, 54-55.
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How the distinction between essence and existence is to be understood, however, is a matter of
controversy, as we can see by turning to a paragraph in De spiritualibus creaturis:
[E]very thing which exists after the first being, because it is not its own existence, has an existence
that is received in something, through which the existence is itself contracted [Lt. per quod ip-
sum esse contrahitur]; and thus in any created object the nature of the thing which participates in
existence is one thing, and the participated existence itself is another.47
This passage is important here because how we understand the relation between essence and
existence informs how we understand our relation to God, as the giver of life, as we can see
from a discussion between John F. Wippel and te Velde. Wippel provides an alternative trans-
lation of the text, stating that “[e]verything which comes after the first being [ens], since it is
not its esse, has an esse which is received in something by which the esse itself is limited.”48
He maintains that Aquinas, starting with the essence-existence distinction, is saying that the
esse “is received by a distinct principle which limits that esse,” i.e. “its nature or essence,” and
notes, with surprise, that te Velde disagrees with this notion of limitation.49 Te Velde uses a
translation similar to the one cited, but he reads it in light of two other key texts, focusing on
a crucial preposition.50 Where the text from De spiritualibus creaturis states that existence is
“received in something, through which the existence is itself contracted” (Lt. per quod ipsum
esse contrahitur), the other texts state, respectively, that since a subsisting ‘created form’ “has
being, and yet is not its own being, it follows that its being is received and contracted to a de-
terminate nature” (Lt. ipsum eius esse sit receptum et contractum ad determinatam naturam),51
and that “the being of every creature is restricted to one in genus and species” (Lt. esse autem
cuiuslibet creaturae est determinatum ad unum secundum genus et speciem).52 Te Velde notes
47 De spir. creat., a.1, corp.
48 Wippel,Metaphysical Thought, 118, emphasis added.
49 Wippel,Metaphysical Thought, 118, esp. n63.
50 te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 151-154.
51 ST I, q.7, a.2.
52 ST I, q.54, a.2.
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the significance of this change of preposition:
The use of ‘ad’ emphasizes that a nature is not so much a pre-existing subject which is already
determined in itself, but that the specific nature is the determinateness being acquires in that in
which it is received. Being is contracted to the being of a horse; ‘horse’ stands for a nature which
has being in a determinate manner. In creatures being is always found contracted or adapted to the
being of a horse or a stone, i.e. to a specific nature.53
The claim is that we cannot simply reverse the argument for God – that “in God being subsists
by itself and is not received in something else” and that “His being is not limited by some
determinate nature so that one could say that He is this and not that” – because while being
“may not be a self-limiting act,” it “cannot be limited by something else that is presupposed
in its otherness.”54 So while Aquinas does use the preposition per (‘by’ or ‘through’) in the
text from De spiritualibus creaturis,55 this should be read in a strictly formal way, as there “can
be no question of a quasi-subject which in a certain sense already “is” before it has received
esse.”56 If we say that essence limits being, as Wippel does, we are absurdly presupposing
the distinction between essence and existence before it exists, saying that essence preexists
its own existence: “God, as the first being, is determined in identity with its being,” while a
creature “must be determined in its being in difference from being itself (as being this or being
that).”57 I follow te Velde’s argument, partly because Aquinas uses the preposition ad in the
Summa, partly because ‘contracted’ and ‘limited’ do not necessarily mean the same thing, but
primarily because it avoids presupposing the distinction we try to explain, while postulating the
contradictory notion of an essence that exists without having existence.58 If essence ‘limits’
existence (the way, say, a vase limits water), it seems that we would have to propose something
already existent, outside the economy of divine donation, limiting being, precisely because the
53 te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 152.
54 te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 152.
55 De spir. creat., a.1, corp.
56 te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 154, cf. 150-154.
57 te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 154.
58 See te Velde, Aquinas on God, 145, n47.
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distinction between essence and existence is what characterises created things. We furthermore
cannot coherently speak of something existing before it receives existence, and we must always
understand that the power of essence to contract being is itself a gift of God: “God at the same
time gives being and produces that which receives being, so that it does not follow that his
action requires something already in existence.”59 Nothing exists outside the economy of divine
donation and it is hard to see how Wippel’s position avoids contradicting creatio ex nihilo.
Creation is ‘radically unilateral,’ but in a paradoxical way. God creates both the recipient and his
or her response. We are given both being and our ability to give thanks in one ‘influx of being,’60
which, as John Milbank notes, must be understood as divine donation (creation as creation as ‘a
gift of a gift to a gift’), andwhich gives rise to the paradoxical notion of the ‘unilateral exchange’
(or perhaps a ‘unilateral reciprocity’) which only makes sense if we postulate that God works in
us, including in our response.61 Our response is itself a gift, and therefore this has wide ranging
consequences of how we understand liturgy. To participate, in the sense Aquinas uses it here,
is to receive something according to a particular nature (which contracts it).62 This entails a
more organic notion of participation, central to Aquinas’s notion of creation. For Aquinas, a
created thing participates in God, yet also has, through this participation, an intrinsic value that
goes beyond mere ‘functionality.’63 Human participation in the divine is not purely extrinsic
but involves a certain assimilation into (or similitude with) God, understood analogically. To
59 De pot., q.3, a.1, ad 17, cf. ST I, q.45; q.75, a.5, ad 4. Also see Davison, Participation in God, 65-83,
143-146, 165-169.
60 Thomas Aquinas, On Separate Substances (De substantiis separatis, hereafter: De subst. sep.), c.9-10.
61 John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate concerning the Supernatural (2nd
ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014), 96, 108, cf. De pot., q.3, a.7; Oliver, Creation, 143-157; te Velde,
“Participation,” 137.
62 As Davison, Participation in God, 141-146, 150-152 notes, these gifts are received according to the mode of
the receiver. This also lies close to the Neoplatonic doctrine, ‘borrowed’ by Aquinas from Liber de causis,
that things known are known according to the mode of the knower. See Hankey, Aquinas’s Neoplatonism, 13
(cf. 13-21); te Velde, “Participation,” 131-134. While Aquinas has a ‘design argument,’ the fifth way (ST I,
q.2, a.3, corp., cf. De pot., q.3, a.7), grounded in teleology and connected to form and final cause, he does
not envision such design in (modern) mechanistic terms. See Edward Feser, Five Proofs of the Existence of
God (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2017), 254, 287-288.
63 ST I, q.2, a.3; I, q.5, cf. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, x-xiii.
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explore this, we now turn to the question of language and analogy.
2.2 Participation, language, and analogy
Discussing how we speak about God, Aquinas notes that when we do, we use certain words
obviously metaphorically (e.g. “God is a rock”) and some literally (e.g. “God is good”). The
latter, which we may call ‘perfection terms,’ tell us something positive about God:
As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God, and more properly than
they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily toHim. But as regards their mode of signification,
they do not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of signification applies to creatures.64
While the names or words themselves do not apply to God in “their mode of signification,” they
do apply to that which is signified.65 Aquinas goes on to explain this further, noting that we
do not attribute words to God and creatures purely univocally or equivocally but analogously.
They are predicated primarily of God, only secondarily of creatures.66 This is not an analogy of
proportion,67 but an analogy of attribution, where things are attributed analogously to a common
focus (e.g. health).68 In Aristotle, Aquinas discovered the relation of the many towards the one
(Gk. pròs hèn). And while Aristotle does not use ‘analogy’ for this, Aquinas does.69 Different
things can relate to another thing as their common focus and that they share attributes because
of (and exclusively through) this relation. Medicine, exercise, food, etc. are ‘healthy’ but not
64 ST I, q.13, a.3, cf. q.1, a.9, ad 3.
65 Cf. ST I, q.39, a.4, a.5; De ver., q.23, a.3, corp. Also see Alan Philip Darley, “Predication or Participation?
What is the Nature of Aquinas’ Doctrine of Analogy?” (The Heythrop Journal 57, 2016), 312-324; Brian
Davies, Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014), 63-67.
66 ST I, q.13, a.5, a.6, cf. a.2. Also see Davies, Summa Theologiae, 64-67; te Velde, Participation and Sub-
stantiality, 95-102, 110-111; te Velde, Aquinas on God, 97, 109-118; Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 73-93,
543-572.
67 I.e. a measure between two things: as A is to B so X is to Y (e.g. as a good father is to his children so the
good King is to his subjects).
68 ST I, q.13, a.6. Aquinas uses analogy of attribution (over analogy of proportion) in the Summa, but ex-
plains why in The Principles of Nature (De principiis naturae, hereafter: De princ. nat.), c.6. See te Velde,
Participation and Substantiality, 97, n13.
69 Darley, “Predication or Participation?,” 315, cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham, in Loeb
Classical Library, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, vol. 73 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926), 1096b,
14-29; ST I, q.13, prol.; SCG I, c.34.
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in themselves. They are so in relation to a person who is healthy in himself. This use of analogy
shows us that things only share (or are attributed) their attributeswithin given relations. Peanuts
may be healthy in relation to me but unhealthy in relation to someone with an allergy. They do
not participate in ‘health’ outside their relation to concrete persons. And Aquinas, joining this
Aristotelian notion of attribution with a Platonic notion of participation, notes that this is how
we speak of God and our relation to him. Words like ‘good’ or ‘wise’ are predicated primarily
of God, only secondarily of us, through participation. God is good and wise in Himself ; I
am only good or wise to the extent that I relate to God. This is not just true for attributes
such as goodness or wisdom, but also for existence. God, being metaphysically simple, non-
composed, and utterly perfect, exists in Himself, as ‘subsistent being itself.’ There is only one
focus of reality (God) and everything else exists by participation in Him.70 We see this also
in one of Aquinas’s earlier works, his commentary on Boethius’s De Hebdomadibus, where
he provides a kind of ‘etymological explanation’ of participation: “For ‘to participate’ is, as
it were, ‘to grasp a part’ [of something]” (Lt. partem capere).71 While partem capere might
seem to imply pantheism, Aquinas rejects that position and continues to say that we can speak
of participation “when something receives in a particular way that which belongs to another in
a universal way.”72 Participation is not mechanistic. It concerns the reception, in a particular
manner, of something universal, something that is greater than the thing which ‘takes part’ or,
rather, is ‘assimilated’ into it by participating ‘through similitude.’73 According to Aquinas, we
participate in a likeness of God, then, analogously.
This analogous view of reality has been dubbed the ‘analogy of being’ (analogia entis),
though this is not a ‘generic theism’ but rooted in the Trinitarian God and connected to rev-
70 De ente, c.4; ST I, q.3; q.4, a.2; a.3, ad 3; q.44, a.1.
71 In De Hebd., c.2, 70, cf. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 11; te Velde, “Participation,” 126-128;
Wippel,Metaphysical Thought, 96.
72 In De Hebd., c.2, 70, cf. Davison, Participation in God, 135-146, 164-169.
73 De spir. creat., a.1, corp., cf. above, pp.31, 40-44.
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elation and to Christ as our mediator.74 Created beings only exist ‘by analogy’ (attribution).
This, however, is not uncontroversial. Some, led by John Duns Scotus, propose a univocity of
being, where ‘being’ must be understood epistemologically as a semantic concept, not a strictly
ontological one, distinct from concepts such as infinite and finite, this thing or that thing.75 This
holds that being is predicated univocally of both God and created entities (though infinitely and
finitely, respectively), as it is the principal transcendental and because we can know the exis-
tence of God to some extent by this principal transcendental. To explain his position, Scotus
invokes the ‘formal distinction.’76 There, ‘being,’ understood univocally, is a semantic and
conceptual tool formally distinct from the real being of God and creatures. This, however,
proposes that language can be separated from metaphysics, that there are metaphysically inde-
pendent, ‘purely semantic,’ concepts. As several thinkers have noted, however, language is the
‘grammar of being.’77 If there are ‘purely semantic’ concepts, how can these express truth? This
argument is not necessarily against Scotus himself but those who take his argument to its logi-
cal conclusion, holding to an actual univocity of being, resulting in a deeply problematic view
of God and a ‘flattening out’ of reality.78 Regardless of Scotus’s intentions, the consequence
74 Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2009), 121-135 (esp. 131-135); Darley, “Predication or Participation?”; Davison, Participation
in God, 143, 173-193, 201-216, esp. 205-210; Johannes Hoff, The Analogical Turn: Rethinking Modernity
with Nicholas of Cusa (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2013); Oliver, Creation, 64-75; Erich Przywara, Analo-
gia Entis: Metaphysics: Original Structure and Universal Rhythm, trans. John R. Betz and David Bentley
Hart (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014); te Velde, Aquinas on God, 97, 109-118.
75 Richard Cross, “Duns Scotus, Univocity, and “Participatory Metaphysics”,” in Syndicate, 4-25 December
2017; Daniel P. Horan, Postmodernity and Univocity: A Critical Account of Radical Orthodoxy and John
Duns Scotus (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2014), 157-188 (esp. 169-184); Duns Scotus, “Concerning
Metaphysics,” in John Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings, Latin and English, trans., Allan Wolter (Indi-
anapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 1-12; Thomas Williams, “John Duns Scotus,” 2:3, in
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2016 Edition (ed., Edward N. Zalta). Also see Joshua
Kendall Mobley, Symbolism: A Brief Systematic Theology of the Symbol (PhD dissertation, Durham Univer-
sity, 2020), 77-96.
76 Horan, Postmodernity and Univocity, 176-184, cf. Mobley, Symbolism, 59, n6. Scotus’s argument for uni-
vocity is primarily epistemological, not ontological (Duns Scotus, “Man’s Natural Knowledge of God,” in
Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings, 13-33).
77 Seth Benardete, “The Grammar of Being” (The Review of Metaphysics 30:3, 1977), 486-496; Luis Andrés
Bredlow, “Parmenides and the Grammar of Being” (Classical Philology 106:4, 2011), 283-298; Graham
Priest, “Heidegger and the grammar of being,” in Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy, ed.,
Richard Gaskin (London: Routledge, 2001), 238-251.
78 Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell,
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of this univocal conception has been to place God and creation on the same ontological plane,
something we see, perhaps accidentally, at the end of Daniel P. Horan’s book, discussing radical
orthodoxy and Scotus. He admits that Scotus rejects Aquinas’s insistence on “participation in or
suspension from the divine essence (i.e., esse as proper only to God)” and that the implications
of Scotus’s views “have less to do with existence as such and more to do with relationality.”79
For Aquinas, however, creaturely existence is relational, understood analogously.80 In his more
sympathetic take on Horan’s book, Justus H. Hunter finds these concessions troubling because it
“is just the sort of thing [the proponents of radical orthodoxy] have argued follows from Scotus
all along.”81 They argue that, regardless of Scotus’s intentions, an affirmation of univocity en-
tails, logically and actually, the existence of something (‘being’) which is independent of God
(and consequently above Him). His position entails a purely functional or ‘semantic’ under-
standing of language, bereft of any metaphysical function. It becomes either arbitrary, purely
cultural, or phenomenological,82 and thus it loses its cosmic connection to the divine Logos in
which it participates. By contrast, in following Aquinas’s participatory metaphysics, we will
see that creation exists to praise God. Liturgy is a rational or reasonable ordering of this, which
includes the way we speak and communicate. As a work of the Church, it is not just a cultural
and immanentist phenomenon; it is cosmological, rooted ontologically in God.83 We need an
understanding of language which moves past ‘pure’ culture, semantics, or phenomenology (as
if these exist). The point, again, is not what any one person holds but what is implied by uni-
vocity: that God is both too transcendent, becoming unreachable and infinitely far away, as a
1998), 69, 82, 127, 137, 162, cf. Gavin Hyman, A Short History of Atheism (London: I.B.Tauris, 2010),
67-80.
79 Horan, Postmodernity and Univocity, 186, 187, cf. 185-188. Also see Cross, “Duns Scotus, Univocity, and
“Participatory Metaphysics”.”
80 ST I, q.13, a.3; q.44, a.1.
81 Justus H. Hunter, “Hunter Commentary on Postmodernity andUnivocity,” in Syndicate, 4-25December 2017.
82 Louis-Marie Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian Existence (trans.
Patrick Madigan and Madeleine Beaumont. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1995), 88-99, 200-204.
83 See chapter three, pp.106-118, cf. Psalm 19; Psalm 66:4; Isaiah 55:12; Romans 12:1; 1 Corinthians 14:26-40;
De pot., q.3, a.7; ST I, q.1, a.8, ad 2; I-II, q.55, a.4; q.112, a.1; II-II, q.81.
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distant object, and not transcendent enough, as He is, logically and essentially, on ‘our’ onto-
logical plane.84 If we want to deny that God and creatures really (not just semantically) share a
‘thing’ called ‘being,’ in favour of an affirmation of the real transcendence of God, which seems
to be what Scotus intended, it is not clear how one can do so without affirming something like
the analogia entis. Words have meanings, implications, and consequences, and Aquinas holds
fast to the analogous nature of reality, understood by means of participation, precisely because
it allows him to make sense of how we are related to God, how we can be addressed by God,
and how we can address God, without at the same time ‘collapsing’ creation into God.85 It is
within this analogical framework that we need to understand participation, a participation which
cannot be reduced to existence but is equally true for all creaturely action (Acts 17:28).
3 Participation and human action
3.1 Primary and secondary causality
For Aquinas, creatures are given their natural powers from God, and through Him, these crea-
tures are preserved in being and applied to operation. Therefore, we can say that God “causes
the action of every natural thing.”86 The starting point of this is the question of form, and the
idea that “nothing in nature is void of purpose”:
Now unless natural things had an action of their own the forms and forces with which they are
endowed would be to no purpose; thus if a knife does not cut, its sharpness is useless. It would also
be useless to set fire to the coal, if God ignites the coal without fire.87
Aquinas furthermore notes that the second cause cannot “by its own power have any influence
on the effect of the first cause,” as an instrument is only “in a manner the cause of the prin-
84 Hyman, A Short History of Atheism, 71.
85 Davison, Participation in God, 13-197, esp. 65-83; 171-197.
86 De pot., q.3, a.7, corp. 7, cf. Davison, Participation in God, 217-238; SCG III, c.67; ST I, q.105, a.5; I-II,
q.10, a.4; te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 165, cf. 164-183.
87 De pot., q.3, a.7, corp. 2.
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cipal cause’s effect”: “thus the axe is the cause of the craftsman’s handiwork not by its own
form or power, but by the power of the craftsman who moves it so that it participates in his
power.”88 This means that we cannot say that anything other than God creates in the absolute
sense. Aquinas thus places himself between two extremes; that God takes over natural actions
by absolute power (occasionalism) or that creatures participate so fully in God that they par-
ticipate in his ‘creative action.’89 The two extremes downplay either God’s immanence (by
implying some kind of ‘competition’ between God and creation) or his transcendence (by im-
plying a kind of ‘naturalization’ of God and a ‘divinization’ of nature). A thing operates and
causes effects not because it has its own power, fundamentally, but because it “participates
through its movement in the power of the principal cause,”90 like a chisel causing a sculpture
by participating in the agency, power, and ability of the artist. God, analogous to an artist,
works in, with, and through the nature of the creature when applying him to operation. He is
immanently present, as cause, in the instrument, and the latter participates in God and in doing
so is capable of doing that which it could not have done by itself. As Aquinas puts it: “For the
higher the cause the greater its scope and efficacity: and the more efficacious the cause, the
more deeply does it penetrate into its effect, and the more remote the potentiality from which it
brings that effect into act.”91 God and creation are not two causes standing in ‘competition,’ or
even two distinct foci of reality, but different dimensions of causality, where the ultimate cause
‘influences’ the latter.92 God gives a creature its power to operate and works, immanently,
through the creature. And the creature operates only secondarily, in virtue of God’s operation:
If, then, we consider the subsistent agent, every particular agent is immediate to its effect: but if we
consider the power whereby the action is done, then the power of the higher cause is more immediate
to the effect than the power of the lower cause; since the power of the lower cause is not coupled
88 De pot., q.3, a.7, corp. 7, cf. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 163.
89 te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 160-170.
90 te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 165, cf. Oliver, Creation, 75-80.
91 De pot., q.3, a.7, corp. 7.
92 De subst. sep., c.9-10.
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with its effect save by the power of the higher cause.93
Only God is a universal cause. All other causes are so by participating in Him, by His immanent
work in creation.94 The instrument has an intrinsic virtue or power, a form, and God moves the
being to act in accordance with this. An instrument, notes te Velde, is not “brought to perform
an action which is foreign to it” but “to perform its own action,” while it “participates in the
power of the principal cause.”95 What Aquinas tells us is that we cannot do (or be) anything
except by participation in God. But in this relation, we are real and substantial beings that
have a distinction between two notions of ‘act’; the primary (Lt. actus primus), ‘being-in-act’
(the substantial esse of a creature, a form) and the secondary (Lt. actus secundus), ‘being-in-
operation.’96 A creature participates in God primarily by receiving esse, contracted to a specific
essence.97 The substantial esse is the actus primus of the concrete being (ens), while other acts
or operations are ‘superadded’ to the primary act, as secondary acts. This follows the Thomistic
principle that ‘action follows being’ (Lt. agere sequitur esse), in such a way that, while the actus
secundus is accidental, it can also be called ‘secondarily essential’ (following from being).98 We
can understand an essence distinct from its virtues and powers but never separate from them,
as the actus secundus is the thing through which the actus primus exists and is brought to its
end.99 This means that while secondary acts are, strictly speaking, accidental (it is possible to
be, say, a man without being wise or only being wise to an extent), they are not purely and
externally accidental. They are “secondary perfections” and they are “all acts that are in accord
93 De pot., q.3, a.7, corp. 8, cf. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 166-167.
94 te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 169-175.
95 te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 172.
96 te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 42, cf. Davison, Participation in God, 65-83; De pot., q.1, a.1,
corp., q.2, a.1, ad 6; De ver., q.27, a.3, ad 25; ST I, q.13, q.76, a.4, ad 1; q.77, a.1, corp.; q.105, a.5, corp.
97 ST I, q.7, a.2; q.54, a.2; De spir. creat., a.1.
98 Feser, Five Proofs, 174-176; te Velde, Aquinas on God, 69. This cannot be transferred directly or univocally
to our relation to God, however. In a deeper sense, created being derives from the divine act. See Michael
Hanby, No God, No Science? Theology, Cosmology, Biology (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 358.
99 De spir. creat., a.11, ad 7, cf. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 42; John Michael Rziha, Perfecting
Human Actions: St. Thomas Aquinas on Human Participation in Eternal Law (Washington, D.C.: The
Catholic University of America Press, 2009), 54-66.
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with the substantial form of the creature,” i.e. “accidental forms that perfect a substance with
a special emphasis on operations,” through which “a creature reaches its particular end, which
is its greatest participation in the likeness of God.”100 This points us to the concept of potency
and act, where we only have these perfections potentially before we get them actually.
A thing exists either potentially (in potency) or actually (in act). A can of beer is first po-
tentially cold but becomes actually cold in the fridge, while chips are first potentially fried but
becomes actually fried in the fryer. What actualises their potential is something which is already
actual (a cold fridge or hot oil), as reducing something from potency to act requires something
already actual. This ultimately reduces down to God, as ‘pure act,’ and we need this to ex-
plain change, as something cannot come from nothing.101 We can only act as secondary causes
through the primary causation of God, working in us.102 This reveals some central differences
between Aquinas and Aristotle. Unlike Aristotle, who espoused an immanentist virtue ethics,
Aquinas denies that having a virtue is enough in and of itself to account for operation, and that
not all virtues are acquired (through immanent means). The completion of beings “in being and
in operating … does not belong to created goods according to their essential ‘to be’ itself, but
according to something superadded called their ‘virtue’.”103
For Aquinas, virtue is “what makes its possessor good and renders its work good.”104 And
elsewhere he notes that there is such a thing as a ‘possibility [Lt. potestatem] of being,’ virtus
essendi, but that a finite creature has its virtues or powers in a limited sense and receive them
“according to its mode and, maybe, not according to the whole possibility (Lt. posse) of [the
virtue in question].”105 As Wippel notes, a virtue is distinct both from the primary act and
100 Rziha, Perfecting Human Actions, 54-55, cf. SCG III, c.25.
101 De ente, c.4, 4-6; c.5, 9; ST I, q.9, a.1; q.54, a.1, corp.; q.54, a.3, ad 2, cf. Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics,
34-45; Hankey, God in Himself, 54-55.
102 De pot., q.3, a.7.
103 In De Hebd., c.4, 70, cf. De pot., q.1, a.1 (esp. ad 11), q.2, a.1, ad 6. See Eleonore Stump, “The Non-
Aristotelian Character of Aquinas’s Ethics” (Tópicos 42, 2012), 27-50.
104 In De Hebd., c.4, 150.
105 SCG I, c.28:2, cf. Wippel,Metaphysical Thought, 173.
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its secondary acts, acting as an intermediary through which the created being can operate.106
Aquinas elaborates more on this in the Summa, where he notes that virtues are ‘habits’ (Lt.
habitus), pointing out that a virtue “denotes a certain perfection of a power,” that the perfection
of a thing is “considered chiefly in regard to its end,” and that “the end of power is act” which
means that “power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act.”107 The virtues
are chiefly concerned with operation but not in just any way but always aimed towards the
Good.108 Since evil is a defect (or a privation), “the virtue of a thing must be regarded in
reference to good” and therefore “human virtue which is an operative habit, is a good habit,
productive of good works.”109 Aquinas now proceeds to a more thorough definition of virtue,
defending what he calls its traditional definition: “Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by
which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without
us.”110 According to Aquinas, this definition applies first and foremost (but not exclusively)
to infused virtues, which are the theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity, and “other habits
corresponding, in due proportion, to the theological virtues, which habits are to the theological
virtues, what the moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue.”111 The
virtues are worked in us byGod, “without any action on our part, but not without our consent.”112
Our acts, both our ‘being-in-act’ and our ‘being-in-operation,’ are grounded in God’s own act, or
in God Himself, as ‘pure act.’113 This, therefore, can represent a theurgic perspective, although
we have not yet touched upon the nature of ritual. The centre of theurgy is not the ritual in itself
but participation in the divine act and divine-human union.114 The virtues are a gift of God, a
106 Wippel, Metaphysical Thought, 288, cf. 173, 278, 493. Also see te Velde, Participation and Substantiality,
19, 28, 40-43, 124, n13, 172, 232.
107 ST I-II, q.55, a.1, corp., cf. q.55-56.
108 ST I-II, q.55, a.2; q.55, a.3, cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a, 1-3.
109 ST I-II, q.55, a.3, corp.
110 ST I-II, q.55, a.4, obj. 1.
111 ST I-II, q.63, a.3, corp., cf. q.55, a.4, corp.; q.62.
112 ST I-II, q.55, a.4, ad 6.
113 De ente, c.4, 4-6; c.5, 9; ST I, q.9, a.1; q.54, a.1, corp.; q.54, a.3, ad 2.
114 Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 81-152 (esp. 106-110); Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 31-33,
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grace,115 but it does not cancel out our created nature. On the contrary, it fulfils it.
3.2 The nature of grace
For Aquinas, “grace does not destroy nature but perfects it.”116 This tells us that grace, as it
is given to humans, works in accordance with their nature or form and that it functions as an
(accidental) perfection, and therefore we can assume that it functions in a way similar to other
secondary perfections, or as a virtue through which “a creature reaches its particular end, which
is its greatest participation in the likeness of God.”117 Grace is God “bestowing a partaking
of the Divine Nature by a participated likeness.”118 It functions much like other (accidental)
perfections, but it is depicted in variance with nature. For Aquinas, “that which is proper to
the higher nature cannot be acquired by a lower nature, except through the action of the higher
nature to whom it properly belongs.”119 But is this not true for any act? As we have shown,
you cannot do anything unless you are moved by God who “applies [your] power to action.”120
Aquinas, however, notes that grace is different in that it goes beyond nature (though not through
destruction). Te Velde notes that “by the immanence of the divine power the second cause is
enabled to carry out its own non-divine operation.”121 Elsewhere he notes that grace involves a
spiritual ‘re-creation’ or ‘regeneration’ of the soul, a ‘divinizing’ of the soul bywhich it becomes
“capable of performing the divine act of seeing God in his essence,” and are given the gift of
being “regenerated as children of God,” meaning that the recipients of grace can do what they
could not have done without it.122 The difference between grace and other (natural) perfections
37-38. Although the ultimate expression of this union is ritualistic, it cannot be reduced to it.
115 ST I-II, qq.109-113; De ver., q.27 (cf. qq.28-29).
116 ST I, q.1, a.8, ad 2, cf. DN, IV, 33 (733B): “For to destroy nature is not a function of Providence.”
117 Rziha, Perfecting Human Actions, 55, cf. 54-66. Also see SCG III, c.25; te Velde, Participation and Sub-
stantiality, 42; John P. Yocum, “Aristotle in Aquinas’s Sacramental Theology,” in Aristotle in Aquinas’s
Theology, eds., Emery and Levering, 229.
118 ST I-II, q.112, a.1.
119 SCG III, c.52, cf. te Velde, Aquinas on God, 160-161.
120 De pot., q.3, a.7, corp. 7.
121 te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 172, cf. 181-183; te Velde, “Participation,” 134-135.
122 te Velde, Aquinas on God, 161, cf. ST I-II, q.112, aa.3-4.
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is not that God is the ultimate agent, which is true of both, but that grace points beyond nature,
by creating communion between God and the human person, giving the latter a new and higher
end, so that the person may love God in a ‘suprahuman’ way.123 Aquinas writes:
Charity loves God above all things in a higher way than nature does. For nature loves God above
all things inasmuch as He is the beginning and the end of natural good; whereas charity loves Him,
as He is the object of beatitude, and inasmuch as man has a spiritual fellowship with God.124
For Aquinas, we cannot have ‘friendship’ with God by nature alone but only by grace: “Now
this fellowship of man with God, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is
begun here, in this life, by grace.”125 By grace we become friends of God, though this is a
highly asymmetric relationship, where God initiates, though works with our human freedom,
and granting us a share in the divine nature through the theological virtues which are strictly
speaking divine, not human. God gives grace, which is a created participation of the divine
nature by which the soul can possess these divine virtues.126 Grace is, as noted, an accidental
perfection but it gives us not just a Creator-creature but a Father-child relationship to God.
Outside grace, God is the transcendent source but not the Heavenly Father.127 A human creature
is not a ‘partner of God,’ then, by its created nature.128 But is there a ‘pure’ (‘ungraced’) nature?
How do we see the relation between grace and nature?
Aquinas notes that “the extrinsic principle moving to good is God, Who both instructs us
by means of His Law, and assists us by His Grace.”129 Grace is given by God alone, granting
personal union with him: “For it is as necessary that God alone should deify, bestowing a par-
taking of the Divine Nature by a participated likeness, as it is impossible that anything save fire
123 te Velde, Aquinas on God, 161.
124 ST I-II, q.109, a.3, ad 1.
125 ST I-II, q.65, a.5, corp., cf. te Velde, Aquinas on God, 162-164.
126 ST I-II, q.110, a.3.
127 ST I-II, q.110, a.4, cf. te Velde, Aquinas on God, 164-165.
128 Rudi A. te Velde, ““Partnership with God”: Thomas Aquinas on Human Desire and God’s Grace” (Nova et
vetera 15:4, 2017), 1155-1158.
129 ST I-II, q.90, prol.
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should enkindle.”130 Grace is here understood as distinct from nature, though also closely re-
lated, because “grace does not destroy nature but perfects it.”131 Grace, though, is ‘superadded’
to nature, as an (accidental) perfection, moving us beyond nature. According to Aquinas we
are ‘capable of God’ (Lt. capax Dei), but this is only available through grace.132 Fergus Kerr
points out that this is often misunderstood because of our modern linguistic assumptions:
When Thomas, like Augustine long before, speaks of the human creature’s being capax Dei it must
be remembered that capasitas here is understood as a purely passive receptivity, not being ‘capable’
in the modern sense of having the ability or competence to achieve something but in the pre-modern
sense of being open to something one can receive only as a gift.133
Nature, then, can desire something that can only be attained by grace, while te Velde notes
that while it is true that “[m]ost Thomist interpreters would agree, I suppose, with attributing
to Aquinas the notion of a natural desire of human creatures for God, specifically for know-
ing or seeing God in his essence,” we still find in Aquinas “the view that the vision of God is
granted only by way of a supernatural gift; seeing God is something that exceeds the natural
power (facultas naturae) of human beings.”134 Capax Deimust be understood as the God-given
(even graced) capacity to receive grace whereby we can move beyond nature. He is inclined to
disagree with Henri de Lubac’s formula, of a ‘natural desire for the supernatural,’ as it “tends
to conceal the aspect of discontinuity in the relationship between nature and grace (supernat-
ural).”135 But how do we strike a balance? How do we avoid, on the one hand, jeopardising
the gratuity of grace, making it mandatory for nature’s natural fulfilment, and on the other hand
130 ST I-II, q.112, a.1, corp.
131 ST I, q.1, a.8, ad 2, cf. te Velde, “Partnership with God,” 1158-1164.
132 ST III, q.4, a.1, ad 2; q.9, a.2, ad 1.
133 Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 134/231, n2.
134 te Velde, “Partnership with God,” 1152.
135 te Velde, “Partnership with God,” 1152. See David Grumett, “De Lubac, Grace, and the Pure Nature Debate”
(Modern Theology 31:1, 2015), 123-146; te Velde, Aquinas on God, 155-160. According to te Velde, “Part-
nership with God,” 1155-1156, 1160, 1161, creation is not a work of grace, except in a ‘weakened’ sense of
‘divine generosity,’ and cannot be reduced to it, and his point is that not automatically having grace is no
‘defect’ of nature but just part of its creaturely finiteness.
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ending up with a ‘two-story model’ where salvation becomes arbitrary, as grace is utterly ex-
trinsic, forcing us to invoke the concept of ‘pure nature’ and a ‘purely natural end’? Te Velde
notes that we must go beyond the way de Lubac’s formulation is often understood, either as “a
concrete active tendency of human beings in their natural condition, prior to grace—an innate
desire for the beatific vision” or “only a desire for God under a natural respect.”136 As Aquinas
states, God’s calling to repentance is itself an act of grace, as a participation in the divine nature,
initiated fully by God, yet it is still free:
Man’s turning to God is by free-will; and thus man is bidden to turn himself to God. But free-will
can only be turned to God, when God turns it, according to Jer. 31:18: Convert me and I shall be
converted, for Thou art the Lord, my God; and Lam. 5:21: Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we
shall be converted.137
Te Velde notes that the standard English translation (including the one I use) “misses the point”
because the translators translate convertemur (in Lamentations 5:21) “in a passive voice (“we
shall be converted”), while Thomas reads it in a medium voice (“God lets me convert myself
towards Him”).”138 By God’s grace, which remains, and must remain, a gift distinct from cre-
ation as such, we are able to freely ‘convert ourselves to God.’ Aquinas is thus describing the
divine-human relationship non-competitively. The question which remains, and which has not
been settled fully, it exactly whenwe are graced. I do not think we can answer that fully. We are
obviously given grace before conversion, so that we can indeed ‘be converted’ or be allowed to
‘convert ourselves towards God.’ And adult converts are graced before baptism. But I do not
think that we are capable of answering the exact moment. What we can say, however, is that
God gives everyone ‘sufficient grace’ (“convert me”) that can, by their free conversion become
‘efficient grace’ (“God lets me convert myself towards Him”). With his understanding of grace,
136 te Velde, “Partnership with God,” 1164.
137 ST I-II, q.109, a.6, ad 1.
138 te Velde, “Partnership with God,” 1174, n38.
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Aquinas is following the pattern given in his discussion of infused virtues which are “caused
in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent.”139 We are not the
cause of the virtues but we can refuse them. But we can cooperate with these infused virtues
through acts produced by it, so that it is strengthened.140 Now, given this, Aquinas holds that
this “comprises perfectly the whole essential notion of virtue” because it references all causes
of virtue,141 i.e. the formal (the nature of the virtue “as a good quality,” or a ‘good habit,’ where
‘good’ denotes the species, while ‘quality’ or ‘habit’ the genus), the material (not “the matter
out of which [the virtue] is formed” or the “matter about which it is concerned,” which would be
its object, which is not fitting in a general definition of virtue, but the “matter in which it exists,”
i.e. the subject who possesses the virtue), the final (the operation, to ‘live righteously’), and the
efficient (God, who is “the efficient cause of infused virtue”), cf. Aquinas’s traditional defini-
tion: “Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can
make bad use, which God works in us, without us.”142 Aquinas is informed by Aristotle’s virtue
ethics but read through a Platonic or Neoplatonic emphasis on participation and transcendence,
in such a way that he emphasises a ‘transcendence in the immanence,’ thus noting that you need
to be moved to act by something which is itself in act, and which applies your power to action
by working in you.143 This working in creation (providence) is not something ‘extra special’
that God does on occasion but God’s constant working. He created the world ex nihilo, and has
always governed creation by preserving it in being (i.e. keeping it in existence, ex nihilo) and by
139 ST I-II, q.55, a.4, ad 6 (emphasis added).
140 ST I-II, q.51, a.4, ad 3.
141 ST I-II, q.55, a.4, corp.
142 ST I-II, q.55, a.4, obj. 1. This reveals clear differences between Aquinas and Aristotle. The latter held
that virtues are not infused by God (“without us”) but always acquired by works. See Stump, “The Non-
Aristotelian Character of Aquinas’s Ethics,” 34-35; ST I-II, q. 63 a. 4, sed contra.
143 te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 164. This interplay of transcendence and immanence is also cen-
tral for Pseudo-Dionysius, where God is by essence utterly transcendent but where the transcendence does
not preclude His immanence. See Kevin Corrigan and L. Michael Harrington, “Pseudo-Dionysius the Are-
opagite,” 4.2, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2019 Edition (ed., Edward N. Zalta);
Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 120-135.
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causing “the action of every natural thing by moving and applying its power to action.”144 For
Aquinas, this is fundamentally a metaphysical question. There is no real distinction between
esse, essence, or attributes in God,145 and therefore it follows that as we participate in God, we
participate equally in His being, His attributes, and His acts.
4 Participation, worship, and the sacraments
4.1 The sacraments as instruments of Christ
In his theology of worship, Aquinas emphasises first that God gives grace to us through the
sacraments and, secondarily, that these sacraments, in their cultic context, are acts of religion,146
which for Aquinas is a virtue.147 Aquinas has a focus both on our reception of God’s gift and on
our response in praise, but always logically in that order. The virtue of religion primarily directs
human beings to God and it is a part of justice, as we are paying God his due, in particular by
worship (Lt. latria). The difference, notes Liam G. Walsh, is that in the tertia pars, Aquinas is
explicitly treating “the presence in the sacraments of the divine action throughChrist in the grace
of the Holy Spirit,” which shows us that Aquinas understands the “grace-giving movement of
sanctification” of the sacraments “as being for the fulfillment of the ordo ad Deum, which is
realized in human worship.”148 There is a ‘double movement,’ as sacramental grace is ordained
both towards salvation and worship, but the significance of Aquinas’s principal emphasis on
the movement from above is that he ties together Christology and liturgy, showing that worship
is first and foremost a work of God in which we participate, first by receiving it and then by
144 De pot., q.3, a.7, corp. 7, cf. q.3, a.1; ST I, q.45, a.1.
145 ST I, q.3, aa.3-4, 7, cf. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 272-279; Wippel, Metaphysical Thought,
105 n31, 193, n49, 194.
146 Walsh, “Sacraments,” 332, cf. Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 7-21, esp. 11.
147 ST II-II, q.81, cf. I-II, q.55, esp. aa.3-4; II-II, q.58, a.3.
148 Walsh, “Sacraments,” 332, cf. ST III, q.89, prol.; III, q.62, a.5. Also see Matthew Levering, “Aquinas on the
Liturgy of the Eucharist,” in Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction, eds., Thomas Weinandy, Daniel
Keating, and John Yocum (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 184-187; John P. Yocum, “Sacraments in Aquinas,”
in Aquinas on Doctrine, eds., Weinandy, Keating, and Yocum, 160-164.
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offering it back, through grace.149
Though pagans had the virtue of religion, it seems that Aquinas is pointing out that, at least
in the case of baptised Christians, the virtue of religion is infused, on account of the grace of
God in Christ which does not destroy the virtue but perfects it. The worship towards which
we are called includes not just a recognition of God as Creator but a transformative personal
communion with the Triune God in which we are made holy, and in which this ‘natural wor-
ship’ is included and transformed.150 As noted, there is a natural desire for the supernatural and
therefore an intrinsic natural orientation to worship which needs to be fulfilled through grace.
The virtue of religion is fundamentally a work of God, where we are operating secondarily,
just like in any of our actions, though not without our cooperation or consent.151 The liturgy,
and particular the sacraments, is, to borrow Struck’s formulation, a divine act, an action estab-
lished by God in Christ, “put into use by humans, whose effect is to bring the material world
(including that part of the celebrant which is material) into harmony with the divine order.”152
And even this offering back, this human element, is rooted in Christ, who, as both human and
divine, offers back to God. To quote the prayer of the Cherubic Hymn in the Eastern liturgy:
“For you are the one who offers and is offered, who receives and is distributed, Christ our
God.”153 Furthermore, this human act, this ‘putting into use,’ is receptive, by grace, but it is not
‘pacifying.’ By emphasising worship, and by discussing the sacraments in their ritual context,
Aquinas emphasises the ‘active participation’ of those who take part in worship, both in that
they are participating in the work of God but also that they are involved in the concrete act,
as this participation is both embodied and culturally mediated. Confronted with the idea that
149 ST III, q.62, a.5, corp.; a.6; q.64; De pot., q.3, a.7; Walsh, “Sacraments,” 347-349, 355-358.
150 ST II-II, q.81, a.1, ad 1; a.8, cf. Psalm 19; Psalm 66:4; Isa 55:12.
151 ST I-II, q.55, a.4, corp., cf. q.51, a.4, ad 3; q.55, a.4, ad 6; I, q.1, a.8, ad 2.
152 Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 30, cf. 31-33, 37-38; Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 81-152
(esp. 106-110).
153 The Divine Liturgy of our Father among the Saints John Chrysostom, English and Greek (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995), 23.
55
religion does not have ‘an external act’ (cf. John 4:24), Aquinas argues that we do not wor-
ship God because He is in need of anything, but for our own sake, so that we are “subjected to
Him” and are thereby perfected. And as humans, we need ‘corporeal things’ or sensible signs
to worship; we should not seek a more ‘spiritualising’ form.154 A corporeal religion, centred
on the Eucharist, is based on the human form, which is corporeal and not ‘void of purpose.’
This is not a defect, but the way God created us.155 What we see here is a form of Christianised
theurgy, where God comes to us, and acts, in concrete things. The difference from someone
like Iamblichus is that for Aquinas, this must be rooted in Christ. And this, as Charles M. Stang
notes, is also central to the Pseudo-Dionysian tradition, which is highly dependent on St. Paul:
“The preeminent “work of God,” for Paul, is of course the life, death, and resurrection of Christ,
while for Iamblichus it is the created order and the rites revealed in ancient times.”156 Stang
notes that one of the central texts for Pseudo-Dionysius is Galatians 2:20a: “It is no longer I
who live, but it is Christ who lives in me.” This emphasis, however, does not ignore the created
order, nor our own substantiality, but sees it as grounded in Christ, as we can see in the remain-
der of the verse (emphasis added): “And the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son
of God, who loved me and gave himself for me.” If Christ lives in you, this does not cancel out
your own integrity but fulfils it. To invoke Struck yet again, theurgy is a divine act (an act of
the Logos), put into use by humans (principally by Christ, the Logos incarnate, and secondarily
by the Church which participates in Him), through which “the material world” is brought “into
harmony with the divine order.”157 As I will argue more thoroughly later,158 the Incarnation,
154 ST II-II, q.81, a.7; III, q.83, a.4; De pot., q.3, a.7, corp., cf. Bjørnaas, “Imago Dei og kroppsliggjort væren”;
Walsh, “Sacraments,” 359.
155 De pot., q.3, a.7; ST II-II, q.81, a.7 (esp. ad 2); III, q.61, esp. a.1; q.83, a.4, cf. Yocum, “Sacraments in
Aquinas,” 165-168; Yocum, “Aristotle in Aquinas,” 209-222, esp. 215.
156 Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 114, cf. 81-116, esp. 105-116; John Milbank and Aaron Riches, “Neo-
platonic Theurgy and Christian Incarnation,” foreword to Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The Neopla-
tonism of Iamblichus (2nd ed. Angelico Press/Sophia Perennis, 2014), v-xvii; Struck, “Pagan and Christian
Theurgies,” 31-33, 37-38.
157 Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 30.
158 See chapter four, pp.140-146, 153-162.
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precisely because it involves the union of divinity and humanity in one hypostasis, “without
confusion, change, division, or separation,” means that humanity and divinity have real union,
without ‘collapsing’ into each other.159 In Christ, this divine consummation of human activity
is real and intrinsic,160 while on a Pagan Neoplatonic conception, the union experienced by the
theurgist remains extrinsic, imposed, and temporary.161
In Aquinas, we find this expressed particularly through the notion of instrumentality, where
the sacraments are instruments which derive their power from Christ’s Passion.162 An instru-
ment can either be conjoined (Lt. coniunctum, e.g. a hand) or separate (Lt. separatum, e.g. a
knife).163 For Aquinas, Christ’s human nature is a conjoined instrument of His divine nature,
acting as its ‘organ,’ united with the divine person of Christ through the hypostatic union. The
sacraments, being separate instruments, have their efficiency as instruments of Christ, deriving
saving power from his divinity through his humanity,164 though, as I will argue below the Eu-
charist stands apart as being, paradoxically, conjoined and separate, simultaneously. Aquinas
notes that “an instrumental cause, if manifest, can be called a sign of a hidden effect, for this
reason, that it is not merely a cause but also in a measure an effect in so far as it is moved by
159 The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, trans., introd. and notes, Richard Price and Michael Gaddis (3 vols.,
Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2005, 2007), II, 204.
160 See Panagiotis G. Pavlos, “Theurgy in Dionysius the Areopagite,” in Platonism and Christian Thought in
Late Antiquity, eds., Panagiotis G. Pavlos et al. (London: Routledge, 2019), 157.
161 Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, xxiv-xxv.
162 ST III, q.62, a.5, cf. aa.1-5. For some discussions of the notion of instrumentality and causality in sacraments,
see Bernard Blankenhorn, “The Instrumental Causality of the Sacraments: Thomas Aquinas and Louis-Marie
Chauvet” (Nova et Vetera, English Ed., 4:2, 2006), 255-294; Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 7-45; Rik Van
Nieuwenhove, “Gadamer, Art, and Contemplation: How to Make Sense of Sacraments in an Allegedly Post-
Metaphysical World” (Louvain Studies 38:2, 2014), 114-118; Walsh, “Sacraments,” esp. 329-332, 334-335,
345-347; Yocum, “Aristotle in Aquinas,” 224-230; Yocum, “Sacraments in Aquinas,” 169-174, cf. De ver.,
q.27, a.4, ad 13; q.28 a.2, ad 12; ST III, q.62, a.1, ad 1.
163 The translation of the Summa that I cite uses ‘united’ instead of ‘conjoined.’ While that is an acceptable
translation, ‘conjoined’ captures better the intimate connection between the agent and the instrument (which
is best illustrated by the hand, which is conjoined to me, rather than united with me). ‘United’ is also more
general, while ‘conjoined’ more particular. I will therefore substitute ‘conjoined’ (or derivatives) for ‘united’
when quoting the text.
164 ST III, q.62, a.5, corp., cf. III, q.8, a.1, ad 1; q.19, a.1; q.43, a.2; q.48, a.6; q.56, a.1, ad 3; 62, a.5. Also see
Walsh, “Sacraments,” 343-355 (esp. 343-349); Yocum, “Aristotle in Aquinas,” 229-231; Yocum, “Sacra-
ments in Aquinas,” 170-174.
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the principal agent.”165 Therefore, the Christian sacraments “are both cause and signs,” which
“effect what they signify.”166 But the signification in question is not exclusively ‘sensible.’
Aquinas cites Augustine who says that “the word is added to the element and this becomes
a sacrament” (Lt. accedit verbum ad elementum, et fit sacramentum).167 The sign is not the
sensible element in itself or the intelligible words in themselves, but the whole, the compound.
The sensible element is crucial but it needs the verbal form to be significant and intelligible.168
Aquinas is Augustinian here, but his Augustinianism seems to be integrated into a larger Aris-
totelian and Pseudo-Dionysian framework, with emphasis on the senses.169 As we have noted
above, for Aquinas, sensible signs are not something ‘inferior.’ God, who works through our
form, which is not “void of purpose,”170 makes use of sensible signs because we are embodied
creatures. But this Augustinian element helps us understand that on a properly theurgic account
of the sacraments, the signs need the word, representing the divine work, in the Holy Spirit.
The two belong together. And nowhere is this more evident than in the Eucharist, where the
reality of God and nature and culture are held together without downplaying any of them.
4.2 The presence of Christ
Speaking of Christ’s presence in relation to the species or accidents of bread and wine, Aquinas
states that the body of Christ is in the sacrament “not merely in signification or figure, but also
in very truth,” thus highlighting both the signification, in the species, and the reality of Christ’s
substantial presence.171 He does so using an Aristotelian distinction between substance and
165 ST III, q.62, a.1, ad 1.
166 Cf. De ver., q.27, a.4, ad 13 (cf. q.28 a.2, ad 12): “[T]he sacraments cause by signifying” (Lt. sacramenta
significando causant).
167 ST III, q.60, a.4, sed contra; q.60, a.6, sed contra.
168 Yocum, “Aristotle in Aquinas’s Sacramental Theology,” 209-217 for a discussion of sacraments as ‘com-
pound signs,’ as well as pp.217-222, for a more specific discussion of sacraments as ‘sensible signs.’ Also
see Yocum, “Sacraments in Aquinas,” 165-168.
169 Hankey, Aquinas’s Neoplatonism, 9, cf. 5-12.
170 De pot., q.3, a.7, corp. 2.
171 ST III, q.75, a.1, corp. (my emphasis), cf. III, qq.73-83, esp. qq. 74, 75-77.
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accident. Yocum notes that this explication of the sacramental action through Aristotelian con-
cepts involves a ‘stretching’ of these, “applying them to a range of realities that far exceed the
bounds of Aristotelian natural philosophy and metaphysics,” and he notes that for “an unbe-
lieving Aristotelian philosopher” the idea of transubstantiation, where the accidents remain in
the sacrament without a subject, would be “nonsensical.”172 Using these categories to expli-
cate Christ’s presence, Aquinas notes that the whole Christ, in his whole dimensive quantity, is
present in the sacrament, in both species, in every part. But, notes Aquinas, Christ is not present
in this sacrament “as in a place” but rather “after the manner of substance.”173 We cannot move
or see Christ in the sacrament. He is substantially present in the sacraments but the species of
bread and wine, under which Christ is substantially present, are not species of Christ, nor are
they anymore the species of the substance of bread and wine. Aquinas highlights both the real
presence but also the signification of the remaining accidents. These are important because of
what they signify, and because they we instituted by Christ,174 but the important thing is what
this tells us about creation and its participation in God.
The accidents of bread and wine remain in the sacrament without a subject, and thus the
sign and thing signified are held together. God can keep an accident in existence by his divine
power, since “an effect depends more upon the first cause than on the second” and since God is
“the first cause both of substance and accident.”175 But this is also important because the Eu-
charist becomes a sign of the telos of nature. In the Eucharist, we find what constitutes a ‘body’
in its fullness. The glorified body of Christ is replete, as it does not require any accidental or
dimensional qualification. The remaining accidents of bread and wine are thus ‘free-floating’
172 Yocum, “Aristotle in Aquinas,” 207-208, cf. 206-209; Pickstock, After Writing, 259-261. Yocum distin-
guishes between explication and explanation or justification.
173 Cf. ST III, q.75, a.5, aa.6-7, cf. aa.1-4.
174 ST III, q.74, a.1, corp. Aquinas also argues here for the fact that any ritual act needs ‘corporeal things’ or
sensible signs. Also see ST III, q. 60, a.5, esp. ad 1; III, q. 60, a.7; Yocum, “Sacraments in Aquinas,”
167-164.
175 ST III, q.77, a.1, corp.
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without a subject, being upheld by God through participation. They become signs of creation’s
telos. Through this participation, they are “given the supreme privilege of showing the body and
blood of Christ and which, in doing so, are most fully themselves.”176 There is no ‘competition’
between the spiritual and the concrete and physical, to use an analogy from the divine-human
relationship.177 Through the Eucharist, which is a divine act (an act of the Logos), put into use
by a human being (Christ, the Logos incarnate), and enacted through Christ’s body, the Church,
creation is embraced by God and reconciled to Him. The substance of bread and wine, are, so
to speak, elevated and reveal their (and creation’s) telos: “God is no longer denied to nature,
but sustains the accidents of nature which are thereby most fully realised.”178 The Eucharist,
notes Aquinas, is the principal sacrament, ‘absolutely speaking,’ because Christ is contained
there substantially and because the other sacraments are ‘ordained to’ it and ritually ‘terminate’
in it.179 Where the waters of baptism, for example, only signifies, and does what it signifies, in
use, the Eucharistic elements signify the true presence of Christ regardless of the taking of com-
munion, because the sacrament simply is Christ.180 Here we find an important implication of
Aquinas’s doctrine (which he himself, to my knowledge, does not discuss). The human nature
of Christ is a conjoined instrument of his divinity and in the Eucharistic celebration the bread
and wine are transubstantiated into his body and blood, into Christ himself who is there, com-
pletely and substantially. It follows from this, and from the fact that the species of the elements
remain without a subject as signs, that the Eucharist is, paradoxically and simultaneously, a
conjoined and a separate instrument. What we sense is a separate instrument, the species re-
maining without a subject, but the substantial reality is Christ Himself. What this means is that
176 Simon Oliver, “The Eucharist before Nature and Culture” (Modern Theology 15:3, 1999), 346, cf. 342-350;
Simon Oliver, Philosophy, God and Motion (London: Routledge, 2013), 131-137.
177 te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 163.
178 Oliver, “The Eucharist before Nature and Culture,” 348, cf. Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 30.
179 ST III, q.65, a.3.
180 ST III, q.66, a.1, corp., cf. Walsh, “Sacraments,” 339-340, 360-361; Yocum, “Sacraments in Aquinas,” 174-
176.
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the other sacraments of the Church are separate instruments of God’s power having their effi-
cacy though the Eucharist, through Christ Himself, which entails that according to Aquinas, the
Eucharist signifies the Incarnation itself, the unity of God and humanity, and the transformation
of creation and culture.181 Religion is natural. But in Christ, and through grace, it also extends
beyond nature, without destroying it or leaving it behind.182 Likewise, for Pseudo-Dionysius,
Christian sacraments are theurgic principally because they ritually re-enact the Incarnation. God
came down, not in a statue, but in a living human being, and we participate in this by our own
ritual re-enactment (hierourgia, which is also the work of God in us), in which God descends in
the Spirit.183 The worship towards which we are called, includes not just a recognition of God
as Creator, as in ‘purely natural’ worship (if there is actually a thing like ‘pure nature’), but a
transformative personal communion with the Triune God in which we are made holy, and in
which our intrinsic natural orientation to worship is included and transformed, through grace.184
The natural elements are perfected and transformed by grace and they are no ‘reduced’ to mere
‘technicalities.’185 For Aquinas, liturgy is not just a human creation but something into which
we are incorporated.186 The natural orientation to worship can only be fulfilled through divine
grace. This is, in other words, theurgic, starting with the divine work. It is a graced perfection
of a natural liturgical orientation to God, rooted in the Incarnation. The importance of grace as
a participation in God’s nature is not primarily what this enables us to do, though for Aquinas
this is important too, but that it establishes us in a new fellowship with God, as his friends and
181 ST III, q.60, prol., cf. q.62, a.5; q.75, a.3, q.76, a.1-3, q.77, a.1. Also see Yocum, “Sacraments in Aquinas,”
170-176.
182 ST I, q.1, a.8, ad 2.
183 Alan Philip Darley, “Ritual as erotic anagogy in Pseudo-Dionysius: a Reformed critique” (International Jour-
nal of Philosophy and Theology 79:3, 2018), 262-263, 265-267; Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,”
33-36; Sarah Klitenic Wear and John Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition: De-
spoiling the Hellenes (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 99-115, cf. David J. Kennedy, Eucharistic Sacramentality
in an Ecumenical Context: The Anglican Epiclesis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).
184 ST II-II, q.81, a.1, ad 1; a.8, cf. Psalm 19; Psalm 66:4; Isa 55:12.
185 Blankenhorn, “Instrumental Causality”; Van Nieuwenhove, “Gadamer, Art, and Contemplation,” 114-118;
Walsh, “Sacraments,” 329-332, 334-335, cf. Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, 22-26.
186 ST III, qq.60-90, esp. 60-65, 73-83, cf. Thomas F. O’Meara, “Theology of Church,” in The Theology of
Thomas Aquinas, eds., Van Nieuwenhove and Wawrykow, 310-312; Walsh, “Sacraments,” 360-361.
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children, a fellowship marked most especially by his gratuitous gifts to us and our praise of him
in return, a praise that is, ultimately, God’s own work in us.
5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that created beings only exist through participation in their di-
vine source and that this extends to the whole of their being, including operations. Creatures
only have existence, and can only subsequently act, because they have received everything
from God. For Aquinas, God is the only focus of reality and creatures participate in Him for
their very existence. God is “essential being,” while creatures are “beings by participation.”187
Within this framework, Aquinas captures both the intrinsic value of the immanent world and
its utter reliance on the transcendent God, through participation. He places himself between
the Aristotelians and the Platonists, showing that the metaphysical concepts discussed above
are not intelligible within an immanentist framework but presupposes something transcendent
in which they participate. For Aquinas participation is not merely extrinsic. It is organic and
intrinsic, facilitating growth.188 He is thus capable both of elevating nature while at the same
time underlining the importance of humility, which is even more true when we consider partic-
ipation in grace. But this participation is not just existential but operational and ritual, theurgic.
For Aquinas, we cannot do anything outside our participation in God.189 He pushes this point
further by noting that we need grace to be elevated beyond our nature to God, his love or char-
ity, in praise and thanksgiving. Religion, according to Aquinas, is a virtue and in the case of
baptised Christians this virtue is infused. Our praise of God is always something we receive
and which we return to God. We can only praise God fully, as Christians, through the utterly
187 ST I, q.4, a.3, ad 3, cf. Aertsen, Nature and Creature, 79-89 (cf. 54-91); Proclus, Elements, props. 1-13,
23-24.
188 SCG III, c.25:8; ST I, q.5.
189 De pot., q.3, a.7.
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gratuitous gift of grace given in Christ, as a participation in him, as Christ Himself says, in John
15:4-5:
Abide in me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit by itself, unless it abides in the vine,
neither can you, unless you abide in me. I am the vine, you are the branches. He who abides in me,
and I in him, he it is that bears much fruit, for apart from me you can do nothing.
In the next chapter I develop this participatory vision further in a more Platonic direction. In
critical dialogue with Joseph Ratzinger, I will discuss the nature of beauty in the liturgy and
our participation in the Paschal Mystery, as this is central for our understanding of the purpose
of liturgy as a participation in Christ’s offering. Like Aquinas, Ratzinger emphasises our par-
ticipation in God and in Christ, particularly in the Eucharistic celebration, but unlike Aquinas,
he does so from within a more explicitly Platonic framework and within a tradition which has
emphasised the importance of theurgy.190
190 Boersma, Nouvelle, 52-62, 121-131, 144-148; Joseph Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth: The Church at the End of
the Millennium. An Interview with Peter Seewald (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1996), 33, 41; Joseph




Participatio actuosa and participatio Dei
1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I established the central aspects of a participatory metaphysics, and
some of its liturgical and sacramental implications. This laid the groundwork for a metaphysics
of liturgical participation, as this is expressed in the desire expressed in the Second Vatican
Council’s constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, that “all the faithful should be led to that fully
conscious, and active participation in liturgical celebrations which is demanded by the very na-
ture of the liturgy,” something which “is their right and duty by reason of their baptism.”1 Some
have argued that this participation should be understood principally as the practical involvement
of the faithful,2 while others have made the point that it refers principally to our participation in
God and in the divine act.3 In this chapter, following from my previous discussion of the meta-
physics of action, I will argue for the latter approach, in critical dialoguewith Joseph Ratzinger’s
liturgical theology.4 In The Spirit of the Liturgy, Ratzinger notes how the term ‘active participa-
tion’ was “very quickly misunderstood to mean something external, entailing a need for general
1 Sacrosanctum Concilium (hereafter: SC), 14. On Vatican II documents, see abbreviations, p.5, n4.
2 See Anscar J. Chupungco, “The Implementation of Sacrosanctum Concilium,” in T&T Clark Companion to
Liturgy, ed. Alcuin Reid (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016), 279-295; Anscar J. Chupungco, “The
Vision of the Constitution on the Liturgy,” in T&T Clark Companion to Liturgy, ed., Reid, 261-277.
3 Joseph Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, commemorative ed. (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 2018), 185-
191; Joseph Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy: The Sacramental Foundation of Christian Existence (San
Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 2014), 541-557; Alcuin Reid, “In Pursuit of Participation—Liturgy and Liturgists
in Early Modern and Post Enlightenment Catholicism,” in T&T Clark Companion to Liturgy, ed., Reid, 133-
151; Richard J. Schuler, “Participation” (Sacred Music 114:4, 1987), 7-10.
4 Joseph Ratzinger, The Feast Of Faith: Approaches to a Theology of the Liturgy, trans. GrahamHarrison (San
Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 1986); Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy; Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, cf.
Thomas G. Dalzell, “Eucharist, Communion, and Orthopraxis in the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger” (Irish
Theological Quarterly 78:2, 2013), 103-122; Kjetil Kringlebotten, «Do this in remembrance of me…» The
Sacrificial Aspect of the Eucharist in the Systematic Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg and Joseph Ratzinger
(Master’s thesis, NLA University College, Bergen, 2013), 37-63; Roland Millare, “The Sacred Is Still Beau-
tiful: The Liturgical and Theological Aesthetics of Pope Benedict XVI” (Logos 16:1, 2013), 101-125; Tracey
Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith: The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008),
123-143.
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activity, as if as many people as possible, as often as possible, should be visibly engaged in ac-
tion.”5 Ratzinger is critical of this because it shifts the focus of the liturgy away from the one in
whom we participate towards us, as ‘practitioners.’ For Ratzinger, participation does not prin-
cipally mean involvement in this or that activity but sharing in a ‘principal action’ (Lt. actio)
of God which finds its principal expression in the Eucharistic prayer, the Canon, or the oratio.
Through this, God has inaugurated a new ‘Sacrifice of the Word’ (as opposed to the slaughter
of animals) in which we can participate because God has made it possible by gifting it to us.
Human action makes way for the real, divine, action. Therefore, God is the one who acts; we
act only insofar as he enables us to do so through participation:
The real “action” in the liturgy in which we are all supposed to participate is the action of God
himself. This is what is new and distinctive about the Christian liturgy: God himself acts and does
what is essential. He inaugurates the new creation, makes himself accessible to us, so that, through
the things of the earth, through our gifts, we can communicate with him in a personal way.6
Ratzinger’s point in his analysis of participatio actuosa is not that we should ignore the prac-
tical involvement of the faithful in liturgical celebration (through processions, readings, songs,
prayers, postures, assistance, or more), or that these elements are not a real expression of what
the Constitution calls ‘active participation,’7 but that with regards to this participation, the prac-
tical involvement of the faithful must be understood as secondary to their fundamental meta-
5 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 185, cf. 185-191; Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, 541-557, 574-588.
For Ratzinger’s interpretation of the Constitution, and Vatican II (often associated with the term ‘reform of the
reform’), see Benedict XVI, “A Proper Hermeneutic for the Second Vatican Council,” in Vatican II: Renewal
within Tradition, eds., Matthew L. Lamb and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008),
ix-xv; Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, 358-364, cf. Stephen M. Fields, “Introduction: Benedict XVI and
Conciliar Hermeneutics” (Nova et vetera 15:3, 2017), 705-727; Thomas Kocik, “A Reform of the Reform?,”
in T&T Clark Companion to Liturgy, ed., Reid, 317-338; Matthew J. Ramage, “Benedict XVI’s Hermeneutic
of Reform: Towards a Rapprochement of the Magisterium and Modern Biblical Criticism” (Nova et vetera
14:3, 2016), 879-917 (esp. 900-903); Matthew J. Ramage, “Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Salus and the Substance
of Catholic Doctrine: Towards a Realization of Benedict XVI’s “Hermeneutic of Reform”” (Nova et vetera
14:1, 2016), 295-330 (esp. 295-300). For a critique of this approach, see Massimo Faggioli, Vatican II: The
Battle for Meaning (New York, NY / Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2012), esp. 102-105.
6 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 187, cf. Maximillian Heinrich Heim, Joseph Ratzinger: Life in the
Church and Living Theology: Fundamentals of Ecclesiology with Reference to Lumen Gentium (San Fran-
cisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2007), 521-523.
7 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 76-98, 191-238.
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physical (and personal) participation in God and in the action of God and Christ. If we focus
too much on these secondary elements, we might end up overshadowing this primary sense of
participation. While the Constitution emphasises involvement, it also defines the liturgy prin-
cipally as “an action of Christ the priest and of His Body which is the Church.”8 For Ratzinger,
this Christological perspective is the central interpretive key for liturgical participation. The
incarnate Logos is the principal actor; we can act insofar as we participate in Him: “True, the
Sacrifice of the Logos is accepted already and forever. But we must still pray for it to be-
come our sacrifice, that we ourselves, as we said, may be logiziced (logisiert), conformed to
the Logos, and so be made the true Body of Christ.”9 We are made one with Christ in a funda-
mental way, and through this unification and transformation we see, as Ratzinger tells us, that
the “difference between the actio Christi and our own action is done away with,” as we be-
come partakers of Christ’s one action: “The uniqueness of the eucharistic liturgy lies precisely
in the fact that God himself is acting and that we are drawn into that action of God. Every-
thing else is, therefore, secondary.”10 Elsewhere, Ratzinger notes that there is in God an inner
relationship of mutual recognition and communication and that this trinitarian relationship is
the foundation of our very being and of our response to God, particularly in prayer and liturgy,
allowing for our active participation. He states that “the Logos in God is the ontological foun-
dation for prayer” and that since “there is relationship within God himself, there can also be a
participation in this relationship.”11 This emphasis on the divine Logos denotes both the eternal
rationality or creative reason of God and the core of Christology, and also of Pneumatology.
8 SC, 7.
9 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 187 (translation altered). In the original translation, ‘may be logiziced
(logisiert)’ was rendered ‘may be transformed into the Logos (logisiert).’ This somewhat looser translation
may be more accessible, though it may also create the impression that we are absorbed into the Logos in an
identical manner. While we will be formed after (or conformed to) His image (Romans 8:29), and displaced
in Him (Galatians 2:20), we will remain retain our distinct createdness and subjectivity. See more in chapter
four, pp.153-162.
10 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 188.
11 Ratzinger, Feast Of Faith, 25, cf. 25-32; Joseph Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, new ed. (San Fran-
cisco, CA: Ignatius, 2004), 59-60.
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We are made participants in the divine Logos, the second person of the Trinity that became
flesh in Christ. This participation also makes us participants in the divine intercommunication,
in the dia-logos, as we experience “the God who conducts a dialogue, … the God who is not
only logos but also dia-logos, not only idea and meaning but speech and word in the reciprocal
exchanges of partners in conversation.”12 The divine persons communicate and we are drawn
into this communication. We are able to communicate with God because He is himself speech,
word, logos, and we are formed after (or conformed to) his image, in the Spirit, who prays in and
through us.13 By pointing out that logos has a wider usage than the second person of the Trinity,
Ratzinger may seem to overemphasise the second person, perhaps especially over against the
Spirit.14 But as we can see elsewhere, Ratzinger’s Christology is meaningless without Pneuma-
tology. Ratzinger notes, as Pope Benedict XVI,15 that “it is in Christ, dead and risen, and in the
outpouring of the Holy Spirit, given without measure (cf. Jn 3:34), that we have become sharers
of God’s inmost life,” that the “Spirit invoked by the celebrant upon the gifts of bread and wine
placed on the altar is the same Spirit who gathers the faithful ”into one body” and makes of
them a spiritual offering pleasing to the Father,” and that “the eucharistic liturgy is essentially
an actio Dei which draws us into Christ through the Holy Spirit.”16 And in reference to that, he
quotes one of the propositions that was offered to him before he wrote his exhortation:
This eucharistic encounter takes place in the Holy Spirit, who transforms and sanctifies us. He
re-awakens in the disciple the firm desire to proclaim boldly to others all that he has heard and
12 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 183, cf. 180-190. Also see David G. Bonagura, “Logos to Son
in the Christology of Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI” (New Blackfriars 93:1046, 2012), 475-488; Pablo
Blanco Sarto, “Logos and Dia-Logos: Faith, Reason, (and Love) According to Joseph Ratzinger” (Anglican
Theological Review 92:3, 2010), 499-509.
13 Cf. Romans 8, esp. vv.15-16, 26-30.
14 See Bonagura, “Logos to Son.” While this article is a good resource for Ratzinger’s Logos Christology, it is
oddly lacking in Pneumatology. It does not mention the Spirit at all.
15 In this chapter I will sometimes refer to Ratzinger as Ratzinger and sometimes as Benedict or Pope Benedict,
without further elaboration.
16 Benedict XVI, Sacramentum Caritatis, Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice
Vaticana, 2007), 8, 13, 37, cf. 12, 15-17, 36, 76-78, 94, 97. For a more thorough discussion, see Peter
John McGregor, Heart to Heart: The Spiritual Christology of Joseph Ratzinger (Eugene, OR: Pickwick
Publications, 2016).
67
experienced, to bring them to the same encounter with Christ. Thus the disciple, sent forth by the
Church, becomes open to a mission without frontiers.17
The Spirit is absolutely central for Ratzinger, then, and it is precisely in the Spirit, through
Christ, that we are allowed to participate in the divine life. Ratzinger’s approach is Trinitarian,
rather than exclusively pneumatological. His double usage of logos is both a direct embrace
of divine simplicity and a rejection of interpretations bordering on tritheism (such as so-called
‘social trinitarianism’).18 In this chapter, I will explore Ratzinger’s understanding of our par-
ticipation in theurgic terms. While he does not directly refer to his view as ‘theurgic,’ I argue
that his approach may indeed be understood this way.
In addition to defining liturgical participation as participation in divine action, in the actio
divina or the actio Christi,19 Ratzinger embraces the Platonic tradition, though in a transformed
or ‘baptised’ manner,20 and he understands himself as a ressourcement theologian, though in a
different (second generation and German) context.21 According to the ressourcement tradition,
liturgy is not principally our work of praise but God’s own work that we might participate in and
offer back, in an imitative manner. Yves Congar, for example, holds that our worship of God
is first God’s self-worship and that the ‘downward’ mediation is always prior to our (upwards)
response: “Before being latreutic,22 and in order to be latreutic, the Christian sacramental cult
17 Propositio 42, quoted in Benedict XVI, Sacramentum Caritatis, 13, n29. The
propositions are not published but only offered to the Roman Pontiff. See
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/synod/documents/rc_synod_doc_20051022_final-
propositions_en.html, accessed 14 April 2020.
18 For critiques of this latter approach, only held together by a vague sense of ‘perichoresis’ or ‘interpenetration,’
analogies which are fine if used properly but which can end up with a univocal misunderstanding of divine
personhood which have been projected from us to God and then back, see Karen Kilby, “Perichoresis and
Projection: Problems with Social Doctrines of the Trinity” (New Blackfriars 81:957, 2000), 432-445; Simon
Oliver, “The Holy Trinity and the Liturgical Subject,” in The Liturgical Subject: Subject, Subjectivity and the
Human Person in Contemporary Discussion and Critique, ed., James G. Leachman (London: SCM Press,
2008), 229-240.
19 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 185-191.
20 Joseph Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth: The Church at the End of the Millennium. An Interview with Peter
Seewald (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1996), 33, 41; Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 129-170.
21 Lewis Ayres, Patricia Kelly, and Thomas Humphries, “Benedict XVI: A Ressourcement Theologian?,” in
Ressourcement: A Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology, eds., Gabriel Flynn and
Paul D. Murray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 423-439.
22 I.e. a service or an act of praise rendered unto God.
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is theurgic and soteriological: it does not consist at first in offering, in making something rise
up from us to God, but in receiving the effective gift of God.”23 Ressourcement theologians,
including Congar and Ratzinger, follow this theurgic and Pseudo-Dionysian approach, focus-
ing principally on God’s own work, and his gifts to us, and only secondarily on our praise of
God, understood as flowing from God’s work.24 Borrowing a formulation from Lothar Lies,
Ratzinger, for instance, calls Christ ‘the auto-eulogia of God.’25 What we participate in, is the
divine inner-Trinitarian self-worship, a divine self-address, in which we may be made partici-
pants, most particularly through the liturgy. In the following, I will explore Ratzinger’s view
of this participation in two ways.
First, I will discuss Ratzinger’s approach to participation in the metaphysical sense by ex-
amining his view of beauty, especially in liturgy. I will argue that Ratzinger’s (Christianised)
Platonic vision of this, which is highly indebted to Hans Urs von Balthasar’s theology,26 must
be understood in theurgic terms, not as replacing Christian theology with Platonic philosophy
but as its Christian consummation. This is central because for the Pseudo-Dionysian tradition,
beauty is absolutely central. From Beauty itself, notes Pseudo-Dionysius, “(comes) being to all
existing things,—that each is beautiful in its own proper order.”27
Secondly, I will discuss the sacrifice of Christ and our participation in it, arguing that
Ratzinger’s claim that Christ and the Paschal mystery is at the centre of theology must also
be understood in theurgic terms. This comes to expression as a rational (or Logos-centred) cult
23 Yves Congar, “Le sacerdoce du Nouveau Testament: mission et culte,” in Les Prêtres, eds., Jean Frisque and
Yves Congar (Paris: Cerf, 1968), 254, quoted (and translated) in Guy Mansini and Lawrence J. Welch, “The
Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests, Presbyterorum Ordinis,” in Vatican II, eds., Lamb and Levering,
222, n19, 224, n45, cf. 208, 212.
24 Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2009), 52-62, 121-131, 144-148.
25 Ratzinger, Feast Of Faith, 50.
26 Millare, “The Sacred Is Still Beautiful,” 103-105.
27 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names (De Divinis Nominibus, hereafter: DN) IV, 7 (704A), cf. Benedict
XVI, Sacramentum Caritatis, 35; Millare, “The Sacred Is Still Beautiful”; Ratzinger, Feast Of Faith, 97-
126; Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth, 33, 41; Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 129-170. For notes on the
Pseudo-Dionysian corpus, see abbreviations, p.4, n2.
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(cf. Romans 12:1), where Christ is the ‘master theurgist,’ and believers are partakers of Him,
theourgikoì, co-workers with God or initiates in the divine work, to cite Pseudo-Dionysius.28
My contribution to Ratzinger’s argument is to develop further his argument for active par-
ticipation not only as involvement in external acts, but as a participation in “the action of God
himself.”29 While Ratzinger is already Platonic,30 I will show that his position can and should
be read more directly within a theurgic Neoplatonist context, which is central to ressourcement
theology.31 This will provide us with the metaphysical tools to ground our acts and to show
that while the main focus should not be on us, as ‘actors,’ but on God, our acts are still real and
substantial.
2 Participation, beauty, and liturgy
In a book length interview with Vittorio Messori, Ratzinger notes that the “only really effective
apologia for Christianity comes down to two arguments, namely, the saints the Church has
produced and the art which has grown in her womb”:
Better witness is borne to the Lord by the splendor of holiness and art which have arisen in the
community of believers than by the clever excuses which apologetics has come up with to justify the
dark sides which, sadly, are so frequent in the Church’s human history. If the Church is to continue
to transform and humanize the world, how can she dispense with beauty in her liturgies, that beauty
which is so closely linked with love and with the radiance of the Resurrection? No. Christians must
not be too easily satisfied. They must make their Church into a place where beauty—and hence
truth—is at home. Without this the world will become the first circle of hell.32
28 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy (De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, hereafter: EH) I, 1 (372B),
cf. Joseph Ratzinger, God Is Near Us: The Eucharist, the Heart of Life (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 2003),
27-55; Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth, 3 vols. (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2007, 2011, 2012), II, 76-
277; Joseph Ratzinger, Behold The Pierced One: An Approach to a Spiritual Christology (San Francisco,
CA: Ignatius, 1986), 13-69; Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 67-75; Peter T. Struck, “Pagan and Chris-
tian Theurgies: Iamblichus, Pseudo-Dionysius, Religion and Magic in Late Antiquity” (Ancient World 32:2,
2001), 25-38; Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, 207-217, 337-346, 349-351, 541-557.
29 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 187.
30 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 140-141.
31 Boersma, Nouvelle, 52-62, 121-131, 144-148.
32 Joseph Ratzinger and Vittorio Messori, The Ratzinger Report: An Exclusive Interview on the State of the
Church (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 1985), 129-130.
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With these striking words, we see the essence of Ratzinger’s approach to beauty. He is highly
critical of what he deems a banal focus on ‘utility.’ For him, artistic standards are of great
importance, and much of his theological career has been devoted to this question. He is adamant
that liturgy must be beautiful but for him this is not a superficial aesthetic.33 This approach to
beauty, however, is not something he has conjured up himself. As Roland Millare shows, he
is deeply indebted to Hans Urs von Balthasar (and with him, to Aquinas).34 Balthasar notes
that beauty “is the last thing which the thinking intellect dares to approach, since only it dances
as an uncontained splendour around the double constellation of the true and the good and their
inseparable relation to one another”:
No longer loved or fostered by religion, beauty is lifted from its face as a mask, and its absence
exposes features on that face which threaten to become incomprehensible to man. We no longer
dare to believe in beauty and we make of it a mere appearance in order the more easily to dispose
of it. …We can be sure that whoever sneers at her name as if she were the ornament of a bourgeois
past—whether he admits it or not—can no longer pray and soon will no longer be able to love.35
For Balthasar, modernity has reduced beauty to mere appearance. It has forgotten that, like
truth and goodness, beauty is a transcendental.36 Its ties to the other two have been cut (e.g.
“beauty is in the eye of the beholder”).37 Balthasar is not interested in aesthetics for its own sake
but approaches the question in an essentially Thomistic manner. He affirms a “transcendental
beauty” and his focus is on the fact that beauty is “objectively located at the intersection of two
33 Ratzinger, Feast Of Faith, 97-126, cf. John Jang, Beauty as a transcendental in the thought of Joseph
Ratzinger (Master’s thesis, the University of Notre Dame Australia, 2015).
34 Millare, “The Sacred Is Still Beautiful,” 103-105.
35 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, 7 vols., eds. Joseph Fessio, Brian
McNeil, and John Riches (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1982-1991), I, 18, cf. 17-127. Also see Aidan Nichols,
Redeeming Beauty: Soundings in Sacral Aesthetics (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 53-69; Aidan Nichols, The
Word Has Been Abroad: A Guide Through Balthasar’s Aesthetics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998).
36 Nichols, Redeeming Beauty, 56-59; Nichols, The Word Has Been Abroad, 1-8, cf. Jan A. Aertsen, Nature
and Creature: Thomas Aquinas’s Way of Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 144-147, 338-342, 367, 391-392;
Jan A. Aertsen, “Truth as transcendental in Thomas Aquinas” (Topoi 11:2, 1992), 159-171; Thomas Aquinas,
Disputed Questions on Truth (Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, hereafter: De ver.), q.1, a.1; Thomas
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (hereafter: ST) I, q.5, a.4, esp. ad 1; I-II, q.27, a.1. For notes on the Thomistic
corpus, see abbreviations, p.4, n1.
37 See Robert P. Mills, “Beauty, the Beholder, and the Believer” (Theology Matters 15:5, 2009), 1-16.
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moments which Thomas calls species and lumen (‘form’ and ‘splendour’).”38 While we can
distinguish between the two, they cannot be separated:
The beautiful is above all a form, and the light does not fall on this form from above and from outside,
rather it breaks forth from the form’s interior. Species and lumen in beauty are one, if the species
truly merits that name (which does not designate any form whatever, but pleasing, radiant form).
Visible form not only ‘points’ to an invisible, unfathomable mystery; form is the apparition of this
mystery, and reveals it while, naturally, at the same time protecting and veiling it. Both natural and
artistic form has an exterior which appears and an interior depth, both of which, however, are not
separable in the form itself. The content (Gehalt) does not lie behind the form (Gestalt), but within
it. Whoever is not capable of seeing and ‘reading’ the form will, by the same token, fail to perceive
the content. Whoever is not illumined by the form will see no light in the content either.39
This interplay between ‘form’ and ‘splendour’ is important. Splendour has connotations of
beauty and intelligence; of brilliance, heraldry, magnificence, majesty, brightness, even pomp.
But it also has connotations of revelation, naming, manifestation, or expression.40 Beauty is
that which is revealed, at the same time as it is the form of revelation (though the two are never
confused). And this makes sense only if we assume a participatory metaphysic. In the Divine
Names, Pseudo-Dionysius notes that what we perceive as beautiful is so because it participates
in Beauty:
For, with regard to all created things, by dividing them into participations and participants, we call
beautiful that which participates in Beauty; but beauty, the participation of the beautifying Cause
of all the beautiful things. But, the supraessential (Gk. hyperoúsion)41 Beautiful is called Beauty,
on account of the beauty communicated from Itself to all beautiful things, in a manner appropriate
to each, and as Cause of the good harmony and brightness of all things which flashes like light to
38 von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, I, 10, 70, cf. 9-11, 18-19, 22-23, 38-41, 69-79, 156-158.
39 von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, I, 151, cf. 19-23, 141-155.
40 See ‘splendour, n.,’ in Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press), and ‘splendeō,’
in Michiel de Vaan, Etymological Dictionary of Latin and the other Italic Languages (Leiden: Brill, 2008),
581.
41 The translation used for Dionysius, The Works of Dionysius the Areopagite, 2 vols., trans. John Parker (Lon-
don: James Parker and Co., 1897, 1899), uses the suffix ‘super-’ at different times. While this now de-
notes something being intensified, Parker uses it in in its classic meaning, ‘above’ or ‘beyond.’ For Pseudo-
Dionysius, God is ‘beyond being.’ See Fran O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the metaphysics of Aquinas,
new ed. (Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 65-84. I have therefore chosen to change the
suffix to ‘supra.’
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all the beautifying distributions of its fontal ray, and as calling (καλοῦν) all things to Itself (whence
also it is called Beauty) (κάλλος), and as collecting all in all to Itself.42
Or, as Aquinas phrases it, in his commentary on the Divine Names: “We call something ‘beau-
tiful’ because it is a participant in beauty. Beauty, however, is a participation in the first cause,
which makes all things beautiful. So that the beauty of creatures is simply a likeness of the di-
vine beauty in which things participate.”43 The difference between Plato’s view and the views
of Pseudo-Dionysius and Aquinas is that while the latter two assumes a Neoplatonic under-
standing of participation (as I will discuss more below), they are not envisioning participation
in a distinct realm of (Platonic) forms but in the divine (or a likeness to the divine).44 Created
beauty cannot be identified completely with the divine, as it only participates in it analogously,
but it also cannot be separated from it and it cannot exist without participating in it.
But while beauty manifests, in a majestic and magnificent manner, the very nature of truth,
as well as goodness, it remains hard to define, while also reminding us of the centrality of the
concrete. While truth, goodness, and beauty are all participatory, and thus retain an experiential
dimension,45 it seems that we recognise this more intuitively when it comes to beauty. While we
can at least imagine truth and goodness as abstractions, beauty remains unavoidably concrete
and it thus reminds us of the concreteness of reality. Neither truth, goodness, nor beauty are
abstract, but are rooted in God and particularly in the Logos (cf. John 14:6; 1 Peter 2:3). Beauty,
however, has an immediacy that allows it, more so than truth and goodness, to assert itself, to
bypass our skepticism, and to reveal God to us. We find this Balthasarian approach particularly
42 DN IV, 7 (701C).
43 Thomas Aquinas, Expositio super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, IV, 5, translated by Umberto Eco, The
Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 27. See abbreviations,
p.4, n1 for notes on the Latin text.
44 Andrew Davison, Participation in God: A Study in Christian Doctrine and Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2019), 91-108 (cf. 84-112); Rudi A. te Velde, “Participation: Aquinas and His
Neoplatonic Sources,” in Christian Platonism: A History, eds., Alexander J. B. Hampton and John Peter
Kenney (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 130, n18, 134-135, n26. See chapter one, pp. 32,
40-44.
45 Cf. von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, I, 237; Davison, Participation in God, 303-366; John Milbank and
Catherine Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, ebook version (London: Routledge, 2005), 1-16.
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in Sacramentum Caritatis, where Pope Benedict notes that the liturgy, as the rest of Christian
revelation, is “inherently linked to beauty,” that it is veritatis splendor, ‘the splendour of truth,’
i.e. something which not only looks pretty but which reveals andmakes present the transcendent
beauty of God.46 He notes that liturgy “is a radiant expression of the paschal mystery, in which
Christ draws us to himself and calls us to communion” and that “in Jesus we contemplate beauty
and splendour at their source.” God draws us in by delighting us, thus working through our form
(as Aquinas would say), and in complete freedom. He goes on to note that “God allows himself
to be glimpsed first in creation, in the beauty and harmony of the cosmos (cf. Wis 13:5; Rom
1:19-20)” and that “Christ is the full manifestation of the glory of God. In the glorification of
the Son, the Father’s glory shines forth and is communicated (cf. Jn 1:14; 8:54; 12:28; 17:1).”
Beauty here is not understood in any superficial manner but as something which actually reveals
something of God and his purposes, most particularly in the liturgy:
Beauty, then, is not mere decoration, but rather an essential element of the liturgical action, since it
is an attribute of God himself and his revelation. These considerations should make us realize the
care which is needed, if the liturgical action is to reflect its innate splendour.
For Ratzinger revelation is essentially God’s mediation of himself to us as a community, partic-
ularly in Scripture and in the liturgy (which is Scripture’s proper sitz im Leben).47 This does not
reduce to mere appearances, then, but is a participation in the divine. What we see in Ratzinger
and Balthasar, as well as in Pseudo-Dionysius and Aquinas, is the notion that beauty is not a su-
perficial characteristic of things, not just as outer ceremony or pomp, but an inner reality which
expresses itself and ultimately points to that which is truly beautiful: God himself. There is an
inherent link between beauty and harmony. In this, Ratzinger is deeply indebted to Balthasar,
46 Benedict XVI, Sacramentum Caritatis, 35.
47 See Joseph Ratzinger, The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure (Chicago, IL: Franciscan Herald Press,
1989), esp. 71-75. Also see Matthew Levering, Engaging the Doctrine of Revelation: The Mediation of the
Gospel through Church and Scripture (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2014), 80-84, cf. 59-85.
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who was himself, as other ressourcement theologians, indebted to Pseudo-Dionysius.48 Unlike
Balthasar, however, Ratzinger understands this more explicitly within a Platonic framework
(though consummated in a Christian, particularly Pseudo-Dionysian, manner).49 Following
Paul Evdokimov, Ratzinger notes that in the West, there was an almost exclusive emphasis on
“the pedagogical function of the image,” and that this came to expression in the turn from the
Romanesque style (which, like its Byzantine counterpart, had focused on the risen Christ and
on the Pantocrator, even on the Cross) to the Gothic style (with its more realistic imagery of
the crucified Lord).50 A part was played, here, by the turn from a Platonic to an Aristotelian
framework in the 13th century. Where a Platonic conception embraces the concept of ideas and
archetypes, which may be imitated in a diminished and non-identical manner, an Aristotelian
one emphasises that a thing exists in its own right and that instead of grasping essences through
seeing, we may grasp them through abstraction. Ratzinger noes that beauty is definitive for
Plato and that it coincides with the good, and ultimately with God. And this Platonic notion of
beauty, writes Ratzinger, has “has been profoundly reshaped by the interconnection of creation,
Christology, and eschatology, and the material order as such has been given a new dignity and
a new value.”51
Elsewhere Ratzinger notes that while he is “a decided Augustinian,” he is also a Chris-
tianised Platonist: “To a certain extent I am a Platonist. I think that a kind of memory, of
recollection of God, is, as it were, etched in man, though it needs to be awakened. Man doesn’t
simply know what he is supposed to know, nor is he simply there, but is a man, a being on the
48 Boersma, Nouvelle, 121-131, cf. 135-136, 138-148.
49 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 129-170, esp. 139-141, cf. Nichols, Redeeming Beauty, 63.
50 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 139, cf. 137-141.
51 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 140-141, cf. Benedict XVI, “Meeting with artists” (address given at
the Sistine Chapel, General Audience, Saturday, 21 November 2009). Also see von Balthasar, The Glory of
the Lord, I, 272-273. For a critical assessment of Ratzinger’s Platonic influences, see Dalzell, “Eucharist,
Communion, and Orthopraxis.” Dalzell attempts to argue that Ratzinger was not a Platonist but fails because
he ignores Ratzinger’s own explicit admission of Platonism.
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way.”52 Ratzinger affirms a (Christologically transformed) Platonic notion of recollection, of
contact with the Forms, also informed by a Thomistic notion that transcendent beauty itself is
something more than just this or that beautiful thing. It is a transcendental in which particulars
may participate.53 Elsewhere, Ratzinger notes that the Platonic vision has been “transformed
by the new Christian experience,” and that beauty wounds us with “beautiful wounds” through
which Christ “summons man to his final destiny.”54 For Ratzinger, beauty reminds us that
the world is fallen, that there is something amiss, and that there is something more, something
beyond the mundane.55
Beauty, when it is in its rightful place, understood as an objective value aligned with truth
and goodness, speaks to something deep inside us, drawing us in. This conception of beauty
focuses both on the transcendent nature of beauty and on our participation in it. It is decidedly
Platonic, but consummated in a Christian way. Beauty is something which may draw us in but
it must always be understood in light of Christ, aiming at Him. This involves a transformed
notion of a Platonic doctrine of participation. In Plato, ‘participation’ concerns the relation be-
tween universals and particulars.56 Commenting on this doctrine, Aristotle notes that Plato’s
main interest was in ‘ideas,’ and that he “held that all sensible things are named after them
and in virtue of their relation to them; for the plurality of things which bear the same name as
52 Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth, 33, 41, cf. Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith, 3, 4. For an argument against such
‘baptisms,’ see James K. A. Smith, Speech and Theology: Language and the logic of incarnation (London:
Routledge, 2002), 170-176.
53 Plato, Phaedo, trans. Chris Emlyn-Jones andWilliam Preddy, in Loeb Classical Library, ed. Jeffrey Hender-
son, vol. 36 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), 64-66, 72-78, 95a-107b. For a discussion of
Plato’s concept of forms or ideas, see Russell M. Dancy, Plato’s Introduction of Forms (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2004), esp. 245-315, cf. DN IV, 7 (701CD, 704ABC).
54 Joseph Ratzinger, “The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty,” message to the Communion and
Liberation (CL) meeting at Rimini (24-30 August 2002) (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2002).
55 In his translation of Pseudo-Dionysius, John Parker uses theword ‘supermundane’ to express this, for example
in EH III:III, 11 (441BC), translating huperkósmion (The Works of Dionysius the Areopagite, vol. 2, 105).
In modern parlance this would indicate something extremely mundane and boring, while in Parker’s older
usage, it means the opposite, that which transcends the mundane or earthly and goes ‘above’ or ‘beyond’ it. I
therefore suggest using ‘supramundane’ instead, as we see in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, trans.
Colm Luibheid, in collaboration with Paul Rorem (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987), 221.
56 Dancy, Plato’s Introduction of Forms, 187-206.
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the Forms exist by participation in them.”57 For Aristotle, there was no substantial difference
between this and earlier Pythagorean concepts, as he continues in the same paragraph: “[F]or
whereas the Pythagoreans say that things exist by imitation of numbers, Plato says that they
exist by participation—merely a change of term. As to what this “participation” or “imita-
tion” may be, they left this an open question.”58 Ratzinger also notes this Pythagorean thread,
pointing to Augustine’s use of the Pythagorean theory of music in his early work De musica.
For Pythagoras, Ratzinger notes, the cosmos is mathematical, orderly. “For the Pythagoreans,”
writes Ratzinger, “this mathematical order of the universe (“cosmos” means “order”!) was
identical with the essence of beauty itself. Beauty comes from meaningful inner order.”59 Au-
gustine adopted, and transformed, this concept, seeing it principally as a participation in God.
And this is at the centre of Ratzinger’s view:
The mathematics of the universe does not exist by itself, nor, as people now came to see, can it be
explained by stellar deities. It has a deeper foundation: the mind of the Creator. It comes from
the Logos, in whom, so to speak, the archetypes of the world’s order are contained. The Logos,
through the Spirit, fashions the material world according to these archetypes. In virtue of his work
in creation, the Logos is, therefore, called the “art of God” (ars = technē!). The Logos himself is
the great artist, in whom all works of art—the beauty of the universe—have their origin. To sing
with the universe means, then, to follow the track of the Logos and to come close to him. All true
human art is an assimilation to the artist, to Christ, to the mind of the Creator.60
As Pope, Ratzinger also finds this cosmic vision of liturgy in Pseudo-Dionysius, noting how he
transforms the Proclean “polytheistic universe into a cosmos created by God, into the harmony
57 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Hugh Tredennick, in Loeb Classical Library, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, vol. 271
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), 987b, cf. Plato, Phaedo, 104d-108.
58 There is a certain ambiguity between ‘participation’ (Gk. méthexis) and ‘imitation’ (Gk. mímēsis) in the Pla-
tonic tradition, where some use them interchangeably. See George F. McLean, Plenitude and Participation:
The Life of God in Man (Washington, D.C.: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2004), 49. I
think, however, that we ought to make a distinction between them. See chapter three, pp.124-125.
59 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 166, cf. 166-168. We see a clear Pythagorean influence in the later
Neoplatonic works of Iamblichus. See Ilinca Tanaseanu-Döbler, Theurgy in Late Antiquity: The Invention of
a Ritual Tradition (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 111-135.
60 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 167-168. We find this focus on order also in Aristotle, Metaphysics,
1078a36, though in a more immanent fashion, focusing on arrangement, proportion, and definiteness, and
emphasising mathematics.
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of God’s cosmos, where every force is praise of God, and to show this great harmony, this
symphony of the cosmos that goes from the Seraphim to the Angels and Archangels, to man
and to all the creatures which, together, reflect God’s beauty and are praise of God.”61 Through
this, notes Benedict, we “discover the essential characteristics of his thought”:
first and foremost, it is cosmic praise. All Creation speaks of God and is praise of God. Since
the creature is praise of God, Pseudo-Dionysius’ theology became a liturgical theology: God is
found above all in praising him, not only in reflection; and the liturgy is not something made by
us, something invented in order to have a religious experience for a certain period of time; it is
singing with the choir of creatures and entering into cosmic reality itself. And in this very way the
liturgy, apparently only ecclesiastical, becomes expansive and great, it becomes our union with the
language of all creatures. He says: God cannot be spoken of in an abstract way; speaking of God
is always - he says using a Greek word - a “hymnein”, singing for God with the great hymn of the
creatures which is reflected and made concrete in liturgical praise.62
Liturgy, as a participation in God through Christ, is structured by creation and is an expression
of it. When, for example, we celebrate Easter, we do not merely do so as an ‘anniversary’ of
the Paschal mystery but as a participation in the divinely given order of creation. Easter, in
the western tradition, at least, is on the first Sunday after the first full moon after the Spring
Equinox, when days becomes longer and brighter, and when new life springs forth. This way,
creation reminds us of how life and light becomes victorious over darkness and death. The
dating of Easter, then, is cosmic because the cosmos itself is liturgical.63 The beauty of the
liturgy expresses the beauty and order of the cosmos, but this is always rooted in transcendent
or absolute beauty, as Plato (or Socrates) tells us: “You see it appears to me if some other thing
is beautiful besides the beautiful by itself, it’s beautiful for no other reason than that it has a
share (Gk. metéxei) in that beauty. And indeed, I say everything is like this.”64 Beauty, then,
61 Benedict XVI, Pseudo-Dionysius, the Areopagite, general audience (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana,
2008).
62 Benedict XVI, Pseudo-Dionysius.
63 It should be noted, however, that Christianity understands this cosmology differently from how it is under-
stood in Pagan Neoplatonism. See chapter four, pp.140-146, 149-153.
64 Plato, Phaedo, 100c.
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has a certain order and proportion, though it cannot be reduced to that either. The parades in
Nuremberg in Nazi Germany were obviously ordered, but they were not beautiful. Beauty is a
transcendental which draws us in and aligns us with truth and goodness and it can never be cut
off from the other transcendentals. All three may be sought for their own sake. We believe p
because it is true, we want x because it is good, and we look at y because it is beautiful.65 But
beauty is more than just order, elegance, and ‘prettiness.’ It is the very brilliance or splendour
of truth and goodness, their revelation.66 But what, exactly, can beauty tell us about the nature
of participation? As noted, beauty may be enjoyed for its own sake, though in relation to the
good and the true. What characterises this enjoyment above all else is contemplation, which is
characterised by a receptive participation, as Hans Georg Gadamer notes at two different places
in Truth and Method:
[T]heoria is not to be conceived primarily as subjective conduct, as a self-determination of the
subject, but in terms of what it is contemplating. Theoria is a true participation, not something
active but something passive (pathos), namely being totally involved in and carried away by what
one sees. … Obviously what distinguishes the beautiful from the good is that the beautiful of itself
presents itself, that its being is such that it makes itself immediately evident (einleuchtend). … The
idea of the beautiful is truly present, whole and undivided, in what is beautiful.67
Beauty draws us into itself, letting us enjoy it for its own sake. More than anything, beauty
reminds us that our participation is principally receptive, that we are characterised most of all
as recipients of God’s gifts and that the ultimate gift, our telos, is to contemplate God in the
65 Roger Scruton, Beauty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 2-5, cf. 1-33. He argues that there can
exist a sinister and subversive beauty, cut off from truth and goodness, such as the Nuremberg parades or
villainous and beautiful Queens (my examples, not his). This, however, conflates beauty as such with the
(superficially) charming, elegant, or ‘pretty.’ Scruton seems also to treat beauty in a fairly extrinsic and ‘high
cultured’ manner. Also see his program on BBC2, “Why Beauty Matters” (28 November 2009). Beauty,
however, is not reducible to that, and cannot be cut off from the other transcendentals. It exists as much in a
small village church as it does in a Wagner opera, sometimes even more.
66 Benedict XVI, SacramentumCaritatis, 35, cf. von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, I, 18-24, 57-70, 115-127,
435-439, 447-462.
67 Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Truth andMethod, trans. and rev. JoelWeinsheimer and Donald G.Marshall
(London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 127, 497, cf. Rik Van Nieuwenhove, “Gadamer, Art, and Contemplation: How
to Make Sense of Sacraments in an Allegedly Post-Metaphysical World” (Louvain Studies 38:2, 2014), 111-
125; Jack Williams, “Playing church: understanding ritual and religious experience resourced by Gadamer’s
concept of play” (International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 79:3, 2018), 323-336.
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beatific vision.68 While this is also the case for truth and goodness, we have a much more
immediate and intuitive grasp of beauty. As Ratzinger notes, beauty is “an essential element of
the liturgical action, since it is an attribute of God himself and his revelation.”69 Beauty reminds
us of this, then, not principally by pointing to something else but by drawing us into itself, in a
mediate and experiential manner, through our contemplative participation in it. For Ratzinger
this happens principally through the liturgy. The reason for this is partly metaphysical, rooted
in an analogous conception of being and in the fact that God is always mediated,70 and partly
historical, rooted in God’s actions in history, particularly Christ’s institution of concrete ritual
by which to draw us into His communion:
Man himself cannot simply “make” worship. If God does not reveal himself, man is clutching empty
space. Moses says to Pharaoh: “[W]e do not know with what we must serve the Lord” (Ex 10:26).
These words display a fundamental law of all liturgy. When God does not reveal himself, man can,
of course, from the sense of God within him, build altars “to the unknown god” (cf. Acts 17:23).
He can reach out toward God in his thinking and try to feel his way toward him. But real liturgy
implies that God responds and reveals how we can worship him. In any form, liturgy includes some
kind of “institution”. It cannot spring from imagination, our own creativity—then it would remain
just a cry in the dark or mere self-affirmation. Liturgy implies a real relationship with Another, who
reveals himself to us and gives our existence a new direction.71
The liturgy is beautiful not principally because it pleases us or because it is (superficially) charm-
ing, elegant, or ‘pretty,’ but because it participates in, reveals to us, and draws us into the inner
splendour of Christ and His works. This reveals liturgy as a divine work, a theurgy, in which
we may participate. And it is precisely this theurgic thread, transformed in a Christian context,
which is picked up by ressourcement theologians in the 20th century, understood principally as
68 Van Nieuwenhove, “Gadamer, Art, and Contemplation,” 121-124.
69 Benedict XVI, Sacramentum Caritatis, 35.
70 Joseph Ratzinger,Dogma and Preaching: Applying Christian Doctrine to Daily Life, first unabridged edition
(San Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 2011), 260-271.
71 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 35-36, cf. 27-37. Also see von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, I,
527-604, esp. 571-583.
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a divine work offered for us.72 Yves Congar holds that our worship of God is first God’s self-
worship and that the ‘downward’ mediation is always prior to our (upwards) response: “Before
being latreutic, and in order to be latreutic, the Christian sacramental cult is theurgic and sote-
riological: it does not consist at first in offering, in making something rise up from us to God,
but in receiving the effective gift of God.”73 And Balthasar, discussing the beauty of God’s
favour, notes that “[s]uch beauty is the blazing forth of the primal, protological, and eschato-
logical splendour of creation even in this age of death, in which redeemed man is admitted to
participation in God’s act of praising himself in his creation.”74 And as I have noted, Ratzinger
sees the core of liturgy as a participation in the actio divina or actio Christi.75 The principal
emphasis of Balthasar, Congar, and Ratzinger (and other ressourcement theologians) is God’s
own work, and his gifts to us, as a participation in His splendour. Only secondarily do they
emphasise our return gift, flowing from God, as we participate in divine self-worship, through
Christ, as ‘the auto-eulogia of God.’76 God himself, in human flesh, enters into the old covenant
blessings and transforms them, in the Spirit. As I will discuss later, the Incarnation is absolutely
central here and it is also here we find the main difference from Pagan theurgy. Christ is not just
another man with a ‘special connection’ to the divine. In Christ, the divine and human are fully
united in one single suppositum, while remaining distinct.77 By participating in Christ, and in
72 Boersma, Nouvelle, 52-62, 121-131, 144-148, cf. Crystal Addey, Divination and Theurgy in Neoplaton-
ism: Oracles of the Gods (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016); Alan Philip Darley, “Ritual as erotic anagogy in
Pseudo-Dionysius: a Reformed critique” (International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 79:3, 2018),
261-278; Anne Sheppard, “Theurgy,” in Oxford Classical Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2015); Charles M. Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity in Dionysius the Areopagite: “No Longer I” (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies”; Tanaseanu-Döbler, Theurgy
in Late Antiquity; Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus, 2nd ed. (Angelico
Press/Sophia Perennis, 2014); Algis Uždavinys, Philosophy and Theurgy in Late Antiquity (Kettering: An-
gelico Press/Sophia Perennis, 2014), 204-228; SarahKlitenicWear and JohnDillon,Dionysius the Areopagite
and the Neoplatonist Tradition: Despoiling the Hellenes (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).
73 Congar, “Le sacerdoce,” 254, quoted (and translated) in Mansini and Welch, “The Decree on the Ministry
and Life of Priests,” 222, n19, 224, n45, cf. 208, 212.
74 von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, I, 68.
75 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 185-191.
76 Ratzinger, Feast Of Faith, 50.
77 See chapter four, pp.140-146, cf. The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, trans., introd. and notes, Richard
Price and Michael Gaddis (3 vols., Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2005, 2007), II, 203-205; Michael
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His act, we become blessed, as we enter into this divine self-praise. Furthermore, when we say
that the Christian sacramental cult is first theurgic, this is not primarily a sequential assertion.
The latreutic response is not just secondary in time (nor necessarily so), nor is it separated from
the first, but it is logically secondary, and always reliant on God’s work, as it participates in
it. Through the liturgical ritual, the Church participates in God because it is first and foremost
the work of Christ and because we participate in Him, as St. Paul notes: “For in him the whole
fullness of deity dwells bodily, and you have come to fullness in him, who is the head of every
ruler and authority” (Colossians 2:9-10).78
With Ratzinger’s Christian appropriation and transformation of a Platonic idea of beauty
and participation, then, we see a parallel to Pseudo-Dionysius’s Christian consummation of
Neoplatonic theurgy. Indeed, what emerges is a Christian theurgic approach to liturgy, empha-
sising that God comes down to us and that we may participate in his work and give it back as
praise. Though Ratzinger never uses strict theurgic language himself, he does emphasise litur-
gical and sacramental initiation, noting that the liturgy provides a hope “which initiates us into
authentic life—the life of freedom, of intimate union with God, of pure openness to our fellow-
man,”79 and he notes that in Christ, we “gain access to reality” through sacramental symbols.80
Hans Boersma notes a clear connection between ressourcement theology and a broadly Chris-
tian Platonic metaphysics, indicating that “[c]reated objects derive their value from sacramental
participation in their transcendent ground,” holding that “historical realities of the created order
served as divinely ordained, sacramental means leading to eternal divine mysteries” and that
theology needs to “return to mystery.”81 Created reality is symbolic in that it not only points
J. Gorman, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2017), 73-125.
78 For arguments for this, both the sense in which we participate and our union with God through Christ, see
chapters three and four, pp.106-118, 153-162.
79 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 28.
80 Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, 169, cf. 169-184.
81 Boersma, Nouvelle, 16-17, 289, cf. 126, 148, 289-294. This historic approach is also central to Ratzinger.
See Ratzinger, The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure.
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towards something beyond itself, to God and to other hidden realities, but also, and perhaps
more importantly, that it participates in this. The sign (Lt. signum) both points to and partic-
ipates in a greater reality, ‘the thing’ (Lt. res) or ‘the thing signified’ (Lt. res significata).82
This entails a participatory metaphysics, emphasing the Christian cult and especially the sacra-
ments, as rooted in the divine Logos, which for Ratzinger must be understood not just in light
of the Old Testament but also the Hellenistic culture that helped spread Christianity.83 Central
to this conception, and to Ratzinger’s theology in general, is the relation between Creator and
creation, seen in light of the analogy of being, analogia entis. In his (in)famous Regensburg
Lecture, Pope Benedict notes that in the Middle Ages, we see the rise of a voluntarist notion
of God, where “God’s transcendence and otherness are so exalted that our reason, our sense of
the true and good, are no longer an authentic mirror of God, whose deepest possibilities remain
eternally unattainable and hidden behind his actual decisions,”84 in opposition to Augustine and
Aquinas’s so-called intellectualism:
As opposed to this, the faith of the Church has always insisted that between God and us, between
his eternal Creator Spirit and our created reason there exists a real analogy, in which – as the Fourth
Lateran Council in 1215 stated – unlikeness remains infinitely greater than likeness, yet not to the
point of abolishing analogy and its language. God does not become more divine when we push
him away from us in a sheer, impenetrable voluntarism; rather, the truly divine God is the God who
has revealed himself as logos and, as logos, has acted and continues to act lovingly on our behalf.
Certainly, love, as Saint Paul says, “transcends” knowledge and is thereby capable of perceiving
more than thought alone (cf. Eph 3:19); nonetheless it continues to be love of the God who is
Logos. Consequently, Christian worship is, again to quote Paul – “λογικη λατρεία”, worship in
harmony with the eternal Word and with our reason (cf. Rom 12:1).85
Ratzinger rejects univocity as an adequate way to speak of the relation between Creator and
82 For a recent discussion of this, see Joshua Kendall Mobley, Symbolism: A Brief Systematic Theology of the
Symbol (PhD dissertation, Durham University, 2020), esp. 23-96.
83 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 116-122, 138, 151-158, 213-214; Ratzinger, Jesus, II, 92.
84 Benedict XVI, The Regensburg Lecture, §26, cf. §§25-26. For the text, see James V. Schall, The Regensburg
Lecture (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2007), 130-148. Also see Emery de Gaál, The Theology of
Pope Benedict XVI: The Christocentric Shift (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 269-273.
85 Benedict XVI, Regensburg Lecture, §§27-28, cf. Jang, Beauty as a transcendental, 25-27.
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creation because it reduces God to a distant object to which we have to be ‘transported’ through
a downplaying, even a rejection, of createdness, corporeality, and finitude.86 Furthermore, at
the centre of the analogia entis, lies the fact that we only grasp God in a mediated, non-direct,
fashion, through symbols, images, and analogies, and that he does so here and now, not by
‘whisking us away.’ As Andrew Davison notes, a “participatory spirituality … is comfortable
with mediation” and “[o]ur options are not between an unmediated encounter with God, or none
at all.”87 God always comes to us mediated, in his works of creation (Romans 1) but principally
(or in a fuller way) in His word and in His sacraments. And these mediated encounters are real.
Ratzinger writes:
Scripture is obviously very much aware of the impossibility of a direct, conceptually adequate rep-
resentation of realities in the end times. All human knowing is accomplished with reference to and
within this world. Consequently, if human knowing is to make a statement about something that is
not “world”, it can do so only with the materials of this world; it cannot grasp that something in its
proper being, as it is in itself, but only by means of approximations and similarities that exist within
worldly being, therefore “analogously” in comparisons and images.88
This is precisely where beauty becomes important. We contemplate it for its own sake and it is
always mediated to us in symbols through which we “gain access to reality.”89 When we per-
form beautiful acts or create beautiful works, liturgies, prayers, or more, these always participate
in that which is beautiful in itself.90 But even so, we actually and truly perform these acts. Our
active participation is real.91 This relies on a solid doctrine of participation and on mediation, as
God is only available to us analogously and mediated.92 This is a theurgical perspective in the-
86 Which we can see from his critique of Calvin in Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, 221-224. For my critique
of Calvin, see chapter five, pp.188-196.
87 Davison, Participation in God, 342, cf. 328-331, 341-347.
88 Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching, 262, cf. 260-271.
89 Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, 169, cf. 169-184; Davison, Participation in God, 327-347; Van Nieuwen-
hove, “Gadamer, Art, and Contemplation”; Williams, “Playing church.”
90 Plato, Phaedo, 100c.
91 Davison, Participation in God, 65-83.
92 While absolute beauty for Plato is the Form or Idea of beauty, Christian thinkers, particularly Aquinas, recog-
nised that these forms were divine ideas that ultimately refer to God Himself. See Davison, Participation in
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ology, on our participation in God, our initiation into his life, understood through an analogical
and participatory metaphysic. It is rooted in the act of Christ, most particularly His sacrifice, to
which I will soon turn, and it comes to expression in our praise of him and in the works we do
for our neighbours. This ought to be expressed in beautiful ways because, as Ratzinger notes,
the “only really effective apologia for Christianity comes down to two arguments, namely, the
saints the Church has produced and the art which has grown in her womb.”93
3 Christ and the Paschal Mystery
“In the Eucharist, we are caught up and made contemporary with the Paschal Mystery of Christ,
in his passing from the tabernacle of the transitory to the presence and sight of God.”94 For
Ratzinger, theology is centred on the Incarnation, and particularly the Passion, which includes
the whole Paschal Triduum, to use liturgical language, while not being reducible to these histor-
ical events, as it exists, eternally, in Christ’s person. These elements, the historical – the ‘once
for all’ and unrepeatable sacrifice of Christ, where He was crucified, died, and rose from the
dead (cf. Hebrews 7:27) – and the personal – Christ’s self-giving on our behalf – cannot be un-
derstood in isolation from one another.95 Because of Christ’s self-giving, the Paschal mystery
is a present reality into which we may be drawn:
The liturgy is not about the sacrificing of animals, of a “something” that is ultimately alien to me.
This liturgy is founded on the Passion endured by a man who with his “I” reaches into the mystery
of the living God himself, by the man who is the Son. So it can never be a mere actio liturgica.
God, 84-112, esp. 91-101. Commenting on the notion of noeta in Pseudo-Dionysius, Alexander Golitzin,
“Pseudo-Dionysius: ACommentary on the Texts and an Introduction to Their Influence by Paul Rorem” (Mys-
tics Quarterly 21:1, 1995), 31 notes that “[w]hile the pagan Neoplatonists, Proclus and company, … proceed
to postulate an intelligible universe featuring a descending chain of eternal causes (read gods), Dionysius
breaks this chain … in order to affirm the noeta as referring exclusively either to the powers or activities of
the one God at work in creation, or else to the world of created spirits, the angels.”
93 Ratzinger and Messori, The Ratzinger Report, 129.
94 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 71, cf. 67-75.
95 Ratzinger, Behold The Pierced One, 13-69; Ratzinger, God Is Near Us, 27-55; Ratzinger, The Spirit of the
Liturgy, 67-75; Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, 207-217, 337-346, 349-351, 541-557. Also see Hans Urs
von Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale: The Mystery of Easter (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990); Kringlebotten,
«Do this in remembrance of me…», 43-50.
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Its origin also bears within it its future in the sense that representation, vicarious sacrifice, takes
up into itself those whom it represents; it is not external to them, but a shaping influence on them.
Becoming contemporary with the Pasch of Christ in the liturgy of the Church is also, in fact, an
anthropological reality. The celebration is not just a rite, not just a liturgical “game”. It is meant to
be indeed a logike latreia, the “logicizing” of my existence, my interior contemporaneity with the
self-giving of Christ. His self-giving is meant to become mine, so that I become contemporary with
the Pasch of Christ and assimilated unto God.96
For Ratzinger, sacrifices do not ‘do’ anything to God, nor do they ‘satisfy’ Him. Sacrifices are
there, ultimately, for us.97 By offering Himself, as our representative, Christ reconciles us to
God by drawing us into His communion: “And I, when I am lifted up from the earth, will draw
all people to myself” (John 12:32). The Paschal mystery is historical, but it was, so to speak,
‘reinterpreted’ by Christ in the Upper Room. Without the suffering and death, Christ’s words
of self-offering in the Upper Room become empty words, while Christ’s death, without His
‘reinterpretation’ becomes a meaningless execution. Together, however, they have meaning
as an act of rational, self-sacrificial love.98 According to Ratzinger, through the institution of
the Eucharist and His high-priestly prayer (John 17), Christ transforms His death into prayer.
He renews the cult and introduces the logikē latreía (Romans 12), what the Church Fathers
called thysía logikē, ‘spiritual/reasonable sacrifices.’99 Ratzinger traces this emphasis not only
to Scripture but to the ancient Greek cultures and their influence on the Hebrew tradition, par-
ticularly in the later tradition of ‘the sacrifice of praise.’ Israel grasped that what pleases God
is not burnt-offerings but prayer and praise from a broken and contrite heart (Psalm 51:15-17).
And from this, and the Hellenistic influences, there evolved an idea of a ‘sacrifice of the word’:
Israel was beginning to grasp that the sacrifice pleasing to God is a man pleasing to God and that
prayer, the grateful praise of God, is thus the true sacrifice in which we give ourselves back to him,
96 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 71-72.
97 Ratzinger, Jesus, II, 202-277, cf. 76-144. Also see Kringlebotten, «Do this in remembrance of me…», 43-47.
98 Ratzinger, God Is Near Us, 29-30.
99 Cf. Ratzinger, Jesus, II, 76-277.
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thereby renewing ourselves and the world. The heart of Israel’s worship had always been what we
express in the Latin word memoriale: remembrance. … The religion of Israel was at one here with
the new religious outlook of the pagan world, in which the idea was emerging that the true sacrifice
was the word or, rather, the man who in thanksgiving gave a spiritual dimension both to things and
to himself, purified them, and thereby rendered them fit for God.100
This finds its roots in later Hellenstic conceptions of worship, continuing into the later Neopla-
tonic tradition. R. M. van den Berg notes that ‘the Ancients’ generally “worshipped the gods
in the belief that divinities, if they felt neglected, could cause a lot of harm, whereas worship
in the form of offerings, hymns and the like could put them in a favourable mood.”101 The
philosophers, “from the Presocratics onwards,” however, “were strongly opposed to this (in
their opinion) blasphemous portrayal of the divine.” The gods did not need flattery, nor any
gifts or greasy smoke. “All the same,” notes van den Berg, “the worship of the gods was con-
sidered to be an honourable thing. Not because the divine needs it, but because their majesty
inspires us to do so.”102 He notes that having reflected on this, the Neoplatonist “redefined the
essence of worship in accordance with the goal of their ethics: becoming like god as far as
possible,” and we see that for Proclus, our “hymn to the Father (ὕμνος τοῦ Πατρός) does not
consist in words, nor in rites, but in becoming like him (τὴν εἰς αὐτὸν ἐξομοίωσιν).”103 We
worship the gods, according to Proclus, by reverting to them, by seeking them out and becom-
ing like them. What we see in the history of Israel, is a similar return. This, however, does
not reject words or rites in worship, but, as Ratzinger points out, it entails a transformation of
ritual, in all its concrete physicality, in the recognition, as I have noted elsewhere, that what
100 Ratzinger, God Is Near Us, 48-49, cf. 42-55.
101 R.M. van den Berg, Proclus’ Hymns: Essays, Translations, Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 18, cf. 18-22,
75-85.
102 van den Berg, Proclus’ Hymns, 18.
103 van den Berg, Proclus’ Hymns, 18, 19, cf. Plato, Republic, trans. Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy, in
Loeb Classical Library, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, vol. 237, 276 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2013), 613b1; Plato, Timaeus, trans. R. G. Bury, in Loeb Classical Library, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, vol. 234
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929), 90d; Plato, Theaetetus, trans. Harold North Fowler, in
Loeb Classical Library, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, vol. 123 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1921),
176bc.
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God desires is not our (dead) animals but our (living) selves.104 We do not see a replacement of
the Hebrew mindset with Hellenism, but the Hebrew consummation of Hellenistic philosophy,
where the essential physical nature of liturgy is maintained and transformed. This is centred, for
Ratzinger, on the entire Paschal Mystery.105 Through Christ, we, and particularly our words,
are being drawn by the words of the Word, “into God’s inner dialogue, into his reason and his
love,” not in an abstract manner but concretely and physically, since the Logos became flesh
and offered up himself not just spiritually but physically: “his body offered up, his blood poured
out.”106 Later, Ratzinger notes that the early Fathers saw in Christ’s act what modern scholars
have called ‘corporate personality,’ that Christ offers Himself on our behalf, as the Head.107
The Church’s liturgy centres around the Paschal mystery, both to celebrate it and to be drawn
into it and into Christ. There is, for Ratzinger, an intrinsic link between Christ’s offering of
Himself, both in the institution of the Eucharist and in his high-priestly prayer, and our wor-
ship. This worship, notes Ratzinger, is the worship of theWord, introduced specifically through
this self-offering. What is new in Christianity is that we no longer need the slaughter of animals
because God in Christ has inaugurated a new ‘Sacrifice of the Word,’ as Ratzinger notes else-
where, commenting on the notion of active participation: “Instead, the Word, summing up our
existence, is addressed to God and identified with the Word, the Word of God, who draws us
into true worship,” which means that our worship is “being addressed to God in full awareness
that it comes from him and is made possible by him.”108 We are made capable of worship, of
addressing God, because we participate in the divine self-address, in the fount of all rationality
104 Kjetil Kringlebotten, ““Do this in remembrance of me…” A Lutheran defence of the sacrifice of the mass”
(Studia Theologica – Nordic Journal of Theology 71:2, 2017), 134, cf. Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy,
49-53.
105 Ratzinger, Jesus, II, 202-277, cf. 76-144. Also see Ratzinger, Behold The Pierced One, 13-69; Ratzinger,
God Is Near Us, 27-55; Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 67-75, cf. von Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale;
Kringlebotten, «Do this in remembrance of me…», 41-50.
106 Ratzinger, Jesus, II, 80.
107 Ratzinger, Jesus, II, 204-206, 213-216.
108 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 186.
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and all communication, the coming of the Son from the Father and the self-giving of the Son
to the Father, in the Spirit: “Since there is relationship within God himself, there can also be a
participation in this relationship.”109 God himself, in human flesh, enters into the old covenant
blessings and transforms them, in the Spirit, allowing us to participate, particularly through the
liturgical ritual. It starts with celebration of Christ’s work, particularly His Passion. In cele-
bration, in praise and thanksgiving, we are drawn into Christ and receive His gifts. He notes
that, through our participation in Christ, we participate in the “eternal exchange and eternal
dialogue” of the Triune God, become “adoptive sons,” and receive deification: “Receiving the
Holy Spirit, the Christian glorifies the Father and really shares in the Trinitarian life of God.”110
By seeing liturgy principally as a divine work and our worship as an imitation of Christ’s own
worship, Ratzinger is providing a theurgic perspective, where the whole world participates in
God, which also reveals some central differences between Paganism and Christianity:
The cult rooted in biblical faith is not an imitation of the course of the world in miniature—as is
the case for the basic form of all cults of nature. It is an imitation of God himself and therefore
a preliminary exercise in the world to come. Only in this way does one correctly understand the
singularity of the biblical creation account. The pagan creation accounts on which the biblical story
is in part based end without exception in the establishment of a cult, but the cult in this case is
situated in the cycle of do ut des. The gods create men in order to be fed by them; men need the
gods to keep the course of the world in order. As I have already said, the biblical creation account,
too, must definitely be seen, at least in a certain sense, as the establishment of a cult. But here cult
means the liberation of men through their participation in the freedom of God and thus the liberation
of creation itself, its release into the freedom of the children of God.111
We imitate Christ through participation. He is ‘the auto-eulogia of God,’ and in imitation of Him
we also become true worshippers of God. Here, though, I must disagree partly with Ratzinger.
He notes that our cultic imitation “is not an imitation of the course of the world in miniature—
109 Ratzinger, Feast Of Faith, 25.
110 Joseph Ratzinger,Orationis formas, letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on some aspects of Christian
Meditation (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1989), 15, cf. 13-15.
111 Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, 199, cf. 187-206, esp. 197-199.
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as is the case for the basic form of all cults of nature.” Rather, it is “an imitation of God
himself.”112 Both, however, are true, as this imitation takes into itself the created order. Grace
does not destroy nature, it perfects it, and in Scripture creation itself is expressed through cult
and worship.113 Our imitation of God, however, is non-identical. We are not simply ‘copying’
Christ, or pretending to be Him, but we are, somehow, being made one with Him as we partici-
pate in His works. And this Christian vision also contains, to a certain extent, a cycle of gift and
counter-gift. Even if it is non-identical and derived or participated, it is still real. As Ratzinger
notes:
God gives that we may give. This is the essence of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, of the sacrifice of
Jesus Christ; from the earliest times, the Roman Canon has expressed it thus: “De tuis donis ac
datis offerimus tibi” – from your gifts and offerings we offer you.114
We are enabled to offer, and this offering is real, though derived or participated. We may, as
John Milbank, talk of creation (and the new creation in Christ) as ‘a gift of a gift to a gift’ and
we may, paradoxically, talk of a ‘unilateral exchange’ (or perhaps a ‘unilateral reciprocity’).115
Ratzinger understands such participation in terms of deification or theosis,116 but his focus is
not particularly on its ‘inner mechanics,’ what this actually entails ontologically, but on what
we are saved for. Through this incorporation, Christians are enabled to live ‘in Christ,’ and
most particularly to worship.117 This worship is at the centre of Ratzinger’s Christology and
soteriology. While the Cross and the Resurrectionwere both central, theywere so because Christ
112 Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, 199.
113 Simon Oliver, Creation: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017), 14-21. But
as we have noted above, pp.77-78, Ratzinger seems to disagree with himself when he discusses the cosmic
nature of Pseudo-Dionysius’s liturgical theology (Benedict XVI, Pseudo-Dionysius).
114 Ratzinger, God Is Near Us, 47, cf. 42-55.
115 John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate concerning the Supernatural (2nd ed.
Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014), 96, 108, cf. Davison, Participation in God, 65-83; Oliver, Creation,
143-157.
116 Ratzinger, Orationis formas, 15; Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, 199.
117 Romans 3:24; 6:8; 6:11; 8:1; 8:39; 12:5; 1 Corinthians 1:2; 1:30; 2 Corinthians 5:17; Galatians 2:17; 2:20;
Ephesians 1:3; Colossians 1:4. For my discussion of deification and participation in Christ, see chapter four,
pp.153-162.
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had transformed them into prayer. He did not fail in death because he had already given Himself
as a gift in his high-priestly prayer and in the institution of the Eucharist. In the Eucharistic
words, in the words of institution, notes Ratzinger, “Jesus transforms death into the spiritual
act of affirmation, into the act of self-sharing love; into the act of adoration, which is offered
to God, then from God is made available to men.”118 Through the Passion, the self-offering of
Christ in the Upper Room is consummated. Our participation in this, then, is concrete, bodily,
rational, articulate, and meaningful, as captured in St. Paul’s call for a rational or spiritual
worship: “I appeal to you therefore, brothers and sisters, by the mercies of God, to present
your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is your reasonable service
[Gk. logikē latreía]” (Romans 12:1). This concept is at the heart of Ratzinger’s theology of
the liturgy, and it has some important implications: When we worship, we do so in the Logos,
as a participation in Him, in harmony with Him.119 And this worship, and all our liturgical
acts, should be not only spiritual but reasonable or rational, and ordered (cf. 1 Corinthians
14). This is “worship shaped by the word, structured on reason (Rom 12:1).”120 Ratzinger
notes that the phrase logikē latreía is almost impossible to translate. At one place he calls it
“worship characterized by logos,” noting that it “had developed in the sphere of the encounter
of Jewish with Greek religion at around the time of Christ,” and elsewhere ‘worship in accord
with the Logos’ (Ger. Logosgemäßer Gottesdienst).121 Ratzinger is critical of those strands of
philosophy which look back to the old pagan cults. But rather than abolishing philosophy, he
argues for its Christian consummation by presenting us with a rational cult (or a ‘reasonable
service’) able to answer the challenges of the world and provide a rational grounding.122 He
118 Ratzinger, God Is Near Us, 29, cf. 27-55 (emphasis in original). Also see Ratzinger, Jesus, II, 76-144;
Kringlebotten, «Do this in remembrance of me…», 43; Ratzinger, Behold The Pierced One, 13-69, esp. 22-
32.
119 Cf. Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 58-75, 162-170; Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, 452-455, 549-
557.
120 Ratzinger, Jesus, II, 80.
121 Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, 349, 452, cf. 187-206, 349-351, 371-387, 443-460, 461-479, 494-511.
122 Cf. Ayres, Kelly, and Humphries, “Benedict XVI,” 425-430, 436-439.
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follows Pseudo-Dionysius’s approach, with Christ at the centre as the ‘master theurgist.’123 The
point of theurgy is not first to do a work for God but to be drawn into the divine work, and to be
enabled thereby to perform. This comes to expression as a rational (or Logos-centred) cult, and
this may be understood in theurgic terms where we, as partakers of Christ, become theourgikoì,
co-workers with God or initiates in the divine work.124 This entails that the central sacrifice is
that of Christ and that our worship is a participation in His worship, the worship of the Word.
This is a ‘marriage’ of Greek and Jewish notions, in this case the Greek emphasis on being and
rationality (logos as ratio) and the Jewish emphasis on the Word (logos as verbum). These two
come together in Christ the high priest (cf. John 17):
We ask that the Logos, Christ, who is the true sacrifice, may himself draw us into his act of sacrifice,
may “logify” us, make us “more consistent with the word”, “more truly rational”, so that his sacrifice
may become ours and may be accepted by God as ours, may be able to be accounted as ours. We
pray that his presence might pick us up, so that we become “one body and one spirit” with him.125
For Ratzinger, the Christian ritual is rational and coherent, precisely because it is rooted in the
Logos, who is the root of all rationality. He is “true light, which enlightens everyone” (John
1:9) and he is “the way, and the truth, and the life” (John 14:6). For Ratzinger, our worship
of God, which is rational and conformed to the Logos, cannot be separated from God’s self-
worship in Christ, though they can be distinguished. Using Struck’s formulation, Christ is the
‘master theurgist,’ the one who offers the acceptable cult and who draws us into it.126 We are
back, yet again, to the fact that Christ transforms the old rituals into prayer, renewing the cult
and introducing the logikē latreía.127 And our reasonable sacrifice, our return gift to God and
our liturgical enactments of the sacraments, are of course non-identical. When we celebrate the
123 Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” cf. Charles M. Stang, “Dionysius, Paul and the Significance of the
Pseudonym” (Modern Theology 24:4, 2008), 544-545.
124 EH I, 1 (372B).
125 Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, 350, cf. Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 188-190; Ratzinger,
Jesus, II, 103-277 (esp. 76-102).
126 Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 31-33, 37-38.
127 Cf. Ratzinger, Jesus, II, 76-277.
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Eucharist, or the Eucharistic sacrifice, we are not just mimicking (or doing a re-enactment of)
the Last Supper, or primarily engaging in a meal, but receiving the gifts of God in Christ and
offering them back as thanks and praise, somethingwhich again returns back to us as the blessing
of God, to us and to the world (cf. 1 Timothy 4:4-5).128 And that, according to Ratzinger, is
the essence of the Eucharistic celebration, of the new Passover of Christ, our giving of thanks
for our deliverance, our exodus, in Christ, as expressed in Psalm 22:27: “All the ends of the
earth shall remember and turn to the Lord; and all the families of the nations shall worship
before him.”129 But what is interesting is that while Ratzinger is focusing on the fact that our
Eucharistic celebrations are not simple ‘re-enactments’ of the Last Supper, this is equally true
of Jewish celebrations of the Passover, at least after the destruction of the Temple. We find
no mention of the four cups of wine in Exodus 12, and subsequent celebrations would also be
different just from the fact that only the first was celebrated in Egypt, on the eve of escape.
Ritual always retains a level of ‘traditional innovation.’ We thus repeat Christ’s Passover, or
“keep the feast,” to quote 1 Corinthians 5:8, not by simply re-enacting or identically copying
Christ’s Last Supper with his disciples, but by celebrating the Eucharist according to the many
rites that have developed over the centuries, focusing specifically on the thanks and praise of
Christ in which we are made partakers.130 These concrete rituals are grounded in God, and
particularly in the person of Christ, as the ‘centre piece’ of the Eucharistic celebration, and
in the work of the Holy Spirit.131 Ratzinger is adamant that the Church is not ‘mechanically’
reciting words to God in the liturgy but truly participating in God or in God through Christ,
128 This point also gave rise to a very definitive shift, as indicated by Ratzinger’s choice of title for a in Ratzinger,
Jesus, II, 138-144: “From the Last Supper to the Sunday Morning Eucharist.” This change tells us that
while the institution of the Eucharist is central, its fulfilment is found in the Resurrection. The early Church
celebrated the Eucharist (principally) on the first day of the week, on Sunday morning or ‘the Lord’s day,’
with emphasis on our encounter with Christ resurrected.
129 Cf. Ratzinger, Jesus, II, 204-205.
130 Cf. Gregory Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, 3rd ed. (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2005), 718-719.
131 Benedict XVI, Sacramentum Caritatis, 8, 12-13, 15-16, 36-37, 48, 73, 76, 78, 94, 97; Ratzinger, Jesus, II,
104.
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celebrating His deeds. This has deep roots in the Christian theurgic tradition, as highlighted by
Pseudo-Dionysius (probably describing what we call the post-communion prayer):
Meanwhile, the whole order of the Priests having been collected together in hierarchical order, and
communicated in the most Divine mysteries, finishes with a holy thanksgiving, after having rec-
ognized and sung the favours [Gk. cháritas] of the works of God [Gk. τȭn theourgiṓn], according
to their degree. So that those, who have not partaken and are ignorant of things Divine, would
not attain to thanksgiving, although the most Divine gifts are, in their essential nature, worthy of
thanksgiving. But, as I said, not having wished even to look at the Divine gifts, from their incli-
nation to things inferior, they have remained throughout ungracious towards the boundless graces
of the works of God. “Taste and see,” say the Oracles, for, by the sacred initiation of things Di-
vine, the initiated [Gk. tṓn theíōn muḗsei] recognize their munificent graces, and, by gazing with
utmost reverence upon their most Divine height and breadth in the participation, they will sing the
supercelestial beneficent works of the Godhead with gracious thanksgiving.132
In celebration, in praise and thanksgiving, we are drawn into Christ and receive His gifts. We
become imitators of Him, participants in Him. And through this participation in the master
theurgist, we are “caught up and made contemporary with the Paschal Mystery of Christ.”133
The point of the sacrifice, then, is not principally to appease God or to give Him His ‘pound of
flesh’ but to make His salvation available to us and to draw us into Christ. It is not principally
about what we do but about what is done for us and, more importantly, with us. Ratzinger sees
any external actions on our part as secondary to the actio of God:
Doing really must stop when we come to the heart of the matter: the oratio. It must be plainly
evident that the oratio is the heart of the matter, but that it is important precisely because it provides
a space for the actio of God. … [O]ne must be led toward the essential actio that makes the liturgy
what it is, toward the transforming power of God, who wants, through what happens in the liturgy,
to transform us and the world.134
We are drawn into the Paschal mystery and this sacrifice transforms us, not because God has
been appeased by his ‘pound of flesh’ but because we become one with God through Christ, the
132 EH III:3, 15 (445BC), cf. Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 34.
133 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 71, cf. 67-75; Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, 197-199.
134 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 188, 189.
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God-man. As Ratzinger notes, in a lecture on Sacrosanctum Concilium and the theology of the
liturgy, sacrifice consists “in a process of transformation, in the conforming of man to God, in
his θείωσις (theōsis, in English “theosis”), as the Fathers would say.”135 Sacrifice principally
concerns the transformation of those for whom the sacrifice is performed, not the appeasement
of the one to whom the sacrifice is offered (though in Scripture we do see that God is being
appeased precisely when we are transformed and when we do good).136
Ratzinger follows Iamblicheus’s and Pseudo-Dionysius’ logic, emphasising that this prin-
cipally concerns a divine work into which we are drawn, and that Christ is the principle agent.
Though we do not call down the Holy Spirit in statues, we do call Him down onto bread and
wine, on the promise of Christ, “so that they may become for us the Body and Blood of our Lord
Jesus Christ.”137 We participate in Christ’s own prayer, praying in and with him, in “God’s gift
of himself in his Son’s self-emptying love.”138 Christ is the ‘master theurgist’ and by partici-
pating in Him we are drawn into his life. We become co-workers with God or initiates in the
divine work and this union with Christ is our ultimate end. We are to become one with the
divine Logos in such a way that we are transformed into Him. As Christ sanctifies himself,
we are thereby sanctified through participation, as Christ Himself notes: “Sanctify them in the
truth; thy word is truth” (John 17:17) and “I consecrate myself” (John 17:19). Ratzinger notes
that this concept, of being sanctified or consecrated, carries within itself a paradox: the one
who is sanctified or consecrated is set apart from the world, but through this he exists for the
135 Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, 551, cf. 541-557.
136 Psalm 50:8-14; Psalm 51:16-17; Psalm 119:108; Hosea 6:6; Matt 9:13; 12:7; Mark 12:28-34; Romans 12:1-2;
Hebrews 10:4-10.
137 Eucharistic prayer II in The RomanMissal, third typical edition (Washington, D.C.: United States Conference
of Catholic Bishops, 2011), 101, cf. Missale Romanum, Editio Typica Tertia (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice
Vaticana, 2008), 101. If not otherwise noted, citations from Missale Romanum and Roman Missal use para-
graph numbers (which are identical in the two), not page numbers. Also see Benedict XVI, Sacramentum
Caritatis, 12-13, cf. 8, 15-16, 36-37, 48, 73, 76, 78, 94, 97. We are not dynamically being transported away
to some ‘spiritual realm’ but the Spirit comes to us and brings Christ to us. See Ratzinger, Theology of the
Liturgy, 221-224, cf. Simon Oliver, “The Eucharist before Nature and Culture” (Modern Theology 15:3,
1999), 342-350.
138 Ratzinger, Jesus, II, 128, cf. 125-130. Also see Ayres, Kelly, and Humphries, “Benedict XVI,” 427-428.
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world. Israel was set apart so that it could be there for all, through the Messiah, ‘the Holy One
of God.’139 The Son is sent from the Father to carry out his will in order to liberate humankind
from bondage to sin. So, when Christ says, “I consecrate myself,” He is offering Himself up as
sacrifice, for us, precisely because he is setting himself apart. The Logos, the Word, is the high
priest and He was made flesh “for the life of the world” (John 6:51). Our deliverance, then, is
not purely extrinsic but also intrinsic and transformative, as we are made one with Christ.
4 Conclusion
For Ratzinger, the Logos, Christ, is at the centre of theology, though always understood in
a Trinitarian manner. When we participate in God’s work, or Christ’s work, we partake of
the inner life of the Trinity, the ‘inter-communication’ of God, through the Spirit. As active
participants in the liturgy, especially in baptism and in the celebration of the Eucharist, we are
drawn in to this life, not by ‘leaving behind’ our createdness and culture, but in and through
it. This comes to expression particularly in all that is beautiful, as this not only delights us but
draws us into the ultimate Beauty in which all beautiful things participate. This beauty is not
principally external but internal. When Ratzinger introduces his interpretation of participatio
actuosa, he is not ignoring practical involvement or outwards expression but he is saying that
this must be understood as secondary to the ‘inner’ or personal participation in the action of
God, the action of Christ, which, through the hypostatic union, also become the embodied action
of humanity. If we have too much of a focus on these secondary elements, we might end up
overshadowing the primary sense of participation. And we find this, expressed through the
language of beauty, in 1 Peter 3:3-4: “Do not adorn yourselves outwardly by braiding your hair,
and by wearing gold ornaments or fine clothing; rather, let your adornment be the inner self
139 Ratzinger, Jesus, II, 85-90.
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with the lasting beauty of a gentle and quiet spirit, which is very precious in God’s sight.”
Though he does not use this language himself, Ratzinger’s approach is deeply theurgic.
We are made co-workers with God but the work we perform, or participate in, is not first and
foremost our own but God’s. It is the actio divina or the actio Christi, though precisely through
participation it becomes, really and genuinely, our work. Through this act, this work of the
divine-human ‘liturgist’ (Hebrews 8:2), this theurgy, we are equipped not just to praise God
in the Church on a Sunday morning, or whenever we celebrate the Eucharist, but to praise
God in all of creation, and in our everyday lives, as we practice the true religion. In Ratzinger’s
understanding of ‘active participation,’ liturgical participation is first and foremostmetaphysical
and internal, which does not mean ‘intellectual’ or ‘non-bodily,’ but personal. We enter into a
personal – and indeed interpersonal – communion with the Triune God and with His Church.
For Ratzinger, liturgy is always expressed in concrete ritual but cannot be reducible to this or
that rite, or this or that concrete external activity. It must always refer back to its foundation in
God, in the divine Logos in whom we are made partakers. We are oriented towards the Father,
through Christ, in the Spirit. Our glorification of God is first and foremost a response to God’s
original address, a response that is in many ways God’s own response in us, and it expresses
itself in rational ways. And this, Christ’s own work, his theurgy, his praise of God, finds its
ultimate expression in the liturgy, particularly in the Eucharistic celebration.
In the next chapter, in critical dialogue with Catherine Pickstock,140 I develop this further,
in a more explicitly theurgic direction, discussing how the liturgy, as a rational participation
in the order of God Himself, orients us to God, finding its consummation in the Eucharist.
Like Ratzinger, Pickstock’s (and radical orthodoxy’s) approach is Platonic but more explicitly
Neoplatonic and theurgic.
140 Catherine Pickstock, Repetition and Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 171-188; Catherine




Participation, ritual, and philosophy
1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, through a thorough engagement of Joseph Ratzinger’s liturgical theol-
ogy, I established that when we speak of ‘active participation’ in the liturgy, this participation
should be understood metaphysically and in theurgic terms. Theurgy gives primacy to the di-
vine act but allows us to participate in it, making us theourgikoì, co-workers of the divine work.1
This chapter explores the philosophical side of this, arguing that because we find in the divine
the ultimate consummation and union of thought and action, theurgy is neither the opposite nor
the destruction of philosophy or reason, but its ritual consummation.
Assuming a participatorymetaphysics and the analogy of being, which allows us tomaintain
that while God cannot fully be grasped, we may still participate in Him and imitate Him through
this participation,2 I will argue that this finds its grounding in the incarnate Logos, the ground
of rationality, and comes to expression most fully in the liturgy, where the acts of Christ, most
particularly His sacrifice on the Cross, is offered to the Church in the Eucharist and repeated
there, non-identically, as an active participation in, and a contemplation of, the inner life of
God.3 What I attempt here is not simply to ‘appropriate’ philosophical traditions, particularly
1 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy (De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, hereafter: EH) I, 1 (372B);
Joseph Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, commemorative ed. (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 2018), 129-
170, 185-191. For notes on the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus, see abbreviations, p.4, n2.
2 See Alan Philip Darley, “Predication or Participation? What is the Nature of Aquinas’ Doctrine of Analogy?”
(The Heythrop Journal 57, 2016), 312-324; Johannes Hoff, The Analogical Turn: Rethinking Modernity with
Nicholas of Cusa (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2013); Simon Oliver, Creation: A Guide for the Perplexed
(London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017), 64-75; Erich Przywara, Analogia Entis: Metaphysics: Original
Structure and Universal Rhythm, trans. John R. Betz and David Bentley Hart (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
2014), cf. Daniel P. Horan, Postmodernity and Univocity: A Critical Account of Radical Orthodoxy and John
Duns Scotus (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2014), esp. 157-188.
3 Rik Van Nieuwenhove, “Gadamer, Art, and Contemplation: How to Make Sense of Sacraments in an Al-
legedly Post-Metaphysical World” (Louvain Studies 38:2, 2014), 111-125; Catherine Pickstock, After Writ-
ing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 176-273, esp. 223-228,
238-266; Catherine Pickstock, Repetition and Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 171-197.
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Platonic ones, as a substitute for Christian theology, but to ‘baptise’ them, taking them up into
something larger to transform or consummate them, analogously to the way grace transforms
nature.4 My goal is not to ‘overcome’ or ‘cancel’ Neoplatonic philosophy but to integrate it into
a larger Christian context and re-interpret it. As we saw in chapter two, Ratzinger notes that
in Christian theology, “Plato’s conception has been profoundly reshaped by the interconnection
of creation, Christology, and eschatology, and the material order as such has been given a new
dignity and a new value.”5 Arguing for a theurgical, liturgical, and ritual approach to theology,
this chapter focuses on the nature of philosophy and participation. Participation, though, can be
either be understood as fundamental, the way we participate in something that gives us being
and direction (conveyed by the Greek term méthexis) or as non-identical and imitative, the way
in which we live out of the fundamental mode (conveyed by the Greek term mímēsis).6 The
absolutely fundamental aspect of participation is grounded first and foremost in God. As we
read in Isaiah 45:5-7:
I am the Lord, and there is no other; besides me there is no god. I arm you, though you do not know
me, so that they may know, from the rising of the sun and from the west, that there is no one besides
me; I am the Lord, and there is no other. I form light and create darkness, I make weal and create
woe; I the Lord do all these things.
But even though there is no other besides God, we find that paradoxically, all created things,
as participants in God, having no existence in themselves apart from this participation, are still
real and have their own integrity, a ‘derived solidity.’7 This participation accounts both for
our existence and for our acts. As Andrew Davison notes, “be-ing is the innermost, and most
4 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (hereafter: ST) I, q.1, a.8, ad 2. For notes on the Thomistic corpus,
see abbreviations, p.4, n1.
5 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 140-141, cf. Pickstock, After Writing, 3-46, 169-273.
6 Andrew Davison, Participation in God: A Study in Christian Doctrine and Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2019), 296-300; John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, ebook
version (London: Routledge, 2005), 86-93; Plato, Phaedo, trans. Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy, in
Loeb Classical Library, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, vol. 36 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017),
100bc.
7 Davison, Participation in God, 65-83.
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significant, of all actions.”8 And later in the book he adds that thinking about “participation
in action” is not to “step away from” the topic of “participation in being,” precisely because
being is already an act (of ‘be-ing’): “Participation in being therefore already is participation
in act, participation in agency.”9 One tradition which has a particular focus on participation is
radical orthodoxy (RO).10 RO notes that creation has its existence through participation in the
triune God and that we cannot act except by participation in the actus essendi. In one of the
‘founding texts’ of RO it is said that through this theological approach, “one is led to articulate
a more incarnate, more participatory, more aesthetic, more erotic, more socialised, even ‘more
Platonic’ Christianity”:
The central theological framework of radical orthodoxy is ‘participation’ as developed by Plato
and reworked by Christianity, because any alternative configuration perforce reserves a territory
independent of God. The latter can lead only to nihilism (though in different guises). Participation,
however, refuses any reserve of created territory, while allowing finite things their own integrity.11
This participatory approach entails that “every discipline must be framed by a theological per-
8 Davison, Participation in God, 33, n80, cf. ST I, q.8, a.1.
9 Davison, Participation in God, 217, 218, cf. 68-79, 217-235.
10 Daniel Haynes, “The Metaphysics of Christian Ethics: Radical Orthodoxy and Theosis” (The Heythrop Jour-
nal 52, 2011), 659-671; John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, eds., Radical Orthodoxy: A
new theology (London: Routledge, 1999), esp. 1-20; Adrian Pabst, Metaphysics: The Creation of Hierar-
chy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012); James K. A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a
Post-secular Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), 185-229. For some central writings in
RO, see John Milbank, “Postmodern Critical Augustinianism: A Short Summa in Forty Two Responses to
Unasked Questions” (Modern Theology 7:3, 1991), 225-237; John Milbank, “Radical Orthodoxy and Protes-
tantism Today: John Milbank in Conversation” (Acta Theologica, Supplement, 25, 2017), 43-72; Simon
Oliver, “Henri de Lubac and Radical Orthodoxy,” in T&T Clark Companion to Henri de Lubac, ed., Jor-
dan Hillebert (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017), 393-418; Simon Oliver and John Milbank, eds.,
The Radical Orthodoxy Reader (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009); Adrian Pabst and Christoph Schneider,
Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy: Transfiguring the World Through the Word
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2009); Graham Ward, “In the Economy of the Divine: A Response to James K. A.
Smith” (PNEUMA 25:1, 2003), 115-120; Graham Ward, “Radical Orthodoxy: Its ecumenical vision” (Acta
Theologica, Supplement, 25, 2017), 29-42. For critical engagements with RO, see Wayne J. Hankey and
Douglas Hedley, eds., Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy: Postmodern Theology, Rhetoric and Truth (Lon-
don: Routledge, 2005); Horan, Postmodernity and Univocity; Lisa Isherwood andMarko Zlomislić, eds., The
Poverty of Radical Orthodoxy (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2012); Hyeongkwon Lim, John Milbank
and the Mystery of the Supernatural: His Postmodern Engagement with Henri de Lubac (PhD dissertation,
Université de Strasbourg, 2013); Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy; James K.A. Smith and James H.
Olthuis, eds. Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition: Creation, Covenant, and Participation (Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005).
11 Milbank, Pickstock, and Ward, eds., Radical Orthodoxy, 3, cf. 1-20.
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spective,” and that any attempt to understand creation as self-standing would be incoherent and
nihilistic, as it would create “a zone apart from God, grounded literally in nothing.”12 This
notion of participation is, for RO, both Christological and cultural. John Milbank makes the
point that méthexis traditionally “concerned a sharing of being and knowledge in the Divine”
and that “[t]hose who still espouse this perspective tend to play down the importance of lan-
guage, culture, time and historicity as encouraging a relativism incompatible with any vision of
a metaphysical order.”13 Milbank, however, has “always tried to suggest that participation can
be extended also to language, history and culture: the whole realm of human making” because
“being and knowledge” is not the only thing that “participate[s] in a God who is and who com-
prehends; also human making participates in a God who is infinite poetic utterance: the second
person of the Trinity.”14 For Milbank, then, Christ, as God and man, is the one who makes our
rituals liturgical, in the theological sense, when they are assumed into him.
To explore this participatory approach, in liturgical and theurgic terms, I will engage the
philosophical theology of Catherine Pickstock, who has been central to the recovery of partic-
ipatory metaphysics, Christian Platonism, and the consummation of philosophy in doxology.15
She maintains that liturgy, with the Eucharistic celebration as its centre, is the consummation of
philosophy and that “language exists primarily, and in the end only has meaning as, the praise of
the divine.”16 Arguing against a modernistic ‘flattening out’ of reality, in modern and postmod-
12 Milbank, Pickstock, and Ward, eds., Radical Orthodoxy, 3. RO points out that modernity presupposes the
existence of the secular without acknowledging that it is actually theological, ending up creating a ‘perverse
theology’ with its own liturgies, traditions, and narratives (over and against Christian theology and liturgy).
See JohnMilbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd. ed (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006),
24, 68; Milbank, Pickstock, and Ward, eds., Radical Orthodoxy, i.
13 John Milbank, Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (London: Routledge, 2003), ix.
14 Milbank, Being Reconciled, ix, cf. Graham Ward, Cities of God (London: Routledge, 2000).
15 See Milbank, Pickstock, and Ward, eds., Radical Orthodoxy; Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy, 30-
122. For some engagements with Pickstock, see John F. Baldovin, Reforming the Liturgy: A Response to the
Critics (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2008), 13-32; Jose Isidro Belleza, Lex Loquendi, Lex Orandi:
Pickstock, Aquinas, and the Reform of the Roman Offertoria (Master’s Thesis, the University of Berkeley,
2019); Dora Bernhardt, The Problem of Orality and Literacy: An Inquiry through the Voice of Catherine Pick-
stock (PhD dissertation, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2019); Julie Gittoes, Anamnesis and the Eucharist:
Contemporary Anglican Approaches (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 73-99.
16 Pickstock, After Writing, xiii, cf. 167-273.
101
ern philosophy but also in liturgical reforms,17 she argues for a liturgical and ritual worldview,
where created reality find meaning as it partakes of divinity. This, however, is not an abstract
but a practical life, understood in imitative or emulative terms, rooted in a more fundamental
concept of metaphysical participation:
Liturgy is therefore not a constative representation now and then of what is praise-worthy, but consti-
tutes a whole way of life. To give praise to what is praise-worthy by definition involves participation
in it, just as emulation (Socratic mimesis) of the transcendent good must perforce involve methexis
in the good.18
Earlier in the book, citing Plato, she notes that “the measure of good ethical practice is as much,
or more, determined by its orientation towards liturgical praise of the divine as by the ideal of
rational contemplation.”19 And elsewhere, she notes that throughout history, humankind has
lived in a ritual or sacramental cosmos, making sense of the world through religion and ritual.
Ritual is not only an important and essential component of human history and human culture.
No, it is its defining characteristic.20 Pointing to certain archaeological findings, she maintains
that that these “imply the primacy of ritual over material and economic factors in the develop-
ment of society.”21 She maintain that to understand humanity, we need to understand ritual, and
we need to understand it in a holistic manner, as material and spiritual, practical and intellec-
tive, helping to shape life as a whole. It is a grounded and all-encompassing engagement with
17 Pickstock, After Writing, 3-100, 169-266; Catherine Pickstock, “A Short Essay on the Reform of the Liturgy”
(New Blackfriars 78:912, 1997), 56-65.
18 Pickstock, After Writing, 39.
19 Pickstock, After Writing, 4, cf. 3-4, 135-140, 169-266.
20 Catherine Pickstock, “The Ritual Birth of Sense” (Telos 162, 2013), 29-55, cf. Crystal Addey,Divination and
Theurgy in Neoplatonism: Oracles of the Gods (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 171-291; Eamon Duffy, The
Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England, 1400–1580, 2nd ed. (New Haven/London: Yale
University Press, 2005); Sigurd Hareide, “Messuskýringar: Old Norse Expositions of the Latin Mass and
the Ritual Participation of the People,” in Intellectual Culture in Medieval Scandinavia, c. 1100–1350, ed.,
Stefka Georgieva Eriksen (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2016), 337-371; Catherine Pickstock, “Ritual. An
introduction” (International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 79:3, 2018), 217-221; Roy A. Rappaport,
Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); James K.
A. Smith, Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and Cultural Formation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Academic, 2009), 17-129, esp. 19-27, 39-110; Barry Stephenson, Ritual: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015), 1-4, 21-37.
21 Pickstock, “The Ritual Birth of Sense,” 29.
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reality, seeking to “re-align inner motive and outer shape via the formation of virtues through
the exercise of certain disciplines that are embedded within, and constitutive of, a way of life”:
Indeed, rather than appending ritual activity to the normative instrumental activity of the everyday,
it is implied that, if anything, it is the other way around. Far from being an aberrant or secondary
species of action, ritual can be seen as a typical or defining mode characteristic of all action.22
For Pickstock, then, ritual does not ‘overcome’ or ‘escape’ rational contemplation but consum-
mates it. As Barry Stephenson puts it: “Ritual is a way of thinking and knowing.”23 Her ap-
proach is Platonic but also Proclean and, more importantly, Pseudo-Dionysian and Thomistic.24
Like Ratzinger, she consummates Plato in a Christian way, maintaining that he is a forerunner
of her doxological approach to philosophy. She attempts to read Platonic philosophy in a Chris-
tian context, not by ‘overcoming’ it but by perfecting it and leading it to its rightful place, noting
that “the Plotinian psychic and ascending interpretation of Plato needs to be complemented by
a Proclean doxological (‘theurgic’) and descending interpretation.”25 Seeing a profound link
between ritual and rationality, holding that ritual expression is intellectual apprehension, she
maintains that her approach is Platonic, Christian, and theurgic,26 though some critics find is-
22 Pickstock, “The Ritual Birth of Sense,” 31, cf. 31-35; Armand Leon van Ommen, “Ritual repetition: Creating
safe havens for sufferers or boring experiences?” (Yearbook for Ritual and Liturgical Studies 32, 2016), 125-
141. Ritual, however, although it has innovative elements, is always something received, something we are
initiated into. See Stephenson, Ritual, 51, 54-69, 101, 108-110, esp. 56-62.
23 Stephenson, Ritual, 3, cf. Addey, Divination and Theurgy, 171-213, esp. 183-189, 191-213.
24 Pickstock, After Writing, esp. 1-46; Catherine Pickstock, “Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary
Significance” (Modern Theology 21:4, 2005), 543-574 (esp. 549, 556-558, 562-563, 567-568); Catherine
Pickstock, “Epochs of Modernity: The Implications for Modernity and Post-modernity of Univocity” (Dis-
tinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 6:1, 2005), 65-86 (esp. 73-84); Catherine Pickstock, “Jus-
tice and Prudence: Principles of Order in the Platonic City” (The Heythrop Journal 42, 2001), 269-282 (esp.
270); Catherine Pickstock, “The Late Arrival of Language: Word, Nature and the Divine in Plato’s Cratylus”
(Modern Theology 27:2, 2011), 238-262; Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, 55, 173-178; Pickstock, “Rit-
ual,” 218-220; Pickstock, “The Ritual Birth of Sense”; Catherine Pickstock, “The Sacred Polis: Language as
Synactic Event” (Literature and Theology 8:4, 1994), 367-383.
25 Pickstock, “Justice and Prudence,” 270, cf. Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 140-141. For a more nuanced
discussion of the Plotinian attitude towards theurgy and ritual, see Addey, Divination and Theurgy, 173-180,
199-211. While Pickstock frames her theological project explicitly in theurgic terms, this element of her
thought, and of other RO theologians, has not been researched in great detail.
26 Pickstock, After Writing, 4, 135-140, 223-228, 247, 254, 265; Pickstock, “Justice and Prudence,” 276-281;
Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, 62, 78, 147, 178-179, 183, 185; Pickstock, “Ritual,” 219-220; Pickstock,
“The Ritual Birth of Sense.”
103
sue with this, particularly her use of Plato.27 Engaging her theology, this chapter argues that
theurgy is a mode of philosophy consummated in Christ and offered non-identically in the Eu-
charist. To argue this, I will divide the chapter in two sections.
First, engaging Crystal Addey’s work on theurgy as a rational endeavour, as well as Pick-
stock’s theology, and discussing the philosophical dimension of our ritual participation in the
divine, and particularly St. Paul’s treatment of order in the liturgy, I argue that ritual is a defining
characteristic of humanity, that there is no contradiction between ritual and rationality, and that
philosophy, ideology, and language find their consummation, their telos, in ritual, particularly
in worship, as a participation in the divine order or an orientation to God in Christ. This is signif-
icant because it provides us with a non-Cartesian understanding of rationality and of humanity,
showing us how action and ritual can be an expression of rationality, that ritual expression is
intellectual apprehension.28 Ritual, rather than being irrational, is the ultimate expression of
rationality, because it is a holistic and ordered participation in the ground of rationality.
Secondly, discussing Pickstock’s account of transubstantiation as ‘the condition of possibil-
ity for all meaning,’29 I will argue that a Christian account of theurgy, as a mode of philosophy,
27 Eli Diamond, “Catherine Pickstock, Plato and the Unity of Divinity and Humanity,” in Deconstructing Radi-
cal Orthodoxy, eds. Hankey and Hedley, 1-16; Wayne J. Hankey, “Philosophical religion and the Neoplatonic
turn to the subject,” inDeconstructing Radical Orthodoxy, eds. Hankey and Hedley, 17-30; Wayne J. Hankey,
“Theoria versus Poesis: Neoplatonism and Trinitarian Difference in Aquinas, John Milbank, Jean-Luc Mar-
ion and John Zizioulas” (Modern Theology 15:4, 1999), 387-415; Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy,
87-122, esp. 103-108; James K. A. Smith, Speech and Theology: Language and the logic of incarnation
(London: Routledge, 2002), 170-176; James K. A. Smith, “Will the real Plato Please Stand Up? Participa-
tion versus Incarnation,” in Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition, eds., Smith and Olthuis, 61-72.
For some more sympathetic takes on this trend in RO, see Michael Northcott, “The Metaphysics of Hope and
the Transfiguration of Making in the Market Empire,” in Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical
Orthodoxy, eds., Pabst and Schneider, 93-107; Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of
Iamblichus, 2nd ed. (Angelico Press/Sophia Perennis, 2014), xix-xxxiv.
28 Addey,Divination and Theurgy, 1-42, 171-213, 273-275; Pickstock, “The Ritual Birth of Sense,” cf. Therese
Marie Ignacio Bjørnaas, “Imago Dei og kroppsliggjort væren: En funksjonshemmingsteologi i lys av Thomas
Aquinas,” in Religiøst medborgerskap: Funksjonshemming, likeverd og menneskesyn, eds., Inger Marie Lid
andAnna Rebecca Solevåg (Oslo: Cappelen DammAkademisk, 2020), 269-286; Naomi Irit Richman, “What
does it feel like to be post-secular? Ritual expressions of religious affects in contemporary renewal move-
ments” (International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 79:3, 2018), 295-310; Daniel G. W. Smith, “Rit-
uals of knowing: rejection and relation in disability theology and Meister Eckhart” (International Journal of
Philosophy and Theology 79:3, 2018), 279-294; Stephenson, Ritual, 51, 54-69, 101, 108-110.
29 Pickstock, After Writing, xv, 261-264.
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finds its culmination in the Eucharistic celebration. Transubstantiation points to Christ’s re-
demptive act, made present for us, but it also reveals the true nature of creation as participating
in God and in His act. Discussing the doctrine of transubstantiation in light of Platonic philos-
ophy (particularly theurgic Neoplatonism), I will argue that this is rooted in a metaphysics of
participation and analogy. I will examine particularly the distinct modes of participation, fo-
cusing on the relationship between méthexis and mímēsis, as we can only understand the latter
in relation to the former.30 While this distinction may not be self-evident in Platonic scholar-
ship,31 I will argue that it highlights the difference between our fundamental participation in
God, whereby we are both kept in existence from moment to moment and enabled to act (which
includes our being as Christians, participating in Christ), and the non-identical and imitative
ways in which we may give expression to this participation, the apex of which is found in the
celebration of the Eucharist, which is both given to us as a gift and offered back, non-identically,
in thanksgiving.32 But while these are distinct, they are not separable, as human agency partic-
ipates in divine agency.
Together, these two sections help us to grasp both that liturgy needs a proper grounding,
philosophically and metaphysically, and that this grounding is not separable from its ritual ex-
pression but that this expression is its heart or consummation, centred on the Eucharist as “the
fount and apex of the whole Christian life,” to use the language of the Second Vatican Coun-
30 Milbank and Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, 86-93; Pickstock, After Writing, 14, 20, 34, 38-40, 45, 59, 76, 208-
213; van Ommen, “Ritual repetition”; Catherine Pickstock, “Liturgy, Art and Politics” (Modern Theology
16:2, 2000), 159-180; Catherine Pickstock, “Matter and Mattering: The Metaphysics of Rowan Williams”
(Modern Theology 31:4, 2015), 599-617; Pickstock, “Ritual,” 219-220; Pickstock, “Sacred Polis,” 377-381.
31 Commenting on Plato’s Parmenides, George F. McLean, Plenitude and Participation: The Life of God in
Man (Washington, D.C.: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2004), 49 sees them as equivalents,
noting that “the relation of participation (mimesis or methexis) is not added to the multiple beings after they
have been constituted; it is constitutive of them: their reality is precisely to image.” Aristotle likewise likens
the Pythagorean notion of imitation to Platonic participation, saying that “whereas the Pythagoreans say that
things exist by imitation of numbers, Plato says that they exist by participation—merely a change of term.”
See Metaphysics, trans. Hugh Tredennick, in Loeb Classical Library, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, vol. 271
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), 987b (cf. 987ab, 988a).
32 See Arne Melberg, Theories of mimesis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 10-50; David
Torevell, Liturgy and the Beauty of the Unknown: Another Place (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 161-182.
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cil’s Dogmatic Constitution on the Church.33 My contribution to Pickstock’s argument is both
to place this within a Pauline theology of worship, clarifying why ritual orders us to God, and
relating it more directly to a theurgic Neoplatonist context, not just in Iamblichus and Proclus,
but also Pseudo-Dionysius.34
2 Participation, ritual, and rationality
In her work on the oracular tradition in Neoplatonic (particularly Iamblichean) theurgy, Crys-
tal Addey notes that there is anachronistic tendency, in Platonic scholarship, of assuming a
contradiction between philosophy and ritual, particularly theurgy, labelling the latter as ‘su-
perstitious’ and ‘irrational,’ based on a very limited (and quite frankly Cartesian and logical
positivist) understanding of rationality and ritual.35 There is an assumption that for Plato and
later Platonists, rationality must be understood conceptually and that any attempt to counteract
this is irrational. A classic example is Eric R. Dodds’s assessment of Iamblichus’s De mysteriis
as “a manifesto of irrationalism, an assertion that the road to salvation is found not in reason but
in ritual.”36 Iamblichus notes that “it is not pure thought (Gk. theōrētikȭs philosophoũntas) that
33 Lumen Gentium, 11. On Vatican II documents, see abbreviations, p.5, n4.
34 EH ; Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial (or heavenly) Hierarchy (De coelesti hierarchia, hereafter: CH), cf.
Iamblichus,De mysteriis, Greek and English, intro. and trans. Emma C. Clarke, JohnM. Dillon, and Jackson
P. Hershbell (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003, hereafter: DM); Proclus, The Elements of
Theology, 2nd ed., reprint, ed., trans., intro., and comm. E.R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971). Pickstock
situates herself within a theurgic, particularly Proclean, context, but she does not engage directly with the
scholarship on theurgy over the last decades.
35 Addey, Divination and Theurgy, 1-42, 171-213, 273-275 (esp. 32-38, 171-180, 212-213), cf. Knut Alfsvåg,
What NoMind Has Conceived: On the Significance of Christological Apophaticism (Leuven: Peeters, 2010),
21-31; Pickstock, “The Ritual Birth of Sense”; Peter T. Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies: Iamblichus,
Pseudo-Dionysius, Religion and Magic in Late Antiquity” (Ancient World 32:2, 2001), 25-38 (esp. 27-30).
For some discussions on the role of ritual in Plato, see Edward Goodwin Ballard, “On Ritual and Persuasion
in Plato” (Southern Journal of Philosophy 2:2, 1964), 49-55; Edward Goodwin Ballard, “On Ritual and
Rhetoric in Plato,” in Ballard, Philosophy and the Liberal Arts (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1989), 66-79; William H. Desmonde, “The Ritual Origin of Plato’s Dialogues: A Study of Argumentation
and Conversation among Intellectuals” (American Imago 17:4, 1960), 389-406.
36 Eric R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1951), 287, cf.
283-299; Eric R. Dodds, “Theurgy and its Relationship to Neoplatonism” (The Journal of Roman Studies
37:1-2, 1947), 55-69; Anne Sheppard, “Proclus’ Attitude to Theurgy” (The Classical Quarterly 31:1, 1982),
212, n1. Also see John Dillon, “Iamblichus’ Defence of Theurgy: Some Reflections” (The International
Journal of the Platonic Tradition 1:1, 2007), 30-41.
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unites theurgists to the gods,” as “it is the accomplishment of acts not to be divulged and beyond
all conception, and the power of the unutterable symbols, understood solely by the gods, which
establishes theurgic union.”37 Dodds cites this passage, but theōrētikȭs philosophoũntas is ren-
dered ‘thought,’ rather than ‘pure thought’ (or ‘theoretical philosophising’), thereby creating
a dichotomy between ritual and rationality. Another example may be found in Eli Diamond’s
critique of Pickstock’s use of Plato. Arguing for a more ‘intellectual’ and ‘conceptual’ under-
standing of Plato, he notes that one of the reasons that “[t]he liturgical mediation appeals to
Pickstock” is that “the liturgical union is felt rather than thought.”38 For Addey and Pickstock,
however, as well as for Iamblichus, there is no contradiction; liturgical and ritual expression
is intellectual apprehension. Pickstock maintains that humans make sense of the world princi-
pally through religion and ritual and that ritual is “a typical or defining mode characteristic of
all action.”39 Rather than overcoming rational contemplation, ritual consummates it. And for
both Pickstock and Addey, as well as for Iamblichus, doxology has primacy over theoretical
philosophy, something Diamond even agrees is the case in Plato:
If praise and abasement before the divine is recognizing that the true natures of things are not orig-
inally produced in the human subject, but were produced by the Divine Maker who establishes an
order to be discovered by the philosopher, then Plato’s theory of language can be thought to be
doxological.40
But why is this the case? The central thing we ought to note from this quotation is that at the
centre of Platonic philosophy we find the discovery of divine order and our participation in it. In
the Republic, Plato (or Socrates) states: “The philosopher who allies himself with the divine and
orderly becomes divine and orderly, as far as is possible for a human being.”41 The phrase, ‘as
37 DM, II, 11.
38 Diamond, “Catherine Pickstock, Plato and the Unity of Divinity and Humanity,” 6.
39 Pickstock, “The Ritual Birth of Sense,” 31, cf. 31-34.
40 Diamond, “Catherine Pickstock, Plato and the Unity of Divinity and Humanity,” 8, cf. 7-8.
41 Plato, Republic, trans. Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy, in Loeb Classical Library, ed. Jeffrey Hen-
derson, vol. 237, 276 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 500d.
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far as is possible,’ indicates participation or assimilation, andwe find similar phrasing elsewhere
in Plato,42 in Aquinas,43 and in Pseudo-Dionysius.44 For St. Paul, this notion of order is central
for his theology of worship, as we see from his call for orderly worship in 1 Corinthians 14:26-
40. While it might appear, from his emphasis on the orderly use of gifts, that this is principally
about making sure that worship does not ‘get out of hand,’ there is something deeper going on,
as St. Paul grounds this order in the very nature of God: “For God is a God not of disorder
but of peace” (1 Corinthians 14:33).45 God is absolutely simple and perfectly ‘ordered.’ And
because our worship participates in Him, and reveals Him, as the ground of reason, it is ordered
and rational. This Pauline notion of order is perhaps even clearer in Romans 12:1-2. In v.1, St.
Paul calls us “to present [our] bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is
[our] reasonable service” (Gk. logikē latreía). This indicates that our sacrificial service should
be rational but it can also mean that it participates in, and is in accord with, the (incarnate)
Logos.46 In v.2, St. Paul notes that we should “not be conformed to this world.” This, it
seems, follows the notion of order in 1 Corinthians 14. We should not ignore the world but we
should also not be conformed, ordered to, or oriented towards it, but to God (Colossians 3:1-4;
1 Peter 1:13-16). And through this orientation, towards the One who grounds rationality, we are
rational. As Christ reminds us, when we are ordered towards God, we also achieve the world:
“But strive first for the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things will be given
42 Plato, Theaetetus, trans. Harold North Fowler, in Loeb Classical Library, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, vol. 123
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1921), 176ab.
43 ST I, q.103, a.2, ad 2; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles (hereafter: SCG) I, c.96:3.
44 CH III, 2 (165ABC); VII, 2 (205B); VIII, 2 (241CD); XII, 3 (293B); XIII, 3 (301C); EH I, 1 (372AB); III:III,
11 (441BC); III:III, 13 (444CD); The Divine Names (De Divinis Nominibus, hereafter: DN) XIII, 3 (981B).
45 For a discussion of order (Gk. táxis), from the perspective of Pseudo-Dionysian theology, see Charles M.
Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity inDionysius the Areopagite: “No Longer I” (Oxford: OxfordUniversity
Press, 2012), 83-89. While St. Paul does not cite Plato, it is not unreasonable to assume that his audience,
in Corinth, would have understood his arguments within a broader Hellenistic framework. And, as shown in
Joseph Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, new ed. (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 2004), 188-190 and
Joseph Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth, 3 vols. (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2007, 2011, 2012), II, 80,
this was also central to the Jewish and Christian Lebenswelt.
46 Joseph Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy: The Sacramental Foundation of Christian Existence (San Fran-
cisco, CA: Ignatius, 2014), 349, 452.
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to you as well” (Matthew 6:33).
The primary point, then, is not the ordered structure of the liturgy but its anchoring in God
and its orientation to Him, a perspective which is strengthened by the fact that even though
churchesmay have a structured and defined ordo ofworship,47 this is not identical everywhere.48
The order is not understood in a superficial sense and if we examine the liturgies throughout
history, we see that they are, in fact, not ordered quite so strictly and rigidly, although, as Pick-
stock points out, modern liturgies tend towards such strict order. While older liturgies, such
as the older Roman rite and the Eastern liturgies,49 are full of beginnings and re-beginnings,
non-identical repetitions, and ‘liturgical stammer,’ which help remind us that we cannot fully
grasp liturgy and that the order should be understood principally as participation in God, there
is a tendency in newer reforms to flatten out the staccato like performance which is typical of
these older rites.50 Modern reforms, particularly in the Roman Catholic Church, sought to sim-
plify the liturgy in a superficial way. In the words of the Second Vatican Council’s constitution
on the Sacred Liturgy, they sought a “noble simplicity” and an end to “useless repetitions,” so
that they could get a liturgy that is “within the people’s powers of comprehension” and which
“normally should not require much explanation.”51 This, however, seems to reverse the order,
focusing on the concrete structure or ordo of the liturgy before its orientation to God, and they
47 For example Common Worship: Services and Prayers for the Church of England (London: Church House,
2000, hereafter: CW ), 157-266; Gudsteneste med rettleiingar (Stavanger: Eide, 2020, hereafter: GDNK
2020), 151-271; Missale Romanum, Editio Typica Tertia (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2008),
1-146; The Roman Missal, third typical edition (Washington, D.C.: United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops, 2011), 1-146. If not otherwise noted, citations from Roman Missal and Missale Romanum use
paragraph numbers (which are identical in the two), not page numbers.
48 Gregory Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, 3rd ed. (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2005), 699-734, esp.
718-719.
49 The Divine Liturgy of our Father among the Saints John Chrysostom, English and Greek (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1995); Messeboken – Missale Romanum, Latin and Norwegian (Oslo: Oslo katolske
bispedømme, 1961);Missale Romanum, Editio Typica (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1962).
50 Pickstock, After Writing, 170-176; Pickstock, “A Short Essay,” cf. Nathan Mitchell, Real Presence: The
Work of Eucharist, new and expanded ed. (Chicago, IL: Liturgy Training Publications, 2001), 135-138;
David Torevell, Losing the Sacred: Ritual, Modernity, and Liturgical Reform (London: T&T Clark, 2004),
146-169.
51 Sacrosanctum Concilium (hereafter: SC), 34, cf. T&T Clark Companion to Liturgy, ed., Alcuin Reid (Lon-
don: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016), 534.
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thus end up with an immanent rigidity and the idea that we can fully comprehend what happens
in worship. The fact, however, is that throughout history (and across churches) the liturgies,
while being ordered, have also had certain elements of superficial ‘disorder,’ which indicates
that the Church did not see the order spoken of by St. Paul in such a rigid fashion but principally
as a participation in the order of God Himself, which can take on numerous forms.52
This sense of order is central not just to Christian theology but also to theurgic Neopla-
tonism, which, contra modernity, neither understands philosophy as an abstract inquiry into
knowledge, nor sees rationality as a hypothetico-deductive enterprise, accompanied by a rejec-
tion of ritual as irrational and an imposition of (anachronistic) dichotomies between thought
and action, mind and body, immaterial and material.53 Rather, it understands both as partici-
pating in a truth which comes to us, as indicated by Plotinus’s attitude towards prayer: “The
gods ought to come to me, not I to them.”54 John Dillon notes that this ought not be read as
“the expression of an impious or arrogant attitude to the gods” but “merely a properly Platon-
ist one,” as it notes that “our relations with the gods should be based, not on our going out of
our way to solicit them for favours which we have not made an effort to deserve, but rather on
our making ourselves ready, by the practice of spiritual exercises, to receive their power.”55 In
this tradition, prayer is not separated from philosophy but seen as an expression of it. There has
been a return, though, to a more holistic and instrumental and teleological understanding, where
52 Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, 718-719. We might also apply Aquinas’s words about creaturely participation
in God on our imitative participation in the liturgy: “Now, since God’s goodness is infinite, it can be par-
ticipated in an infinite number of ways, and in other ways besides those in which it is participated by those
creatures which now are” (SCG I, c.81:4).
53 Addey, Divination and Theurgy, 183-189, cf. 171-180 where Addey notes that modernistic philosophy has
introduced an anachronistic contrast between philosophical contemplation (theōría) and theourgía, alongside
a problematic misapplication of the terms ‘sorcery’ and ‘magic’ (Gk. goēteía and mageía) to the latter. On
why I avoid using the term ‘magic,’ see introduction, p.11, n12.
54 Life of Plotinus (Vita Plot.), 10, quoted in John Dillon, “The Platonic Philosopher at Prayer,” in Platonic
Theories of Prayer, eds., John Dillon and Andrei Timotin (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 9.
55 Dillon, “The Platonic Philosopher at Prayer,” 10, cf. R. M. van den Berg, “Plotinus’ Attitude to Traditional
Cult: A Note on Porphyry VP c. 10” (Ancient Philosophy 19, 1999), 345-360. Of course, as a Christian, I
would point out that no one deserves this and that even the preparation is a gift, a grace, given first (or more
fully) in Baptism. See more in chapter one, pp.49-54.
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rationality “involves pursuing ends that are coherent, and employing means that are appropri-
ate to those ends.”56 Understood this way, rationality does not principally concern belief in an
abstract list of propositions but the orientation towards and participation in a given goal, in the
case of worship in that which grounds reason and sustains it. There is no contradiction, on this
view, between worship and reason. By worshipping the divine, a human person is intellectual,
because he or she participates by this act of worship in the Logos. Addey notes that “the division
between ‘rationality’ and ‘irrationality’ seems somewhat anachronistic, given that Iamblichus
characterises theurgic ritual as supra-rational, in the sense that it transcends rationality, rather
than lacks it.”57 Supra-rationality concerns that which transcends reason and grounds it and
participating in it means embracing reason, though its achievement is also dependent on divine
will. Supra-rationality “paradoxically marks the simultaneous culmination and transcendence
of rationality.”58 As Iamblichus notes, while theurgy and philosophy are not necessarily iden-
tical, they are two mutually interdependent sides of the same coin. They must be seen on a
continuum, the one consummating the other:
Hence it is not even chiefly through our intellection that divine causes are called into actuality; but
it is necessary for these and all the best conditions of the soul and our ritual purity to pre-exist as
auxiliary causes; but the things which properly arouse the divine will are the actual divine symbols.
And so the attention of the gods is awakened by themselves, receiving from no inferior being any
principle for themselves of their characteristic activity.59
‘Supra-rationality’ is not a deus ex machina employed by Iamblichus and other theurgic thinkers
to fend off charges of irrationality. It is, rather, an example of the participatory and analogical
frameworkwhich permeates Neoplatonic philosophy andwhich has been central to the Christian
56 Robert M. Berchman, “Rationality and Ritual in Plotinus and Porphyry” (Incognita 2, 1991), 185, quoted in
Addey, Divination and Theurgy, 184 (cf. 171-213, esp. 183-189).
57 Addey, Divination and Theurgy, 188, cf. 29-32, 41-42, 188-189, 273-275, 281, 283, 286.
58 Addey, Divination and Theurgy, 189, cf. 188-189.
59 DM II, 11, cf. Riccardo Chiaradonna and Adrien Lecerf, “Iamblichus,” 2.3, 3.1-2, in The Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy, Fall 2019 Edition (ed., Edward N. Zalta); Algis Uždavinys, Philosophy and Theurgy in
Late Antiquity (Kettering: Angelico Press/Sophia Perennis, 2014), 229-249.
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tradition.60 The intention of rituals in theurgic Neoplatonism is the pursuit of mutually coher-
ent ends and the theurgist claims to employs means designed to pursue these ends. Theurgy is
rational, then, on an instrumental and teleological understanding, because it involves a coherent
and rationally explicable participation in the divine ground of reason. This, of course, presup-
poses divinely instituted (and revealed) means of ritual communication, which affirm, contra
modernistic philosophy, a central aspect of both Neoplatonic and Christian thought, that truth
is revealed and discovered.61 If we are called, as St. Paul notes, to “discern what is the will of
God—what is good and acceptable and perfect” (Romans 12:2), or to partake of beauty, truth,
and goodness, to use more traditional philosophical language, we should understand, then, that
these are not our own creations but gifts of God which have been revealed to us and that we
can avail ourselves of (or rather, God Himself received in us according to our mode).62 In this
sense, ritual can be seen as the way we bid the gift and receive it, though it is dependent on
revelation, and thus it is as much a historical question as it is a logical one.
But why a specifically physical liturgy? Why not adopt a Plotinian ‘spiritualistic’ empha-
sis on ‘inner ritual’? First, Christ instituted physical rites and bid us to participate in them (1
Corinthians 11:23-27). Secondly, contra Plotinus, in congruence with a Iamblichean attitude
to the material, Christian doctrine emphasises that we are not ‘spirits’ or ‘pure intellects,’ nor
60 DM I, 8; DN IV, 7 (701C-704C); Milbank, Pickstock, and Ward, eds., Radical Orthodoxy, 3-11, 19; Proclus,
Elements, props. 1-13, 23-24. Aquinas, for instance, describes revelation in supra-rational terms, noting that
“those things which are of faith surpass human reason, hence they do not come to man’s knowledge, unless
God reveal them” (ST II-II, q.6, a.1). For Aquinas, God’s revelation to us is not something we have coerced
but a gift of grace which, coincidentally, does not destroy nature, including human reason, but perfects it (ST
I, q.1, a.8, ad 2).
61 Knut Alfsvåg, “Gudsåpenbaring og virkelighetsforståelse: Kristen åpenbaringsteologi i dag” (Dansk
Tidsskrift for Teologi og Kirke 42:3, 2015), 204-206; Mark L. McPherran, “Socratic Religion,” in The Cam-
bridge Companion to Socrates, ed., Donald R. Morrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011),
111-137, esp. 122-127. For a Christian perspective on the revealed and given nature of ritual, see Ratzinger,
The Spirit of the Liturgy, 27-37. For a Iamblichean perspective, see DM I, 21; II, 11.
62 SCG I, c.43:5, cf. Davison, Participation in God, 141-146, 150-152; Wayne J. Hankey, Aquinas’s Neopla-
tonism in the Summa Theologiae om God: A Short Introduction (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press,
2019), 13 (cf. 13-21); Rudi A. te Velde, “Participation: Aquinas and His Neoplatonic Sources,” in Chris-
tian Platonism: A History, eds., Alexander J. B. Hampton and John Peter Kenney (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2021), 131-134.
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‘semi-divine’ creatures whose souls are (partly) unfallen but essentially embodied creatures of
God.63 As Pseudo-Dionysius points out, everything, even rationality, is mediated to us from
above and always in a sensible manner, because we are embodied creatures.64 And, as Aquinas
shows us, “nothing in nature is void of purpose.”65 Thirdly, because of the Incarnation, this cre-
ated materiality has been lifted up, in its concrete materiality, and given new value (Colossians
2:9-10).66 Arguments for the ‘irrational’ or ‘superstitious’ nature of rituals seem, however,
to beg the question in favour of a Cartesian dualism between res cogitans and res extensa,67
disallowing any non-occasionalist connection between the two. As bodily creatures, however,
our orientation towards God must be embodied. While we take part in the Angelic praise of
God, as noted in the Eucharistic preface,68 we take part as humans. Ritual, more than anything
else, gives expression to reason, because it is ordered, in a double sense, by being structured
and having a defined ordo, though this is expressed or repeated non-identically,69 and, more
63 Bjørnaas, “Imago Dei og kroppsliggjort væren,” 280-281; ST I, q.84, esp. aa.6-8. Addey, Divination and
Theurgy, 173-180, 199-211, notes that Plotinus’s concept of contemplation shares significant structural simi-
larities with Iamblichus’s emphasis on rituals and can only be said to be in conflict with a ritualistic perspective
if we first impose the dichotomy between thought and action onto him. See Zeke Mazur, “Unio Magica: Part
II: Plotinus, Theurgy, and the Question of Ritual” (Dionysius 22, 2004), 44: “In certain cases, these tech-
niques are accompanied by corresponding physical acts, but given this new definition, inner ritual would need
no overt physical expression for it to be considered “ritual.”.” The point is not that there are no differences
between the two approaches, as they do have significantly different views on the nature of matter and the
descent of the soul, but that both are essentially ritualistic, as interior acts remain acts. It should be noted
though, as we will return to below, that while Iamblichus holds matter in high regard, noting that it is not
“excluded from participation in its betters” (DM, V, 23), he still sees the ultimate end of theurgy to be a purely
intellectual union (DM VI, 6). See van den Berg, “Plotinus’ Attitude to Traditional Cult,” 358-359; Eyjólfur
Kjalar Emilsson, “Plotinus’ doctrine of badness as matter in Ennead I.8 [51],” in Platonism and Christian
Thought in Late Antiquity, eds., Panagiotis G. Pavlos et al. (London: Routledge, 2019), 78-99; Wayne J.
Hankey, God In Himself: Aquinas’ Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae, reprinted ed.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 48-49; Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, 26, 34-35, 104, 108-109, 126,
154, 173-182, 232-233, 267.
64 CH, I, 2 (121B), cf. ST I, q.1, a.9.
65 Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Power of God (Quaestiones Disputatae de potentia Dei, here-
after: De pot.), q.3, a.7, corp. 2.
66 I argue this point in chapter four, pp.140-146.
67 See Richard B. Carter, Descartes’ Medical Philosophy: The Organic Solution to the Mind-Body Problem
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 22, 29-95, 98, 145, 172, 174 219, 221/n8, 226,
233, 267, 270, cf. Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. and rev. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald
G. Marshall (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 59, 548; Michael Hanby, Augustine and Modernity (London:
Routledge, 2003), 134-177; Milbank and Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, 49/111-112, n142.
68 CW, 188; GDNK 2020, 172; Roman Missal, 33, cf. Pickstock, After Writing, 186-190, 209-213, 233-238.
69 Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, 699-734, esp. 718-719.
113
importantly, by participating in and being ordered to the Logos, according to our nature.
In Neoplatonic thought, such ordering is expressed particularly through the notion of rec-
ollection, something which is only possible because we are prompted to it from the outside.
Understood properly, Platonic recollection is not reduced to an inner re-experience of forgotten
prior knowledge. It is something which comes from without, extrinsically, though not in an ex-
trinsicist manner. It comes from without yet does not remain there. The soul has to be triggered
by something outside of it.70 This presupposes that there is something in the soul that can be
triggered, but this is not a ‘given,’ a brute fact, but a gift of God. In a Catholic understanding,
this ‘triggering’ is seen as a principally liturgical and ritual truth. In the Lutheran tradition, for
instance,71 God, who may communicate with us in whichever way He pleases, is still said to
have promised to communicate with us, or rather communicate Himself to us, in concrete and
recognisable rituals that are, nonetheless, repeated non-identically.72 There is, though, some
central differences between Pagan and Christian understandings of the nature of ritual. Where
Iamblichus saw theurgy as potentially a-historical, though within a tradition of ancient revealed
rites, particularly those of Greco-Roman Egypt,73 Pseudo-Dionysius refers to the sacramental
life of the Church, yes, but principally to Christ’s own works (which grounds this sacramental
life).74 He finds a basis for this in St. Paul’s use of érgon in Romans 14:20, as Charles M. Stang
70 Pabst, Metaphysics, 40, 57; Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, 26-27, cf. Pickstock, After Writing, 267-273;
Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, 158-159.
71 I use ‘the Lutheran tradition’ in the sameway I would use ‘the Anglican tradition’ or ‘the Byzantine tradition.’
Not all Lutherans are in communion with one another and the tradition manifests itself in very different, at
times contradictory ways, just like Russian Orthodox and Maronite theologians are all ‘Byzantines,’ despite
having very different views on, say, the Papacy or Purgatory. And, as noted, by ‘Catholic’ I do not mean the
Roman Catholic Church exclusively.
72 Confessio Augustana V-XIII (hereafter: CA), cf. Andrew Davison, Why Sacraments? (London: SPCK,
2013), 1-12. For notes on the Lutheran confessions, see abbreviations, p.5, n3. If not otherwise noted,
quotations from CA follow the translation of the Latin text.
73 Dennis C. Clark, “Iamblichus’ Egyptian Neoplatonic Theology in De Mysteriis” (The International Journal
of the Platonic Tradition 2:2, 2008), 164-205.
74 In fact, he makes a distinction between the divine act (theurgy) and the ecclesial enactment of this divine
act (hierurgy). See Sarah Klitenic Wear and John Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist




This single phrase allows Dionysius to infer that Paul was a theurgist, and was reminding the Greeks
of the true meaning of theurgy, which they had no doubt forgotten or corrupted. For Dionysius,
traces of the true meaning of theurgy are to be found in Iamblichus, but he has mistaken ancient
pagan rituals for the liturgy of the Church, the work of the gods for the true work of God, who is
none other than Christ.75
Furthermore, for Pagans, unlike Christianity, theurgy is, as noted, understood in elitist terms.76
They distinguish between ‘the theurgists’ (Gk. hoi theourgoí), who are privy to a certain hidden
knowledge, and ‘the herd’ (Gk. hē agélē) or ‘the mass of men’ (Gk. tò plēthos tȭn anthrṓpōn),
who are ‘subject to Destiny’ and who are not privy to this knowledge.77 For Iamblichus (who
also introduces amiddle category between ‘the theurgists’ and ‘themass ofmen’), this manifests
itself in different approaches to worship, from a ‘crude’ materialistic kind to a ‘sophisticated’
spiritual kind, i.e. “an intellectual and incorporeal rule of sacred procedure.”78 For Pagan theur-
gic thinkers, then, theurgic rituals have elitist and individualistic connotations. Theurgic union
with the divine is grounded specifically in the relation between the gods and the individual
theurgist and it is only available for those who are both able to, and who actually do, perform
the theurgic acts. The ultimate goal is to be freed from the human bond. For Iamblichus, the
75 Charles M. Stang, “Dionysius, Paul and the Significance of the Pseudonym” (Modern Theology 24:4, 2008),
545.
76 See introduction, pp.15-17.
77 Ruth Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles: Text, Translation, and Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 1989, hereafter:
TCO), frag. 153-154, 194, cf. pp.20, 198, 212. This, however, does not necessarily make them Gnostics, as
they did not regard matter as necessarily evil (Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles, 30-46, 199-200). For notes
on the Chaldean Oracles, see abbreviations, p.5, n5. For Pickstock’s discussion of the difference between
Gnostics and theurgic Neoplatonists (principally Iamblicheans and Procleans), and the Christian contrast to
(and similarity with) both, see Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, 171-188.
78 DM V, 18. The latter corresponds to the Hellenistic notion of the ‘spiritual’ or ‘logical’ sacrifice. See R.
M. van den Berg, Proclus’ Hymns: Essays, Translations, Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 18-22, 75-85.
This was later consummated by Jewish and Christian traditions. See Ratzinger, Jesus, II, 202-277; Ratzinger,
The Spirit of the Liturgy, 49-53. The Iamblichean focus on the ultimate telos of the human elite as some-
thing purely spiritual finds an equivalent in the modern distinction between spirit and matter. The crucial
difference, though, is that the positive role of matter and the Neoplatonic notion of participation has been
abandoned in favour of a univocal metaphysical framework. See Knut Alfsvåg, “Explicatio and Complica-
tio: On the Understanding of the Relationship between God and the World in the Work of Nicholas Cusanus”
(International Journal of Systematic Theology 14:3, 2012), 295-309, esp. 296-300; Alfsvåg, “Gudsåpen-
baring og virkelighetsforståelse,” 206-210; Knut Alfsvåg, “Luthersk spiritualitet: Om lære og liv i den éne,
kristne kirke” (Dansk Tidsskrift for Teologi og Kirke 40:1, 2013), 42-56.
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theurgist loses, in a sense, his humanity in the theurgic act, if only temporarily:
The theurgist, through the power of arcane symbols, commands cosmic entities no longer as a human
being or employing a human soul but, existing above them in the order of the gods, uses threats
greater than are consistent with his own proper essence—not, however, with the implication that
he would perform that which he asserts, but using such words to instruct them how much, how
great and what sort of power he holds through his unification with the gods, which he gains through
knowledge of the ineffable symbols.79
For Christians, however, Christ is the one true theurgist in whom we participate. He subverts
the Pagan perspective by assuming flesh so that humanity is not destroyed but lifted it up, in all
its concrete creatureliness, by allowing all to partake of His theurgic act, regardless of age, capa-
bility, or anything else, and by emphasising the community, the Church. As Mark A. McIntosh
notes, “a Neoplatonic itinerary has been re-contextualized in the sacramental life of the com-
munity.”80 This subversion and re-contextualisation, however, does not negate the distinction
between elite and non-elite. Rather, it is consummated in Christ. Instead of distinguishing be-
tween ‘the herd’ or ‘the mass of men’ on the hand and the elite of the few ‘theurgists’ on the
other, it distinguishes between Christ on the one hand and all of creation, including humans, on
the other, equally subject to sin and fallenness.81 Christ, however, does not keep this to Himself.
He allows us to participate in it through Him, by means of the sacrament of Baptism, which is
open to anyone, in the celebration of the Eucharist, and in our daily non-identical imitations of
Him.82 In one sense, then, a Christian conception of theurgy is more elitist than a Pagan one,
79 DM VI, 6.
80 Mark A. McIntosh, Mystical Theology: The Integrity of Spirituality and Theology (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1998), 45, cf. 44-56. Also see Panagiotis G. Pavlos, “Theurgy in Dionysius the Areopagite,” in
Platonism and Christian Thought in Late Antiquity, eds., Pavlos et al., 157-158; Pickstock, After Writing,
121-166 (esp. 158-166); Pickstock, “The Ritual Birth of Sense,” 34-36, as well as chapters four and six,
pp.140-153, 224-231.
81 Roman 3:9-31; 5:12-21; 8:19-23, cf. chapter four, pp.146-153. This is not contrary to the Catholic doctrine
of the immaculate conception which holds that the Virgin Mary was “redeemed, in a more exalted fashion,
by reason of the merits of her Son.” See The Catechism of the Catholic Church, 482, cf. 490-493, issued by
Pope John Paul II (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1992, revised 1994).
82 Cf. 1 Corinthians 4:16; 11:1; Galatians 2:19-20; Ephesians 5:1-2; Philippians 3:17; 1 Thessalonians 1:6-7; 1
Peter 1:13-25; 2:21-25.
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as there is only one true master theurgist, but in another sense it is less elitist, as the master
theurgist allows all to participate in Him.83 Or, it is a proper elitism, not between different
‘classes’ of humans but between God and creation. These differences, however, do not negate
the similarities between Pagan and Christian conceptions of theurgy.
Commenting on the nature of prayer, Stang notes that the Iamblichean notion of prayer is
“an almost perfect match” with St. Paul’s account of the Spirit praying in us,84 in Romans 8:16;
8:26; and Galatians 4:6 and, I would add, the account of worship offered in Psalm 40:3: “He
put a new song in my mouth, a song of praise to our God.” Iamblichus states:
And if one were to consider also how the hieratic prayer-formulae have been sent down tomortals by
the gods themselves, and that they are the symbols of the gods themselves, and not known to anyone
but them, and that in a way they possess the same power as the gods themselves, how could one any
longer justly believe that such supplication is derived from the senseworld, and is not divine and
intellectual? Or how could any element of passion be reasonably insinuated into this activity, seeing
that not even a virtuous human character can easily be brought to the requisite level of purity?85
As Gregory Shaw notes, theurgic prayer is “not an address to the gods but a way of entering
the power of their voice and awakening a corresponding voice in one’s soul.”86 Pagan Neopla-
tonists, then, hold that the divine descends to work through us. This human desire for union
with the divine, however, finds its consummation in Christ, through the Holy Spirit. Prayer is
first offered to us as a divine act and only secondarily may we participate in it and offer it back.
It is a kind of ‘ritual effacement,’ akin to St. Paul’s point in Galatians 2:20: “It is no longer I
who live, but it is Christ who lives in me.” This, however, does not cancel us out and absorb
83 Christ also notes that the goal is not to be as elitist as possible but to have a childlike trust in God (Matthew
18:1-5, cf. Mark 10:13-16). This, however, does not mean to become stupid, but to be trustful. As Christ
notes earlier: “See, I am sending you out like sheep into the midst of wolves; so be wise as serpents and
innocent as doves” (Matthew 10:16).
84 Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 115.
85 DM I, 15.
86 Gregory Shaw, “Neoplatonic Theurgy and Dionysius the Areopagite” (Journal of Early Christian Studies
7:4, 1999), 589, cited in Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 111, 115. Also see Luc Brisson, “Prayer in
Neoplatonism and the Chaldaean Oracles: Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus,” in Platonic Theories of Prayer,
eds., Dillon and Timotin, 108-133; José Manuel Redondo, “The Transmission of Fire: Proclus’ Theurgical
Prayers,” in Platonic Theories of Prayer, eds., Dillon and Timotin, 164-191.
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us into nothingness. For St. Paul continues (emphasis added): “And the life I now live in the
flesh I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me.”87 As rational
and embodied creatures, participating in God, we achieve this union with God through concrete
rituals, particularly the word and the sacraments, grounded not in us but in the Incarnate Logos,
and ordered towards the nature of God. “For God is a God not of disorder but of peace” (1
Corinthians 14:33). Through the Incarnate Logos, we can embody the liturgy we receive from
Him and offer it back, in a rational and ordered manner. And, as we see in the synoptic Gospels
and in St. Paul, the central liturgy that we have received from Him is the Eucharist, through
which He comes to dwell with us, induct us into His covenant, and feed us with His gift of new
life.88 I will, therefore, now discuss the nature of this sacrament.
3 Metaphysics, participation, and the Eucharist
To begin with, the holy council teaches and openly and straightforwardly professes that in the
Blessed Sacrament of the Holy Eucharist, after the consecration of the bread and wine, our Lord
Jesus Christ, true God and man, is truly, really and substantially contained under the appearances
of those realities [can. 1]. For, there is no contradiction in the fact that our Savior always sits at the
right hand of the Father in heaven according to his natural way of existing and that, nevertheless, in
his substance he is sacramentally present to us in many other places. We can hardly find words to
express this way of existing: but our reason, enlightened through faith, can nevertheless recognize
it as possible for God [cf. Mt 19:26; Lk 18:27], and we must always believe it unhesitatingly.89
With these words, the Council of Trent put into words the central truths of the doctrine of tran-
substantiation. This doctrine is fundamental to Roman Catholic theology, but belief in the real
presence of Christ is not exclusive to Rome. According to Lutheran teaching, “the true body
and blood of Christ are truly present under the form [Ger. Gestalt] of bread and wine in the
87 Cf. Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 183-185.
88 Matthew 26:26-30; Mark 14:22-25; Luke 22:14-23; 1 Corinthians 11:23-26.
89 Enchiridion symbolorum, 1636, eds. H. Denzinger and P. Hünermann (Denzinger-Hünermann), Latin-
English, 43rd ed. (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press 2012).
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Lord’s Supper and are distributed and received there.”90 According to the same confession,
the sacraments are absolutely central, as they are the only means through which God acts for
us (or at least the only means of which we can be sure): “Through these [the Word and the
sacraments], as through means, he gives the Holy Spirit who produces faith, where and when
he wills, in those who hear the gospel.”91 The Catholic tradition, in its various alterations, sees
the sacraments as signs which really participate in and mediate God’s salvation and God’s pres-
ence, as expressed, for instance, in Romans 10:17 (“faith comes from what is heard”) or 1 Peter
3:21 (“baptism … now saves you”).92 These are seen first as God’s gifts in Christ, which is
particularly true for the Eucharist: “This is my body that is for you” (1 Corinthians 11:24a).
But at the same time they can represent our return of God’s gifts as praise and service: “Do this
in remembrance of me” (1 Corinthians 11:24b).93 And for the Eucharist, the centre is found
in the real presence, where there are major disagreements, centred around the doctrine of tran-
substantiation.94 As we have seen above, Aquinas, teaches that Christ’s body (and blood) is
in the sacrament “not merely in signification or figure, but also in very truth.”95 For him, the
90 CA X (German text).
91 CA X (German text).
92 See Alfsvåg, “Luthersk spiritualitet,” 49-53; Davison, Why Sacraments?, 1-12, 23-29, 148-151; Ratzinger,
Theology of the Liturgy, 153-184; Alexander Schmemann, For the Life of the World: Sacraments and Ortho-
doxy, 2nd ed. (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 1997), 23-46, 67-79, 135-151.
93 Kjetil Kringlebotten, ““Do this in remembrance of me…” A Lutheran defence of the sacrifice of the mass”
(Studia Theologica – Nordic Journal of Theology 71:2, 2017), 127-147, esp. 130-139.
94 Brett Salkeld, Transubstantiation: Theology, History, and Christian Unity (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Aca-
demic, 2019), 1-137 (esp. 1-55, 86-133). Some later Lutheran confessions directly reject this doctrine, such
as Luther’s Smalcald Articles III, 6 or the Epitome and Solid Declaration of the Formula of Concord VII.
Again, for notes on the Lutheran confessions, see abbreviations, p.5, n3. But unlike these confessions, CA
is, at least, open to it. According to The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran
Church, eds. Robert Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2000), 44, n61, Gestalt, the
noun used in the German version of CA X, is used there “as the German equivalent for the Latin species,
which already was associated with the doctrine of transubstantiation at the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215.”
CA was not principally intended as a declaration of what made Lutherans unique but an expression of the
universal or Catholic faith of the Lutheran churches (Alfsvåg, “Luthersk spiritualitet,” 43-46). And unlike
CA, however, the other confessions do not have confessional status in all Lutheran churches, including the
Church of Norway. See Arve Brunvoll and Kjell Olav Sannes, Vedkjenningsskriftene til Den norske kyrkja
(Oslo: Lunde, 2017), 7-9.
95 ST III, q.75, a.1, corp., cf. qq.73-83 (esp. 75-77); Salkeld, Transubstantiation, 57-127 (esp. 86-133). Also
see chapter one, pp.58-62. While the Roman Catholic Church is the only ecclesial body which, as whole,
teaches this doctrine, it is not exclusively Roman. See Pickstock, After Writing, 253-266.
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Eucharistic species of bread and wine are more than extrinsic signs (though they do not cease
to be so). The fundamental part of this doctrine, which we see highlighted in both Confessio
Augustana (CA) and in the decree from the Council of Trent, is that Christ’s body (and blood) is
present “in very truth.” We ought, however, also to emphasise the first part of Aquinas’s saying,
that Christ’s body (and blood) is present “in signification or figure.” Christ is not just substan-
tially present, although that is the bedrock of the doctrine, but He is also present symbolically in
the species or accidents of bread and wine, which remain (and which on the level of physics is
indistinguishable from normal bread and wine). These accidents function as symbols of Christ,
of our spiritual feeding, but they also become symbols of (and actual instances of) creation’s
participation in God. Pickstock notes that they participate “in and essential symbolization of
the Body,”96 which indicates that it is appropriate to use the Aristotelian categories of sub-
stance and accident. Aquinas sees these distinctions as useful, but by employing the notion of
transubstantiation, where the substance is changed but the accidents remain, he questions their
ultimacy and points us to a more fundamental analogical participation in the divine. John P.
Yocum notes that for “an unbelieving Aristotelian philosopher,” the idea of transubstantiation,
where the accidents remain in the sacrament without a subject, would be “nonsensical,”97 and
Pickstock notes that “the way in which the bread is not physically evacuated in order to make
room for the Body pushes these Aristotelian categories to breaking point.”98 Where accidents
are normally substantial in other respects, this is not the case for the Eucharistic species, accord-
ing to this doctrine. The substance of the bread and wine are not destroyed but changed and
transubstantiated, though not in a natural manner but a supernatural manner, by God’s power.99
And likewise, the accidents continue to exist, paradoxically, by a direct participation in the esse
96 Pickstock, After Writing, 259.
97 John P. Yocum, “Aristotle in Aquinas’s Sacramental Theology,” in Aristotle in Aquinas’s Theology, eds.,
Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 208 (cf. 206-209).
98 Pickstock, After Writing, 259.
99 ST III, q.75, a.3, ad 1; a.4, corp.
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of Christ’s divinely transfigured body, and are thus, in a sense, ‘free-floating.’100 This may push
the Aristotelian categories ‘to breaking point,’ but this participatory account is held together by
a more fundamental (Neoplatonic) distinction between esse and essentia. Transubstantiation is
an extreme case of contingent reality as such because creation is always ‘accidental’ in relation
to God. The bread and wine anticipate, here and now, what we are all called to. As Ratzinger
puts it:
This action of God,101 which takes place through human speech, is the real “action” for which all of
creation is in expectation. The elements of the earth are transubstantiated, pulled, so to speak, from
their creaturely anchorage, grasped at the deepest ground of their being, and changed into the Body
and Blood of the Lord.102
The accidents of bread and wine become signs of the divine in which they participate, as
Christ (being God), does not fall under any category that transubstantiation would contradict,
as Christ’s divinely transfigured body, unlike our bodies, is replete.103 As Aquinas notes, at two
different places:
When we say, God, or the divine essence is the Father, the predication is one of identity, and not of
the lower in regard to a higher species: because in God there is no universal and singular.104
Christ’s body is not in this sacrament in the sameway as a body is in a place, which by its dimensions
is commensurate with the place; but in a special manner which is proper to this sacrament. Hence
we say that Christ’s body is upon many altars, not as in different places, but sacramentally: and
thereby we do not understand that Christ is there only as in a sign, although a sacrament is a kind
of sign; but that Christ’s body is here after a fashion proper to this sacrament.105
Transubstantiation, then, is not a rejection of nature but, so to speak, an elevating of nature to
its telos: “God is no longer denied to nature, but sustains the accidents of nature which are
100 ST III, q.77, a.1, corp., cf. Simon Oliver, Philosophy, God and Motion (London: Routledge, 2013), 131-137;
Salkeld, Transubstantiation, 114-119.
101 I.e. the Eucharistic action as it comes to expression in the Eucharistic prayer.
102 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 187.
103 Oliver, Philosophy, God and Motion, 135; Pickstock, After Writing, 260.
104 ST I, q.39, a.6, ad 2.
105 ST III, q.75, a.1, ad 3.
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thereby most fully realised.”106 The remaining accidents become signs of our own ultimate
end and reveal that creation can be understood in liturgical terms, as ordered to worship of the
divine,107 something which finds its end in the Church. For Pickstock, the eucharistic elements
participate “in and essential symbolization of the Body, including not only the sacramental
Body, but also the historical body of Jesus and the ecclesial body.”108 Following trends in
ressourcement theology, and particularly Henri de Lubac, she points to the essential connection
between these three bodies which are, in a mysterious way, one, without collapsing into each
other.109 She notes that the ecclesial body is mystical, as theologians of later centuries have
emphasised, but it is so only because it participates in the Eucharist, which is the mystical
body, being both the true body of Christ and veiled in the sacrament. Citing St. Ildephonsus of
Toledo, de Lubac notes that “in order to remain in this body of Christ, which is the holy Church,
we must achieve true participation, through the sacrament, in the first body of Christ.”110 The
Church, partaking of the body of Christ, is constituted as the body of Christ (1 Corinthians
10:16-17; 1 Corinthians 12:12-31). Though Pickstock does not use these words herself, she is
advocating for a eucharistic ecclesiology.111 We participate in Christ through the sacrament and
are thereby constituted as the body of Christ. And as the body of Christ, as partakers of Christ
and receivers of His gifts, we are enabled to offer back the divine work. Precisely because
the Eucharist is ordered in a particular way towards God, and reveals the telos of creation as
106 Simon Oliver, “The Eucharist before Nature and Culture” (Modern Theology 15:3, 1999), 348, cf. 342-
350. Oliver critiques Calvin, who sees the Eucharistic signs as mere non-essential and non-participatory
illustrations of the body and blood of Christ. For my critique of Calvin, see chapter five, pp.188-196.
107 Oliver, Creation, 14-21.
108 Pickstock, After Writing, 259.
109 Pickstock, After Writing, 158-166, 259-261, cf. Henri de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum: The Eucharist and the
Church in the Middle Ages, 2nd ed., trans. Gemma Simmonds with Richard Price and Christopher Stephens
(London: SCM Press, 2006), esp. 13-119, 248-262. For the use of de Lubac in RO, see Oliver, “Henri de
Lubac and Radical Orthodoxy.”
110 de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, 14.
111 Cf. Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 242-287; Hans Boersma, “Sacramental Ontology: Nature and the Supernatural in
the Ecclesiology of Henri de Lubac” (New Blackfriars 88:1015, 2007), 242-273; Gemma Simmonds, “The
Mystical Body: Ecclesiology and Sacramental Theology,” in T&T Clark Companion to Henri de Lubac, ed.,
Hillebert, 159-179.
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participating in this order, it is the definite expression of the Pauline understanding of ordered
worship. Transubstantiation holds together sign, action, and reality and becomes, in Pickstock’s
words, ‘the condition of possibility for all meaning.’112 For if, as Pickstock holds, liturgy is the
consummation of philosophy, this consummation finds its centre in the Eucharistic celebration,
which is the centre not just of the liturgical life but “the fount and apex of the whole Christian
life.”113 This sacrament is unique in that, being Christ, it is at once Creator and creature, given
to us to consume. And it becomes symbolic precisely because it participates in that which it
symbolises and expresses it in act. The Eucharist underlines language and gives it meaning,
since it points to that which makes language, and all signage, possible in the first place:
Transubstantiation saves the meaning of the sign (and our “common-sense” that there is meaning)
because the element of uncertainty remains and yet this becomes identical with a corporeal presence
which, as infinite, does not arrive in the manner of an object’s transferral from one place to another,
but rather arrives in and through its positive supplementations, which effect a return of the sign.114
The distinction, then, between ‘thing’ and ‘sign’ becomes untenable, as all things are ultimately
signs that point to the divine. In the ritual, the bread and wine, as material gifts, become signs
not just of Christ but of the telos of creation. Like the accidents of bread and wine in the
Eucharist, creation itself is a ‘free-floating accident,’ existing only because it participates in the
divine esse. We see, then, that the ultimate symbol of our dependence on God is found in the
Eucharistic celebration, a ritual action established by Christ, by the incarnate Logos, “put into
use by humans,” by the Church, “whose effect is to bring the material world (including that part
of the celebrant which is material) into harmony with the divine order,” to use Peter Struck’s
definition of theurgy.115
112 Pickstock, After Writing, 261-264, cf. xv.
113 Lumen Gentium, 11.
114 Pickstock, After Writing, 263-264. While someone like Derrida taught that all signs are empty, this presup-
poses that they are not suspended from that which transcends creation. Inside this participation, however,
signs and language retain meaning. Instead of the Eucharist being “something extra-linguistic which makes
up or compensates for the deathliness of language,” we see that “the Eucharist situates us more inside lan-
guage than ever” (Pickstock, After Writing, 262, cf. 261-266).
115 Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 30.
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With Pickstock and de Lubac, I affirm a eucharistic ecclesiology, where we, as the body of
Christ, are given the divine work as a gift and enabled to offer it back or ‘put it into use,’ as
highlighted in SC, 7. The Eucharist, which holds together sign, action, and reality, is, therefore,
essentially theurgic. For the action in question is not first and foremost your acts, my acts, or
the acts of the Church, but the acts of Christ, put into use, in an imitative and non-identical
way, in the Church.116 In theurgic Neoplatonism, such ‘putting into use’ (and the resulting
harmonisation) is rooted in a participatory account of being:
[E]ven as they [the superior beings, the gods] are not contained by anything, so they contain every-
thing within themselves; and earthly things, possessing their being in virtue of the totalities of the
gods, whenever they come to be ready for participation in the divine, straight away find the gods
pre-existing in it prior to their own proper essence.117
We need, however, to distinguish between different modes of participation, between méthexis,
our ultimate participation in God, whereby we are both kept in existence from moment to mo-
ment and enabled to act, and mímēsis, the non-identical and imitative ways in which we may
give expression to this participation.118 Pickstock points to these two levels, arguing that “the
narrative logic of imitation in the liturgy is underpinned by a metaphysical logic of participa-
tion” and that “the culmination of the Mass in the transformation and reception of the elements
displays the fusion of these two levels.”119 While we could say that our participation in God
is imitative, in an analogous sense, by distinguishing between méthexis and mímēsis, we avoid
confusing God (and his gifts) with us, and our enactments, though they are closely connected in
the Eucharist. For, as noted, the celebration represents both our reception of God’s gift – “This is
116 Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, 48-78; Kringlebotten, “Do this…,” 130-132.
117 DM I, 8, cf. Aristotle,Metaphysics, 987ab, 988a; McLean, Plenitude and Participation, 49.
118 Melberg, Theories of mimesis, 10-50; Torevell, Liturgy and the Beauty of the Unknown, 161-182. This
distinction, between méthexis and mímēsis, is not universal in the Platonic tradition. The two terms are at
times used interchangeably. See Aristotle,Metaphysics, 987ab, 988a; McLean, Plenitude and Participation,
49. But it is still useful, as ontological participation is more fundamental than our active imitation. The latter,
however, is based on the former.
119 Milbank and Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, 87, cf. 1-51, 76-95 (esp. 86-93). For a basic critique of theMilbank
and Pickstock’s use of Aquinas, see Wayne J. Hankey, “Participatio divini luminis: Aquinas’ doctrine of the
Agent Intellect: Our Capacity for Contemplation” (Dionysius 22, 2004), 149-157.
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my body that is for you” (1 Corinthians 11:24a) – and our return of this gift as praise and service
– “Do this in remembrance of me” (1 Corinthians 11:24b). These represent, respectively, our
ultimate participation in God through Christ and our imitative (and active) participation in this
gift.120 The gift of the Eucharist is the sacrifice of Christ, started in the upper Room, completed
on the Cross and in the Resurrection.121 And this sacrifice makes us “partners [Gk. métochoi]
of Christ” (Hebrews 3:14) and “participants in the divine nature” (2 Peter 1:4). And on this
basis, we are called to imitate God and Christ: “Therefore be imitators of God [Gk. mimētaì
toũ theoũ], as beloved children, and live in love, as Christ loved us and gave himself up for us,
a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God” (Ephesians 5:1-2). This imitative participation, where
we offer back what has been gifted to us, will, however, always remain diminished and non-
identical. We can never do liturgy fully, at least not in this life. As Pickstock puts it, liturgy will
always remain ‘impossible’ and its performance will always be an imperfect copying or repro-
ducing of the heavenly liturgy, of God’s own operation by means of our gratuitous participation
in Him.122 This, however, is possible, paradoxically, because God has descended, incarnation-
ally, to us, and so the earthly liturgy becomes a real (though non-identical and eschatological)
anticipation of what is to come, in the full descent of God (cf. Revelation 21:1-5). The centre,
therefore, is in the historical acts of God in Christ. While theurgy can potentially (and in its
Iamblichean incarnation is) envisioned a-historically, this is not possible for Christians. For
the acts we celebrate is not just the acts of the divine here and now, but God’s concrete acts in
history, particularly the creation and the acts of Christ.123
If we examine Christian liturgies, we see that they are filled with constant reminders (and
120 Kringlebotten, “Do this…,” 130-139.
121 Matthew 26:27b-28; John 19:30; Romans 4:25.
122 Pickstock, After Writing, 169-219 (esp. 176-192).
123 Both the Old and the New Testament is filled with examples of praising God (and Christ) for his works.
For example 1 Chronicles 16:8-36; Psalm 34; Psalm 40; Psalm 105; Psalm 111; Matthew 15:29-31; Luke
1:46-55; Luke 1:68-79; Luke 2:29-32; and Luke 18:35-43.
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celebrations) of God’s acts in history, fromScripture readings to collects and Eucharistic prayers.
At the centre of this we find Baptism and the Eucharist, which are liturgical and ritual, yes,
but also concretely historical. For Pickstock, this comes to expression through the notion of
‘liturgical drama,’ which represents a fusion of a historical and ritual approach. She writes:
“Theurgically to instigate the divine re-descent in baptism and the Eucharist, just as Mary insti-
gated the theurgic descent of God becomeMan, is to repeat a drama which is both heavenly and
historical.”124 If we are called, as I noted above, to “discern what is the will of God—what is
good and acceptable and perfect” (Romans 12:2), or to partake of beauty, truth, and goodness,
ritual can be seen as the way we bid the gift and receive it. And the Eucharist is, perhaps, where
this is most evident. Not only do we pray that God should be with us spiritually but that Christ,
in the Spirit, comes down to us in the Eucharistic elements in a substantial manner, so that “the
true body and blood of Christ” may be “truly present under the form of bread and wine in the
Lord’s Supper” and “distributed and received there.”125 In the words of the Eastern Epiclesis:
Also we offer you this spiritual worship, without shedding of blood, and we ask, pray and implore
you: send down your Holy Spirit upon us, and upon these gifts here set forth, andmake this bread the
precious Body of your Christ, and what is in this Cup the precious Blood of your Christ, changing
them by yourHoly Spirit, so that thosewho partake of themmay obtain vigilance of soul, forgiveness
of sins, communion of your Holy Spirit, fulness of the Kingdom of heaven, freedom to speak in your
presence, not judgement or condemnation.126
The Epiclesis, more than anything else in Christian liturgy, puts into words its essentially theur-
gic nature. It is not a manipulative charm by which the Spirit can be coerced to come down,
because “the wind blows where it chooses” (John 3:8). No, it is first and foremost a divine work
that we have put into use, in order for us to be brought “into harmony with the divine order.”127
As we see from the words of the Epiclesis, the Eucharist ritually performs or (re-)enacts the
124 Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, 177-178, cf. 176-188.
125 CA X (German text).
126 The Divine Liturgy, 33-34.
127 Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 30.
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divine descent and the communion given in the sacrament enacts our ascent, though this as-
cent is not an ascent away from here, both because it is an ascent to the God who descended
here in the flesh (John 1) and because God’s transcendence is immanent or ubiquitous.128 This
is rooted in a participatory account of being and the relation between méthexis and mímēsis,
where the latter flows from the former and comes to expression most fully in doxology.129 We
thus highlight both the centrality of history, particularly the history of God’s interaction with us,
and the importance of a ritualised faith, that our contact with the divine does not occur through
an abandonment of the body but precisely through it, and that faith expresses itself principally
through praise. John Milbank summarises this union of ritual and historicity by noting that the
Christian religion, “at its liturgical and sacramental heart,” focuses both on local rituals, which
have often been included in its liturgical practice, and on “a heightened enchantment able to
charm down even the absolute (though by and through his ordaining of such cultic means).”130
This ‘charming down,’ however, is not in any way ‘coercive,’ as if God could be coerced. No,
it is first and foremost a work of God Himself, in Christ or, more accurately, the work of the
God-man. The Eucharistic liturgy (as all liturgy), is principally a divine work, particularly the
work of the incarnate Logos in the Holy Spirit, offering to the Father, and we participate in this
through a non-identical repetition of the divine descent in the Incarnation. As God descends to
creation and becomes flesh, He descends, in a similar way, to the Eucharistic elements and to
the Eucharistic ritual (thus shattering the dichotomy between sign and action). Pickstock notes
that we repeat a heavenly and historical drama by theurgically instigating “the divine re-descent
in baptism and the Eucharist, just as Mary instigated the theurgic descent of God becomeMan,”
something which “has validity if it is perpetuated as a real repetition in lives of charity, which
128 Rudi A. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 160-164.
129 Diamond, “Catherine Pickstock, Plato and the Unity of Divinity and Humanity,” 8; Milbank and Pickstock,
Truth in Aquinas, 86-93; Pickstock, After Writing, 39, 220-252.
130 John Milbank, Beyond Secular Order: The Representation of Being and the Representation of the People
(Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 17.
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continuously begin to restore the face of the earth.”131 The rituals of the Church, and particu-
larly the Eucharist, reveal to us the acts of God and our participation in Him. In the celebration,
creation becomes a partaker of the divine act, the theurgy, and is transformed and lifted up to
its telos. To quote Ratzinger again, the “elements of the earth are transubstantiated, pulled, so
to speak, from their creaturely anchorage, grasped at the deepest ground of their being, and
changed into the Body and Blood of the Lord.”132 This is an icon of the creation’s goal, to
partake of the fulness of God.
4 Conclusion
In this chapter, taking a starting point in Pickstock’s understanding of the nature of the liturgy, as
a non-identical repetition of the work of God, and relating it more directly to a theurgic Neopla-
tonist context, I have argued that ritual is a, if not the, defining characteristic of humanity, that
there is no contradiction between ritual and rationality, and that philosophy, ideology, and lan-
guage find their consummation, their telos, in worship and most particularly in the Eucharistic
celebration.
Discussing a Pauline theology of worship, where order is understood to participate first and
foremost in the orderly nature of God (1 Corinthians 14:26-40), I have shown that ritual, through
this participation, can be understood as a rational endeavour and as theurgic, as participation in
the divine act. This notion of rationality is not principally a hypothetico-deductive one, which is
typical of modernistic philosophy, but a more instrumental notion, where rationality “involves
pursuing ends that are coherent, and employing means that are appropriate to those ends.”133
131 Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, 177-178, cf. Pickstock, After Writing, 39, 176-192, 253-273. Also see
David Cayley, “Radical Orthodoxy,” podcast at CBC Radio One, 00:49:55-00:50:14; van Ommen, “Ritual
repetition”; Smith, Desiring the Kingdom, 19-27, 39-110.
132 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 187.
133 Berchman, “Rationality and Ritual in Plotinus and Porphyry,” 185, quoted in Addey,Divination and Theurgy,
184 (cf. 183-189).
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Rationality, understood this way, is not principally concerned with belief in an abstract list of
propositions but the orientation towards (and participation in) a given goal. And liturgy is, as
St. Paul notes, an orientation towards God, where we participate in His divine order and are
allowed to “present [our] bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is [our]
reasonable service” (Romans 12:1, cf. 1 Corinthians 14:26-40). This excludes an improper, and
immanentist, fixation on the human agent, while at the same time allowing us to make it our
own. The words and gestures of the liturgy are not primarily grounded in the human self but
in God, in the one in whom the liturgical self participates and acts, but they are expressed in
conformity with our form as creatures, and in the case of humans as intentional and rational.
What we see from this is that liturgical participation, which is the consummation of philosophy,
is not something tacked on as a bonus but a genuine participation in Christ and consequently a
non-identical repetition of his life, by grace, through faith.
If, as Pickstock holds, liturgy is the consummation of philosophy, this consummation finds
its centre in the Eucharistic celebration, which is the centre of the liturgical life, holding together
sign, action, and reality.134 In the Eucharistic signs, Christ is offered to us, both in a symbolic
sense, signifying nature’s participation in the the divine esse, and in a substantial way, by giving
us a gift through which we become “partners of Christ” (Hebrews 3:14) and “participants in the
divine nature” (2 Peter 1:4). This indicates our fundamental participation in God, as expressed
trough the notion ofméthexis. At the same time, however, this gift enables us to live in imitation
of God, as expressed trough the notion of mímēsis. As we read in the Second Vatican Council’s
Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, the Eucharist is the centre not just of the liturgy. It is “the
fount and apex of the whole Christian life.”135 Through the Eucharist, we participate in what
is, essentially, the work of the transcendent God, His theurgy, and through it we are formed by
134 Pickstock, After Writing, 261-264.
135 Lumen Gentium, 11.
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and ordered to Him.
In the next chapter, I focus specifically on the Christological nature of Christian theurgy.
I will provide an argument for why the Incarnation is what makes Christian theurgy possible,
by arguing (1) that the hypostatic union denotes not just a loose ‘partnership’ between divinity
and humanity but a real metaphysical union-in-distinction, informed by Aquinas’s doctrine of
one esse and one suppositum in Christ, (2) that this finds its centre in the Paschal mystery,
consummating all aspects of Christ’s ministry, particularly his baptism and the Eucharist, and
providing the inner core and logic of the Church’s sacramental life, and (3) that we are ordered
to God, developing further the argument made in this chapter, arguing that Christology provides
the basis for this participation, as Christ becomes the exemplar in which we participate.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Christ the ‘Master Theurgist’
1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I argued, in critical dialogue with Catherine Pickstock, that liturgy, as a
rational participation in the order of God Himself, orients us to God and finds its consummation
in the Eucharist. In this chapter, focusing on the Christological nature of Christian theurgy, I will
develop this further, arguing that what makes Christian theurgy possible is the incarnation or the
hypostatic union, which unites us with God on a metaphysical level, though “without confusion,
change, division, or separation.”1 Andwhile the sacrifice of Christ is consummated on the cross,
as I will argue below, it involves His whole life and its goal is not just atonement but union with
God, which is deification or theosis.2 This emphasis is also central in theurgic Neoplatonism.
In De Mysteriis, Iamblichus maintains that “the final purpose of sacrifice” is “that it brings us
into contact with the demiurge, since it renders us akin to the gods through acts.”3 For him,
theurgy is a participation of creatures in divine work. It is ‘demiurgy,’ understood within the
framework of non-dualistic Platonism, where the material cosmos manifests the Creator.4 In
Pagan Neoplatonic philosophy, the Demiurge is one of the gods, while neither he nor any of the
other ‘lesser gods’ is the highest God, ‘the One.’ He created the cosmos in which we participate
and for Pagan theurgic Neoplatonists, theurgy is a participation in the cosmos as a morally
1 The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, trans., introd. and notes, Richard Price and Michael Gaddis (3 vols.,
Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2005, 2007), II, 204.
2 Joseph Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy: The Sacramental Foundation of Christian Existence (San Fran-
cisco, CA: Ignatius, 2014), 551 (cf. 541-557); Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (hereafter: ST) III, q.22,
a.2, corp. For notes on the Thomistic corpus, see abbreviations, p.4, n1.
3 Iamblichus,De mysteriis, Greek and English, intro. and trans. Emma C. Clarke, JohnM. Dillon, and Jackson
P. Hershbell (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003, hereafter: DM) V, 26, cf. VIII, 3, 6.
4 Gregory Shaw, “Taking the Shape of the Gods: A Theurgic Reading of Hermetic Rebirth” (Aries – Journal
for the Study of Western Esotericism 15:1, 2015), 136-169; Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The Neo-
platonism of Iamblichus, 2nd ed. (Angelico Press/Sophia Perennis, 2014), 50-64; Ilinca Tanaseanu-Döbler,
Theurgy in Late Antiquity: The Invention of a Ritual Tradition (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013),
243-251.
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unfallen “agalma, a shrine of the Demiurge (Timaeus 37c)” which “reveals the presence of
gods.”5 This participation is understood as imitation of the Demiurge in particular, as well as the
other gods, through which the theurgist can participate in their order and attain communion with
them (and through them, with the One), without the human element being removed, because
“the whole of theurgy presents a double aspect”:
On the one hand, it is performed by men, and as such observes our natural rank in the universe; but
on the other, it controls divine symbols, and in virtue of them is raised up to union with the higher
powers, and directs itself harmoniously in accordance with their dispensation, which enables it quite
properly to assume the mantle of the gods.6 It is in virtue of this distinction, then, that the art both
naturally invokes the powers from the universe as superiors, inasmuch as the invoker is a man, and
yet on the other hand gives them orders, since it invests itself, by virtue of the ineffable symbols,
with the hieratic role of the gods.7
Since theurgy, then, is most particularly a participation in the creator of the universe, the uni-
verse or cosmos is central.8 As participants in the creator, creatures are secondary causes or
agents, in case of rational beings. This participatory metaphysics, which is central both to
Neoplatonic and Christian thought, understands such causality as real and substantial, but at
the same time participated or derived.9 In theurgy, the focus is principally on participation in
the divine works, where the end goal is divine-human communion. As Peter Struck puts it:
“Theurgy is a divine act, a θεῖον ἔργον, insofar as it is action, established by gods, put into
use by humans, whose effect is to bring the material world (including that part of the celebrant
5 Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, xxiv, cf. xxiv-xxv; Jan Opsomer, “Proclus on Demiurgy and Procession: A
Neoplatonic Reading of the Timaeus,” in Reason and Necessity: Essays on Plato’s Timaeus, ed., M. R.Wright
(London: Duckworth/Classical Press of Wales, 2000), 113-143; Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 2nd ed.,
reprint, ed., trans., intro., and comm. E.R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), props. 20-22; Sarah Klitenic
Wear and John Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition: Despoiling the Hellenes
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 56-58, 75, 108; Donald Zeyl and Barbara Sattler, “Plato’s Timaeus,” in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2019 Edition (ed., Edward N. Zalta).
6 Or: ‘taking the shape of the Gods’ (Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, 57).
7 DM IV, 2, cf. I, 21; Crystal Addey,Divination and Theurgy in Neoplatonism: Oracles of the Gods (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2016), 171-282; Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, 31-40, 50-64.
8 As I argued in chapter two, pp.77-78, this is also central to Christianity. The cosmos is liturgical. But, as I
will argue below, pp.148-153, for Christians, the cosmos is fallen.
9 Andrew Davison, Participation in God: A Study in Christian Doctrine and Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2019), 65-83; Proclus, Elements of Theology, props. 9-12 (cf. props. 1-39).
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which is material) into harmony with the divine order.”10 But in what way can this perspective
become Christian?
As noted, some scholars contrast Iamblichean andChristian (predominately Pseudo-Dionysian)
theurgy to the point of downplaying (even denying) the latter’s Neoplatonic roots and some
argue, from both Pagan and Christian perspectives, that theurgy, in any guise, is inherently
non-Christian.11 Some, however, see Christian usages of theurgy not as the ‘replacement’ of
Christian theology with Pagan philosophy, but as the Christian consummation of Neoplatonic
thought, providing Christian theology with a philosophical framework through which we can
understand human participation in, and ritual celebration of, the divine work.12 From this per-
spective, Neoplatonic and Christian conceptions of theurgy are both seen as ways to achieve
union by participating in divine work. There are differences but these do not concern the prin-
ciple itself but its context and content. Where Iamblichus saw theurgy as related to ancient re-
vealed rites, particularly those of Greco-Roman Egypt,13 Pseudo-Dionysius refers principally to
Christ’s own works and the communal-sacramental life of the Church.14 But Pseudo-Dionysius
still found it useful to deploy the term ‘theurgy,’ finding a grounding for this in St. Paul’s use
of ‘work’ (Gk. érgon) in Romans 14:20, holding that Pagans had “mistaken ancient pagan rit-
10 Peter T. Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies: Iamblichus, Pseudo-Dionysius, Religion and Magic in Late
Antiquity” (Ancient World 32:2, 2001), 30.
11 See introduction, pp.13-15, esp. nn22-24.
12 See introduction, pp.15-18, esp. n29, cf. Thomas Richard Plant, Dualism and nondualism in the thought of
Dionysius the Areopagite and Shinran Shōnin (PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2013); Charles M.
Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity inDionysius the Areopagite: “No Longer I” (Oxford: OxfordUniversity
Press, 2012); Charles M. Stang, “Dionysius, Paul and the Significance of the Pseudonym” (Modern Theology
24:4, 2008), 541-555; Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies”; Wear and Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite
and the Neoplatonist Tradition. In his study of Pseudo-Dionysius’s philosophy, Eric Perl, Theophany: The
Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite (Albany, NY: State University of NewYork Press, 2007),
sees no contradiction between Christian and Neoplatonic thought. He therefore does not give particular
emphasis on “Dionysius’ background in earlier Christian thought,” not because “is unreal or unimportant,
but because it does not contribute to the specifically philosophical understanding of Dionysius” (p.115, n2).
While I agree with much of Perl’s points, Pseudo-Dionysian thought is a critical Christian and theological
consummation of Neoplatonic philosophy. He does not separate these aspect and neither should we. And,
as I will show below, there are significant differences between Neoplatonic and Pseudo-Dionysian views on
Incarnation, cosmology, and anthropology.
13 DM VII, cf. Dennis C. Clark, “Iamblichus’ Egyptian Neoplatonic Theology in De Mysteriis” (The Interna-
tional Journal of the Platonic Tradition 2:2, 2008), 164-205.
14 Wear and Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition, 99-115.
133
uals for the liturgy of the Church, the work of the gods for the true work of God, who is none
other than Christ.”15 Following this tradition, I will argue for a Christian conception of theurgy,
consummated in Christ, the Incarnate Word or Logos, in which all things cohere (John 1:1-18;
Colossians 1:15-20). Where earlier actors, rituals, and philosophies where shadows, Christ is
the fulfilment. And in Him, the material world is reconciled to God, and the divine order, in
an utterly radical way.16 The standard orthodox position on the relation between divinity and
humanity in Christ is that Christ is one (divine) person, with two natures; divine and human.17
On this view, the Incarnation does not mean that Christ merely has a particularly acute way of
being one with God. No, in Him, divinity and humanity are fully united in one single person (or
suppositum, to use Aquinas’s language), while remaining distinct.18 On this view, we are, made
capable of unity with God through Christ, as St. Paul notes: “For in him the whole fullness of
deity dwells bodily, and you have come to fullness in him, who is the head of every ruler and au-
thority” (Colossians 2:9-10). Without the Incarnation, any act remains on the mimetic stage, as
the divine remains extrinsic to humanity. But with the Incarnation we see the divine consumma-
tion of human activity in one single person. Although it is hard to pinpoint Pseudo-Dionysius’s
Christology,19 as he has tendencies towards both monophysitism and Chalcedonianism, with
15 Stang, “Dionysius, Paul and the Significance of the Pseudonym,” 545.
16 Colossians 2:16-17; Hebrews 8-10, esp. Hebrews 8:1-7; 10:1-4, cf. Joseph Ratzinger, The Spirit of the
Liturgy, commemorative ed. (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 2018), 129-170, 186-189; Struck, “Pagan and
Christian Theurgies,” 30-38.
17 Michael J. Gorman, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2017), 14-52; Timothy J. Pawl, The Incarnation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 3-
27.
18 The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, II, 203-205, cf. Gorman, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic
Union, 73-125; ST III, qq.1-59 (esp. qq.1-17).
19 See Aloys Grillmeier and Theresia Hainthaler, Christ in Сhristian Tradition: From the Council of Chalcedon
(451) to Gregory the Great (590-604), vol. II:3, trans. Marianne Ehrhardt (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), 298-342; Andrew Louth, Denys the Areopagite (London: Continuum, 1989), 14, 64, 74-75, 76, n15,
114-115; István Perczel, “The Christology of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite: The Fourth Letter in its
Indirect and Direct Text Traditions” (Le Muséon 117:3-4, 2004), 409-446; Vasilije Vranic, “The Christology
of the Fourth Letter of Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite: Chalcedonian or Monophysite?” (Open Theology:
A Theological Quarterly 5, 2008), 1-12; Wear and Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist
Tradition, 4-6. Vranic’s article is only available from his academia.edu page, as the original journal seems to
be gone from the web.
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an Antiochian and Neoplatonic emphasis, I argue that Pseudo-Dionysius’s Christology is com-
patible with an orthodox Chalcedonian theology. The text most often cited to argue that he is
a monophysite, is his fourth epistle. At the end of the epistle, Pseudo-Dionysius’s states that
Christ did not do “things Divine as God, nor things human as man, but exercising for us a certain
new God-incarnate energy (Gk. theandrikḗn enérgeian) of God having become man.”20 Taken
by itself, this might seem to indicate monophysitism. It may seem that there has been a kind
of ‘mixture’ of the natures, perhaps where the human nature has been absorbed into the divine.
Wear and Dillon note these tendencies, arguing that there “is no question here of two natures,
since the human body is simply an instrument with which he unites in order to do his work as
Jesus Christ.”21 This, however, presupposes that the human body, for the Areopagite, should
be understood in distinction, even separation, from its nature and that the instrumentality in
question should be understood as separate rather than conjoined (with Christ’s divine nature).22
More importantly, as Vasilije Vranic has noted,23 the text lacks any of the ‘code words’ of the
fifth century Christological controversies (like hypóstasis, phúsis, or prósōpon). Furthermore,
at the beginning of the epistle, Pseudo-Dionysius notes that Christ is “in absolute whole essence
truly man.”24 There is no indication, here, that His human nature is abolished or diminished.
And, as we see from history, Pseudo-Dionysius was not rejected but embraced as orthodox by
the neo-Chalcedonians, who did not shy away from accusing whole churches (often wrongly)
of being monophysites.25 This indicates at least that they thought his theology was compatible
with their own. Charles M. Stang notes that John of Scythopolis, a neo-Chalcedonian bishop,
20 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Letters/Epistles (Epistulae, hereafter: Ep.) IV (1072C). For notes on the Pseudo-
Dionysian corpus, see abbreviations, p.4, n2.
21 Wear and Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition, 5, cf. 4-6; Ep. IV.
22 Cf. ST III, q.62, a.5; RowanWilliams,Christ the Heart of Creation (London, Bloomsbury Continuum, 2018),
31-40.
23 Vranic, “The Christology of the Fourth Letter,” 2.
24 Ep. IV (1072A).
25 Vranic, “The Christology of the Fourth Letter,” 1-2, cf. Niall Finneran, “Beyond Byzantium: the Non-
Chalcedonian Churches,” in A Companion to Byzantium, ed., Liz James (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010), 199-223.
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commented on Pseudo-Dionysius’s use of the phrase ‘the human theurgies,’ and how the Incar-
nation itself was (and is) “a human theurgy, in which God while in the flesh did divine things.”26
Through this pairing of words, ‘theurgy’ and ‘human,’ we see that Christ is both divine and hu-
man. I argue that when Pseudo-Dionysius speaks of “a certain new God-incarnate energy of
God having becomeman,”27 he is, rather, arguing for the what we call the communicatio idioma-
tum, ‘the communication of idioms or properties.’ This has its background in the Chalcedonian
definition, that Christ should be “acknowledged in two natures without confusion, change, di-
vision, or separation.”28 Because of the Hypostatic Union, there is a communication between
divinity and humanity and we can, therefore, say that “the Word became flesh” (John 1:14) or
that “rulers of this age … crucified the Lord of glory” (1 Corinthians 2:8).29 And, as Stang
notes, Pseudo-Dionysius, should rather be seen as a Pauline theologian, which is natural, as he
uses the pseudonym of one of Paul’s disciples (Acts 17:32-34):
Contrary to the claims of somanymodern scholars, then, there is a robust Dionysian Christology and
that Christology is deeply Pauline. Jesus is both our only “access” to the work of God (θεουργία), the
loving activity (ἐνέργεια) of the hierarchies, and also simultaneously that very work and activity.30
Apart from the charges of monophysitism, we also have the idea, expressed by Wear and Dil-
lon, that Pseudo-Dionysius’s Christology is just plainly Neoplatonic. They compare the divine-
human relationship in Christ with Porphyry’s theory of the union of body and soul as “a union
without contamination on the part of the soul,” where “there is no question of the body having a
conscious ‘nature’ of its own. It is merely an instrument which the soul vivifies and controls.”31
This, however, seems to boil down to a question of compatibility. Is a Christian (Chalcedonian)
conception of the Incarnation compatible with a Neoplatonic metaphysics? In some sense, they
26 Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 112.
27 Ep. IV (1072C).
28 The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, II, 204, cf. Pawl, The Incarnation, 24-26; ST III, q.16.
29 For some argument for this, see Johann Anselm Steiger, “The communicatio idiomatum as the Axle and
Motor of Luther’s Theology” (Lutheran Quarterly 14, 2000), 125-158.
30 Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 101, cf. 92-102.
31 Wear and Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition, 5.
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are not. Proclus, for example, assumes a chain of being, with a multitude of gods,32 and the
ultimate goal of theurgy, as understood by Iamblichus, is to be freed from the human bond.33
Pseudo-Dionysius, however, is not uncritically assuming this. He is correctively consummat-
ing it in Christ. He does invoke a conception of hierarchy but this is rooted in Scripture and
it distinguishes sharply between God, who is ‘beyond being’ (or even ‘non-being’), and the
created beings in the hierarchy, with angels, humans, and other creatures.34 And in describing
theurgy, he roots it specifically in Christ, thus removing the spiritualist and elitist connota-
tions of Iamblichean (and Chalcedonian) theurgy.35 I argue, therefore, that Pseudo-Dionysius’s
Christology was orthodox and Chalcedonian.
My intention in this chapter, however, is not just to demonstrate that orthodox Christology
is compatible with a Christian conception of theurgy but that it is its foundation. A Christian
theurgic approach to theology is, and must be, Christologically grounded. Alongside the doc-
trine of the Trinity, the doctrine of the Incarnation is that which above all makes a theology
Christian.36 The principal focus should be on Christ, as the Head, while the Church, as His
body, is enabled to offer through Him. Discussing the Christological and Trinitarian core of
liturgy, as participation in a divine act, I will argue that Christ is the true theurgist, the ‘master
theurgist,’ and that His work is the transformative foundation of our acts, but that this does not
entail that these acts are any less real.37 If the doctrine of the Incarnation, and the Trinity, makes
32 See Radek Chlup, Proclus: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 112-136, esp.
the illustrations on pp. 121 and 123.
33 DM VI, 6.
34 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial (or heavenly) Hierarchy (De coelesti hierarchia, hereafter: CH), esp. I-III,
cf. Fran O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the metaphysics of Aquinas, new ed. (Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press, 2005), 65-84, esp. 76-84.
35 DM V, 18; VI, 6; Ruth Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles: Text, Translation, and Commentary (Leiden: Brill,
1989, hereafter: TCO), frag. 153-154, 194, cf. pp.20, 198, 212. For notes on the Chaldean Oracles, see
abbreviations, p.5, n5.
36 Knut Alfsvåg, “The centrality of Christology: On the relation between Nicholas Cusanus and Martin Luther”
(Studia Theologica – Nordic Journal of Theology 70:1, 2016), 22-38; Knut Alfsvåg, “Unknowability and
Incarnation: Creation and Christology as Philosophy of Science in the Work of Nicholas Cusanus” (Interna-
tional Journal of Systematic Theology 21:2, 2019), 141-156.
37 Davison, Participation in God, 65-83.
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the radical difference for Christian theology, then, accordingly, it should also be the deciding
difference in Christian accounts of theurgy. I will argue this in three ways.
First, I will present a conception of the metaphysics of Christology and the hypostatic union,
starting with a critique of Shaw’s comparison of the Incarnation and the Iamblichean notion of
theurgic union with the divine.38 I will argue that this notion makes the Incarnation into an
extrinsic and voluntarist partnership with God, while Aquinas’s doctrine of one esse and one
suppositum in Christ gives us a coherent notion of theurgy, where we have real union with
God, something which reveals central differences between the Christian and Pagan views.39
This shows us how in Christ we find the divine consummation of human activity, real union
between God and the world, “without confusion, change, division, or separation.”40 In Him,
we do not merely have an extrinsic and imposed voluntarist union, a ‘contract’ between God
and humankind, but a real metaphysical union-in-distinction.41
Secondly, I will argue that this finds its most central expression in Christ’s high priestly acts.
As the high priest, the master theurgist, Christ gave Himself for us so that He could bring the
fallen world “into harmony with the divine order.”42 This finds its centre in the Paschal mystery,
the “once for all” sacrifice (Hebrews 7:27), which consummates all aspects of Christ’s ministry,
particularly his baptism and the Eucharist, and which provides the inner core and logic of the
Church’s sacramental life.
38 Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, xxiii-xxxiv; 53-57.
39 Gorman, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union, 35-52, 73-157. As noted in the introduction
and in chapter one, pp.20-21, 32-34, I am here moving beyond Aquinas. I am not arguing that he defines
his approach in theurgic terms, or that he was not critical of the term (cf. ST II-II, q.96, a.1), but that if
we understand theurgy as a participation in the divine act, rather than a coercive ‘manipulation’ of God, it
is compatible with Aquinas’s understanding of our metaphysical participation in God and its manifestation
in worship and human work. See Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Power of God (Quaestiones
Disputatae de potentia Dei, hereafter: De pot.), q.3, a.7; ST III, qq.60-90, cf. Addey,Divination and Theurgy,
32-38, 171-213; Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 81-152 (esp. 106-110); Struck, “Pagan and Christian
Theurgies,” esp. 31-33, 37-38.
40 The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, II, 204.
41 PaulM. Blowers,Maximus the Confessor: Jesus Christ and the Transfiguration of theWorld (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016), 144, 154; Marie-Odile Boulnois, The Theology of St. Cyril of Alexandria: A Critical
Appreciation (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 84-111.
42 Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 30, cf. 30-33.
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Thirdly, I will argue that a proper theurgic and incarnatory approach shows us how we may
participate in the divine in and through Christ. I will argue that this was necessary in order for
us to be able to participate in God through Christ so that we could not just be saved from sin but
saved to a new life where we can offer true worship to God, a true act of theurgy, rooted in the
ultimate act of theurgy, the divine-human worship offered by Christ, in which we are invited
to participate,43 though how this participation comes to be expressed will always remain non-
identical, as God, who is immeasurable, cannot be exhausted. Continuing the argument made
in the previous chapter, that we participate in the divine order (cf. 1 Corinthians 14:26-40),44
and engaging Knut Alfsvåg’s use of Luther and Pseudo-Dionysius,45 I will develop it further
in a specifically Christological direction, arguing that we find union with God particularly by
being incorporated into Christ, who is the common focus of the divine-human union, through
the Holy Spirit. As the exemplar of the telos of human life, ordered to God, Christ allows us to
participate in Him and through this find union with God.
All of this helps us better ground our liturgical participation in the divine act and to make
sense of how we can become united with God, and how this allows our acts to have their own
integrity, as it does not involve a competition between God and creation. Because Christ is the
God-man, we find in Him the resolution of the tension between reception of the divine gift and
the return of the gift by humans, on behalf of creation as a whole. We may offer ourselves and
be deified or sanctified only because we participate in or imitate Him.
Others have also argued for a similar approach to the hypostatic union, focusing onAquinas’s
43 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy (De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, hereafter: EH) III:3, 15
(445BC).
44 See chapter three, pp.106-118.
45 Knut Alfsvåg, “Luther as a reader of Dionysius the Areopagite” (Studia Theologica – Nordic Journal of
Theology 65:2, 2011), 101-114, esp. 104-105.
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approach,46 the centrality of Christ, and the Paschal mystery,47 and our union with God, often
called deification or theosis.48 In this chapter, however, I take this a step further, arguing that
these elements ought to be explicated theurgically, not by ‘replacing’ Christianity with Neo-
platonic philosophy, but by consummating the latter in Christ. This consummation, however,
utterly radicalises what we mean by participation or what we mean when we say that theurgy,
as a divine act re-enacted by humans, and particularly by Christ, reconciles the world, in all its
concrete materiality, to God.
2 Christology, theurgy, and metaphysics
Commenting on the differences and similarities between Pagan and Christian conceptions of
theurgy, Gregory Shaw notes that for Iamblichus, the theurgist “was simultaneously man and
god” by virtue of his union with the divine powers and that he “became an icon and sunthema in
precisely the same way as the other pure receptacles described by Iamblichus,” and that through
the “appropriate rites the theurgist … became a theios aner, universal and divine yet particular
and mortal.”49 In the preface to the second edition of the same book, Shaw maintains that this
is comparable to the Christian notion of the Incarnation:
The theurgist remains human yet takes the shape of the gods. The language of Chalcedon is remark-
ably similar. Christ is described as possessing two natures, divine and human, that remain unmixed
46 Gorman, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union, esp. 53-125; Thomas Joseph White, The
Incarnate Lord: A Thomistic Study in Christology (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America
Press, 2015), 73-125; Williams, Christ the Heart of Creation, esp. xi-xvi, 1-40.
47 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale: The Mystery of Easter, trans. and intro. Aidan Nichols
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990); Sergiĭ Bulgakov, The Lamb of God, trans. Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 2008), esp. 321-441; James W. Farwell, This Is the Night: Suffering, Salvation, and the Liturgies
of Holy Week (London: T&T Clark International, 2005); White, The Incarnate Lord, 277-464, esp. 340-379.
48 Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, eds. Union with Christ: The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998); Michael J. Christensen and Jeffery A. Wittung, eds., Partakers of the
Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions (Madison/Teaneck,
NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2007); Kurt Marquart, “Luther and Theosis” (Concordia Theo-
logical Quarterly 64:3, 2000), 182-205; Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic
Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); A. N. Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in
Aquinas and Palamas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
49 Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, 57, cf. 53-57.
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despite their “union” in the person of Christ. The theurgist also possesses two natures, divine and
human, that remain distinct while being embodied by the theurgist.50
This, however, is not what Christian theology understands by the Incarnation and it reveals
some central differences between Christian and Pagan conceptions. According to the Chal-
cedonian definition, Christ is “acknowledged in two natures without confusion, change, divi-
sion, or separation.”51 This formula insists that there is a communication between divinity and
humanity in Christ, yet they are not confused. In Shaw’s understanding, this remains extrinsic
to (and imposed on) humanity, and thus he presupposes some kind of Nestorian or Adoptionist-
Apollinarian Christology. As I will show, Shaw ends up either with Christ being a person, how-
ever important, who has a ‘close connection’ to God, or with a kind of ‘replacement theology,’
where a human person and human esse gets ‘replaced,’ i.e. destroyed, upon being ‘adopted.’
In the first instance, which is essentially Nestorian,52 Christ’s ‘close connection’ to God
remains extrinsic and thus any ofHis acts, and the acts we perform throughHim (1 Peter 2:5), are
pure mimicry.53 We could not on this account say that “the Word became flesh and lived among
us” (John 1:14), precisely because it would not entail the assumption of flesh at all but a kind of
partnership. In the second instance, if we opt for a ‘replacement theology,’ this would amount to
the destruction of a human being in order for the Logos to then assume its nature (which would
essentially be a revised Adoptionist-Apollinarian hybrid).54 This would disrupt one of the main
50 Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, xxxii, cf. xxiii-xxxiv. It seems that Shaw compares the Iamblichean use of
sunthēmawith the Pauline use of Christ as the ‘icon’ (Gk. eikṓn) of God, where we are said to be transformed
in His image. See 2 Corinthians 4:4; Colossians 1:15, cf. Romans 8:29; 2 Corinthians 3:18.
51 The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, II, 204, cf. 183-205.
52 See Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Сhristian Tradition: From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451), vol. I,
trans. J. S. Bowden (London: A. R. Mowbray & Co., 1965), 369-417.
53 On both a Pagan Neoplatonic and a Christian account, when we act, we do so because we participate in
divine agency (Acts 17:28), but these acts are imitative. Otherwise, we would just be ‘gods.’ See George F.
McLean, Plenitude and Participation: The Life of God in Man (Washington, D.C.: Council for Research in
Values and Philosophy, 2004), 49.
54 See Grillmeier, Christ in Сhristian Tradition I, 6-7, 23, 64-65, 79, 92-93, 121, 123, 220-233. For a contem-
porary defence of neo-Apollinarian Christology, see J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical
Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic/InterVarsity Press, 2003), 597-
614 (esp. 598-602, 608-610).
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theses of Christian theology, that grace does not destroy nature but perfects it. Furthermore, if
we follow Aquinas (and Boethius) in defining a person as ‘an individual substance of a rational
nature,’55 this would not only entail the destruction of the individual but its nature as well, thus
implying a kind of Docetism, where the Logos only appears to be human.56 Shaw’s claim,
that the divine-human relation of the Pagan theurgist is comparable to the hypostatic union is
only true, then, if we understand this union in an extrinsic, imposed, and traditionally heretical
manner. This would entail the rejection of crucial metaphysical assumptions and it would not
entail that “theWord became flesh,” precisely because the assumed flesh would either be utterly
extrinsic or be destroyed upon assumption. In Christ, however, we do not see a human person
with a ‘special connection’ to the divine or the ‘replacement’ of the human person with the
Logos. In the following I will present my understanding of the hypostatic union, arguing that
Aquinas’s doctrine of one esse and one suppositum in Christ gives us a coherent conception
of Christology which is compatible with a theurgic conception of theology, while also being
radically different from aspects of the Pagan traditions.
As noted, on the standard orthodox position, Christ is one (divine) person, with two natures,
divine and human.57 Now, when speaking of individual substances, particularly ones that are
personal, Aquinas prefers to use the term suppositum. This denotes that the substance in ques-
tion is a primary substance, something which subsists and which can act as the subject or the
‘organising principle’ of a thing. And discussing the Incarnation, he argues that there is but one
suppositum in Christ and, consequently, only one esse (where esse is understood as unqualified
or substantial existence). If it had two, we would have two persons.58 The Logos is that which
55 ST I, q.34, a.3, ad 1; q.40, a.3, cf. Gorman, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union, 36, n6,
73-100, esp. 93-99.
56 Grillmeier, Christ in Сhristian Tradition I, 34, 76-78, 82, 92-94.
57 Gorman, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union, 14-52; Pawl, The Incarnation, 3-27.
58 Gorman, Aquinas on theMetaphysics of the Hypostatic Union, 73-100. On esse and actus essendi, see chapter
one, pp.35-40, cf. De pot., q.7, a.2, ad 9; ST I, q.45, a.5, corp.; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles
(hereafter: SCG) I, c.22:9; III, c.66:4.
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holds all things together as its Creator and sustainer (John 1:1-18; Colossians 1:15-20), while
simultaneously offering internal coherence to Christ’s humanity, as its subject. The union of
the Incarnate Word takes place in the person and this divine person communicates Himself to us
through His humanity, the latter being a conjoined instrument of the divine nature.59 Christ, as
a divine person in human flesh, embodies the divine in a finite creation, thus opening up for us
to participate in this. And this is, arguably, the metaphysical centrepiece of Aquinas’s Christol-
ogy.60 The point of the Incarnation is deification or theosis, the divine consummation of human
activity (2 Corinthians 8:9; 2 Peter 1:4). But where Pagan notions of incarnation are understood
in extrinsic terms, denoting a mere extrinsic union of partnership,61 the Christian understanding
utterly radicalises the concept of the divine-human union. “For in him,” writes St. Paul, “the
whole fullness of deity dwells bodily, and you have come to fullness in him, who is the head
of every ruler and authority” (Colossians 2:9-10). In Christ, divinity and humanity are fully
united in one single person or suppositum, while remaining distinct.62 While an Iamblichean
conception of Incarnation, as presented by Shaw, introduces a competitive (and metaphysically
destructive) conception of the divine-human union, a Christian conception rejects any notion
of ‘competition’ between God and humanity in Christ (as elsewhere in creation). Divinity and
humanity are not competing causes but different dimensions of causality, the latter participat-
ing, as a second cause, in God, as the first cause which ‘influences’ created substances, through
the ‘influx of being.’63 On this conception, the relationship between divinity and humanity in
59 ST III, q.8, a.1, ad 1; q.19, a.1; q.43, a.2; q.48, a.6; q.56, a.1, ad 3; q.62, a.5. For a further discussion of how
Christ is mediated to us, see chapter five, pp.176-188.
60 Williams, Christ the Heart of Creation, 1-40 (esp. 31-40); Gorman, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the
Hypostatic Union, 16-19, 73-125; ST III, q.2, aa.2-3; q.17. For a critique of Aquinas’s approach, which
argues that it has monophysitist tendencies, see Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas
Aquinas to Duns Scotus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), esp. 250-253, 311-324 (cf. 128-133).
61 Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, xxiii-xxxiv; 53-57.
62 The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, II, 203-205.
63 Thomas Aquinas, On Separate Substances (De substantiis separatis, hereafter: De subst. sep.), c.9, 46 (cf.
c.9-10). Also see Simon Oliver, Creation: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark,
2017), 143-157; Rudi A. te Velde, “Participation: Aquinas and His Neoplatonic Sources,” in Christian Pla-
tonism: AHistory, eds., Alexander J. B. Hampton and John Peter Kenney (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2021), 137; Williams, Christ the Heart of Creation, xii-xiii, 11-12, 32, 36-37, 40, 64, 82, 119-122, 155,
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Christ is not understood univocally. The natures are not natures in the exact same way, but only
analogously, as God is metaphysically simple.64
But what is significant with God becoming human? Some might say that God could perhaps
have chosen other ways to achieve this, as did the nominalists and their successors,65 but He
chose Incarnation and Passion. Aquinas, however, notes that the Incarnation was both fitting
(Lt. conveniens), as an expression of God, because it “belongs to the essence of the highest good
to communicate itself in the highest manner to the creature,” which is chiefly brought about by
the hypostatic union,66 and necessary (Lt. necessarium), not in an absolutist manner, but with
regards to the end, our salvation.67 And the reason the Incarnation as such was necessary is that
salvation is not just a restoration to a prelapsarian state but a real union with God which moves
beyond that. Scripture teaches that we are made “partners of Christ” (Hebrews 3:14) and “par-
ticipants in the divine nature” (2 Peter 1:4). Without the Incarnation, any union with God will
remain extrinsic, voluntary, and contractual, rather than metaphysical. We find this tendency in
Iamblichus, who holds that the theurgist loses, in a sense, if only temporarily, his humanity, in
the theurgic act. Panagiotis G. Pavlos notes that the Pagan theurgist “receives a power belong-
ing to gods, which renders him nothing other than a divine agent,” while “such a person remains
a man, a human being, after the temporary theurgic deifying process is completed.”68 To point
235, 248.
64 Gorman, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union, 53-72; ST I, qq.3-5; Rudi A. te Velde, Aquinas
on God: The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa Theologiae (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 77-90.
65 Late medieval nominalism saw the Incarnation solely in extrinsicist terms, holding that God could have saved
us with the flick of a finger or, even, as William of Ockham states, by becoming incarnate as a donkey or an
ox. See Richard Cross, “Nominalism and the Christology of William of Ockham” (Recherches De Théologie
Ancienne Et Médiévale 58, 1991), 126-156; Stanley J. Grenz, The Named God and the Question of Being: A
Trinitarian Theo-Ontology (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 2005), 58-59; Eugene K. McGee,
“Cranmer and Nominalism” (The Harvard Theological Review 57:3, 1964), 189-216; Roland Millare, “The
Nominalist Justification for Luther’s Sacramental Theology” (Antiphon: A Journal for Liturgical Renewal
17:2, 2013), 168-190. If the Incarnation is extrinsic, Christ as a human (where ‘human’ is either a mere
concept or just a convenient label), becomes someone we can imitate (or in all practicality only someone to
look up to), not someone we can truly participate in.
66 ST III, q.1, a.1, corp., cf. Adrian J. Walker, “‘Rejoice always’: How Everyday Joy Responds to the Problem
of Evil” (Communio 31:2, 2004), 219, n25.
67 ST III, q.1, a.2, corp., cf. John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, ebook version (London:
Routledge, 2005), 52.
68 Panagiotis G. Pavlos, “Theurgy in Dionysius the Areopagite,” in Platonism and Christian Thought in Late
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back to Shaw’s comparison of Pagan and Christian notions of the Incarnation, this would imply,
if temporarily, the ‘destruction’ or the ‘suspension’ of the human person.69 In Christ, however,
as emphasised by Pseudo-Dionysius, we do not see “a temporary theurgic effect taking place on
the theurgist” but “the permanent novel theandric activity of God having become man.”70 What
is central to note here is that Christian theology holds that we do not just have an extrinsic ‘part-
nership’ with God but a real and intrinsic divine-human union. The Incarnation, understood in
a Christian manner, is precisely what makes that possible. While it may not be ‘necessary’ in
an absolutist way,71 it is still necessary as an expression of God’s will to save (1 Timothy 2:4).
God, the Logos, saves us by becoming a human being (without losing His divinity in any way),
and thus opening up to real union and not just a retreat to a prelapsarian state. As it says in the
collect for the First Sunday of Christmas in Common Worship:
Almighty God, who wonderfully created us in your own image and yet more wonderfully restored
us through your Son Jesus Christ: grant that, as he came to share in our humanity, so we may share
the life of his divinity; who is alive and reigns with you, in the unity of the Holy Spirit, one God,
now and for ever.72
The Incarnation does not just mean that Christ has a particularly acute way of being one with
God. No, in Him, divinity and humanity are fully united, metaphysically, not just voluntarily,
in one single suppositum, while remaining distinct. In Christ, we find the telos of creation,
as participation in, and union with, God and we can only achieve this through Him.73 As I
have noted, the goal of theurgy is to reconcile the world to God and make humans capable of
Antiquity, eds., Panagiotis G. Pavlos et al. (London: Routledge, 2019), 157, cf. DM VI, 6.
69 Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, xxiii-xxxiv, 53-57.
70 Pavlos, “Theurgy in Dionysius the Areopagite,” 157, cf. Ep. IV (1072C).
71 ST III, q.46, esp. a.1.
72 CommonWorship: Services and Prayers for the Church of England (London: Church House, 2000, hereafter:
CW ), 381, emphasis added.
73 As Hans Urs von Balthasar notes, Christ is the ‘concrete analogia entis,’ because in Him the ultimate union
of divinity and humanity is found, without invoking any competition between the two. See Peter Casarella,
“Hans Urs von Balthasar, Erich Przywara’s Analogia Entis, an the Problem of a Catholic Denkform,” in The
Analogy of Being: Invention of the Antichrist or the Wisdom of God?, ed., Thomas Joseph White (Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), 199-205.
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worship and service through participation in Him.74 The Incarnation utterly radicalises what
we mean by this participation. We see the divine consummation of human activity in one single
person, enabling a real union between divinity and humanity, not merely an extrinsic, mimetic,
and imposed one. And now, having discussed the metaphysics of the Incarnation, and how
that makes possible “a certain new God-incarnate energy (Gk. theandrikḗn enérgeian) of God
having become man,”75 I turn to the actual activity in question, focusing principally on Christ’s
sacrifice, the Paschal mystery, as this “once for all” sacrifice (Hebrews 7:27) consummates all
aspects of Christ’s ministry, particularly his baptism and the Eucharist, and because the Church’s
sacramental life is principally a participation in this.
3 Theurgy, act, and reconciliation
According to Matthew 3:13-17, Christ was baptised by a reluctant John the Baptist “to fulfil
all righteousness” (3:15). This fulfilment is connected specifically to death. In Romans 6, St.
Paul notes that those who “have been baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death”
and that they “have been buried with him by baptism into death, so that, just as Christ was
raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, so [they] too might walk in newness of life”
(vv.3-4). By allowing Himself to be baptised with a baptism of a sinner, Christ obediently
took upon Himself the mission that would lead to the Cross (Philippians 2:7b-8), and thus he
‘fulfilled all righteousness.’ It is significant, I think, that after the baptism, St. John the Baptist
declares, when seeing Christ: “Here is the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world!”
(John 1:29) And through our Baptism, we participate in His death (Romans 6). Likewise, when
Christ instituted the Eucharist, this was a ritual enactment of his impending Passion, being
74 See introduction, p.18, cf. the Second Vatican Council’s constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, Sacrosanctum
Concilium (hereafter: SC), 7; Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 30. On Vatican II documents, see
abbreviations, p.5, n4.
75 Ep. IV (1072C).
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consummated by it. This started in the Upper Room, both through Christ’s high priestly prayer
(John 17) and the institution of the Eucharist.76 When Christ instituted the Eucharist, he said
“this is my body, which is given for you” (Luke 22:19) and “this is my blood of the covenant,
which is poured out for many for the forgiveness of sins” (Matthew 26:28). The institution of
the Eucharist is oriented towards, and participates in, the Cross. And when we celebrate the
Eucharist, we participate in Christ’s institution, in His ‘once for all’ sacrifice, and in His eternal
celebration.77 At the centre of these acts we find the Cross, the ‘once for all’ sacrifice in which
all other (theurgic) sacrifices participate. As St. Paul writes: “When I came to you, brothers and
sisters, I did not come proclaiming the mystery of God to you in lofty words or wisdom. For
I decided to know nothing among you except Jesus Christ, and him crucified” (1 Corinthians
2:1-2). This key act, whereby Christ laid down his life freely as an act of self-sacrifice on
our behalf, is a ritual, priestly, and sacrificial act, “a fragrant offering and sacrifice to God”
(Ephesians 5:2).78 Christ taught the people like a rabbi and healed them like a physician but His
salvific and redeeming act is first and foremost the act of a priest. Christ’s transforms His death
into an offering and allows us to partake of it, through the Eucharist. The ultimate offering,
the Paschal mystery, which is the “once for all” sacrifice (Hebrews 7:27), consummates and
grounds all aspects of Christ’s ministry, particularly his baptism and the Eucharist.
This is also significant formy argument becausewithin a Christian theurgic tradition, theurgy
principally denotes the acts of God in history, and particularly the acts of Christ. Pseudo-
Dionysius talks of ‘the human theurgies of Jesus’ (Gk. tás ándrikás Iēsoú theourgías), quite
literally the human-divine works of Jesus,79 through which he ‘sacramentalises,’ ‘ritualises,’ or
76 Joseph Ratzinger, God Is Near Us: The Eucharist, the Heart of Life (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 2003),
27-41; Joseph Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth (3 vols. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2007, 2011, 2012) II,
76-144.
77 Kjetil Kringlebotten, ““Do this in remembrance of me…” A Lutheran defence of the sacrifice of the mass”
(Studia Theologica – Nordic Journal of Theology 71:2, 2017), 127-147 (esp. 130-136).
78 Cf. John 10:18, 19:11.30.
79 EH III:3, 4 (429c), trans. in Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 31. Also see CH IV, 4 (181B).
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‘theurgises’ the life and works of God incarnate. As Peter Struck notes, for Pseudo-Dionysius,
through this ritualisation, Christ “appears as master theurgist.”80 The Incarnation itself is the
ultimate act of theurgy, by which the fallen world, with humanity at its centre, is reconciled
with God through Christ, the high priest (2 Corinthians 5:17-21; Hebrews 7). Discussing the
nature of Christ’s priesthood, Aquinas notes that it was fitting for Christ to be a priest because
the ultimate act of a priest is to act as a mediator between God and humanity, reconciling the
two and bestowing sacred things upon the latter (hence the Latin term sacerdos for priest):
He reconciled the human race to God, according to Col. 1:19, 20: In Him (i.e., Christ) it hath well
pleased (the Father) that all fullness should dwell, and through Him to reconcile all things unto
Himself. Therefore it is most fitting that Christ should be a priest.81
Aquinas understands this in terms of an Anselmian view of satisfaction, rejecting any notion that
this entails God ‘punishing’ Christ as if He was guilty, as we see in the predominately Calvinist
doctrine of ‘penal substitutionary atonement’ (PSA).82 Defining sacrifice, Aquinas notes that
“whatever is offered to God in order to raise man’s spirit to Him, may be called a sacrifice.”83
Aquinas adds that sacrifices are offered to atone for sins, preserve humans in a state of grace,
80 Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 33, cf. cf. 31-38. Such ritualisation permeates Scripture. The
creation accounts are saturated by ritual imagery, God decrees the ritual celebration of His works, and key
events are marked specifically in a liturgical or ritual manner. See Genesis 1; Exodus 12; Exodus 24; Lev-
eticus 1-9, 16; Numbers 28; 1 Chronicles 23:31; Isaiah 66:23; Matthew 3:13-17; Mark 1:9-11; Luke 1-2;
Luke 3:21-22; 1 Corinthians 10-11. Also see Oliver, Creation, 14-21; Brant Pitre, Jesus and the Last Supper
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2015), 53-147, esp. 90-95, 108-114.
81 ST III, q.22, a.1, corp., cf. aa.1-6.
82 Gerald O’Collins and Michael Jones, “Aquinas on Christ’s Priesthood,” in O’Collins and Jones, Jesus Our
Priest: A Christian Approach to the Priesthood of Christ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 105-127
(esp. 110-121), cf. Gerald Bray, ed., 1–2 Corinthians (Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture, New
York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 247-253 (esp. 251-253). In PSA, an Anselmian notion of atonement is re-
interpreted as Christ ‘taking our place’ and as a ‘transfer of penalty.’ For a sympathetic take on this doctrine,
see Jason B. Hood, “The Cross in the New Testament: Two Theses in Conversation with Recent Literature
(2000–2007)” (Westminster Theological Journal 71, 2009), 281-295. For additional critiques, see J. Patout
Burns, “The Concept of Satisfaction in Medieval Redemption Theory” (Theological Studies 36:2, 1975),
286-289; Paul Fiddes, Past Event and Present Salvation: The Christian Idea of Atonement (Louisville, KY:
Westminster John Knox, 1989), 83-111; John D. Hannah, “Anselm on the Doctrine of Atonement” (Biblio-
theca Sacra 135, 1978), 333-344; Kringlebotten, “Do this…,” 132-136; Paul J. LaChance, “Understanding
Christ’s Satisfaction Today” (The Saint Anselm Journal 2:1, 2004), 60-66; Andrew Sutherland, “From Sat-
isfaction to Penal Substitution: Debt as a Determinative Concept for Atonement Theology in Anselm and
Charles Hodge” (The Saint Anselm Journal 13:1, 2017), 98-108.
83 ST III, q.22, a.2, corp.
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and unite the human spirit perfectly to God. Following (and modifying) Anselm, he argues
that in Christ, God embraces the world, and particularly humanity, in order to reconcile it with
Himself and achieve real metaphysical unity.84 St. Paul notes that God sent “his own Son in
the likeness of sinful flesh, and to deal with sin, he condemned sin in the flesh” (Romans 8:3).85
Christ needed to be fully human to reconcile humanity to God (in the metaphysical sense argued
above), which included experiencing death, which is the conclusion of life.86 As St. Gregory
of Nazianzus phrased it: “What has not been assumed has not been healed.”87 This notion of
sacrifice can be understood in theurgic terms, as the goal of theurgy is to raise man to union
with the divine. As Iamblichus maintains, “the final purpose of sacrifice” is “that it brings us
into contact with the demiurge, since it renders us akin to the gods through acts.”88 But while
I have argued that there are central similarities between Pagan and Christian conceptions of
theurgy, particularly the divine descent, this focus on reconciliation also reveals some crucial
cosmological and anthropological differences (in addition to the metaphysical ones, rooted in
the hypostatic union). While both traditions hold that the effect of the theurgy, the divine work,
is to reconcile the world, in all its materiality, to the divine order,89 they understand this in
radically different ways, though these differences are intertwined with similarities.
Commenting on Iamblichus’s cosmology, Shaw distinguishes his view, which he calls ‘loca-
tive,’ with what he calls a ‘utopian’ view. The former sees the created cosmos as the icon or
revelation of the higher divine order, a properly formed human society as a microcosm of this
cosmos, and the work of priests and kings to attune us to this divine world, while the latter
disregards the world, reversing ‘Platonic taxonomy’ and denying, as a consequence, “the value
84 ST III, q.22, a.3, cf. O’Collins and Jones, “Aquinas on Christ’s Priesthood,” 112-113, 118-119.
85 As noted by Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology (3 vols. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991, 1994,
1998) II, 421-429 (cf. 397-437), God was not in need of reconciliation but the world was. See Catherine
Pickstock, Repetition and Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 171-192.
86 von Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale, 13-14.
87 Brian E. Daley, Gregory of Nazianzus (London: Routledge, 2006), 14.
88 DM V, 26.
89 Romans 5:12-21; 1 Corinthians 15; 2 Corinthians 5:11-21; Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 30.
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of religious rituals tied to the rhythms of the sensible world.”90 On the locative view, contact
with the divine, and recollection, is always given through physical creation and through the
body.91 The Iamblichean Neoplatonists saw theurgy first and foremost as a ritual and embod-
ied enactment or participation in a work that was already divine (which was also adopted by
Christians, though in a transformed manner), and not as a ‘manipulation’ of divine forces.92 As
Peter Struck puts it, theurgy is “a divine act, a θεῖον ἔργον, insofar as it is action, established by
gods, put into use by humans.”93 For Iamblichus, however, this is understood within a specific
cosmology. For him, the cosmos stands above humanity and it is not fallen, even if humans are.
Shaw writes:
Milbank and Riches also point to a difference, the key difference, between the theurgy of Iamblichus
and Christian theurgy. It is this: in Neoplatonic theurgy the material cosmos is an agalma, a shrine
of the Demiurge (Timaeus 37c); the cosmos itself reveals the presence of gods. That is, the natural
world for Iamblichean Platonists is a theophany. Far from being “fallen,” nature itself is the face
and living symbol of the divine: nature is the incarnation of divine realities ab ovo. From this
perspective, the Incarnational theology of the Church enters this theophanic current downstream
90 Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, 13, cf. 10-14. In the book, Shaw attributes the former to Iamblichus and the
latter to Plotinus, though he later admits that while Plotinus looks unfavourably on the nature of materiality
(and holds that the highest part of the soul remains undescended), he is not ‘utopian.’ See Gregory Shaw,
“Eros and Arithmos: Pythagorean Theurgy in Iamblichus and Plotinus” (Ancient Philosophy 19, 1999), 121-
143 (esp. 124-134), cf. R. M. van den Berg, “Plotinus’ Attitude to Traditional Cult: A Note on Porphyry VP
c. 10” (Ancient Philosophy 19, 1999), 352-359. I would note, though, that there is a difference. Whereas
Iamblichus sees human society as a microcosm of the cosmic order which reveals the gods, aiming to become
one with the gods through theurgic ritual, which does include spiritual ascent (DM VI, 6), Plotinus holds that
prior to any such ritual, we (or the highest, undescended, part of our souls) “are not just a microcosmos of
that divine society, we are a part of it” (van den Berg, “Plotinus’ Attitude to Traditional Cult,” 353).
91 It should be noted, though, that while the Iamblichean tradition rejects any notion of matter as evil and holds
that it is crucial for union with the divine, Iamblichus still regards the body as less noble than the soul (and
sees the latter as in some sense divine). The goal, for those who are able, is to transcend matter, though
not because it is evil. See Addey, Divination and Theurgy, 79-80, 98-102, 252-255; Shaw, Theurgy and the
Soul, 26, 34-35, 104, 108-109, 126, 154, 173-182, 232-233, 267. Crystal Addey notes the Plotinian doctrine,
however, is not ‘anti-ritualistic.’ While Plotinus holds that the soul is not fully descended, he still values
ritual as an inner concept. Arguments to the contrary, she argues, are based on a modern dichotomy between
thought and action (Addey, Divination and Theurgy, 173-180, 199-211).
92 Stang, “Dionysius, Paul and the Significance of the Pseudonym,” 544, cf. Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles,
199-200.
93 Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 30, cf. Addey, Divination and Theurgy, 79-80, 98-102, 171-290;
Alan Philip Darley, “Ritual as erotic anagogy in Pseudo-Dionysius: a Reformed critique” (International
Journal of Philosophy and Theology 79:3, 2018), 261-278; Andrew Louth, “Pagan Theurgy and Christian
Sacramentalism” (The Journal of Theological Studies, new series, 27:2, 1986), 432-438; Shaw, Theurgy
and the Soul, 23-40, 121-133, 147-211, 259-272; Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity; Algis Uždavinys,
Philosophy and Theurgy in Late Antiquity (Kettering: Angelico Press/Sophia Perennis, 2014), 204-228.
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and embraces theurgic realities that had already been spelled out by Platonists and in a manner
significantly different from Christian theology.94
For Iamblichus, the ultimate goal of theurgy is full intellectual union with the divine and the
ascent of the soul which is, now, fully descended (contra Plotinus). But the cosmos itself remains
the unfallen centre of creation. For him, then, the cosmos takes the place of Christ, as the
revelation of divine presence and “the incarnation of divine realities.”95
In Christian theology, however, the cosmos as a whole is fallen and God descended to re-
deem the entirety of creation (Romans 5:12-14; 8; 2 Corinthians 5:19). This follows fromChris-
tianity’s emphasis on humanity as the centre of creation. This does not mean that humanity is
the most important or highest part of creation, but that humanity, as its microcosm, uniquely
incorporates all its aspects, visible and invisible. Humanity is, in the words of the Psalmist,
made “little lower than God” (Psalm 8:5). Or, in the words of St. John of Kronstadt, humanity
is “the crown of creation.”96 As I will discuss more in the next chapter, we do not reject that the
world or the cosmos is, in some sense, theophanic, that creation bears witness to its Creator (Job
12:7-8; Psalm 19:1; Romans 1:20). But this is rooted in humanity as the microcosmic centre
of creation, whose priestly task it is to offer the world back to God.97 When the first Adam fell
and failed his priestly task, the world fell with him and reconciliation is only possible through
Christ, ‘the last Adam’ (1 Corinthians 15:45), who has reunited the cosmos with God through
the hypostatic union, as the true high priest.98 For Christians, then, the divine order into which
94 Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, xxiv, cf. xxiv-xxv. Also see John Milbank and Aaron Riches, “Neoplatonic
Theurgy and Christian Incarnation” (foreword to Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, v-xvii).
95 Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, xxiv, cf. 67-77; Gregory Shaw, “Neoplatonic Theurgy and Dionysius the Are-
opagite” (Journal of Early Christian Studies 7:4, 1999), 582-583, 595.
96 St. John of Kronstadt, My life in Christ, trans. E. E. Goulaeff (London: Cassell and Company, Limited,
1897), 230.
97 See Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus the Confessor, trans.
Brian E. Daley (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2003), 173-177, 207-275; Catherine Pickstock, “The
Ritual Birth of Sense” (Telos 162, 2013), 33; Alexander Schmemann, For the Life of the World: Sacraments
and Orthodoxy, 2nd ed. (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 1997), 16-18, 32-36, 91-94.
98 Romans 5:12-21; 1 Corinthians 15:20-23, 42-49; Hebrews 7, cf. Joseph Ratzinger, Introduction to Chris-
tianity, new ed. (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 2004), 234-243.
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the material world is brought into harmony, is rooted in the Logos Incarnate, through whom “all
things in heaven and on earth were created, things visible and invisible” (Colossians 1:16), in
whom “all things hold together” (Colossians 1:17), and in whom “the whole fullness of deity
dwells bodily” (Colossians 2:9).99 The zenith of His work of reconciliation was His death on
the Cross, the “once for all” sacrifice in which all other (theurgic) sacrifices participate (He-
brews 7:27).100 The sacrifice on the Cross consummates other aspects of Christ’s mission and
draws them together, particularly the Baptism and the institution of the Eucharist, as they are
all oriented towards the Passion. As Thomas Plant notes, when Pseudo-Dionysius speaks of the
completion of the divine theurgy in Christ, this cannot be reduced to something written but is
grounded in the actual death on the Cross:
[T]he word ἐτέλεσε has unmistakable connotations for the Greek-speaking Christian, who cannot
help recalling Jesus’ last word on the Cross: the τετέλεσται of Jn 19.30, itself an echo of the same
word in Jn 19.28, which refers to the fulfilment of the old scriptures. The New Testament is com-
pleted on the Cross, not on paper.101
In Christ, God becomes the human head of creation by taking “sinful flesh” (Romans 8:3) and
healing it, and creation with it. This sacrifice is not just a theurgic act. It is the theurgic act par
excellence, reconciling the world to God and making possible the theurgic life of the Church.
Christ’s sacrifice, then, was necessary for our redemption.102 Some have argued that while
God could have saved us in any way He pleased, He chose Incarnation and Passion. He chose
to descend into His own fallen creation, not because He was out for his ‘pound of flesh,’ but
because fallenness and death had entered the world and because Christ redeemed it by assuming
it all and transforming it from the inside. While these elements are undoubtedly true, they are
phrased in voluntarist language, and do not adequately express the utterly radical nature of the
99 Cf. Colossians 1:15-20; 2:6-19.
100 Cf. 2 Corinthians 5:17-21; Galatians 3:13-14; Colossians 1:21-23.
101 Plant, Dualism and nondualism, 104, cf. 101-110, esp. 103-108.
102 ST III, q.62, a.5, corp.
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Incarnation. The Incarnation is not just a handy choice. Without the real metaphysical union-
in-distinction of the hypostatic union, we can only have an extrinsic union with God. We cannot
really participate in the atonement, even passively, by being “crucified with Christ” (Galatians
2:19), unless this union is real. In Christ, divinity and humanity are fully united in one single
suppositum, while remaining distinct.103 We see the divine consummation of human activity
in one single person, enabling real divine-human union, finding its apex on the Cross and in
the Resurrection, whereby Christ takes all of human experience, up to and including death, and
transforms it from the inside.
4 Theurgy, Incarnation, and participation in Christ
In an article on Pseudo-Dionysius, Andrew Louth notes that when the Areopagite uses the ad-
jective theourgikōs, “its primarymeaning is ‘deifying’… or as conveying divine activity (which
comes to the same thing for Denys).”104 This perspective, often called deification or theosis, has
been especially emphasised in Eastern theology, but it also finds its rightful place in Western
theology.105 At the centre of this tradition, we find the notion that we are made “participants
in the divine nature” (2 Peter 1:4). Following the Chalcedonian definition, that Christ should
be “acknowledged in two natures without confusion, change, division, or separation,”106 both
Eastern and Western theologians focus on the communicatio idiomatum, that there is a commu-
nication between divinity and humanity, because of the Hypostatic Union.107 We may partici-
103 Colossians 1:19; 2:9-10; John 1:1-18, cf. The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, II, 203-205.
104 Louth, “Pagan Theurgy and Christian Sacramentalism,” 437. Louth, and others, sees a clear difference be-
tween Iamblichean and Pseudo-Dionysian theurgy (see introduction p.14, 24). I think that even though the
differences really matter, most particularly when it comes to the Incarnation, the differences are exaggerated
and they end up obscuring the Neoplatonic influences in Christian theurgy and particularly Pseudo-Dionysius.
105 Braaten and Jenson, eds. Union with Christ; Christensen and Wittung, eds., Partakers of the Divine Nature;
Marquart, “Luther and Theosis”; Russell, The Doctrine of Deification; Williams, The Ground of Union.
106 The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, II, 204.
107 Philip Kariatlis, “A credible presentation of Redemption today” (lecture delivered at St Andrew’s Theolog-
ical College, Sydney College of Divinity, 2004); Pawl, The Incarnation, 24-26; ST III, q.16; Steiger, “The
communicatio idiomatum.”
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pate in the Logos precisely because He became a human being. For St. Paul, this is expressed
through the notion of exchange: “For you know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though
he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, so that by his poverty you might become rich”
(2 Corinthians 8:9). Or, in the words of St. Athanasius, “He, indeed, assumed humanity that
we might become God.”108 In Christ, we are made one with God and active participants in His
work, which comes to expression most fully in the liturgy.109 What is significant is that unlike
any other, Christ is a true theurgist because in Him, divinity and humanity are forever united,
without confusion. And He invites us to be participants in Him, and in His work, as we see in
Galatians 2:19-20:
For through the law I died to the law, so that I might live to God. I have been crucified with Christ;
and it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me. And the life I now live in the flesh I
live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me.
The goal of theurgy is the divine consummation of human activity. It is, a kind of ‘displacement’
in Christ, as we are made partakers in Him. Charles M. Stang notes that this displacement is
at the heart of theurgy, whether Pagan or Christian: “[F]or both Iamblichus and Dionysius,
deification consists in our consenting to have the “work of God” (ἐργὸν θεοῦ)—or “theurgy”
(θεουργία)—displace us, so that we become ciphers or conduits of divine activity.”110 But how
do we understand this displacement? As I have argued in the previous chapter,111 we are ordered
to God (1 Corinthians 14:26-40). While St. Paul’s argument seems, on a surface level, to be
concerned principally with the structure of the worship service, he grounds this order in the
very nature of God: “For God is a God not of disorder but of peace” (1 Corinthians 14:33).
The centre of this orientation towards God, however, is found in Christ, where we find a real
108 Athanasius, On the Incarnation, new revised edition, trans., a religious of C. S. M. V., intr., C. S. Lewis
(Crestwood, N.Y.: SVS Press, 1996), 93.
109 I have discussed this in the previous chapter and I will explore this more thoroughly in the next.
110 Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 39.
111 See chapter three, pp.106-118.
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metaphysical union-in-distinction between divinity and humanity.112 To be orientated fully to
God, as understood by St. Paul in 1 Corinthians 14, then, we must participate in Christ, be
incorporated into Christ.
Citing Pseudo-Dionysius and Luther, Knut Alfsvåg states: “True human existence is es-
tablished through participation in Christ as the exemplar of what it is to be human.”113 This
is rooted in the Pseudo-Dionysian idea of exemplarism, “according to which the principles of
the phenomena pre-exist as entities in God.”114 For Pseudo-Dionysius, an exemplar is not just
an extrinsic notion that we imitate, in a mimetic fashion, but something we can participate in
(méthexis), which then opens up for our imitative participation in act (mímēsis). Because of
the hypostatic union, Christ, as the exemplar of human life, ordered to God, is the focal point
of the divine-human union. This is not merely the union between Creator and creature, which
will at some level always remain external. It is not an extrinsic and imposed voluntarist union,
a ‘contract’ between God and humankind, but a real metaphysical union-in-distinction, some-
thing, I argue, should be understood in analogical and participatory terms. To use Aquinas’s
Aristotelian-Neoplatonic language of analogy, in Christ we see the relation of the many to-
wards the one (Gk. pròs hèn). Just like different things can be considered healthy by reference
to a person who is healthy in himself, different persons can share in the divine, by reference
to Christ, who is the common focus of the divine-human union.115 By being incorporated into
112 Blowers, Maximus the Confessor, 144, 154; Boulnois, The Theology of St. Cyril of Alexandria, 84-111.
113 Alfsvåg, “Luther as a reader of Dionysius the Areopagite,” 104.
114 Alfsvåg, “Luther as a reader of Dionysius the Areopagite,” 104, cf. Knut Alfsvåg, What No Mind Has
Conceived: On the Significance of Christological Apophaticism (Leuven: Peeters, 2010), 136-137; Pseudo-
Dionysius, The Divine Names (De Divinis Nominibus, hereafter: DN.) V, 8-9 (821C-825A). We see this also
in ST I-II, prol., were Aquinas distinguishes between God, as exemplar, and humans, as creatures in God’s
image. See te Velde, Aquinas on God, 16; Rudi A. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas
Aquinas (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 108-116. Furthermore, in ST II-II, q.45, a6, corp., Aquinas notes that humans
“are called the children of God insofar as they participate in the likeness of the only-begotten and natural Son
of God, according to Rom. 8:29.”
115 SCG I, c.34; ST I, q.13, prol., cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham, in Loeb Classical
Library, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, vol. 73 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926), 1096b, 14-29;
Alan Philip Darley, “Predication or Participation? What is the Nature of Aquinas’ Doctrine of Analogy?”
(The Heythrop Journal 57, 2016), 315.
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Christ and becoming “partners [Gk. métochoi] of Christ” (Hebrews 3:14), we relate to God,
analogously, and become “participants in the divine nature” (2 Peter 1:4), precisely because of
the hypostatic union. And in Scripture, such incorporation is understood ontologically, com-
munally and sacramentally. In John 15, Christ distinguishes between Himself as the true vine
and us as the branches: “I am the vine, you are the branches. Those who abide in me and I in
them bear much fruit, because apart from me you can do nothing.”116 This is ontological, as
Christ is the condition for our actions, at least as converted believers, and communal, as we all
relate to Christ, as branches, and therefore also to one another. And in Scripture, our incorpora-
tion or initiation into Christ is understood in sacramental terms. St. Paul notes that “when [we]
were buried with [Christ] in baptism, [we] were also raised with him through faith in the power
of God, who raised him from the dead.”117 And in John 6:53-56, we also find the eucharistic
ground for this incorporation:
Very truly, I tell you, unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you have no
life in you. Those who eat my flesh and drink my blood have eternal life, and I will raise them up
on the last day; for my flesh is true food and my blood is true drink. Those who eat my flesh and
drink my blood abide in me, and I in them.
Our incorporation into Christ, through which we relate not just to God but to all who believe in
Christ, comes through concrete rituals. In the words of the Emmaus wanderers, Christ is “made
known to [us] in the breaking of the bread” (Luke 24:35).118 This incorporation, in turn, opens
up to a life in Christ, where He is present in us, working through us, allowing us to imitate Him
(Galatians 2:19-20; Ephesians 5:1-2; 1 Peter 1:13-25; 2:21-25). Alfsvåg notes that for both
Pseudo-Dionysius and Luther, “one may be lifted into a contemplation of the essential work of
God beyond the rationally definable,” through which “Christ will make himself known in the
116 John 15:5, cf. vv.1-17; Romans 8:1-11; Ephesians 4:17-24.
117 Colossians 2:12, cf. vv.6-15; Romans 6:1-14; Galatians 3:27-28.
118 For my discussion of this with regards to mediation, see chapter five, pp.183-188.
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believer as the exemplar of true human existence.”119 We are allowed to partake of the divine
work, the theurgy, and when we act, we do so through Christ, in imitation of Him.
How this imitation comes to expression, though, is a case for debate. As this deals with
our participation in Christ’s redemptive work, as we are “crucified with Christ,” some have
argued that this must (also liturgically) be understood in a completely passive manner, because
the atonement is, supposedly, ‘pure gift.’ Oswald Bayer states, for instance, that “[t]he worship
service is first and last the service of God to us, his sacrifice that has taken place for us once-
and-for-all, which in the Lord’s Supper is ministered, promised and communicated by the word
of giving, in, with and under the bread and wine.”120 In one sense, this is true. We do not
perform the work that Christ offered “once for all” (Hebrews 7:27). Bayer, however, goes on to
state that the service of God to us “is misjudged, when—as Luther emphasizes with his sharp
distinction between “sacrament” and “sacrifice”—wewant to give to God, as a work, as an actio
hominis, that which we are granted to receive and accept as his pure gift.”121 While Bayer is
correct in seeing human beings principally defined by passivity and reception, as creation is “a
gift of a gift to a gift,”122 this ought to be understood as middle voiced, as an ‘active passivity’
or an ‘active reception.’123 Catherine Pickstock notes that the term ‘middle voice’ indicates
“the mediation of divine by human action.”124 Though this usually expresses reciprocity or
reflexivity, e.g. “John and Jacob hug each other” or “I cooked myself dinner,”125 Pickstock
notes that, overcoming the dichotomy between ‘active’ and ‘passive,’ it can denote “the way
119 Alfsvåg, “Luther as a reader of Dionysius the Areopagite,” 105.
120 Oswald Bayer, “The Ethics of Gift” (Lutheran Quarterly 24, 2010), 453, cf. Joshua C. Miller, Hanging by
a Promise: The Hidden God in the Theology of Oswald Bayer (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2015),
118-123, 136-145; John T. Pless, “Can We Participate Liturgically in the Atonement?” (Logia: A Journal of
Lutheran Theology 19, 2010), 39-47.
121 Bayer, “The Ethics of Gift,” 453.
122 John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate concerning the Supernatural, 2nd ed.
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014), 96, cf. Oliver, Creation, 143-157.
123 See Kringlebotten, “Do this…,” 132-136.
124 Catherine Pickstock, “Liturgy, Art and Politics” (Modern Theology 16:2, 2000), 180, n8.
125 For a discussion of the grammatical category of the middle voice, see Suzanne Kemmer, The middle Voice
(Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1993).
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in which God can act in and through a subject but without denying the subject its freedom, and
to describe the way in which action under grace is neither active nor passive in voice.”126 And
the reason is that everything that is not God, including our own works, is in the mode of gift.
In Scripture we see that when we offer a sacrifice of praise, something Bayer calls an actio
hominis, we do so because God “put a new song in [our] mouth[s], a song of praise to our God”
(Psalm 40:3). And when we do good works, we do so because “we are what [God] has made
us, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand to be our way of
life” (Ephesians 2:10). God works through us, in the deeds we do and the prayers and sacrifices
we offer, but this is equally considered a work that we do. When we are displaced, when we
“become ciphers or conduits of divine activity,”127 this displacement, the divine consummation
of human activity, is perfective, not destructive. St. Paul states that it “is no longer I who
live, but it is Christ who lives in me” (Galatians 2:20a). But he follows this up by pointing out
that the self is not obliterated but perfected and fulfilled: “And the life I now live in the flesh
I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me” (Galatians 2:20b,
emphasis added).128 If we separate the actio hominis and the actio divina, we make human
acts too autonomous and we obscure the fact that in Christ, we see the perfection of the human
act. The divine consummation of human activity finds its ultimate expression precisely in the
human acts of Christ or ‘the human theurgies of Jesus’ (Gk. tás ándrikás Iēsoú theourgías).129
For Pseudo-Dionysius this displacement is divine, as we participate in a work which remains,
principally, a divine work. But at the same time, this includes us.130 In this, Pseudo-Dionysius
is close to Iamblichus’s use of theurgy,131 though grounded in Christ to whom we are ordered.
126 Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell,
1998), 105, n8, cf. 35-36, 112, 145, 157.
127 Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 39, cf. 187-194 (192-194).
128 Cf. Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 183-185.
129 EH III:3, 4 (429c), cf. CH IV, 4 (181B); Shaw, “Neoplatonic Theurgy and Dionysius the Areopagite,” 590;
Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 112; Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 31.
130 Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 167.
131 Cf. DM I, 12-13; I, 18; II, 9; III, 3; 17; 20, 25; V, 23; VII, 5; X, 5-8.
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As Stang notes, St. Paul is, so to speak, a ‘theurgist,’132 because even though he does not use
the word ‘theurgy,’ he does speak of our participation in the work of God or the work of Christ
in which we participate. The radical difference between this and Pagan notions is that it is
grounded in Christ as master theurgist (rather than in the cosmos and the pantheon of gods).
We become partakers of this, theourgikoì, “participants of the work, co-workers of the work,”
only through Him.133 Christian practices are always grounded in Christ and in His presence and
it is always in accordance with our natures, in the middle voice.134
Bayer agrees that human activity must be understood in this manner (although he does not
use that particular phrasing), but he sees Christ’s redemptive work as an exemption. This, how-
ever, introduces the possibility of ‘purely human’ acts and introduces a competitive conception
of the divine-human relationship, and the nature of Christ’s act, into our theology of the atone-
ment. Christ is the master theurgist, yes, but not in a way that ‘excludes’ our participation in
His act. Christ’s mission on our behalf, furthermore, is the human act par excellence, precisely
because it was, at the same time, the divine act.135 In a way we can say that Christ’s activity,
as the God-man, is the perfection of human work, as we also find in Bayer’s theology. Even
with his flaws, he has some real insights. He rejects any occasionalistic views on liturgy or
God’s commands, and he emphasises the centrality of the liturgy and God’s gift. But more im-
portantly, discussing the “absurd desire of humans to become self-creators,” Bayer insists that
human dignity and freedom lies in this receptivity.136 Our dignity lies in the fact that we receive
132 Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 114-116, cf. Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies”; Wear and Dillon,
Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition, 99-115. See Romans 14:20; 1 Corinthians 3:9;
15:58; 16:10; Ephesians 1:18-21; Ephesians 3:7; Philippians 2:29-30; Colossians 1:29; 2:12; 1 Thessalonians
3:2.
133 Wear and Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition, 100, cf. EH I, 1 (372B).
134 De pot., q.3, a.7; Bård Norheim, Practicing Baptism: A Theological Investigation of the Presence of Christ in
Christian Practices in the Context of Youth Ministry (PhD dissertation, MF Norwegian School of Theology,
Oslo, 2011), 76-81, 89-90, 98-123.
135 Kringlebotten, “Do this…,” 132-137.
136 Oswald Bayer, “Self-creation? On the Dignity of Human Beings” (Modern Theology 20:2, 2004), 275, 282,
cf. Oswald Bayer, “Categorical Imperative or Categorical Gift?,” in Bayer, Freedom in Response: Lutheran
Ethics: Sources and Controversies, trans. Jeffrey F. Cayzer (Oxford Studies in Theological Ethics. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007), 13-20; Bayer, “The Ethics of Gift,” 448, 453-454, 457-458; Oswald Bayer,
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our being and our ability to act in freedom. Though Bayer is critical of Thomistic theology, his
emphasis still seems to be compatible with the Thomistic focus on participation, where we are
able to act in freedom, as secondary causes, participating in God as the primary agent: “But
every application of power to operation is originally and primarily made by God. … Therefore;
every operation should be attributed to God, as to a first and principal agent.”137 Aquinas is,
in a broadly theurgic manner, making use of a Proclean emphasis on the relationship between
Creator and creature, saying that any act we do is only possible through participation in God’s
own act.138 Indeed, it is a participation in God’s own act. As creatures, we participate in God,
and this finds its complete fulfilment in Christ, where participation moves beyond our mimetic
participation in God to a complete union, though “without confusion, change, division, or sep-
aration.”139 And this is why this act is the ultimate act of theurgy. Precisely because of God’s
ultimate act, in Christ, through which we are granted a fundamental participation in God (Gk.
méthexis), we can imitate the divine life (Gk. mímēsis), grounded in Christ’s act, in a manner
that is not extrinsic and imposed: “Therefore be imitators of God [Gk. mimētaì toũ theoũ], as
beloved children, and live in love, as Christ loved us and gave himself up for us, a fragrant
offering and sacrifice to God.”140 I am, then, distinguishing between, but not separating or
equivocating on two related but allegedly separate notions of participation (méthexis andmímē-
sis). They are not identical, but they are closely related. We participate in God and he keeps us
in being, in act, from moment to moment. Our being is an act, expressing itself in actions. But
Martin Luther’s Theology: A Contemporary Interpretation, trans. Oswald Bayer (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerd-
mans, 2008), 37-39, 53-54; Oswald Bayer, Theology the Lutheran Way, ed. and trans. Jeffrey G. Silcock
and Mark C. Mattis (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007), 17-18, 83-98; Oswald Bayer, “Worship and The-
ology,” inWorship and Ethics: Lutherans and Anglicans in Dialogue, eds., Oswald Bayer and Alan Suggate
(Berlin/New York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 1996), 148-161. Also see Knut Alfsvåg, “Luthersk spiritualitet:
Om lære og liv i den éne, kristne kirke” (Dansk Tidsskrift for Teologi og Kirke 40:1, 2013), 42-56; Miller,
Hanging by a Promise, 4, 116-172 (cf. 1-12, for an introduction to Bayer).
137 SCG III, c.67:4, cf. Bayer, Martin Luther’s Theology, 37; Bayer, Theology, 29, 34, 76-77, 97-98, 203-205,
263, n145.
138 Davison, Participation in God, 218, n4.
139 The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, II, 204.
140 Ephesians 5:1-2, cf. 1 Corinthians 4:16; 11:1; Philippians 3:17; 1 Thessalonians 1:6-7; 1 Peter 1:13-25;
2:21-25.
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even though created things are grounded in (or suspended from) the divine, this participation is
nonetheless real, not illusory:
All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But they are not called beings through the divine
being, but through their own being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness, but by
their own goodness. … And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he called God
the absolute good, from whom all things are called good by way of participation. … Hence from
the first being, essentially such, and good, everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as
it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective.141
AndrewDavison comments that “be-ing is the innermost, andmost significant, of all actions.”142
And later he adds that thinking about “participation in action” is not to “step away from” the
topic of “participation in being,” precisely because being is already an act (of ‘be-ing’): “Par-
ticipation in being therefore already is participation in act, participation in agency.”143 We are
actual performers of our acts and this is real and derived at the same time. The point is not
that participation in God is involvement in concrete practices but that involvement in concrete
practices is grounded inméthexis, in that we are perfected, and that it comes to expression (non-
identically) as mímēsis, in that we also bring about perfection.144 Being involved in practices
which realise human goods (ethical, ritual, cultural, or otherwise) is a participation in the being
and agency of God and it is the proper form of human life.145 We have being because of God,
who is pure act, and our actions flow from our being, as participating in this act of God, or in
God himself. Existence and action are both constitutive parts of what it means to be: “The less
perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake
141 ST I, q.6, a.4, sed contra and corp.
142 Davison, Participation in God, 33, n80, cf. ST I, q.8, a.1.
143 Davison, Participation in God, 217, 218, cf. 68-79, 217-235.
144 EH I, 1 (372B).
145 See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 3rd ed. (London: Duckworth, 2007), 181-225; James K. A. Smith,
Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and Cultural Formation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic,
2009), 17-129, esp. 19-27, 39-110. MacIntyre notes (p.187) that the goal of any practice, “any coherent
and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity,” is that through these practices certain
“goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of
excellence.”
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of the form, so the form which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second
act; and thus operation is the end of the creature.”146 But through the Incarnation, this is utterly
radicalised and intensified.
God became a human being who lived, died, and was resurrected for us, and He gave us
the sacramental gifts so that we may participate concretely in this. Through our ontological
participation in Christ, through our incorporation into Him, we are called to participate in or
imitate the Incarnation. Not only dowe participate in Christ ontologically but this alsomanifests
itself in action, not only for ourselves but for all the Church. Without their historical rooting
in the acts of Christ, the gifts are nothing. But likewise these acts are just historical acts unless
we are given the gift to participate in them and to imitate their gifts non-identically. As St.
Paul puts it, rather strikingly: “I am now rejoicing in my sufferings for your sake, and in my
flesh I am completing what is lacking in Christ’s afflictions for the sake of his body, that is,
the church” (Colossians 1:24). What is ‘lacking in Christ’s afflictions’ is not His perfect and
eternal ‘once for all’ sacrifice, but our participation in Him, as His body (Galatians 2:19-20).
Being blessed by Christ, first and foremost through the sacraments (as we will discuss more in
the next chapter), we are made co-workers of the theurgy and are called to be formed in Christ
or conformed to Him (Romans 8:29), as Christ is “the exemplar of what it is to be human.”147
This is at the heart of what we mean by ‘active participation.’ Human union with God finds
its ultimate (and exclusive) expression in the life of Christ, where divinity and humanity are
forever united “without confusion, change, division, or separation.”148
146 ST I, q.105, a.5, corp., cf. SCG III, c.113:1; Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2002), 48-49.
147 Alfsvåg, “Luther as a reader of Dionysius the Areopagite,” 104, cf. EH I, 1 (372B); Kringlebotten, “Do
this…,” 132-136.
148 The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, II, 204.
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5 Conclusion
In the introduction to this thesis I asked: How is it even possible to speak of human agency in
the context of the liturgy as a participation in the divine act, and why is it even necessary? In
this chapter I have attempted to answer this question by interpreting liturgy, and theology as a
whole, through the lens of theurgy and by centring it on Christ. I have argued that this must be
rooted in Christ, in His person and His act, most particularly in the Passion, in the ultimate act
of theurgy. According to the Pagan theurgists, the human community, finding its apex in the
theurgic rituals, is an imitation or a participation in the divine community. As Peter Struck puts
it, commenting on the Iamblichean notion of theurgy: “Theurgy is a divine act, a θεῖον ἔργον,
insofar as it is action, established by gods, put into use by humans, whose effect is to bring
the material world (including that part of the celebrant which is material) into harmony with
the divine order.”149 For Iamblichus, this should be understood in mainly cosmological and
polytheistic terms as a participation in the cosmos as a morally unfallen “agalma, a shrine of
the Demiurge (Timaeus 37c)” which “reveals the presence of gods,”150 and it is principally open
to anyone. This, however, is subverted in Christianity. Christian theology maintains that there
is One true God and that there is likewise only One true ‘master theurgist,’ Jesus Christ, who
redeemed not only individuals but the world itself (2 Corinthians 5:17-21). Through Christ’s
central theurgic act of vicarious penal suffering, He shared our fallen condition, suffering on our
behalf, and transformed this condition from the inside, allowing us to become participants in
this. This does not mean that Christ was punished as if He was guilty, through a crude ‘transfer
of penalty,’ but that He redeemed the world by participating in it and transforming it, not just
in its physicality but in its fallenness, to open up to new life.151
149 Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 30.
150 Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, xxiv, cf. xxiv-xxv; Zeyl and Sattler, “Plato’s Timaeus.”
151 Romans 8:1-8, cf. Fiddes, Past Event, 89-104; Kringlebotten, “Do this…,” 132-136; Pannenberg, Systematic
Theology II, 421-429; Sutherland, “From Satisfaction to Penal Substitution,” 103-108.
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With the Pagan theurgists, we affirm that theurgy is a divine act, enacted by humans to rec-
oncile the world to God. But we note that without the Incarnation, such bringing into harmony
remains shadowy and extrinsic. The ultimate divine-human union is established through Christ.
God is no longer just external to us, as Christ unites humanity with God in an utterly radical
way, in one single suppositum, “without confusion, change, division, or separation,”152 Christ
elevates creation, as creation, and makes real union with God possible. As St. Paul notes:
“For in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily, and you have come to fullness in him,
who is the head of every ruler and authority” (Colossians 2:9-10). Through participation in His
act of redemption, through being ‘crucified with Christ,’ we may live out the Christian life in
Him (Galatians 2:19-20; Ephesians 5:1-2; 1 Peter 2:5). Through Him, particularly through the
Church’s liturgy, and principally through baptism, we are granted participation in the divine and
we are given the dignity of active participation in the liturgy. Through the grace given there,
which moves us beyond our participation as creatures, we are perfected in a non-destructive
manner. Grace transforms us, and gives us the dignity to participate in the divine work, while
still remaining fully human.
In the next chapter, I focus specifically on the nature of sacramentality by first providing
an account of the metaphysics of worship, arguing that God is always revealed to us as medi-
ated, something which presupposes that creation, while fallen, still participates in the divine,
as creation and, more particularly, in Christ, through whom all things were made and through
whom the sacraments become channels of divine grace, and second by arguing that the fullest
expression of this is found in the Eucharist and in a doctrine of transubstantiation which both
provides a coherent account of real presence, divine act, and an analogical understanding of
reality, but which also preserves the place of nature, as nature, in a concrete cultural context.




Theurgy, liturgy, and sacramentality
1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I argued that what makes Christian theurgy possible is the incarnation
or the hypostatic union, which unites us with God on a metaphysical level, though “without
confusion, change, division, or separation.”1 Through Christ, as the God-man, we are deified
and are enabled to offer ourselves and celebrate the liturgy. In this chapter, I will explore the
specifically liturgical and sacramental nature of this, arguing that God is never disclosed to
creation in a direct or unmediated manner, but that this is not necessarily ‘unreal,’ if we assume
a participatory and analogical metaphysic.2 This participatory approach is a perspective that
Christian theology shares with its Pagan Neoplatonic counterparts. For Iamblichus this comes
to expression particularly through symbols, where the theurgic cult, which “imitates the order
of the gods, both the intelligible and that in the heavens, … possesses eternal measures of what
truly exists and wondrous tokens, such as have been sent down hither by the creator and father
of all.”3 For Iamblichus, matter is not “excluded from participation in its betters,” and “since
it was proper not even for terrestrial things to be utterly deprived of participation in the divine,
earth also has received from it a share in divinity, such as is sufficient for it to be able to receive
1 The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, trans., introd. and notes, Richard Price and Michael Gaddis (3 vols.,
Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2005, 2007), II, 204.
2 Andrew Davison, Participation in God: A Study in Christian Doctrine and Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2019), 65-83, 341-343, cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy (De coelesti
hierarchia, hereafter: CH), I, 2 (121B); Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (hereafter: ST) I, q.1, a.9. For
notes on the Thomistic and Pseudo-Dionysian corpora, see abbreviations, p.4, nn1-2.
3 Iamblichus,De mysteriis, Greek and English, intro. and trans. Emma C. Clarke, JohnM. Dillon, and Jackson
P. Hershbell (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003, hereafter: DM), I, 21, cf. I, 8, II, 11, VII, 1;
John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, eds., Radical Orthodoxy: A new theology (London:
Routledge, 1999), 3-11, 19; Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 2nd ed., reprint, ed., trans., intro., and comm.
E.R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), props. 1-13, 23-24; Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names (De
Divinis Nominibus, hereafter: DN), IV, 7 (701CD, 704C); Algis Uždavinys, Philosophy and Theurgy in Late
Antiquity (Kettering: Angelico Press/Sophia Perennis, 2014), 204-228.
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the gods.”4 He holds that the human intellect cannot fully grasp the divine, and terrestrial things
may function as mediations, as we cannot experience God directly. For him, therefore, theurgy
is not a purely intellectual pursuit and theurgic rituals cannot be grasped fully by the human
mind. But, as I have argued above,5 this does not necessarily make them irrational. Rituals
can be an expression of rationality because they are ordered by, ordered to, and expressive
of divine order. They are both rational and supra-rational, as they move beyond philosophy
without rejecting it. Iamblichus distinguishes between philosophy, theology, and theurgy, but
never separates them. Furthermore, his theurgic arguments presuppose his arguments from
philosophy and metaphysics.6 The Iamblichean tradition holds createdness, corporeality, and
finitude in high esteem and denies the Plotinian notion that the soul is not fully descended.
Yet, it still holds that the ultimate goal of theurgy for humans is the exclusively intellectual
and spiritual ascent to, and union with, the gods, granted only to those who have the ability to
achieve it:
A certain few individuals … employing an intellectual power which is beyond the natural, have
disengaged themselves from nature, and turned towards the transcendent and pure intellect, at the
same time rendering themselves superior to natural forces. … Those … who conduct their lives in
accordance with intellect alone and the life according to intellect, and who have been freed from
the bonds of nature, practise an intellectual and incorporeal rule of sacred procedure in respect of
all the departments of theurgy.7
The theurgist, through the power of arcane symbols, commands cosmic entities no longer as a human
being or employing a human soul but, existing above them in the order of the gods.8
The ultimate goal, then, is is to be freed from the body and to climb the hierarchy, though for
4 DM V, 23.
5 Chapter three, pp.106-118.
6 Crystal Addey,Divination and Theurgy in Neoplatonism: Oracles of the Gods (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016),
29-32, 41-42, 171-213, 273-275, 281, 283, 286; Riccardo Chiaradonna and Adrien Lecerf, “Iamblichus,” 2.3,
3.1-2, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2019 Edition (ed., Edward N. Zalta).
7 DM V, 18.
8 DM VI, 6, cf. Ruth Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles: Text, Translation, and Commentary (Leiden: Brill,
1989, hereafter: TCO), frag. 153-154, 194 (cf. pp.20, 198, 212). Also see Uždavinys, Philosophy and
Theurgy, 18-21. For notes on the Chaldean Oracles, see abbreviations, p.5, n5.
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Iamblichus, the theurgist paradoxically achieves ascent through rituals and a further kenotic
descent into matter, in and through the body.9
In this chapter, like the previous one, I argue for a Christian consummation of these ideas.
Here, however, I focus particularly on the sacramental aspect. Like Iamblichus, Pseudo-Dionysius
emphasises the divine act and ritual performance, while rejecting the adequateness of ‘pure
thought’ (though without rejecting thought and philosophy).10 He emphasises that “theurgy is
the consummation of theology,”11 and rejects any notion that theurgy is either ‘magic’ or ‘ir-
rational,’ where ‘magic’ is understood as manipulation.12 For him, all of creation reveals the
work of God, from the largest galaxy to the most insignificant ant, in all its concrete physical-
ity, understood within a hierarchy. This, however, reveals some crucial differences between
Pagan and Christian conceptions of theurgy. Both have understandings of hierarchy (a term
coined by Pseudo-Dionysius), though for the Areopagite, the point is not to ‘escape’ or lose
one’s humanity (if only temporarily), or even to ‘ascend’ the hierarchy.13 He does not see God
(univocally) as a distant monarch on the top but as equally present to all ‘strands.’ Rather than
9 Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus, 2nd ed. (Angelico Press/Sophia
Perennis, 2014), xxviii, cf. John Milbank and Aaron Riches, “Neoplatonic Theurgy and Christian Incarna-
tion” (foreword to Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul), xiv-xvi.
10 See Kevin Corrigan and L. Michael Harrington, “Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite,” 4.2, in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2019 Edition (ed., Edward N. Zalta); Ernesto Sergio Mainoldi, “The
Transfiguration of Proclus’ Legacy: Pseudo-Dionysius and the Late Neoplatonic School of Athens,” in Pro-
clus and his Legacy, eds., David D. Butorac and Danielle A. Layne (Berlin/Boston, MS: de Gruyter, 2017),
199-217. As noted in Thomas Richard Plant, Dualism and nondualism in the thought of Dionysius the Are-
opagite and Shinran Shōnin (PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2013), 110-117 (cf. 101-110), this
rejection of pure speculation as capable of facilitating divine-human union is particularly evident in DM
X, DN, and in Proclus’s Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, trans. Glenn R. Morrow and John M. Dillon
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).
11 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy (De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, hereafter: EH) III:3, 5
(432B), Gk. ésti tēs theologías hē theourgía sugkephalaíōsis. In The Works of Dionysius the Areopagite,
2 vols., trans. John Parker (London: James Parker and Co., 1897, 1899), II, 95, this is translated ‘the work
of God is a consummation of the Word of God,’ while in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, trans.
Colm Luibheid, in collaboration with Paul Rorem (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987), 214, it is translated
‘the divine works are the consummation of the divine words.’ For a discussion of why these renditions are
problematic, see Plant, Dualism and nondualism, 101-110.
12 On why I avoid using the term ‘magic,’ see introduction, p.11, n12.
13 CH, esp. I-III (120A-168B), cf. Dimitrios A. Vasilakis, “On the meaning of hierarchy in Dionysius the
Areopagite,” in Platonism and Christian Thought in Late Antiquity, eds., Panagiotis G. Pavlos et al. (London:
Routledge, 2019), 181-200.
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ascending ‘up’ the hierarchy we can perhaps say that in Christ we ascend more fully into it.
In Christ, God moves through the hierarchy to displace us and make us vessels for the divine
work, as human beings, while we remain at our place in the hierarchy.14 As I have argued,15
displacement means to be ordered to God in Christ, to be incorporated into Christ in a way that
does not destroy but complete us, so that we become one with Him (Galatians 2:20). We are,
as creatures, already part of the hierarchy but in Christ we get access to it in a way that we
may become our true selves. The point, then, is that the world, in all its createdness, corporeal-
ity, and finitude, remains the place where we encounter God and receive His gifts. We do not
hope to be freed from the body, to become ‘more spiritual’ or ‘less human,’ as in Chaldean and
Iamblichean theurgy,16 but to become more fully human and embodied in Christ, who grants
anyone access to his sacraments (1 Corinthians 15).17 But even with these absolutely crucial
differences between Pagan and Christian conceptions of theurgy, my argument presupposes a
great deal of agreement between these traditions and that the differences can often be taken
too far. Panagiotis G. Pavlos, for example, maintains that the “only possible correspondence
between” Iamblichean and Pseudo-Dionysian theurgy is that “what Iamblichus postulates with
his θεουργία is nothing other than the Dionysian activity of hierurgy.”18 Pseudo-Dionysius dis-
tinguishes between the divine work (theourgía) and our (ecclesial) works of praise, the rites, the
ritual re-enactment or celebration of the divine work (hierurgy, Gk. hierourgia). Sarah Klitenic
Wear and John Dillon suggests that this distinction is introduced by the Areopagite to claim that
the Christian tradition is superior to the Pagan Platonist one. Where Pagans focus primarily on
14 Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2007), 166, cf. 160-169; Charles M. Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity in Dionysius
the Areopagite: “No Longer I” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 98-116 (esp. 115-116).
15 See chapter four, pp.153-162.
16 DM V, 18; VI, 6; TCO, frag. 153-154, 194, cf. Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles, 20, 198, 212.
17 Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 86-88, 98-102, 109-116, cf. the discussion in chapter three, pp.115-117.
18 Panagiotis G. Pavlos, “Theurgy in Dionysius the Areopagite,” in Platonism and Christian Thought in Late
Antiquity, eds., Pavlos et al., 163, cf. 162-164.
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the human participation in the divine work, Christians focus primarily on the divine works.19
For Pseudo-Dionysius, theurgy is used specifically for the divine works, particularly the works
of Christ. Wear and Dillon note that there is a danger of overlooking the connection between
theourgía and hierourgia (but also to overemphasise it). The primary meaning of theurgy for
Pseudo-Dionysius is the Incarnation, while we are called to participate in this. They write:
When Dionysius speaks of theourgia, he specifically means the work of God, the incarnation of
Christ. However, when we enact this work, through hierourgia, we become theourgikoi: partici-
pants of the work, co-workers of the work. Thus, Rorem and Louth correctly assert that theourgia
pertains only to divine works, while Shaw rightly points out that the principle of theurgy does, as
propounded by Iamblichus and Proclus, indeed exist in Dionysian thought.20
Hierurgy, then, is the human (ecclesial) participation in the divine work. When Peter Struck
defines theurgy, then, as “a θεῖον ἔργον, insofar as it is action, established by gods, put into
use by humans, whose effect is to bring the material world (including that part of the celebrant
which is material) into harmony with the divine order,”21 Pseudo-Dionysius would say that this
participation, this ‘putting into use,’ is hierurgy. Pavlos, however, while agreeing that hierurgy
is a participation in the divine work, dismisses Wear and Dillon’s arguments that this is still
within a broadly Neoplatonic framework. They write:
Dionysian (and Eastern Church, for that matter) sacramental theology is … fundamentally similar
to Hellenic theourgia in that both use material symbola to harness divine energeia, but there is a
subtle shift in terminology as between Dionysius and his Neoplatonic predecessors.22
19 Sarah Klitenic Wear and John Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition: Despoiling
the Hellenes (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 12.
20 Wear and Dillon,Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition, 100, cf. 99-115. Also see Andrew
Louth, “Pagan Theurgy and Christian Sacramentalism” (The Journal of Theological Studies, new series, 27:2,
1986), 432-438; Pavlos, “Theurgy in Dionysius the Areopagite,” 158-161; Paul E. Rorem, “Iamblichus and
the Anagogical Method in Pseudo-Dionysian Liturgical Theology,” in Studia Patristica, vol. XVIII (part
one), ed., Elizabeth A. Livingstone (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), 453-460; Gregory Shaw, “Neoplatonic
Theurgy and Dionysius the Areopagite” (Journal of Early Christian Studies 7:4, 1999), 573-599 (esp. 599),
cf. Alan Philip Darley, “Ritual as erotic anagogy in Pseudo-Dionysius: a Reformed critique” (International
Journal of Philosophy and Theology 79:3, 2018), 261-278 (esp. 262-263, 265-267); Peter T. Struck, “Pagan
and Christian Theurgies: Iamblichus, Pseudo-Dionysius, Religion and Magic in Late Antiquity” (Ancient
World 32:2, 2001), 25-38.
21 Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 30.
22 Wear and Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition, 102, cf. Pavlos, “Theurgy in
Dionysius the Areopagite,” 164.
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Pavlos maintains that we do not use symbols because they have ‘theurgic properties,’ as was
the case with the Pagan theurgists, but because of Christ’s institution. He even notes that
Iamblichus’s symbolism shares similarities with Protestant notions of ‘pure symbolism’ and
that Pseudo-Dionysius sees theurgy as a prerequisite of hierurgy, in contrast to Iamblichus. I,
however, propose a different approach, though I must note that Pavlos is correct when he points
out that in Christian theology, “man is the mediator between God and His cosmos,”23 which
finds its centre in Christ.24
First, for Iamblichus, symbols are divine gifts with a real ontological connection to that
which they signify. He emphasises that the theurgic cult was “established by law at the begin-
ning intellectually, according to the ordinances of the gods,” that it “imitates the order of the
gods, both the intelligible and that in the heavens,” and that it “possesses eternal measures of
what truly exists and wondrous tokens, such as have been sent down hither by the creator and
father of all.”25 And we can assume that he follows the Chaldeans in holding that “the Pater-
nal Intellect has sown symbols throughout the cosmos.”26 This is not Christianity but also not
‘pure’ or ‘mere’ symbolism. It is an ontological understanding of signs as actual partakers of
that which they symbolise. While symbols are inferior to that which they mediate or commu-
nicate, they remain essential for such communication. An object, a person, or an animal may
manifest the divine (without exhausting it), due to a ‘sympathy’ between things.27 For Pagan
theurgists, it is precisely through these symbols, by which the divine theurgy may be accessed
23 Pavlos, “Theurgy in Dionysius the Areopagite,” 168, cf. 166-168. Here, Pavlos notes some critical remarks
towards those who claim that Iamblichus’s position is often caricatured, which would include me.
24 As I have noted, this does reveal a clear difference between Pseudo-Dionysian and Iamblichean cosmology,
as the latter emphasises that man is below the (unfallen) cosmos and not its centre. See chapter four, pp.148-
153, cf. Shaw, “Neoplatonic Theurgy and Dionysius the Areopagite,” 582-583, 595; Shaw, Theurgy and the
Soul, xxiv-xxv, 67-77.
25 DM I, 21.
26 TCO, frag. 108, cf. DM I, 1-2; III, 31; VI, 7; IX, 4; Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles, 182; Shaw, Theurgy
and the Soul, 53-57.
27 DM III, 17; X, 6; Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, 25-30, 50-57; Peter T. Struck, Birth of the Symbol: Ancient
Readers at the Limits of Their Texts (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 189-192, 246-248.
Pseudo-Dionysius invokes a similar concept to this ‘sympathy,’ emphasising the bond of love (Gk. ágápē).
See DN, IV, 7 (701CD, 704C), cf. Struck, Birth of the Symbol, 262.
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through ritual re-enactment, that “the material world (including that part of the celebrant which
is material)” is brought “into harmony with the divine order.”28 Furthermore, the very separa-
tion of the sign from that which is signified, which permeates this ‘pure’ or ‘mere’ symbolism,
is also a modern (and often Protestant) invention.29 While Scripture does not use the word
‘symbol’ for this, it teaches that God reveals Himself through creation (Job 12:7-8; Psalm 19:1;
Romans 1:20).30
Secondly, although Iamblichus does not distinguish between theurgy and hierurgy, like
Pseudo-Dionysius, he sees the divine work as a prerequisite of our ritual participation. He
distinguishes between ‘the theurgical’ (Gk. tēs theourgikēs) and ‘the technical’ (Gk. tēs tech-
nikēs), noting that the theurgic ritual is a supernatural and divine gift, rather than a technical
manipulation.31 We cannot perform theurgy, according to Iamblichus, without first receiving
it as a divine gift. Wear and Dillion, therefore, note that the distinction between theourgía and
hierourgia could have been useful for Iamblichus, as he indeed distinguished between the di-
vine work and its human participation, re-enactment or ‘putting into use,’ and as he argues,
against Porphyry, that the latter does not compel the divine but participates in an already divine
work.32 In Iamblichus’s defence, however, I argue that while the distinction itself is useful and
prudent, it can be taken too far. It might fool us into thinking that our hierurgies are completely
autonomous. But, as Wear and Dillon note, “when we enact this work,” the Incarnation, the
theurgy, “through hierourgia, we become theourgikoi: participants of the work, co-workers of
the work.”33 Our ritual re-enactment is the work of God, both through the gift given and through
28 Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 30.
29 See Eamon Duffy, The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England, 1400–1580, 2nd ed. (New
Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2005), 439, cf. 424-447.
30 For a recent discussion of such notions of symbol, see Joshua KendallMobley, Symbolism: A Brief Systematic
Theology of the Symbol (PhD dissertation, Durham University, 2020), 23-96.
31 DM IX, 1, III, 20; III, 31. Also see EmmaC. Clarke, Iamblichus’ DeMysteriis: A manifesto of the miraculous
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 21-22; Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 35-36.
32 Wear and Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition, 100-101.
33 Wear and Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition, 100, cf. EH I, 1 (372B); Struck,
“Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 34-36, 37-38.
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our imitative enactment. Shaw likewise notes that some (in his case, Andrew Louth) draw “too
firm a line between the historical acts of Jesus and their expression in the liturgy”:
For, if the purpose of the liturgy is to deify its members, this would require direct participation in the
theurgies, and this could hardly be effected by simply recalling (or interpreting) the acts of the his-
torical Jesus. While Dionysian theurgy is distinctively Christian—with Christ as the “principle and
essence of every theurgy” (EH 372A)—Dionysius understood that Jesus’ transmission of “theurgic
mysteries” (ta theourga musteria) in the Eucharist required the hierarch, in performing these rites,
to be assimilated to these theurgies and communicate their deifying power to others. Louth’s in-
sistence that theurgies be confined to the activities of Jesus “recalled” in the liturgy, simply cannot
account for this deifying activity nor for the diversity of other evidence.34
Thirdly, while Pavlos is correct in arguing for a basis in the act of Christ’s institution, he seems
to argue for this in a way that opens us to a kind of arbitrary ‘liturgical occasionalism.’ Aquinas
argues that “these visible elements [the sacraments] effect spiritual well-being not by any prop-
erty of their nature, but by Christ’s institution, from which they derive their instrumental effi-
cacy.”35 For Aquinas, the elements receive their instrumentality by Christ’s institution. This
perspective, however, is also found in Iamblichus. He holds that the elements used in theurgy
have ‘theurgic properties’ not by their own nature but as participants in the divine work:
[N]othing hinders the superior beings from being able to illuminate their inferiors, nor yet, by con-
sequence, is matter excluded from participation in its betters, so that such of it as is perfect and pure
and of good type is not unfitted to receive the gods; for since it was proper not even for terrestrial
things to be utterly deprived of participation in the divine, earth also has received from it a share in
divinity, such as is sufficient for it to be able to receive the gods.36
Charles M. Stang notes that theurgy, for both Iamblichus and Pseudo-Dionysius is about the
divine work displacing us, “so that we become ciphers or conduits of divine activity.”37 Or, in
34 Shaw, “Neoplatonic Theurgy and Dionysius the Areopagite,” 592-593, cf. EH V (500C-516C). This, how-
ever, must be distinguished from Donatism. It does not mean that the priest must be morally perfect, lest the
sacraments he administers be ‘faulty,’ but that he enacts them through the gift given to him by the laying on of
his ordaining bishop’s hands (cf. Romans 15:15; 1 Timothy 4:14; 2 Timothy 1:6). For a Lutheran perspective
on this, see Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology (3 vols. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991, 1994,
1998) III, 393-397, cf. 370-431.
35 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles (hereafter: SCG) IV, 56:7.
36 DM V, 23.
37 Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 39, cf. 187-194 (esp. 192-194).
172
Aquinas’s terminology, instruments. Furthermore, was Christ’s institution arbitrary? Aquinas
argues that, no, the choice was deliberate, that it was fitting that Christ should use bread and
wine as the matter of His sacrament.38 The bread and wine signify spiritual feeding and the
health or salvation of both body and soul, their separation signifies the separation of soul and
body in Christ’s death, and the bread, composed of multiple grains, and the wine, made from
multiple grapes, signify the unity of the Church (1 Corinthians 10:17). For Aquinas, we use the
elements because Christ instituted them, but His institution was not ‘arbitrary.’ He used them
for the reasons noted but also, more generally, because we, as humans, need ‘corporeal things’
or sensible signs.39 Also, can we even speak of arbitrariness or convention when it comes to the
divine? And if so, would this not presuppose that all created things, including the laws of nature,
are arbitrary or conventional? Further, the role of Christ is central here. Not only does creation
reveal God as Creator, in a symbolic manner, it is precisely because of Christ that we can say
that created things have ‘theurgic properties,’ not by their own nature or through ‘manipulation,’
but because of the Incarnation. Because God became a concrete created substance, all created
substances participate in (and have become united to) God, and His act, in a new and radical
way. This is where we find the central difference between a Pagan and Christian conception of
theurgy, not in the nature of symbols or nature, but in the specific and unique role of Christ.
Christ is the only one who can hold divinity and humanity together, because He, as the God-
man, is “acknowledged in two natures without confusion, change, division, or separation.”40
The Incarnation is something entirely new. It rejects the destruction, or the temporary suspen-
sion, of our createdness, corporeality, and finitude and allows us to participate in God, beyond
38 ST III, q.74, a.1, cf. II-II, q.81, a.7.
39 ST II-II, q.81, a.7 (esp. ad 2); III, q.61, esp. a.1; q.83, a.4, cf. I, q.1, a.9; CH, I, 2 (121B); John P. Yocum,
“Aristotle in Aquinas’s Sacramental Theology,” in Aristotle in Aquinas’s Theology, eds., Gilles Emery and
Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 209-222 (esp. 215); John P. Yocum, “Sacra-
ments in Aquinas,” in Aquinas on Doctrine, eds., Weinandy, Keating, and Yocum, 165-168.
40 The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, II, 204.
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external mimicry. Where pre-Christian (and non-Christian) rituals remain on the mimetic stage,
as the divine remains extrinsic to humanity, through the presence of the Incarnate Logos, Chris-
tian rituals participate in an utterly radical way in the divine.41 We need the Incarnation to have
real intrinsic union with God. In Christ, divinity and humanity, while remaining distinct, are
fully united in one single suppositum to whom we can relate, analogously.42 As I have argued
in the previous chapter, Christ is the true liturgist, the master theurgist, who enables us to praise
and to live out lives of virtue, in Him. This represents a clear difference between Pagan and
Christian notions of theurgy. The difference, however, does not constitute destruction but per-
fection. As I have already noted, the emphasis on Christ does not ignore the created order, which
also the Pagans held to, nor our own substantiality, but sees it as grounded in Christ (Galatians
2:20). Christ does not cancel out your own integrity but fulfils it.43 While Christian theology
may explain why we need the incarnation to make sure that the ritual constitutes real union
between God and humanity (and through humanity with creation as a whole), theurgy still pro-
vides us with a philosophical framework through which we can understand human participation
in the divine work and its ritual celebration. We are physical, social, and political beings who
make sense of reality precisely through our senses and particularly through ritual. As creatures
created in the image of God we have an intrinsic natural orientation to worship.44 Consummated
41 Colossians 2:16-17; Hebrews 8-10, esp. 8:1-7; 10:1-4, cf. chapter four, pp. 140-146; Michael J. Gorman,
Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 73-
125; Pavlos, “Theurgy in Dionysius the Areopagite,” 157-158.
42 See Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory (5 vols. San Francisco, CA: Ig-
natius Press, 1988) III, esp. 202-259, cf. Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A
Return to Mystery (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 121-135; Davison, Participation in God, 143,
173-193; Johannes Hoff, The Analogical Turn: Rethinking Modernity with Nicholas of Cusa (Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans, 2013). Also see Duns Scotus, “ConcerningMetaphysics,” in JohnDuns Scotus, Philosophical
Writings, Latin and English, trans., Allan Wolter (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 1-
12; Daniel P. Horan, Postmodernity and Univocity: A Critical Account of Radical Orthodoxy and John Duns
Scotus (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2014), esp. 157-188; Thomas Williams, “John Duns Scotus,” 2:3,
in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2016 Edition (ed., Edward N. Zalta).
43 Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 183-185.
44 See Duffy, The Stripping of the Altars; Scott W. Hahn, “Worship in theWord: Toward a Liturgical Hermeneu-
tic” (Letter & Spirit 1, 2005), 106; Sigurd Hareide, “Messuskýringar: Old Norse Expositions of the Latin
Mass and the Ritual Participation of the People,” in Intellectual Culture in Medieval Scandinavia, c. 1100–
1350, ed., Stefka Georgieva Eriksen (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2016), 337-371; Catherine Pickstock,
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in Christ, theurgy does not introduce the idea that humans can celebrate God ritually or that they
have the potential to be spiritual, but that God became flesh, that God became matter, and that
we may have real communion with Him through material creation, because materiality as such
participates in the divine in a radically new way and is brought “into harmony with the divine
order.”45 As St. John Damascene put it, in his defence of icons:
In other ages God had not been represented in images, being incorporate and faceless. But since
God has now been seen in the flesh, and lived among men, I represent that part of God which is
visible. I do not venerate matter, but the Creator of matter, who became matter for my sake and
deigned to live in matter and bring about my salvation through matter.46
In this chapter, I will explore the implications of the Incarnation for liturgy and spirituality,
within a theurgic framework. Theurgy, consummated in Christ, is the graced perfection of
our natural liturgical orientation to God, rooted in our ‘natural desire for the supernatural,’
which cannot be fulfilled without divine grace.47 I will argue that the central expression of our
participation in Christ comes through praise, principally in the public worship of the Church
but also beyond it. I will argue this in two ways.
First, I will provide an account of the metaphysics of worship. With critical reference to
Charles S. Peirce’s explanation of the nature of the sign,48 I will argue that to ground com-
munication and knowledge, which requires mediation, we need a participatory and analogical
conception of being, where the world participates in God, yet retain its own integrity.49 I will
“The Ritual Birth of Sense” (Telos 162, 2013), 29-55; Roy A. Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making
of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Alexander Schmemann, For the Life of the
World: Sacraments and Orthodoxy, 2nd ed. (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 1997), 118; James K. A. Smith,
Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and Cultural Formation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic,
2009), 17-129 (esp. 19-27, 39-110); Barry Stephenson, Ritual: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2015).
45 Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 30.
46 Quoted in Benedict XVI, JohnDamascene, general audience (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2009).
47 ST II-II, qq.81-91; III, qq.60-90, cf. David Grumett, “De Lubac, Grace, and the Pure Nature Debate” (Modern
Theology 31:1, 2015), 123-146; Rudi A. te Velde, Aquinas on God: The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa The-
ologiae (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 155-160; Rudi A. te Velde, ““Partnership with God”: Thomas Aquinas
on Human Desire and God’s Grace” (Nova et vetera 15:4, 2017), 1155-1175.
48 Thomas Lloyd Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 207-234, cf.
2, 27.
49 Davison, Participation in God, 65-83; Milbank, Pickstock, and Ward, eds., Radical Orthodoxy, 1-20.
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argue that God, even Christ, as the God-man, is never revealed to us unmediated but that this
is not a problem on this account. We can reach beyond symbols to that which they symbolise
or signify, but we do so precisely by not losing sight of them. Symbols always point beyond
themselves but never away from themselves. This symbolic nature of reality, which unites a
Christian and a Neoplatonic account, captures the inherent value of physicality and thus why a
theurgic, symbolic, and mediatory approach is essential for a theology that seeks to affirm the
transcendence of God, creation’s participation in Him, the uniqueness of Christ, and creation’s
inherent value. Creation reveals God precisely not by shifting our focus away from itself but
by mediating Him (Job 12:7-8; Psalm 19:1; Romans 1:20).
Secondly, having argued for a Christian sacramental view of liturgical-symbolic mediation,
I will argue that while this may be expressed in many ways, its fullest expression is in the cele-
bration of the Eucharist. Continuing from my discussions of transubstantiation in chapters one
and three,50 in critique of John Calvin’s downplaying of physical creation’s place in liturgy,51
I will argue that such a doctrine not only provides the most coherent way of holding together
real presence, divine act, and an analogical understanding of reality, but that it also preserves
the place of nature, as nature, in a concrete cultural context, and that liturgy is a real ontolog-
ical participation in the divine, and a real presence of the divine, made manifest in the gifts of
creation.
2 Symbolism, mediation, and analogy
In his book on participation in God, Andrew Davison notes that a participatory spirituality em-
phasises mediation, that we cannot have a direct, unmediated encounter with God, no more so
than with a number, but that this does not indicate that mediation is ‘unreal’: “We have me-
50 See pp.58-62, 118-128.
51 Cf. Simon Oliver, “The Eucharist before Nature and Culture” (Modern Theology 15:3, 1999), 331-353, esp.
342-350.
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diated encounters with the number 2 every day, and our encounters are no less real for that.
In fact, the way in which I encounter the number 2 in my pieces of toast each morning, or in
my two hands, might not be a bad analogy for how I ineluctably encounter God in every en-
counter.”52 Everything we have, everything we are, exists only insofar as God has given it to
us and keeps it, and us, in existence (Acts 17:28; Romans 11:33-36). And everything points to
God: “The heavens are telling the glory of God; and the firmament proclaims his handiwork.”53
For Christian theology, however, this is now centred on Christ, as the “one mediator between
God and humankind.”54 Across the board, from Anglo-Catholics and Orthodox to Baptists and
Reformed, sacraments are understood as signs of Him, though with very different interpreta-
tions.55 We cannot experience anything except through mediation. But if we want to affirm
the possibility of true knowledge, and reject pure skepticism and even solipsism,56 we need a
way to account for how we can have true knowledge. Contesting the modernistic notion that
we cannot truly know something unless it is completely exhaustible,57 I propose here that in
order to account for knowledge of the inexhaustible, we must assume an analogical and par-
ticipatory metaphysics. Even if created reality remains mysterious and inexhaustible, and even
if we cannot meet God independent of ‘outer symbols’ (because of the ontological difference
between God and creation), this is not ‘unreal.’ In this section I will argue for a comprehensive
and Catholic understanding of symbolism and mediation,58 where symbols or signs are not just
52 Davison, Participation in God, 342, cf. 341-343. There is, of course, a significant difference between God
and the number 2. While we cannot have an unmediated (‘direct’) relation to either, we can have a personal
relation to God.
53 Psalm 19:1, cf. Job 12:7-8; Romans 1:20.
54 1 Timothy 2:5, cf. Galatians 3:19; Galatians 3:20; Hebrews 8:6; Hebrews 9:15.
55 Andrew Davison, Why Sacraments? (London: SPCK, 2013), 55-65; Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology:
An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2000), 988-1002; Schmemann, For the
Life of the World, 135-151; Michael Welker,What Happens in Holy Communion?, trans., John F. Hoffmeyer
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000).
56 This is a danger in Cartesian thought. See Anita Avramides, “Other Minds,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, Winter 2020 Edition (ed., Edward N. Zalta); Stephen P. Thornton, “Solipsism and the Problem
of Other Minds,” in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
57 See Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell,
1998), 47-70, 103-110, 135-140, 264-273.
58 To reiterate, by ‘Catholic’ I do not mean ‘Roman Catholic’ (exclusively).
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pedagogical functions or mere illustrations of something utterly beyond themselves, but tings
which participate in, reveal, and provide that which they signify, though without exhausting it.
While a sign or a symbol mediates or communicates something beyond itself and greater than
itself, it is still utterly essential for the communication to happen. To borrow a phrase from C.
S. Lewis, while we do not simply look at symbols (qua symbols), we do not look away from
them either. Rather, we look along them.59 But what do we mean by signs?
Charles S. Peirce notes that in modern semiotics, the term is used in three ways: (1) an icon,
a likeness imitating or resembling that which it signifies, but which does not necessarily have
any direct connections to reality, (2) a symbol, which has a conventional relation to that which
it signifies, and (3) an index, which has a real connection to that which it signifies.60 While
these distinctions can be useful, as they allow us to distinguish between different aspects of the
symbolic, and different understandings of it, to separate these from one another is problematic,
especially when we apply it to text written with a different (and pre-modern) metaphysic in
mind. Christ, for instance, is called ‘the icon of God’ (Gk. eikṑn toũ theoũ).61 That, however,
does not mean that He merely ‘resembles’ God. That we should separate the indexical, iconic,
and symbolic or conventional aspects of the sign, which often happens in modern semiotics, is
not self-evident. The first flowers of spring, for example, signify spring in a visual manner but
in springing forth, they also participate in it and bring it about. And despite the connotations
of ‘symbol’ in modern English, for ancient thinkers symbols had a deep ontological connection
to that which they symbolised. The classic example is a piece of pottery that has been split
in two. The point in this scenario is not that the pieces just happens to relate or that one of
59 C. S. Lewis, “Meditation in a Toolshed,” in Lewis, God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics, reprint
ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014), 230-236.
60 Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs, 207-234 (esp. 214-225), cf. Harald Hegstad, Dåpen: En nådens kilde (Oslo:
Verbum akademisk, 2019), 34-36.
61 2 Corinthians 4:4; Colossians 1:15 (my translation). If not otherwise noted, I use Novum Testamentum
Graece, 28th ed., eds. Eberhard Nestle and Kurt Aland (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2012).
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them ‘resembles’ the other, but that they have a real connection. They fit together. It is, in
other words, ‘indexical.’ But it is equally ‘iconic’ or ‘symbolic/conventional.’62 Baptism, for
instance, as understood in Catholic theology, is a sign and a symbol of salvation, in an ontolog-
ical or indexical manner, by participating in salvation and bringing it about. But it is so also in
a conventional manner, through the institution of Christ, and in an iconic manner, as it resem-
bles cleansing figuring our spiritual cleansing, our being rescued from peril, and our dying to
sin (though the latter symbolism is often better preserved in Orthodox, Baptist, and Pentecostal
traditions).63 A comprehensive understanding must include all three aspects of symbolism but
the central part must remain the ‘indexical.’
In the Catholic tradition, the sacraments are understood as concrete signs of creation’s par-
ticipation in God through Christ. We participate in this through matter, most particularly in
the sacraments where God promises to be for us in concrete things that we can see, hear, smell,
taste, and feel. They are signs which really participate in and mediate God’s salvation and God’s
presence, as expressed, for instance, in Romans 10:17 (“faith comes from what is heard”) or
1 Peter 3:21 (“baptism … now saves you”).64 To borrow Peter Struck’s phrase again, in the
sacrament, in the act of theurgy and through Christ, “the material world (including that part of
the celebrant which is material)” is brought “into harmony with the divine order.”65 We can,
62 Struck, Birth of the Symbol, 1-20, 78-84, 162-277, cf. Mobley, Symbolism, 23-96. In the following, if not
otherwise noted, I will use the word ‘symbol’ in this wider (classical) sense. For some more discussions
of symbols, from philosophical, sociological, theological, and ethnographical perspectives, see Rubem A.
Alves, “The Hermeneutics of the Symbol” (Theology Today 29:1, 1972), 46-53; Ian Hodder, “Symbolism
and the Origins of Agriculture in the Near East,” review article on The Birth of the Gods and the Origins of
Agriculture by Jacques Cauvin (Cambridge Archaeological Journal 11:1, 2001), 107-112; C. Behan McCul-
lagh, “The relations between symbols and what they symbolize” (Social Science Information 27:2, 1988),
293-305; Mobley, Symbolism; Paul Willis, “Sým-bolon: Symbol–action–context” (Ethnography 11:1, 2010),
3-23.
63 Davison, Why Sacraments?, 13-22; Hegstad, Dåpen, 34-90, cf. Matthew 28:16-20; Mark 16:16; John 3:3-
5; Acts 2:38-41; Romans 6; Galatians 3:23-27; Ephesians 5:25-26; Colossians 2:6-15; Titus 3:1-7; 1 Peter
3:18-22.
64 See the Second Vatican Council’s Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, Lumen Gentium, 9-29, as well
as the Lutheran Confessio Augustana (hereafter: CA), V-XIII, cf. Davison, Why Sacraments?, 142-147;
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, III, 336-369; Schmemann, For the Life of the World, 28, 43-46, 55, 67-79.
OnVatican II documents, see abbreviations, p.5, n4. For notes on the Lutheran confessions, see abbreviations,
p.5, n3. If not otherwise noted, quotations from CA follow the translation of the Latin text.
65 Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 30. Also see Struck, Birth of the Symbol, 262, where he, citing
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perhaps, speak of a ‘sacramental assurance,’ where our assurance of God’s promise is not rooted
just intellectually in our own ability to ‘remember’ (or even ‘demonstrate’ with works), but in
concrete gifts: in a baptismal act, through which we were buried and risen with Christ, in the
Eucharistic elements, in which we are given the body and blood of Christ in order to have a
deeper share in His life, or in audible words of absolution spoken by a physical priest, whereby
we are given a concrete way to return to the baptismal grace, all of which is or was given to
us at specific and concrete moments in time. As I have argued above,66 God is communicated
or mediated to us in concrete and physical ways because we are physical human beings. And,
as I have noted elsewhere, we find an instance (or a precursor) to this in Leviticus 6:14-18,
regarding the grain-offering.67 In v.18, it states that the male descendants of Aaron shall eat
of the offering and that “anything that touches them shall become holy.” Holiness, then, can
be communicated or mediated in a concrete and corporeal manner. The divine is, so to speak,
incorporated into the body, expressing itself in and through it. We find an allusion to this in
Luke 8:43-48, where a woman suffering from haemorrhages is healed by touching the fringe
of Christ’s clothes. She was healed and became holy through touch. Perhaps this is a veiled
argument for Christ as the high priest.
Understood this way, the sacraments function as icons of God or of Christ, of the divine-
creaturely union, where physical elements may mediate the divine, but also of the sacramental
character of creation.68 The heart of the liturgical conception I am developing here is this par-
CH, II, 4 (144B), notes that Pseudo-Dionysius holds that “even brute matter bears divine traces and is able
to raise us up to the divinity.”
66 Chapter three, pp.112-114.
67 Kjetil Kringlebotten, “Liturgi og kropp” (Lære og liv 37:2, 2010), 54-57, esp. 55. Some bibles, including
Norwegian ones, follow the Hebrew Masoretic numbering, where Leviticus 6:14-18 is Leviticus 6:7-11 (and
Leviticus 6:1-7 is Leviticus 5:20-26). The edition I use follows the Septuagint.
68 Simon Oliver, “Episcopacy, Priesthood, and the Priesthood of the Church” (The Michael Ramsey Lecture,
Delivered at Little St. Mary’s, Cambridge, 6 November 2017): “The key point is that we know creation as
sacramental because we have sacraments, we know the Church as priestly because we have priests with the
bishop as the fount of the Church’s priestly ministry.” See John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, Truth in
Aquinas, ebook version (London: Routledge, 2005), 52-75; Alexander Schmemann, The Eucharist: Sacra-
ment of the Kingdom, trans. Paul Kachur (Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 2003), 27-48.
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ticipation in Christ, made manifest principally through the divine liturgy and the praise of the
Church. According to Pseudo-Dionysius, we attain union with God “only by the love and the
religious performance of the most worshipful Commandments” or “the religious performance
of the most august commandments,” i.e. through the hierourgical acts of liturgy and lives lived
out in charity.69 But these sacred acts or religious performances are not completely autonomous.
Their source, notes Pseudo-Dionysius, is Baptism or divine regeneration. They are human re-
enactments or non-identical repetitions of the divine work in Christ, the theurgy, where Christ
works in us.70 Theourgía is principally a subjective genitive (‘a work of the divine’). But, as
Stang notes, “the subjective genitive includes and subsumes the objective,”71 because through
our ontological participation (Gk. méthexis) in Christ, which creates a real act of imitation (Gk.
mímēsis), it may become an objective genitive (‘a work addressed to the divine’). In Christ,
our works are real and yet derived. To invoke Aquinas’s understanding of conversion, God
lets us convert ourselves to Him, through His work, in a non-competitive manner.72 As crea-
tures, participating in God, we are made capable of action, not in a principally active sense,
not even passively, but in the ‘middle voice,’ which indicates “the mediation of divine by hu-
man action.”73 What marks this is its anchoring in the transcendent, and its rejection of any
‘competition’ between divine and human agency. Our praise is not utterly self-reliant. It con-
stantly reminds us that without grounding in God, through Christ, liturgy is impossible (cf.
69 EH II:1 (392A), cf. Catherine Pickstock, “Ritual. An introduction” (International Journal of Philosophy and
Theology 79:3, 2018), 217-221, esp. 218-220.
70 EH II:3, 1-8 (392A-404D, esp. 397A-404D), cf. Titus 3:3-5; Darley, “Ritual as erotic anagogy,” 268 (cf.
262-263, 264-268, 265/272, n80); Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 98-102. Also see Louth, “Pagan
Theurgy and Christian Sacramentalism”; Rorem, “Iamblichus and the Anagogical Method,” 456; Wear and
Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition, 99-115.
71 Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 111, cf. Shaw, “Neoplatonic Theurgy and Dionysius the Areopagite,”
590; Charles M. Stang, “Dionysius, Paul and the Significance of the Pseudonym” (Modern Theology 24:4,
2008), 554, n15; Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 26-30; Wear and Dillon,Dionysius the Areopagite
and the Neoplatonist Tradition, 101.
72 ST I-II, q.109, a.6, ad 1, cf. te Velde, “Partnership with God,” 1174, n38. See chapter one, pp.52-54.
73 Catherine Pickstock, “Liturgy, Art and Politics” (Modern Theology 16:2, 2000), 180, n8, cf. 161; Pickstock,
After Writing, 35-36, 105, n8; 112, 145, 157; Catherine Pickstock, Repetition and Identity (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 180-181.
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John 15:5). It can never be adequately celebrated here in this world: “In the Roman Rite …,
the worshipping “I” is both designated and realized by self-dispossessing acts of doxological
impersonation which displace any sense of enclosed autonomy in the subject in favour of that
which is impersonated.”74 The priest, on behalf of the congregation, boldly starts the celebration
of Mass with the ultimate ‘impersonation’: “In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of
the Holy Spirit.” Our praise is only possible because God already praises, or glorifies, Himself.
As Pickstock formulates it: “The human being is in the image of God as God’s worshipper, a
sharer in his Trinitarian self-praise.”75 But this imitation or impersonation, Pickstock notes, is
impossible except through Christ: “[W]e are able to receive God in the middle voice, since, in
Christ, God is ineffably both divine and human, active and passive.”76 And we can also see this
by analysing the Greek word leitourgía.
While this word, formed from laós (‘people’) and érgon (‘work’), is often translated as ‘the
work of the people,’ that is only partly accurate. Yes, when we worship, we worship. Our acts
are real and we are not ‘competing’ with God.77 But even so, the liturgy is only ‘the work of the
people’ in a derivative and secondary sense, as an imitation grounded in our ontological par-
ticipation in God through Christ. We can also translate leitourgía as ‘the work for the people’
(which also captures the way the word was actually used in the ancient Greek city states). A
‘liturgy’ was a public service rendered unto the city state by its wealthiest citizens, who financed
74 Pickstock, After Writing, 208, cf. 180-192, 208-213; NathanMitchell, Real Presence: TheWork of Eucharist,
new and expanded ed. (Chicago, IL: Liturgy Training Publications, 2001), 142-144. Also see Jose Isidro
Belleza, Lex Loquendi, Lex Orandi: Pickstock, Aquinas, and the Reform of the Roman Offertoria (Master’s
Thesis, the University of Berkeley, 2019).
75 Pickstock, “Ritual,” 220, cf. Milbank and Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, 1-16. We impersonate God but
also the Angels (Pickstock, After Writing, 188-189, 202-213). Also see Pseudo-Dionysius’s treatment of the
celestial hierarchy, and our participation it it, in CH I-III (120A-168B); EH I (369A-377B).
76 Pickstock, After Writing, 157.
77 Davison, Participation in God, 65-83; Milbank and Riches, “Neoplatonic Theurgy and Christian Incarna-
tion,” viii. The pagan Neoplatonists also understood theurgy partly as a human work, but they also high-
lighted that it was principally divine. As I will come back to in chapter six, pp.216-224, there is a focus
on the human ‘part’ of this in many of the modern liturgical reforms. We often see that certain parts of the
liturgy, especially the prayers and the praise, are regarded as the Church’s responses and as human works that
are subject to change.
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the city state, more or less voluntarily.78 A ‘minister’ or ‘liturgist’ (Gk. leitourgós) could pay
for roads, soldiers (when needed), gymnasiums, choir members, actors, and more. The point of
the liturgy offered by the liturgist was to enable the citizens to live out their lives, religiously,
culturally, or otherwise. The liturgist was an enabler who worked for the people to make possi-
ble the work of the people. This understanding of liturgy might help us better understand what
is meant by the word in the New Testament. When Hebrews 8:2 calls Christ “a minister (Gk.
leitourgós) in the sanctuary,” this indicates first and foremost that He is ministering or making
intercession on our behalf. But it also means that through His work we are enabled to live
out our lives, ethically, ritually, or culturally. We see this more explicitly in Romans 15:15-16
when St. Paul calls himself a ‘minister’ or ‘liturgist’ of Christ through grace. He is ministering
to the Gentiles on the behalf of Christ, “so that the offering of the Gentiles may be acceptable,
sanctified by the Holy Spirit.” Through the liturgical, holy, and priestly work of St. Paul, and
other ministers, the people of God are not just saved but enabled to praise and worship. Liturgy
is the work of God, the work of Christ as “a minister in the sanctuary” (Hebrews 8:2) through
whom we are made capable of a life of service and worship.
To put it in sacramental terms, Christ may be called the ‘primordial sacrament.’ As a hu-
man being, hypostatically united to God, He is God’s mystery, and we encounter God first and
foremost through Him.79 For us, however, this does not come directly but, as Aquinas notes,
in the sacraments, which become mysteries, channels of divine grace, precisely through Christ,
God’s mystery: “[It is not] unreasonable that spiritual well-being be dispensed by means of
78 Matthew R. Christ, “Liturgy Avoidance and Antidosis in Classical Athens” (Transactions of the American
Philological Association 120, 1990), 147-169.
79 Romans 16:25; 1 Corinthians 2:1; 2:7; 4:1; Ephesians 1:8-12; 3:1-4; 3:7-10; 5:32; 6:19-20; Colossians 1:25-
27; 2:2-3; 4:3-4; 1 Timothy 3:8-9; 3:16, cf. Benjamin Allen Kautzer, The Works of Mercy: Towards a
Liturgical Ethic of the Everyday (PhD dissertation, Durham University, 2015), 36, 38-57; C. Pierson Shaw,
““Christ as Primary Sacrament”: Ways to Ecumenical Convergence in Sacramental Ecclesiology,” in Path-
ways for Ecclesial Dialogue in the Twenty- First Century: Revisiting Ecumenical Method, eds., Mark D.
Chapman and Miriam Haar (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 29-42; Herbert Vorgrimler, Sacra-
mental Theology, trans. Linda M. Maloney (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1992), 27-42, esp. 30-32;
Wear and Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition, 104-106, esp. 104, n16.
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visible and corporeal things, since these visible elements are, as it were, instruments of God’s
Incarnation and Passion.”80 But is there not a disadvantage here, at least for us? We, unlike
the apostles, have not heard, seen, or touched Christ. Christ is the one mediator (1 Timothy
2:5), but for us, this mediator is also mediated to us. For us, the revelation of Christ must come,
so to speak, hidden, veiled, mediated in Scripture, in the sacraments, and through other peo-
ple (1 John 1:1-4). In John 20:29, having just received praise from St. Thomas the Apostle,
Christ says, “Have you believed because you have seen me? Blessed are those who have not
seen and yet have come to believe.” Something similar is seen in Luke 24:13-35, were we find
two disillusioned disciples walking from Jerusalem to Emmaus on Easter day, not believing
in the resurrection stories. They meet Christ on the way, though they do not know, as they
are hindered from recognising Him. On the walk, Christ mediates Himself to them, through the
Scriptures, and at the end, the two disciples invites Christ to dine with them. Then, as He breaks
the bread, they suddenly recognise Him, before He vanishes. They recall how their hearts were
“burning within [them] while he was talking to [them] on the road, while he was opening the
scriptures to [them]” (v.32), thus emphasising that He was mediated to them through Scripture,
and through a preacher (though He was Himself the preacher), before they go back to the other
disciples in Jerusalem, proclaiming Christ, and saying that He “had been made known to them
in the breaking of the bread” (v.35). According to Scripture, then, we truly see the risen Christ
in His gifts, not directly. But why is this?
Scripture, recognising that Christ is not here with us as He was with the apostles, acknowl-
edges that, as bodily creatures, we need concrete means of grace and we need someone to reveal
it to us. In 1 John 1:1-3, St. John notes that he, and his fellow apostles, are revealing to us that
which they “have heard, what [they] have seen with [their] eyes, what [they] have looked at and
touched with [their] hands.” We, who have not heard, seen, or touched Christ like the apostles
80 SCG IV, 56:7.
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did, must get this revealed to us by other people who points us to Christ and to His gifts, by
the power of the Holy Spirit, precisely because we are bodily creatures in concrete places and
in a a given time in history.81 Since we cannot encounter Christ directly, at least not here, He,
as mediator, must Himself be mediated to us through the means of grace, through Scripture
and the sacraments. And this is a central point of Christian theurgy. Theurgy is the work of
God, whose principal subject is God Himself, particularly in Christ. For us, however, it must
be mediated. With Iamblichus we can say, as Wear and Dillon, that “theourgía is not human
work that compels the gods, but rather divine work enacted by humans.”82 As I have argued
above,83 we are incorporated into Christ ritually and sacramentally, and become Christ’s body.
To point back to my definition of Christian theurgy,84 we enact or participate in the divine act,
the divine theurgy, as members of Christ’s body. And this is mediated to us through concrete
means and concrete persons. But mediation is not, thereby, less ‘real.’ Rather, it gives creation
a new purpose. The divine or heavenly liturgy in which we participate non-identically, in an
expectant and diminished fashion in time, is coming down to us in acts, in water, in bread and
wine, in prayer, praise, and thanksgiving. It comes to us in concrete things and actions, through
God’s gifts in creation, because the Incarnation sanctifies creation in a new way. The point is
not that we should try to become ‘more spiritual,’ but that God became a human being, that
God “became flesh and and lived among us” (John 1:14) and that He reveals Himself to us in
concrete things, not abstractions. The world, in all its createdness, corporeality, and finitude,
is then qualified as the place wherein we meet God as giver and wherein we receive His gifts,
including the gift of service which we are allowed to offer back. As Oswald Bayer puts it:
In the particular divine service [the Eucharistic celebration], we can hear, taste, and see, through
81 John 16:4-15; Romans 10:14-17, cf. CA, V, XIV; Davison, Why Sacraments?, 55-95.
82 Wear and Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist Tradition, 101, cf. Stang, Apophasis and
Pseudonymity, 108-116.
83 See chapter four, pp.153-162, esp. 155-157.
84 See introduction, p.18, cf. Sacrosanctum Concilium (hereafter: SC), 7; Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theur-
gies,” 30.
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the word, that what holds the world together in its inmost essence is the categorical gift rather than
the categorical imperative (contra Kant). The particular divine service does not cultivate its own
separate religious sphere, but it discloses the world as creation.85
This is connected to the Incarnation but also to God in Himself, and His relation to creation. God
is not transcendent because He is far away in some ‘spiritual realm.’ No, He is transcendent
in Himself. He is equally ‘near’ and ‘far.’ This also levels the modern distinction between
‘spirit’ and ‘matter,’ pointing to the older (and more fundamental) distinction between God and
creation. God has created everything, visible and invisible, as we confess in theNicene Creed.86
Through the Incarnation, the distinction between God and creation has not been denied but it
has, somehow, been ‘bridged’ – “without confusion, change, division, or separation.”87 And the
union gained is not a union between God and humans alone, understood in a spiritualist sense.
No, it is a union between God and creation, with humanity, in all its spirituality and physicality,
as its centre. We are not called to become non-human and to abandon creation but to become
more human, fully human, in creation. For Pseudo-Dionysius, this comes to expression in his
understanding of hierarchy. The point of theurgy is that it displaces us where we are, deifying
us in our place. “Despite the prevalent descriptions of ascent,” writes Stang, “proximity and
union are not achieved by our moving closer to the source, ascending the hierarchy, but rather
by allowing the source to move more fully through us.”88 We are already part of the hierarchy
but in Christ we can ascend more fully into it. The point, then, is not that we should become
something else, something ‘more spiritual,’ as we see in Chaldean and Iamblichean theurgy,89
but that we become more fully human and that the world, in all its createdness, corporeality, and
85 Oswald Bayer, Theology the Lutheran Way, ed. and trans. Jeffrey G. Silcock and Mark C. Mattis (Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007), 91, cf. Knut Alfsvåg, “Luthersk spiritualitet: Om lære og liv i den éne, kristne
kirke” (Dansk Tidsskrift for Teologi og Kirke 40:1, 2013), 43-46.
86 See The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, eds. Robert Kolb and
Timothy J. Wengert (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2000), 22, cf. 19, 22-23.
87 The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, II, 204.
88 Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 115, cf. 81-116, 187-194 (192-194); Louth, TheOrigins of the Christian
Mystical Tradition, 160-169.
89 DM V, 18; VI, 6; TCO, frag. 153-154, 194, cf. Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles, 20, 198, 212.
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finitude, remains the place where we meet God. As Stang notes, creation is the place through
which the ‘divine energy’ or the divine work, the theurgy (ie. Christ himself, as light and love)
works. This comes to us where we are, and displaces us, most particularly in the liturgical life
of the Church:
To each creature is given the choice to consent to this light and love, that is, to allow it to pass
through in two directions, as the energy processes downward and returns upward to the neighboring
ranks, and to rest in the creature. To all of creation is given this same choice, but humans access
this energy through the rites of the church. When we consent to have Christ pass through us—as we
do once at baptism and regularly at the Eucharist—we seek to be what Paul calls “co-workers with
God” (συνεργοῖ θεοῦ). This “cooperation” (συνεργία) with the work of God is for Dionysius none
other than divinization, the very goal of hierarchy. We cooperate first by consenting to be displaced
by Christ, and we thereby look to lead a split existence, remaining in our rank in the hierarchy of
creation and yet suffering union with the very source of that creation.90
When we ascend, our ascent becomes a paradoxical descent into creation, in imitation of Christ.
God descended and became a human being, and this descent found its utmost expression on
the Cross and it is communicated to us in the sacraments, most particularly in the Eucharist,
though what happens in the Eucharist is not just the descent of God but the corresponding
ascent of creation. This ascent, however, is paradoxically a descent, as we ascend to the God
who is here, amongst us. The principal movement is not from us to God but downwards, from
the transcendent God, whose transcendence is not extrinsic and remote but immanent.91 The
Christian, earthly, liturgy, then, is amediated participation in its divine source but in an imitative,
‘diminished’ and and non-identically repeated manner in time. We can never do liturgy fully,
at least not in this life. It will always remain an ‘impossible’ repetition of the heavenly liturgy,
but not as a participation in some abstract realm ‘up there.’92 We participate in the divine
90 Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 194-195, cf. 194-196.
91 Revelation 21:1-5a, cf. Rudi A. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill,
1995), 164: “…transcendence in the immanence.”
92 Pickstock, After Writing, 173. Gregory Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, 3rd ed. (London: Bloomsbury T&T
Clark, 2005), 718-719 notes that our celebrations are not simple (resembling) ‘copies’ of the Last Supper.
They have developed into a wide variety of (non-identical) rites.
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liturgy here on earth in a mediatory and symbolic manner, and in this way the Christian, earthly,
liturgy becomes a real (though non-identical) and eschatological anticipation of what is to come,
of the union of heaven and earth (or an actual fore-taste of it, in the consecrated elements)
when God descends more fully, when He dwells with us more fully, when we become His
people more fully, and when He will be with us more fully (Revelation 21:1-5). This is the
nature of Christian theurgy. It is first and foremost the ritual participation in God, or the ritual
application of our justification and deification, given as a gratuitous gift. What we see in a
liturgical conception informed by the analogy of being is an ‘assimilation’ of nature and culture
in worship but only because they participate in Christ, who communicates or mediates Himself
to us through nature and culture, forming and transforming them. And now, having argued for a
metaphysics of worship and mediation, which embraces nature in its createdness, corporeality,
and finitude, I will argue that while this Christian theurgy may be expressed in many ways, its
fullest expression is in the celebration of the Eucharist.
3 Analogy, liturgy, and transubstantiation
In this section, I will argue that a doctrine of transubstantiation not only provides the most
coherent way of holding together real presence, divine act, and an analogical understanding of
reality, but it also preserves the place of nature, as nature. To argue this, I will contrast it to John
Calvin’s understanding of the Eucharist, as he downplays the role of physicality in worship. For
him, the central interpretive key of the Eucharist is the sursum corda (“lift up your hearts”). We
see this particularly in the rather wordy and didactic Reformed liturgy used in Calvin’s Geneva,
where the minister exhorts the people to lift up their hearts, focusing on heavenly things:
[L]et us lift our spirits and hearts on high where Jesus Christ is in the glory of His Father, whence we
expect Him at our redemption. Let us not be fascinated by these earthly and corruptible elements
which we see with our eyes and touchwith our hands, seeking Him there as thoughHewere enclosed
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in the bread or wine. Then only shall our souls be disposed to be nourished and vivified by His
substance when they are lifted up above all earthly things, attaining even to heaven, and entering
the Kingdom of God where He dwells. Therefore let us be content to have the bread and wine as
signs and witnesses, seeking the truth spiritually where the Word of God promises that we shall find
it.93
For Calvinist theology, then, the bread and wine, “these earthly and corruptible elements,” have
absolutely no value, at least liturgically, if not in themselves. This seems to follow a Pauline
emphasis on setting our minds on that which is above (Colossians 3). But it ignores the Pauline
emphasis a chapter earlier: “For in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily, and you have
come to fullness in him, who is the head of every ruler and authority” (Colossians 2:9-10). For
Calvin, the sursum corda signifies our spiritual ascent to God through the Spirit, as he notes in
his Institutes of the Christian Religion:
The sum is, that the flesh and blood of Christ feed our souls just as bread and wine maintain and
support our corporeal life. For there would be no aptitude in the sign, did not our souls find their
nourishment in Christ. This could not be, did not Christ truly form one with us, and refresh us by
the eating of his flesh, and the drinking of his blood. But though it seems an incredible thing that
the flesh of Christ, while at such a distance from us in respect of place, should be food to us, let us
remember how far the secret virtue of the Holy Spirit surpasses all our conceptions, and how foolish
it is to wish to measure its immensity by our feeble capacity. Therefore, what our mind does not
comprehend let faith conceive—viz. that the Spirit truly unites things separated by space.94
This is, as Joseph Ratzinger notes, a fundamentally ‘dynamic’ understanding of liturgy, where
the movement is upwards and away from our created context.95 Understood in theurgic terms,
this indicates, in Stang’s words, “our moving closer to the source, ascending the hierarchy,”
93 “The Form of Church Prayers, Strassburg, 1545, and Geneva, 1542,” in Liturgies of the Western Church,
selected and introduced by Bard Thompson (Cleveland: William Collins and World Publishing Co., 1961),
207 (cf. 185-210). For an argument in favour of Calvin’s Eucharistic theology, see Martha L. Moore-Keish,
Do This in Remembrance of Me: A Ritual Approach to Reformed Eucharistic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 2008), esp. 22-32.
94 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2 vols., trans. Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerd-
mans, 1989), B.4, c.17, para. 10 (vol. 2, p.563), cf. para. 36 (vol. 2, p.594).
95 Joseph Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy: The Sacramental Foundation of Christian Existence (San Fran-
cisco, CA: Ignatius, 2014), 221-224.
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rather than “allowing the source to move more fully through us,” the latter of which is the
Pseudo-Dionysian approach.96 In Calvin, we find something similar to the Iamblichean con-
ception of ascent or anagogy (Gk. anagōgē), namely a spiritualistic notion of union, which
is nonetheless achieved through rituals established by the divine (though the difference is that
for Iamblichus, the elements are not worthless in themselves).97 For Calvin, the liturgy has the
same function, though he introduces to it a modern notion of symbolism, anchored in a purely
conventional understanding of Christ’s institution, the local, yet glorified presence of Christ
in heaven, and the action of the Holy Spirit, uniting “things separated by space.”98 Citing St.
Paul’s point, that bread and the cup participate in Christ’s body and blood (1 Corinthians 10:16),
Calvin notes that they do so as mere symbols:
There is no ground to object that the expression is figurative, and gives the sign the name of the
thing signified. I admit, indeed that the breaking of bread is a symbol, not the reality. But this being
admitted, we duly infer from the exhibition of the symbol that the thing itself is exhibited.99
Calvin maintains the symbolic power of the bread and wine (that they symbolise nourishment
in Christ and that ‘the thing itself,’ the body and blood of Christ, is exhibited by these symbols),
and contrasts this to the belief that they really participates in Christ. For Calvin, the Eucharist, as
bread and wine, understood in a theatrical and pedagogical manner, is a symbol of our spiritual
union with Christ. His use of ‘symbol’ here resembles the modern semiotic separation discussed
by Peirce.100 He separates out the ontological, conventional, and (merely) iconic dimensions of
the sign. His approach, furthermore, is epistemological, focused on us and our understanding,
rather than metaphysical, focused on the nature of the gift given. Simon Oliver notes that when
96 Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 115, cf. 115-116; Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradi-
tion, 160-169.
97 DM VI, 6 (cf. V, 18): “The theurgist, through the power of arcane symbols, commands cosmic entities no
longer as a human being or employing a human soul but, existing above them in the order of the gods.” Also
see TCO, frag. 153-154, 194; Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles, 20, 198, 212; Uždavinys, Philosophy and
Theurgy, 18-21.
98 Calvin, Institutes, B.4, c.17, para. 10 (vol. 2, p.563).
99 Calvin, Institutes, B.4, c.17, para. 10 (vol. 2, pp.564).
100 Short, Peirce’s Theory of Signs, 214-225.
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Calvin emphasises the sursum corda, he maintains that what is important is not the real presence
of Christ in the Eucharistic elements but “the Church’s Trinitarian participation in the being of
Christ” and “the participation in a localized but glorified Christological body in heaven.”101 In
this sense, the rituals may become an ‘escape’ from concrete physical nature, which is deemed
‘worthless’ for liturgical purposes (if not in itself). Calvin separates the ‘spiritual’ and the
‘material,’ he denies the real and substantial presence of Christ in the Eucharist, and he separates
God, as giver, and His gifts, as we see particularly in his rejection of the practice of adoring
Christ in the Eucharistic elements: “For what is idolatry if it is not to worship the gifts instead
of the giver?”102 But the point in the Eucharist is that Christ is the gift given, and that this total
separation of giver and gift is inappropriate, as Pickstock notes, echoing Søren Kierkegaard:
“[I]n the case of the divine gift, gift, giver, giving, and condition of reception are identical, and
therefore this is the only real gift in which one can absolutely trust.”103 In Calvin’s conception
of liturgy, the divine-human relationship is totally ‘spiritualised’ and we end up with a denial not
just of our cultures but of our very physical creation as relevant for liturgy or worship. In order
to ‘reach’ God, we have to, somehow, ignore the physical world that God has gifted us, as well
as the cultures through which we express ourselves. Oliver notes that for Calvin, the bread and
wine are “representations of that which is elsewhere, namely the body and blood of Christ,”
which entails that the natural is “somewhat arbitrary and secondary within the Eucharist.”104
This is underscored by the emphasis on the sursum corda, where the natural body is “to be
101 Oliver, “The Eucharist before Nature and Culture,” 342, cf. 342-350.
102 Calvin, Institutes, B.4, c.17, para. 36 (vol. 2, p.594).
103 Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, 135 (cf. 134-140). See Søren Kierkegaard, Eighteen Uplifting Discourses
III, 35-52, IV, 24-53, in Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. V, eds. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, 26 vols.
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978-2000). “God is the only one who gives in such a way that he
gives the condition along with the gift,” writes Kierkegaard, “the only one who in giving already has given.
God gives both to will and to bring to completion; he begins and completes the good work in a person”
(Eighteen Uplifting Discourses IV, 32). It should be said that there is a distinction between giver and gift,
so that the gift remains gift (and free), though never a separation (Davison, Participation in God, 160, cf.
155-164). But in the case of the Eucharist, this distinction does not apply to the Eucharist in itself, which is
Christ, but to the gift of union given through the Eucharist. But this becomes a problem for Calvin, as he
focuses on us rather than the gift.
104 Oliver, “The Eucharist before Nature and Culture,” 342-343.
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escaped from rather than itself participating in the economy of salvation towards transformation
and redemption,” something which entails that for Calvin, “the believer’s participation in the
liturgy is mimetic.”105 As Calvin notes himself:
Christ is the only food of our soul, and, therefore, our heavenly Father invites us to him, that,
refreshed by communion with him, we may ever and anon gather new vigour until we reach the
heavenly immortality. But as this mystery of the secret union of Christ with believers is incom-
prehensible by nature, he exhibits its figure and image in visible signs adapted to our capacity. …
[Christ] makes it as certain to us as if it were seen by the eye; the familiarity of the similitude giving
it access to minds however dull, and showing that souls are fed by Christ just as the corporeal life is
sustained by bread and wine. …Wherefore [the body and blood of the Lord] are represented under
bread and wine, that we may learn that they are not only ours, but intended to nourish our spiritual
life; that is, as we formerly observed, by the corporeal things which are produced in the sacrament,
we are by a kind of analogy conducted to spiritual things.106
The physical liturgy, including the Eucharistic elements of bread and wine, only mimic the
heavenly celebration of the liturgy, reducing it to ‘mere theatre’ with one purpose only: to teach
or to illuminate ‘dull minds.’107 His liturgy “adopts a machine-like quality,”108 which indicates
a disconnect between imitation and ontological participation and an affirmation of a purely
immanent view of created reality, at least in relation to salvation. If we assume a univocal
conception of being, where God is an infinitely distant object, the anagogical countermove to
God’s descent becomes a spiritual escape from concrete physicality where the actual physical
liturgy is nothing but a theatre and where you are ‘whisked away’ by the Spirit who “unites
things separated by space.”109 Liturgy is, then, not really transformative, at least not in any direct
105 Oliver, “The Eucharist before Nature and Culture,” 343.
106 Calvin, Institutes, B.4, c.17, para. 1, 3 (vol. 2, p.557, 558).
107 We also find tendencies toward this view in the Lutheran tradition, not with regards to liturgy as such, which
is seen as essential (CA V, VII), but in the treatment of so-called ceremonies, human traditions, and rites
which need not necessarily “be alike everywhere” (VII). While this is not problematic in itself, as our rites
are always non-identical imitations, it becomes more problematic when the confession later states that that
these ceremonies are “especially needed in order to teach those who are ignorant” (XXIV). This way, the
way in which we do liturgy becomes somewhat arbitrary and the ceremonies are not valued in themselves
but only as a means to an end.
108 Oliver, “The Eucharist before Nature and Culture,” 343.
109 Calvin, Institutes, B.4, c.17, para. 10 (vol. 2, p.563), cf. Oliver, “The Eucharist before Nature and Culture,”
342-350; Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, 221-224.
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way. If such a conception of liturgy is true, liturgy can only be transformative in an occasional
manner, where God, for instance, gives blessings on the occasion of the liturgy, on account of
promises made, but not because of the nature of the liturgy itself. It is, basically, ‘liturgical
occasionalism’ (though that is never spelled out explicitly). Like the cog, which is nothing in
itself, the worshipper only serves a ‘higher purpose.’ Blessings become utterly spiritualised.
The Eucharist is emphasised because it is instituted by Christ but no real value is given to its
form or physicality. What seems indicative of Calvin’s conception of the liturgy, and of his
(consistent) followers, is, as noted, an abandoning of our corporeality and particularity, and
especially of our cultures, in favour of a ‘spiritualising’ both of worship and of the worshipper,
where we are, so to speak, ‘whisked away’ from our bodily context.110
If we affirm an analogical and theurgic conception of liturgy, however, we can both affirm
culture and physical creation, while also affirming that they need to be perfected in Christ.111
This, however, is true of all created things, including our very selves. The fundamental dualism
of reality is not between spirit andmatter, as it seems to be in modernity, in different guises, and
with different consequences, but between Creator and creature.112 Contrasting this to Calvin’s
spiritualised conception, Oliver makes the point that Aquinas’s conception of the Eucharist is
not principally ‘mimetic,’ but that liturgy, the concrete and physical liturgical celebration, “be-
comes an essential and integral element of feeding par excellence, which is a feeding on the
body of Christ.”113 In this understanding, writes Oliver, “the natural and cultural become not
110 This also has a flip side, fostering a negative view of creation. See Alfsvåg, “Luthersk spiritualitet,” 46-
49; Knut Alfsvåg, “Transhumanism, Truth and Equality: Does the Transhumanist Vision Make Sense?”
(Theofilos 7:3, 2015), 256-267, cf. Pickstock, After Writing, 101-118.
111 For some studies on the place of material culture in Christian worship and theology, see Timothy Carroll,
Orthodox Christian Material Culture: Of People and Things in the Making of Heaven (London: Routledge,
2018); Francesca Dell’Acqua and Ernesto Sergio Mainoldi, eds., Pseudo-Dionysius and Christian Visual
Culture, c.500–900 (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020); Gordon W. Lathrop, Holy Things: A Liturgical
Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1998); Hallvard Olavson Mosdøl and Anne Haugland Bal-
snes, “Mer enn ord – om gudstjenestereformen og sanselighet,” in Gudstjeneste á la carte: Liturgireformen
i Den norske kirke, eds., Anne Haugland Balsnes et al (Oslo: Verbum akademisk, 2015), 210-229.
112 Knut Alfsvåg, Liturgien som modernitetskritikk (Råde: FBB, 2016); Alfsvåg, “Luthersk spiritualitet.”
113 Oliver, “The Eucharist before Nature and Culture,” 344, cf. 344-346; Darley, “Ritual as erotic anagogy.” As
noted in chapter one, pp.33-34, while Aquinas does not describe his approach as ‘theurgic,’ if we understand
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objective ontological categories that apparently stand over against God and each other and from
which we are removed, but most fully themselves as a participation in the divine life.” Unlike
Calvin, who held that the body of Christ is utterly like our own bodies, Aquinas held that the Eu-
charist determines what a body really is, that the body of Christ, unlike our bodies, is ‘replete,’
requiring no accidents. The remaining accidents of bread and wine are thus ‘free-floating’ with-
out a subject, by divine powerwhich can preserver the accidents in being.114 The accidents, then,
are not non-existent or simple but are upheld by God, subsistent being itself, by participation.
Elsewhere Oliver notes that this ‘un-Aristotelian’ use of accidents as ‘free-floating,’ makes the
Eucharist “a recapitulation of creation,” as “creation is an accident, but not an accident of the
divine substance.”115 The accidents are ‘free-floating’ by grace because creation is essentially
accidental. It only exists because it participates in (or is ‘suspended from’) God. The Eucharist
is a real ontological participation in the divine, and a real presence of the divine, made manifest
in the gifts of creation. Transubstantiation explicates the species of bread and wine as symbols,
in the comprehensive sense, for the divine through their participation in God. The Eucharist
becomes the sacramental focus of all creation and the symbol par excellence. It reveals not just
the salvation of Christ but also the symbolic nature of creation, reminding us that creation itself
participates in the divine, and that this expresses itself as cult and culture, as a non-identical
imitation of the divine life.
This participation is a participation in the divine act, the theurgy, which on a Thomistic
theurgy as a participation in the divine act, rather than a coercive ‘manipulation’ of God, it fits his under-
standing of metaphysical participation in God, manifested in Christ, worship, and human work. See Thomas
Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Power of God (Quaestiones Disputatae de potentia Dei, hereafter: De
pot.), q.3, a.7; ST III, qq.60-90, cf. Addey, Divination and Theurgy, 32-38, 171-213; Stang, Apophasis and
Pseudonymity, 81-152 (esp. 106-110); Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” esp. 31-33, 37-38.
114 ST III, q.77, a.1, corpus, cf. qq.75-77. I am indebted, here, to one of my fellow PhD candidates in Durham,
nowDr. JoshuaMobley, for letting me read one of his essays on transubstantiation, creation, and contingency,
where he develops the notion of creation as a ‘free-floating’ accident, participating in God. Also see Joshua
Kendall Mobley, “Transubstantiation: Theology, History, and Christian Unity by Brett Salkeld” (review in
Modern Theology 36:3, 2020), 692-695.
115 Simon Oliver, “Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: from participation to late modernity,” in The Radical Or-
thodoxy Reader, eds., Simon Oliver and John Milbank (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 17/27, n31, cf.
17-21; Milbank, Pickstock, and Ward, eds., Radical Orthodoxy, 1-20.
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account of divine simplicity cannot be distinguished from God in Himself.116 And the central
act of Christian theurgy is the Eucharist. Pseudo-Dionysius calls it “the most Divine Supper,
and arch-symbol of the rites performed.”117 In many ways it reveals the ultimate supernatural
telos of humanity, and of nature. It is, to again use my definition of Christian theurgy, an act
of the triune God for us, put into use by Christ as the God-man, and the Church as His body,
whose effect is to reconcile the world to God and make humans capable of worship and service
through participation in Him.118 Through the Eucharist, the accidents of bread and wine reach
their end through participation in God by becoming icons of Christ, of his most precious body
and blood. Aquinas highlights both the signification and the reality, stating that the body of
Christ is in the sacrament “not merely in signification or figure,” as is Calvin’s position, “but
also in very truth.”119 Here we see an absolute contrast to the Calvinist liturgy, where we are
urged not to “be fascinated by these earthly and corruptible elements which we see with our eyes
and touch with our hands” but to “be content to have the bread and wine as signs and witnesses,
seeking the truth spiritually where the Word of God promises that we shall find it.”120 For
Aquinas, transubstantiation is not a rejection of nature, but an elevating of nature to its telos.
“God,” writes Oliver, “is no longer denied to nature, but sustains the accidents of nature which
are thereby most fully realised.”121 With Calvin, I confirm an anagogic understanding of the
Eucharist, but against Calvin I hold that this ‘rising up’ is not a rejection of the concrete, physical
nature of creation, but an expression of it. The material world is not destroyed by the divine
order but brought into harmony with it. There is a legitimate way to understand the relation of
the sursum corda and the Eucharist, where we emphasise both the value of the physical liturgy
116 ST I, q.3.
117 EH III:3, 1 (428B).
118 See introduction, p.18, cf. SC, 7; Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 30.
119 ST III, q.75, a.1, corp.
120 “The Form of Church Prayers,” 207.
121 Oliver, “The Eucharist before Nature and Culture,” 348, cf. 348-350; Mobley, Symbolism, 57-96.
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and the participation in the heavenly liturgy, but where this heavenly worship is made present
here, in the midst of creation. We do not ascend away to some spiritual realm but we are deified
where we are.122 There is a perfection of the worshipping community, and creation as a whole,
as nature.
4 Conclusion
In this chapter, following from the discussion in the previous one, I have argued that in a Chris-
tian understanding of the divine-human relationship, as in Neoplatonic theurgy, God is always
revealed to us as mediated, in symbols and words, and that this presupposes that creation, while
fallen, still participates in the divine and that it still retains its theophanic character (Job 12:7-8;
Psalm 19:1; Romans 1:20). This presupposes a participatory and analogical conception of be-
ing. Our liturgical participation is a concrete manifestation of our participation in God, both as
creatures in the Creator and as children and friends in the loving Trinity, through grace. This
participation is a participation of the whole human being and of the whole of creation, and it
happens in and through this, through mediation, symbolically and analogously. We do not re-
ject createdness, corporeality, and finitude but let it have its place in the economy of God, and
in our praise of him. In this conception, practical participation in the liturgical act, as liturgy,
flows from, and is only possible through, ontological participation in Christ, or in God through
Christ. Or rather: it is ontological participation in Christ, as the liturgy is principally the work
of Christ, both divine and human, and because our very being is defined not just by mind and
thought but also by action. When we act, we do so as participants in God, and it expresses itself
non-identically in our imitation of Him. As the principal actor of the liturgical act, Christ does
122 See Sverre Elgvin Lied, Participation in Heavenly Worship: The Pre-Nicene Growth of a Concept (PhD dis-
sertation, VID Specialized University, Stavanger, 2016), cf. Kjetil Kringlebotten, ““Do this in remembrance
of me…” A Lutheran defence of the sacrifice of the mass” (Studia Theologica – Nordic Journal of Theology
71:2, 2017), 130-136; Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition, 160-169; Stang, Apophasis
and Pseudonymity, 115-116.
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not reject, destroy, or surpass our nature but perfects and transforms it. And that is, ultimately,
what liturgical theology is all about.
God does not want us to escape or transcend the material world, and certainly not in the
liturgical act. Rather, He wants us, and the material world, to be brought “into harmony with
the divine order.”123 The worshipping community, and creation as a whole, ascends to God,
in its physicality. Human creatures, as all other creatures, are integrated wholes who relate
to God as whole beings, not as disembodied ‘spirits.’ God created us as physical beings and
He works in and through our form, as “nothing in nature is void of purpose.”124 Nature is
lifted up into the divine but as nature. God is not transcendent because He is a ‘larger than
life’ creature hidden away in a realm ‘up there’ but because He is utterly other, yet utterly
near, being ‘subsistent being itself.’ Liturgy is, in its essence, a theurgy, as understood and
reinterpreted through Christian practice and theology. It is revealed as the work of God by
which we are made capable of worship and of a life of virtue. We are given an eschatological
foretaste of heaven and we are enabled, through this gift of deification, to offer ourselves –
in our createdness, corporeality, and finitude – as living sacrifices to God, in the Holy Spirit
(cf. Romans 12:1). Where a univocal conception of being downplays the role of the material,
introducing a spiritualised understanding of worship, an analogical concept of being allows
us to participate in the divine life and the divine work, as friends and as children, by being
transformed and transfigured in Christ, without ceasing to be created. Liturgy, and particularly
the Eucharistic celebration, is not mere theatre helping us to become ‘more spiritual,’ but a real
participation in the divine theurgy, the actio divina or actio Christi. This is not an escape from
creation but the descent of God.125 We are transformed in a way that does not entail a rejection
123 Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 30, cf. Darley, “Ritual as erotic anagogy”; Oliver, “The Eucharist
before Nature and Culture,” 342-350; Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, 221-224.
124 De pot., q.3, a.7, corp. 2, cf. chapter three, pp.112-114.
125 Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition, 160-169; Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity, 115-
116.
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of physical creation. Liturgy, in all its spirituality and corporeality, is the way in which human
beings worship, as integrated beings, through the gifts given to us by God.
In the next chapter, I apply my argument, for why we ought to understand liturgical partici-
pation in theurgic terms, to the latest liturgical reform in the Church of Norway, in comparison
to reforms in the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church, arguing that the reform
tends to downplay the metaphysical nature of participation. As Ratzinger notes, there is a focus
on practical ‘tasks,’ where the liturgy becomes fragmented and compartmentalised.126 And,
as Pickstock has noted, we see that the liturgies themselves have become more ‘logical’ and
‘streamlined,’ often missing the more non-identical and organic nature of older rites.127 In the
chapter, I argue that in order to properly reform liturgy, we must first ask what liturgy is, and
who its main actor is, before we ask what we should do.
126 Joseph Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, commemorative ed. (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 2018), 185-
191.
127 Pickstock, After Writing, 170-176; Catherine Pickstock, “A Short Essay on the Reform of the Liturgy” (New
Blackfriars 78:912, 1997), 56-65.
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CHAPTER SIX
Theurgy, liturgy, and reform
1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I argued that God is always revealed to us as mediated, something
which presupposes that creation, while fallen, still participates in God, through Christ, as cre-
ation. Christ, through whom all things were made and through whom the sacraments become
channels of divine grace, is the centre, and this finds its fullest expression in the Eucharist and
in a doctrine of transubstantiation. In this chapter, I continue my argument for a theurgic un-
derstanding of active participation in the liturgy. While the concept of active participation has
been central to the liturgical movement, inside and outside the Roman Catholic Church, though
not necessarily by that exact designation, it is often understood in principally practical terms.1
I, on the other hand, have argued that we should understand such participation principally in
metaphysical terms, as a human participation in, and ritual celebration of, the divine act, and
that, re-imagined within Christian theology, Neoplatonic theurgy provides us with a philosoph-
ical framework through which we can understand this participation, the ultimate expression of
1 See John F. Baldovin, “The Development of the Liturgy: Theological and Historical Roots of Sacrosanctum
Concilium” (Worship 87:6, 2013), 517-532; Jan Terje Christoffersen, “Sammen for Guds ansikt: Gudstjen-
estereform mellom visjon og virkelighet,” in Gudstjeneste á la carte: Liturgireformen i Den norske kirke,
eds., Anne Haugland Balsnes, et al. (Oslo: Verbum akademisk, 2015), 24-66 (esp. 26-32); John R. K. Fen-
wick and Bryan D. Spinks, eds., Worship in Transition: The Liturgical Movement in the Twentieth Century
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), esp. 6-7, 23-52, 71-79; Benjamin Gordon-Taylor, “An Anglican Perspec-
tive,” in T&T Clark Companion to Liturgy, ed., Reid, 483-498; Clare V. Johnson, “From Organic Growth to
Liturgico-Plasticity: Reconceptualizing the Process of Liturgical Reform” (Theological Studies 76:1, 2015),
87-111; Keith F. Pecklers, The Genius of the Roman Rite: On the Reception and Implementation of the
New Missal (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark/Continuum, 2003), 23-45; Joseph Ratzinger, Theology of the
Liturgy: The Sacramental Foundation of Christian Existence (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 2014), 541-568,
574-594; Alcuin Reid, “After Sacrosanctum Concilium—Continuity or Rupture?,” in T&T Clark Compan-
ion to Liturgy, ed., Reid, 297-316; Alcuin Reid, “On the Council Floor: The Council Fathers’ Debate of the
Schema on the Sacred Liturgy,” in Authentic Liturgical Renewal in Contemporary Perspective, ed., Uwe
Michael Lang (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017), 125-143; Alcuin Reid, “The Twentieth Century
Liturgical Movement,” in T&T Clark Companion to Liturgy, ed., Reid, 153-174; Richard J. Schuler, “Par-
ticipation” (Sacred Music 114:4, 1987), 7-10; Kenneth D. Whitehead, ed., Sacrosanctum Concilium and the
Reform of the Liturgy (Scranton, PA: University of Scranton Press, 2009).
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which is the hypostatic union. In the hypostatic union, there is not just a voluntary and con-
tractual union but a real metaphysical union-in-distinction between divinity and humanity and,
through humanity, with creation as a whole.2 The Second Vatican Council’s Constitution on the
Sacred Liturgy defines liturgy as “an exercise of the priestly office of Jesus Christ” and notes
that it is also an act of the Church, but only through participation in Christ: “in the liturgy the
whole public worship is performed by the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ, that is, by the Head
and His members.”3 When we participate in the liturgy, then, according to the Constitution, we
participate in the act of Christ, because we already participate in Him through Baptism. What
I demonstrate in this thesis is that, while liturgical participation cannot be separated from par-
ticular rites and celebrations, it cannot be reduced to them. I am arguing that we must ground
liturgical participation in the divine, in a rational manner, and that if we do not do so, it has no
inner coherence.
In this chapter, I examine to what extent such a metaphysical approach to the liturgy can be
found in the latest liturgical reform of the Church of Norway (hereafter: CoN). Where that is
relevant, I will compare and contrast this to the reforms in the Church of England (hereafter:
CofE) and the Roman Catholic Church (hereafter: RCC). I do so because CoN has recently
concluded the main parts of an extensive liturgical reform, which started in the early 2000s,4
because these are all Western churches with similar structures, anchored in a sacramental and
liturgical life, because we see in both CoN and CofE, who are in communion, a move towards
a more ecumenical or universal shape of the liturgy, informed by the liturgical and ecumenical
movements and particularly developments in RCC,5 and because we see in the reforms of all
2 See chapter four, pp.140-146.
3 Sacrosanctum Concilium (hereafter: SC), 7. On Vatican II documents, see abbreviations, p.5, n4.
4 Anne Haugland Balsnes, et al., “Innledning: Gudstjenestefornyelse i menighetene,” in Gudstjeneste á la
carte, eds., Balsnes, et al., 13-23; Christoffersen, “Sammen for Guds ansikt.”
5 Christoffersen, “Sammen for Guds ansikt,” 26-32; Fenwick and Spinks, eds., Worship in Transition, 37-52,
61-79.
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three churches an emphasis on an activistic notion of involvement an a corresponding deempha-
sis on a metaphysical dimension of liturgical participation.6 Although the empowering the laity
through involvement is noble, instead of empowering the lay vocation, inside and outside the
liturgical setting, this empowering seems to be a turning of the laity into clerics. And further-
more, it has tended to reduce the liturgy to a cultural phenomenon, best studied by sociologists
and anthropologists.7 As I have argued, however, liturgy does not principally express human
sentiments or needs but the divine order in which we can discover our place.
The CoN reform started in the early 2000s, with a renewal of the main (Sunday) celebration
of Mass,8 but this had roots in earlier reforms.9 In the late 1960s, while some started to be more
inspired by the liturgical movement, there were certain ‘anti-ritualistic’ tendencies in the Church
of Norway, with some seeing the new (ecumenical) changes as a ‘catholicising’ and ‘ritualising’
of the divine service. The critics of this newmove emphasised the passive nature of the liturgical
and sacramental gifts.10 Later, including in the latest reform, we saw a move towards a more
6 Anscar J. Chupungco, “The Vision of the Constitution on the Liturgy,” in T&T Clark Companion to Liturgy,
ed., Reid, 261-277; Transforming Worship: Living the New Creation (GS 1651), report by the Liturgical
Commission to the General Synod of the Church of England, February 2007), 2.6-7, 2.15, 2.20, 3.5, 5.6.1,
6.9.2, 6.10; Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, 541-568, 574-594; Merete Thomassen, “«Jeg brenner jo for
involvering.» Involvering og delaktighet i gudstjenester med økt oppslutning” (Teologisk tidsskrift 9:2, 2020),
38-54.
7 An example of which can be found in Martin Modéus, Menneskelig gudstjeneste: Om gudstjenesten som
relation og ritual, trans. and comm. Anita Hansen Engdahl (København: Alfa, 2011). Modéus, rather than
starting with the theological nature of the liturgy, sees it as an expression of human experience, discussing it
in anthropological and sociological terms.
8 The standard name used to be høgmesse (lit. ‘High Mass’), which is still in use, but now the more prevalent
one is either either gudsteneste (‘Divine Service,’ the equivalent on the German Gottesdienst) or hovudgud-
steneste (‘Main Divine Service’). Part of the reason was that there was a tendency to use høgmesse of any
service on Sunday, even if it did not include the Eucharistic celebration.
9 Christoffersen, “Sammen for Guds ansikt,” 26-41. Before this there were to major reforms, one starting in
the late 19th century, concluding in the 1920s, after which we have seen many small revisions and additions,
and one in the 1960s and 1970s, after which, in 1977, the bishops issued a new liturgy. This was supple-
mented by additions up to the 1990s. See Lars Flatø, Den store liturgirevisjonen i vår kirke 1886-1926: En
kirkehistorisk undersøkelse (Oslo: Land og Kirke/Gyldendal, 1982); Gudstenestebok for Den norske kyrkja,
2 vols. in one book (Oslo: Verbum, 1996); Øystein Skullerud, Liturgisk musikk i Den norske kirke 1889 -
2009: Musikkmateriale og faktisk bruk (Master’s Thesis, NMH Norwegian Academy of Music, Oslo, 2010),
9-98.
10 Jørund Håkedal, Fra prestens gudstjeneste til folkets messe (Master’s Thesis, MF Norwegian School of The-
ology, Oslo, 2012), 29. An important figure here is the influential theologian Carl. Fr. Wisløff, who empha-
sised the role of preaching to the extent that the sacraments became secondary. He was highly influential on
the more pietistic strands of Norwegian Lutheranism. See Sverre Bøe, ed., Teologen Carl Fr. Wisløff: En an-
tologi hundre år etter hans fødsel (Oslo: FMH-forlaget, 2008), as well as Carl Fr. Wisløff,Nattverd og messe:
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ritualistic focus.11 In 2001, CoN’s Youth Synod or Youth Assembly (No. ungdomstinget) issued
a resolution emphasising active participation. It stated that the Church must make sure that “the
whole congregation participates actively in the Divine Service.”12 Later, in 2002, the Church
Council made a decision that if there was to be a reform, this would have to be brought up to
the General Synod.13 The Youth Synod took the challenge and called for a simpler order:
The liturgy of the current High Mass comes across as inaccessible for many of its participants, and
we believe that we have to focus on communicating what it means and what it stands for. It will
also be important to have a simpler order, something which can in itself serve as a means to increase
the understanding of the order and the content of the Divine Service.14
What the Synod called for was more freedom within the existing liturgies, for example being
allowed to use more diverse musical expressions or have more youth oriented services (in addi-
tion to the family services). The result, however, was a long an complex reform, lasting almost
two decades, ending (for now) with a new order of Baptism in 2017 and a new order of the
En studie i Luthers teologi (Doctoral thesis. Oslo: Lutherstiftelsen, 1957), cf. Carl Fr. Wisløff, The Gift of
Communion: Luther’s controversy with Rome on Eucharistic Sacrifice, trans. JosephM. Shaw (Minneapolis,
MN: Augsburg Publishing House, 1964). I criticised Wisløff’s approach in Kjetil Kringlebotten, ““Do this in
remembrance of me…” A Lutheran defence of the sacrifice of the mass” (Studia Theologica – Nordic Jour-
nal of Theology 71:2, 2017), 127-147 (esp. 132-136) and Kjetil Kringlebotten, «Do this in remembrance of
me…» The Sacrificial Aspect of the Eucharist in the Systematic Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg and Joseph
Ratzinger (Master’s thesis, NLA University College, Bergen, 2013), 104-111, 117.
11 Hallvard Olavson Mosdøl and Anne Haugland Balsnes, “Mer enn ord – om gudstjenestereformen og sanse-
lighet,” inGudstjeneste á la carte, eds., Balsnes, et al., 210-229; Gunnfrid Ljones Øierud, “Deltakerroller for
konfirmanter,” in Gudstjenester med konfirmanter: En praktisk-teologisk dybdestudie med teoretisk bredde,
ed., Elisabeth Tveito Johnsen (Oslo: IKO-forlaget, 2017), 157-201; Merete Thomassen, “Konfirmanter som
ministranter i gudstjenesten,” in Gudstjenester med konfirmanter, ed., Johnsen, 119-156; Elisabeth Tveito
Johnsen, “Gudstjenestelæring gjennom deltagelse,” in Gudstjeneste på ny, ed., Geir Hellemo (Oslo: Univer-
sitetsforlaget, 2014), 151-179; Kari Veiteberg, “Gudstenesta som ei hendingmed handlingar,” inGudstjeneste
på ny, ed., Hellemo, 71-88.
12 UKM 01/01 Menighetsfellesskap, resolution on the communion of the congregation from the Church of Nor-
way Youth Synod (Oslo: Kyrkjerådet, 2001), 1 (my translation). Original text: “Det er spesielt viktig at hele
menigheten deltar aktivt i gudstjenesten.”
13 KR 08/02 Vurdering av ordningen med liturgiske forsøkssaker, decision on the possibility of liturgical reform
from the Church of Norway Church Council (Oslo: Kyrkjerådet, 2002). For the website of the Church Coun-
cil (No. kyrkjerådet or kirkerådet), see https://kirken.no/nb-NO/om-kirken/slik-styres-kirken/kirkeradet/ (ac-
cessed 10 February 2021).
14 UKM 05/03 Hva slags gudstjeneste vil vi ha, hearing on the liturgy from the Church of Norway Youth Synod
(Oslo: Kyrkjerådet, 2003), 2 (my translation). Original text: “Liturgien i dagens høymesse oppleves lite
tilgjengelig for mange gudstjenestedeltagere, og vi tror at det må fokuseres på å formidle hva den betyr og
hva den står for. Dette vil også være viktigmed en enklere ordning, noe som i seg selv kan være et virkemiddel
til å øke forståelsen av gudstjenestens gang og innhold.”
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Divine Service in 2020.15 Early in the process, the Youth Synod laid out some suggestions for
the reform:
The Synod asks the Church Council to work for a more flexible order of the High Mass and Divine
Service. We suggest that one can take a starting point in a basic structure which shall remain the
same in all services. In addition, one should strive for a set of core values. Furthermore, forms of
expression for the various parts can be adapted to local needs and resources, etc.16
From this, the Church Council introduced two central methodological tools;17 the ordo, as a
principle of unity (cf. “a basic structure which shall remain the same in all services”) and three
so-called ‘core values’; flexibility, involvement, and localised contextuality (No., fleksibilitet,
involvering, and stadeigengjering/stedegengjøring), intended to be used as guidelines for the
15 See Gudsteneste med rettleiingar (Stavanger: Eide, 2020, hereafter: GDNK 2020); Ordning for dåp (Sta-
vanger: Eide, 2017). Some of these are found online, along with translations (though the translation of the
principal service has not yet been updated to the 2020 edition). See https://kirken.no/nb-NO/om-kirken/for-
medarbeidere/liturgier/ and https://kirken.no/nb-NO/om-kirken/for-medarbeidere/liturgier/liturgier-oversatt-
til-andre-sprak/, both accessed 17 January 2021. There has still not been a revision to the ordination rituals
or specific days during the church year. For those, see Gudstenestebok. I have been told that the plan is
to revise them in the near future. For the website of CoN General Synod (No. kyrkjemøtet or kirkemøtet),
see https://kirken.no/nb-NO/om-kirken/slik-styres-kirken/kirkemotet/ (accessed 17 January 2021). The rel-
evant years are 2010 (no. 4-8), 2011 (no. 4-7), 2017 (no. 5), and 2019 (no. 5). For the debates, plenary
proceedings, and votes on the revision in the 2019, see https://vimeo.com/album/5872354, video 4 (1:58:15-
3:27:57) and 11 (0:04:15-1:28:01, 2:07:05-2:36:21), accessed 2 April 2019. For some central research, see
Balsnes, et al., eds., Gudstjeneste á la carte; Håkedal, Fra prestens gudstjeneste til folkets messe; Hellemo,
ed., Gudstjeneste på ny; Robert Lilleaasen, Old Paths and New Ways: Negotiating Tradition and Relevance
in Liturgy (PhD dissertation, MF Norwegian School of Theology, Oslo, 2016); Jorunn Raddum, Variety is
the Spice of Life? Forandring fryder? the Church of Norway 2011 liturgical reform: A study of the concept
of contextuality in Nord-Gudbrandsdal (Master’s Thesis, MF Norwegian School of Theology, Oslo, 2015);
Marit Rong, Det liturgiske møte: Språk og gudsmetaforer i Den norske kirkes høymesse (PhD dissertation,
University of Bergen, 2009); Johnsen, ed., Gudstjenester med konfirmanter. A book based on Lilleaasen’s
thesis has later been published; Old Paths and New Ways: Negotiating Tradition and Relevance in Liturgy
(Oxford: Peter Lang, 2018).
16 UKM 05/03 Hva slags gudstjeneste vil vi ha, 2 (my translation). Original text: “UKM [the abbreviation of
the Synod’s Norwegian title] ber Kirkerådet jobbe for en mer fleksibel høymesse- og gudstjenesteordning.
Vi foreslår at man kan ta utgangspunkt i en grunnstruktur som skal være den samme i alle gudstjenester. I
tillegg bør man tilstrebe et sett av kjerneverdier. Videre kan uttrykksformer for de ulike ledd tilpasses lokale
behov og ressurser osv.”
17 GDNK 2020, 10-11, 351-393; KR 10/04 Reform av Høymessen, decision on the liturgical reform by the
Church of Norway Church Council (Oslo: Kyrkjerådet, 2004), esp. 9-10; KR Protokoll 01/04, minutes from
the Church of NorwayChurch Council meeting, March 2004 (Oslo: Kyrkjerådet, 2004), 9-12, esp. 10; Liturgi
– Bokmål: Forslag til Ny ordning for hovedgudstjeneste i Den norske kirke (Bergen: Eide/Kyrkjerådet, 2008),
13-24, 44-46; UKM 07/08 Gudstenestereforma, hearing on the liturgical reform from the Church of Norway
Youth Synod (Oslo: Kyrkjerådet, 2008), 1-3; UKM 07/14 Innspill til evaluering av gudstjenestereformen
i forkant av Kirkemøtet 2017, decision on the liturgical reform from the Church of Norway Youth Synod
(Oslo: Kyrkjerådet, 2014), cf. Christoffersen, “Sammen for Guds ansikt,” 58-66; Rong, Det liturgiske møte,
51; Finn Wagle, “Etterord: …liv fra kilder utenfor oss selv,” in Gudstjeneste á la carte, eds., Balsnes, et al.,
287-289.
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reform nationally, regionally, and locally (cf. “a set of core values”). The concept of the ordo
was central to the liturgical movement, representing the organising principle of the liturgy, in-
dicating not just the order of service but the deep structures and presuppositions of the liturgy.18
In the reform, however, this is seen as “a framework or a skeleton for the Divine Service,”19
and is therefore understood as referring specifically to the surface order of the liturgy. In this
framework, the core values represent the freedom of the congregation to shape the way in which
this ordo plays out, but always within the confines of said ordo, except by express permission
from the bishop. It is intended to be an ecumenical and structural principle which guards the
universal and theological nature of the liturgies, establishing the boundaries of the core values,
though it is understood not principally in theological terms but as an extrinsic formal principle,
the ‘glue’ which helps ground local flexibility.20 Where the ordo represents the universality or
catholicity of the liturgies, the core values represent their locally anchored flexibility. In this
chapter I aim to analyse the way in which the reform understands these terms in order to dis-
cover how it envisions liturgical participation and communion. A working hypothesis is that,
even if the reform presupposes a metaphysical dimension to the liturgy, as participation in God,
its main focus, when it comes to active participation, is not the metaphysical aspect but an ac-
tivistic notion of involvement. While there was, perhaps, an overemphasis on the dogmatic and
passive nature in earlier reforms, this reform overemphasises activism, which is also true for
other reforms.21 My intention, then, is to discuss the reform in light of a metaphysical notion
18 Gordon W. Lathrop, Holy Things: A Liturgical Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), 33-83;
Martha L. Moore-Keish, “The Importance of Worship that Centers on the Ordo” (Liturgy 21:2, 2006), 15-
23; Alexander Schmemann, Introduction to Liturgical Theology, 2nd ed., trans. Asheleigh E. Moorhouse
(Crestwood, NY: SVS Press, 1975), 40-71.
19 Liturgi – Bokmål, 15 (my translation), cf. GDNK 2020, 351-393. Original text: “Den universelle ordo er et
rammeverk eller et skjelett for gudstjenesten.”
20 GDNK 2020, 9-11, 252-254, 351-393.
21 Håkedal, Fra prestens gudstjeneste til folkets messe, 29; Egil Morland, “Fritt og fast: Gudstenesta sin ordo –
eit korrektiv til stadeigengjering,” in Guds rikes skatt: Festskrift til Tore Kopperud, eds., Egil Morland, Jens-
Petter Johnsen and Åge Haavik (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2013), 97-114; Ådne Njå, “Messen som Guds nåde
og Kirkens takksigelse: En refleksjon over Luthers messeforordninger med et drøftende sideblikk på liturgi-
og trosopplæringsreformen i Den norske kirke,” in «Hva betyr det?» Luthers katekisme i trosopplæringen,
eds., Knut Alfsvåg and Joar Haga (Prismet bok. Oslo: IKO, 2013), 185-202; Thomassen, “Jeg brenner jo
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of participation. To do so, I will divide the chapter in three sections.
First, I will analyse the concept of the ordo in the CoN reform, particularly in relation to the
nature of flexibility. I will first explore how the reform understands the term, before discussing
this understanding in light of the work of Gordon W. Lathrop and Alexander Schmemann, as
they have both had a huge impact on liturgical theology, and particularly on the nature of the
ordo, and because the former’s work has been central to Lutheran theology.22 Engaging Joseph
Ratzinger, I will argue that the CoN reform neglects the vertical connection to the God as char-
acteristic of the ordo, while overemphasising its horizontal dimensions, and that it emphasises
human autonomy and creativity in such a way that the revealed or given nature of the liturgy
is deemphasised.23 The reform reduces the ordo to a formal unity that unites the liturgical ac-
tions and structures an otherwise flexible liturgy, rather than a metaphysically ordering principle
which is rooted in the order of God Himself (1 Corinthians 14:26-40). I will argue that while
both Lathrop and Schmemann’s approaches can help us provide a coherent critique of the un-
derstanding of the ordo in the reform, these approaches need an analogical and participatory
grounding, something which is implicit in Schemann but missing in Lathrop, as he assumes a
basic structuralist (and consequentially immanentist) philosophy.
Secondly, I will analyse the first two core values of the CoN reform, flexibility and in-
volvement, arguing that these envision liturgical participation through the lens of an activistic
notion of involvement and comprehension, presenting liturgy as principally something we do
and something we can comprehend. Comparing and contrasting this to similar strands of the
CofE and RCC reforms, I will argue that this downplays the principal role of divine agency
for involvering,” cf. Chupungco, “The Vision of the Constitution on the Liturgy”; Transforming Worship,
2.6-7, 2.15, 2.20, 3.5, 5.6.1, 6.9.2, 6.10; Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, 541-568, 574-594; Reid, “After
Sacrosanctum Concilium.”
22 Lathrop, Holy Things, 33-83; Schmemann, Introduction to Liturgical Theology, 40-71, cf. Modéus, Men-
neskelig gudstjeneste, 96-103; Moore-Keish, “The Importance of Worship that Centers on the Ordo.”
23 Joseph Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, commemorative ed. (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 2018), 27-37.
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in human action and overemphasises the human capacity to do and to comprehend liturgy. In
dialogue with Catherine Pickstock, I will argue that from a human perspective, liturgical par-
ticipation is impossible, that it is only made possible through participation in Christ,24 and that
while this is being downplayed in the reforms, it finds more clear expression in the liturgies
themselves.
Thirdly, I will analyse the core value of localised contextuality, arguing that this indicates
a concept of communion which overplays the locality in such a way that the wider ecclesial
communion may be forgotten, threatening our understanding of our communion with God and
our notion of catholicity, which is never only individualistic or local. In dialogue with Aquinas
and Pickstock, I will make the point that what we see in this emphasis on local contextuality is
a specifically Norwegian (and parochial and congregationalist) example of the Anglican fresh
expressions movement,25 which may have missional value but also represents us with a flawed
conception of communion, seen from the perspective of the catholicity or universality of the
Church. I will argue that the liturgical self, while being an individual, is fulfilled in communion
and that this communion, while manifesting itself locally, is principally universal or Catholic,
rooted in Christ.
2 Ordo, flexibility, revelation, and tradition
When describing what characterises the ordo, the CoN Youth Synod does not provide a princi-
pled argument for why liturgy should be ordered, but argues pragmatically by noting that you
24 Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell,
1998), 169-192, 238-253; Catherine Pickstock, “Liturgy, Art and Politics” (Modern Theology 16:2, 2000),
161-162, esp. n8.
25 See Steven Croft, Ian Mobsby, and Stephanie Spellers, eds., Ancient Faith, Future Mission: Fresh Ex-
pressions in the Sacramental Tradition (New York, NY: Seabury Books 2010); Louise Nelstrop and Mar-
tyn Percy, eds., Evaluating Fresh Expressions: Explorations in Emerging Church. Responses to the
Changing Face of Ecclesiology in the Church of England (London: Canterbury Press Norwich, 2008), cf.
https://freshexpressions.org.uk, accessed 23 February 2021. For a critique, see Andrew Davison and Alison
Milbank, For the Parish: A Critique of Fresh Expressions (London: SCM Press, 2010).
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can still recognise the liturgy when you are abroad because you recognise its universal struc-
ture.26 In one of the reform documents, which accompanied the 2008 trial liturgy, the ordo is
understood as the structure of the service, and it functions as the universal (or Catholic) element,
though it is understood principally in terms of our actions:
The universal level is represented by the term Ordo. The Latin word ordo means in the first place
order or structure, and refers to the structure shown in the section above.27 But in this context,
the word also acquires a wider meaning. It also stands for tradition or inheritance or that which is
handed over, ultimately for “the way in which it is common to celebrate a divine service”. Char-
acteristic of the ordo is also that the divine service is fundamentally seen as a series of acts that
the congregation does together, more than specific words or formulas. This is especially expressed
through the sacraments, Baptism and the Eucharist, but also the reading from Scripture, the sermon
and the prayers must be seen from the point of view of action. Together, the actions form a liturgy,
a word which directly translated from Greek means “the people’s work”. But saying that the divine
service is something people do alone is still not exhaustive of the divine service. It can also be seen
as a gift which creates a frame around the means of grace, i.e. the Word and the sacraments, where
God acts with us.28
Understood this way, the ordo becomes the equivalent of the four part structure of the liturgy, or
any similar structuring (the Gathering, the Word, the Eucharist, and the Dismissal),29 while the
work God is doing becomes a kind of ‘bonus,’ where He acts alongside us to ‘frame’ our actions.
26 UKM 07/08 Gudstenestereforma, 1-2. Of course, that is not always the case. In a contemporary CofE cele-
bration of Mass, for example, the Gloria is placed near the beginning, after the confessions and Kyrie (as is
also the case in CoN services), while in a traditional Anglican Mass, it is placed after the communion. See
The Book of Common Prayer, standard ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 259; Common
Worship: Services and Prayers for the Church of England (London: Church House, 2000, hereafter: CW ),
171; GDNK 2020, 157-162.
27 Earlier in the reform there was a five part part structure, while there is now a four part structure. See GDNK
2020; Gudsteneste for Den norske kyrkja (Stavanger: Eide, 2011); Liturgi – Bokmål, 8-9, 14-15.
28 Liturgi – Bokmål, 15 (my translation). Original text: “Det universelle nivået er representert ved begrepet
Ordo. Det latinske ordet ordo betyr i første omgang ordning eller struktur, og henviser til den strukturen som er
vist i avsnittet over. Men i denne sammenheng får ordet også en videre betydning. Det står også for tradisjon
eller arv eller overlevering, i siste hånd for “den måten det er vanlig å feire gudstjeneste på”. Karakteristisk
for ordo er også at gudstjenesten grunnleggende sett betraktes som en rekke handlinger som menigheten
gjør sammen, mer enn bestemte ord eller formularer. Dette kommer særlig til uttrykk i sakramentene, dåp
og nattverd, men også lesningen fra Skriften, prekenen og forbønnene må ses under synsvinkelen handling.
Til sammen danner handlingene en liturgi, et ord som direkte oversatt fra gresk betyr “folkets verk”. Det er
likevel ikke utfyllende å si at gudstjenesten er noe som folket alene gjør. Den kan også ses som en gave som
danner en ramme rundt nådemidlene, dvs. Ordet og sakramentene, hvor Gud handler med oss.”
29 GDNK 2020, 351-393.
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These actions, however, are seen as human first and foremost, as ‘the people’s work.’30 The
ordo, then, is not principally understood in theological terms, or in terms of our participation
in divine agency, but as an external structure which may be universal but is principally human
nonetheless. Its universality is understood principally with reference to the Church herself,
often reduced to a universality of place, and it is understood as an extrinsic formal principle
of unity, the ‘glue’ which helps ground local flexibility. This, however, is not usually what is
meant by ordo in liturgical theology. To explore this, I will engage Gordon W. Lathrop and
Alexander Schmemann.
For Lathrop, who is the most central figure to work on the ordo in Lutheran theology,31 the
key lies precisely in structure and relation. He understands it not just as the texts and rubrics
but “the presuppositions active behind such scheduling”:
Meaning occurs through structure, by one thing set next to another. The scheduling of the ordo, the
setting of one liturgical thing next to another in the shape of the liturgy, evokes and replicates the
deep structure of biblical language, the use of the old to say the new by means of juxtaposition.32
For Lathrop, the operative word is juxtaposition. The ordo is not just a collection of actions,
things, or people, but their relation. He presents different pairs of juxtapositions, for example
between the Seven Days and the Eight Day (the week and Sunday), producing a tension which
highlights creation and re-creation, death and resurrection, this world, as God’s good gift, and
the hope of the new heaven and the new earth.33 The ordo, then, emerges in these relations,
and provides the dynamic structure of the liturgy which drives the liturgical act. The acts of
God are juxtaposed with our everyday experiences and things, and through this, these things
30 See chapter five, pp.182-183.
31 Modéus, Menneskelig gudstjeneste, 96-103; Moore-Keish, “The Importance of Worship that Centers on the
Ordo.”
32 Lathrop, Holy Things, 33, cf. 33-83. Also see Gregory Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, 3rd ed. (London:
Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2005), esp. 36-140; Allen Cabaniss, Pattern in Early Christian Worship (Macon,
GA: Mercer University Press, 1989).
33 Lathrop, Holy Things, 36-53, 55-83, cf. Moore-Keish, “The Importance of Worship that Centers on the
Ordo,” 16.
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are given new meanings and become holy. Water or bread and wine, for example, become holy
when juxtaposed with the Word in Christ, as expressed through St. Augustine’s dictum, “the
word comes to the element and so there is a sacrament” (Lt. accedit verbum ad elementum,
et fit sacramentum).34 Lathrop understands the ordo not merely as the structure of this or that
rite but the deep structures of the Christian tradition. His approach, then, widens the context of
the liturgy, seeing it as universal or Catholic, as he can use the ordo as a tool to unite different
churches, traditions, and expressions. He widens the context beyond the local church, the dio-
cese, or the denomination, and he roots it in the acts of God. This approach is very useful if we
aim to understand how the words, gestures, acts, symbols, and people within a ritual tradition
relate and how these relate to God (and to equivalents in different ritual traditions).35
Schmemann, likewise, understands the ordo not principally as the texts themselves or the
simple order (such as the four part structure of the CoN liturgy), but the theological principle
and content which underlies the liturgical life. He understands the ordo in terms of a ‘liturgi-
cal dualism’ between the old and the new, not as separation but union and fulfilment. Early
Christian worship, notes Schmemann, “is a participation in the old cult and at the same time the
presence— from the very beginning— of the cult of the new.”36 This is not a dualism between
‘Hebrew’ and ‘non-Hebrew,’ but between the old rites and the new revelation in Christ. The
main structural element is Christ, who fulfils the old and brings in the new (2 Corinthians 5:17).
This, however, comes through renewal. Christ does not destroy these older rites but transforms
them. For Schmemann, the Christian ordo is the cult itself, not reduced to this or that particular
rite or external structure, but specifically as it is oriented towards Christ and His acts. All the
34 Quoted in Lathrop, Holy Things, 164, cf. 164-169.
35 Jan Terje Christoffersen, “På hvert et sted: Inn til kjernen av gudstjenestereformen” (Tidsskrift for Praktisk
Teologi 31:1, 2014), 4-15 (esp. 9-14); Morland, “Fritt og fast”; Dag Øivind Østereng, “Ordo og dens be-
tydning for den liturgiske agenda — en respons på liturgireformen i Dnk” (Lære og liv 1/2009), 18-26 (esp.
22-23), cf. Knut Alfsvåg, “Luthersk spiritualitet: Om lære og liv i den éne, kristne kirke” (Dansk Tidsskrift
for Teologi og Kirke 40:1, 2013), 42-56.
36 Schmemann, Introduction to Liturgical Theology, 47, cf. 45-51.
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elements of the liturgy find their meaning in relation to Him, or through participating in Him.
The cult, notes Schmemann, is the presence of Christ Himself, which provides the content of
the rule of prayer or the lex orandi.37 Schmemann concludes his article by noting that there
“is good reason to regard the principle of the Ordo, i.e. of that co-relation and conjunction of
the Eucharist with the liturgy of time in which we recognize the fundamental structure of the
Church’s prayer, as having existed from the very beginning in her ‘rule of prayer,’ as the real
principle of this rule.”38 The ordo, then, relates life to Christ, given to us in the Eucharist. In
this, we find echoes of Lathrop’s framework, but there is a crucial difference.
While Lathrop presents the liturgy in terms of a set of relations and juxtapositions,39 Schme-
mann emphasises the primordial relation to Christ. Although he does not treat the metaphysics
of the ordo in the text,40 his theology presupposes a participatory and ontological grounding.
He notes, elsewhere, that baptismal theology should focus on “ontological terms” and he holds
that “the fundamental Christian understanding of creation” should be understood “in terms of
its ontological sacramentality.”41 By emphasising the fundamental relation of Christ (in the
sacrament) and the world, and its rituals, he emphasises that these are suspended from their
transcendent source.42 This, however, is not merely juxtaposition. Whilst we, as human beings,
are, so to speak, juxtaposed to Christ or related to Him horizontally, as He is truly man, our most
fundamental relation to Christ is still vertical, as He is truly God. For Lathrop, however, in the
liturgy it is precisely the juxtapositions which produce meaning, as meaning “occurs through
37 Schmemann, Introduction to Liturgical Theology, 50-70, cf. chapters three and four, pp.106-118, 153-162.
38 Schmemann, Introduction to Liturgical Theology, 70.
39 Lathrop, Holy Things, 33-83.
40 Schmemann, Introduction to Liturgical Theology, 40-71.
41 Alexander Schmemann, For the Life of the World: Sacraments and Orthodoxy, 2nd ed. (Crestwood, NY:
SVS Press, 1997), 67, 129. Furthermore, as noted by David W. Fagerberg, Liturgy outside Liturgy: The
Liturgical Theology of Fr. Alexander Schmemann (Hong Kong: Chorabooks, 2018), 63-76, for Schmemann,
liturgy is the ontological condition for (theoretical) theology.
42 Cf. John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, eds., Radical Orthodoxy: A new theology (Lon-
don: Routledge, 1999), 1-20.
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structure, by one thing set next to another.”43 Following philosophical trends in late modern or
postmodern thought,44 Lathrop advocates for a structuralist (and consequentially immanentist)
philosophy. While this can be a fruitful way of discovering relations on a horizontal level, this
lacks a robust metaphysics of participation, whereby we relate vertically to God. It therefore
risks turning our participation into something extrinsic and imposed and/or making God into
just another (horizontal and immanentist) thing in the structure, albeit the most central one.45 I
argue that while the liturgical ordo is expressed in concrete rites and celebrations, and we can
discern certain universal (or Catholic) structures or patterns in worship, it is more than just an
extrinsic formal principle that helps us structure an otherwise flexible liturgy. It is our ritual
orientation to God, grounded in an analogical and participatory metaphysic, and particularly in
the incarnation (1 Corinthians 14:26-40). Through the hypostatic union, we are related to God
horizontally, through Christ as a human being, but our fundamental relation to Him remains
vertical (and analogical).46 And it is in the crossroads of these two points that we see that the
liturgical order is theurgic. As we saw in the introduction, inspired by Sacrosanctum Concilium
and Peter Struck, I define theurgy as “an act of the triune God for us, put into use by Christ as
the God-man, and the Church as His body, whose effect is to reconcile the world to God and
make humans capable of worship and service through participation in Him.”47 The divine act
43 Lathrop, Holy Things, 33.
44 We can see this particularly in coherentist approaches, where truth is understood in terms or relation and
structure. See Lorenz Bruno Puntel, Structure and Being: A Theoretical Framework for a Systematic Philos-
ophy, trans. and in collab. with Alan White (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press,
2008); Nicholas Rescher, Philosophical reasoning: A study in the methodology of philosophizing (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2001). Against this, we find foundationalism. See J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philo-
sophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic/InterVarsity Press,
2003), 110-129, 146-147.
45 Cf. Pickstock, After Writing, 47-166. Catherine Pickstock, Repetition and Identity (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2013), 33 sidesteps the discussion between coherentism and foundationalism by simply noting that
“if finite things imitate and participate in transcendent realities, there need be no finite original, and one finds,
in this world, a play of repetitions without original, where each variation is equally an original because it is
equally a copy.” This way we are not basing reality in either a foundational fact or in a relational structure,
which are both finite and immanent categories, but in subsistent and active being itself.
46 See chapters three and four, pp.106-118, 153-162.
47 Introduction, p.18, cf. SC, 7; Peter T. Struck, “Pagan andChristian Theurgies: Iamblichus, Pseudo-Dionysius,
Religion and Magic in Late Antiquity” (Ancient World 32:2, 2001), 30.
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is established by God and put into use by Christ, first and foremost, and only secondarily by the
Church, as His body (Romans 12:1-8; 1 Corinthians 12:12-31), participating in His act. In 1
Peter 2:5, we are called to “let [ourselves] be built into a spiritual house, to be a holy priesthood,
to offer spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God through Jesus Christ.” As Schmemann notes, the
ordo is first and foremost grounded in the revelation of Christ, and in His act. With him, then,
I see the ordo both as the ordering of the liturgy, the way in which it is celebrated, but also, and
more fundamentally, the orientation towards Christ, both horizontally and vertically. It is an
expression of, or a participation in, the life of God, in the God who is Himself order: “For God
is a God not of disorder but of peace” (1 Corinthians 14:33).
If we understand the ordo in this way, we are also provided with a way to problematise the
emphasis, in the reform, on human autonomy and creativity (especially when combined with
the emphasis on flexibility and local contextuality). If the ordo is merely an extrinsic formal
principle that helps structure an otherwise flexible liturgy, liturgy becomes a principal human
work, even if sanctioned by God. This was evident in the reform, which saw the ordo simply
as the surface structure, the ‘glue’ which helps ground local flexibility, while the content itself
is more flexible.48 Norwegian church historian Ole Fredrik Kullerud notes that if the ordo is
reduced in such a way, it turns Lutheran theology on its head.49 Defining the Church, Confessio
Augustana (hereafter: CA) states:
The church is the assembly of saints (Lt. congregatio sanctorum) inwhich the gospel is taught purely
and the sacraments are administered rightly. Ans it is enough for the true unity of the church to agree
concerning the teaching of the gospel and the administration of the sacraments. It is not necessary
that human traditions, rites, or ceremonies instituted by human beings be alike everywhere.50
48 In the 2011 liturgy, for example, the Offertory prayers had this rubric: “The offering may conclude with a
short prayer, for example this…” See Gudsteneste for Den norske kyrkja, 2.16 (my translation). Original
text: “Ofringa kan avsluttast med ei kort bøn, til dømes denne.” Here you do not find a large selection of
alternatives but practically endless ones, as the alternative is only put there as a suggestion.
49 Ole Fredrik Kullerud, “«Et godt sted å være for alle»: Forslaget til liturgisk reform i Dnk (2011-liturgien)”
(Lære og liv 1/2009), 29.
50 CA, VII. For notes on the Lutheran confessions, see abbreviations, p.5, n3. If not otherwise noted, quotations
from CA follow the translation of the Latin text.
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Kullerud argues that in the reform, the ordo represents the replacement of doctrinal with formal
unity, reduced to a ‘skeleton,’ to the now four part structure of the liturgy: the Gathering, the
Word, the Eucharist, and the Dismissal.51 If, however, the ordo is more than simply the com-
position of the liturgy but represents the deep structure of participatory relation and orientation
towards God, we must take into account what He has revealed to us when it comes to worship.
As I have argued, in Christian (as well as theurgic Neoplatonic) thought, truth is revealed and
discovered.52 If that is the case, liturgy must be rooted in revelation and in the divine act. Joseph
Ratzinger, for instance, notes that “Man himself cannot simply “make” worship,” that if “God
does not reveal himself, man is clutching empty space” and that “real liturgy implies that God
responds and reveals how we can worship him”:
In any form, liturgy includes some kind of “institution”. It cannot spring from imagination, our own
creativity—then it would remain just a cry in the dark or mere self-affirmation. Liturgy implies a
real relationship with Another, who reveals himself to us and gives our existence a new direction.53
The question, however, is how we understand revelation and how it expresses itself liturgically.
On one side we can find those who hold to a ‘liturgical eclecticism,’ where liturgical forms are
principally human expressions, though with divine sanction. As we will return to later, we can
find this, for example, in the emerging church or fresh expressions movements.54 On the other
side we find the Calvinist ‘regulative principle of worship,’ where nothing explicitly sanctioned
in Scripture is allowed in Christian worship.55 In this framework, the ordo becomes a rigid
51 GDNK 2020, 351-393.
52 Chapter three, p.112. See Knut Alfsvåg, “Gudsåpenbaring og virkelighetsforståelse: Kristen åpenbaring-
steologi i dag” (Dansk Tidsskrift for Teologi og Kirke 42:3, 2015), 204-206; Mark L. McPherran, “Socratic
Religion,” in The Cambridge Companion to Socrates, ed., Donald R. Morrison (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011), 111-137, esp. 122-127.
53 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 35-36, cf. 27-37. This notion of revealed religion or ritual is also central
to Iamblichean theurgy. See Iamblichus, De mysteriis, Greek and English, intro. and trans. Emma C. Clarke,
John M. Dillon, and Jackson P. Hershbell (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003, hereafter: DM),
I, 21; II, 11.
54 Croft, Mobsby, and Spellers, eds., Ancient Faith, Future Mission; Gladys Ganiel and Gerardo Marti, “The
Emerging Church Movement: A Sociological Assessment” (Currents in Theology and Mission 42:2, 2015),
105-112; Nelstrop and Percy, eds., Evaluating Fresh Expressions, cf. Davison and Milbank, For the Parish.
55 See John M. Frame, Worship in Spirit and Truth: A Refreshing Study of the Principles and Practices of
Biblical Worship (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1996).
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structure, misunderstanding the orientation towards God, who can be participated in numerous
ways. A Catholic notion of liturgy places itself in between, stating that liturgies will never (and
should not) be completely identical. Confessio Augustana notes that it is “not necessary that hu-
man traditions, rites, or ceremonies instituted by human beings be alike everywhere.”56 From
a Catholic perspective, God reveals Himself through liturgical acts, enacted in the Church.57
This is rooted in the divine act, in the being of God, and is therefore deeply theurgic. If we
understand liturgy as a concrete ritual participation in God, we must also remember that this
cannot be exhaustive, that it will remain analogical and non-identical. Commenting on divine
goodness, Thomas Aquinas notes that “since God’s goodness is infinite, it can be participated in
an infinite number of ways, and in other ways besides those in which it is participated by those
creatures which now are.”58 And since there are no real distinctions in God, this can also be
applied to our liturgical participation in the divine, which can equally take on numerous forms.
But even if we can participate in God in infinite ways, or rather that God may provide infinite
ways for Himself to be participated, by different species, He nevertheless governs the world
through the forms of each of these numerous beings.59 A metaphysical concept of the ordo,
as an orientation to God, expressing itself in concrete rituals, will, then, involve a great deal of
freedom but it does not involve chaos. Rather than advocating a modern notion of freedom from
restraint, a ‘freedom of indifference,’ this advocates a freedom towards God, flowing from this
participation, a ‘freedom for excellence.’60 Liturgy, then, is characterised by both revelation
56 CA, VII, cf. Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, 718-719.
57 Andrew Davison,Why Sacraments? (London: SPCK, 2013), 55-65; Schmemann, For the Life of the World,
117-151.
58 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles (hereafter: SCG) I, c.81:4. For notes on the Thomistic corpus, see
abbreviations, p.4, n1.
59 Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Power of God (Quaestiones Disputatae de potentia Dei, here-
after: De pot.), q.3, a.7; Thomas Aquinas, An Exposition of the On the Hebdomads of Boethius (Expositio
libri Boetii De ebdomadibus, hereafter: In De Hebd.), c.2, 70.
60 See Louise A. Mitchell, “Free to Be Human: Thomas Aquinas’s Discussion of Liberum Arbitrium” (New
Blackfriars 96:1061, 2015), 22-42.
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and tradition, but always in that order,61 i.e. by an orientation to God and His gifts and the
ways in which this manifests, communally, in different contexts and cultures. To use Aquinas’s
language, liturgy expresses both grace and nature, where the latter is transformed and perfected
by the former.62 It is rooted in revelation, but this revelation expressed itself in various ways in
creation, and particularly in our nature as human beings. Yes, as modern humans we may ex-
pect flexibility but at the same time the reform process made it clear that we also crave stability
(or perhaps catholicity). In 2011, for example, the CoN Church Council introduced nineteen
different musical settings by almost as many composers.63 In 2017, having tried them out, these
were reduced to five.64 Part of the reason for ‘tightening’ this and other areas was that many
people, valuing givenness, recognition and stability over flexibility and local contextuality, had
complained that the alternatives were too numerous, that some of the music was too complex
for congregational singing, and that they often could not recognise the service when visiting
different parishes.65 In practice, then, the ordo was not just an extrinsic formal principle, struc-
turing an otherwise flexible liturgy but a theological principle, actually informing the content
of the liturgy, orienting it towards its source. And on the theurgic understanding of liturgy that I
have argued for, this is how the ordo should be understood. Now, having argued that the reform
has a problematic understanding of the ordo, I turn to the values of flexibility and involvement,
arguing that these envision an overly activistic conception of human agency.
61 Østereng, “Ordo og dens betydning for den liturgiske agenda,” 19-21.
62 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (hereafter: ST) I, q.1, a.8, ad 2.
63 Liturgisk musikk for den norske kirke (Stavanger: Eide, 2011).
64 KR 47/18 Presentasjon av høringen av saken Justering av hovedgudstjenesten og alminnelige bestemmelser,
attachment to 47/18 Hovedgudstjenesten by the Church of Norway Church Council (Oslo: Kyrkjerådet,
2018), 11.
65 KR 47/18 Presentasjon av høringen, 2, 9-26, cf. Morland, “Fritt og fast”; Raddum, Variety, 24, 42-45.
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3 Flexibility, involvement, and agency
In some of the earlier documents in the reform, the CoN Youth Synod states that we must make
sure that “the whole congregation participates actively in the Divine Service,”66 and it calls for
“a simpler order, something which can in itself serve as a means to increase the understanding
of the order and the content of the Divine Service.”67 This echoes Sacrosanctum Concilium’s
calls for “fully conscious, and active participation in liturgical celebrations,” something which
is the “right and duty” of the people of God “by reason of their baptism,”68 and for rites “distin-
guished by a noble simplicity” that are “short, clear, and unencumbered by useless repetitions”
and which “should be within the people’s powers of comprehension, and normally should not
require much explanation.”69 Underneath these texts, we find not only the noble idea of lay
empowerment, which often resulted in a clericalisation of the laity, but the idea that liturgy,
perhaps particularly worship, is a human work which we can understand. And this became even
clearer in later documents, especially in the presentation of the ordo which I cited above. The
document states that “the divine service is fundamentally seen as a series of acts that the congre-
gation does together, more than specific words or formulas,” that this is “especially expressed
through the sacraments, Baptism and the Eucharist,” but that “the reading from Scripture, the
sermon and the prayers must [also] be seen from the point of view of action,” and that these
actions, together “form a liturgy, a word which directly translated from Greek means ”the peo-
ple’s work”.”70 Liturgical participation, then, is principally understood in activistic terms, with
particular focus on external and concrete involvement.
We see this particularly in the first two of three ‘core values’: flexibility and involvement.71
66 UKM 01/01 Menighetsfellesskap, 1 (my translation). See n12 above (p.202).
67 UKM 05/03 Hva slags gudstjeneste vil vi ha, 2 (my translation). See n14 above (p.202).
68 SC, 14, cf. 11, 19, 21, 27, 30, 41, 50, 79, 113-114, 121, 124.
69 SC, 34, cf. 21, 50, 59, 66, 79, 90, 92, 117.
70 Liturgi – Bokmål, 15 (my translation), see n28 above (p.207).
71 UKM 07/08 Gudstenestereforma, 1-3; UKM 07/14 Innspill til evaluering av gudstjenestereformen.
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These categories, which are sociological rather than theological or metaphysical, emphasise
human action first and foremost. They are there to ensure the involvement of the people as a
whole by creating a larger ‘pool’ of alternatives to choose from and by facilitating the external
involvement of as many people as possible in the liturgical act, both as members of the con-
gregation but also as assistants who may, for example, serve as ushers,72 carry the processional
cross, read texts, collect money, or carry the gifts in the offertory. These values highlight how
the reforms present the nature of liturgical participation and it is understood principally through
the prism of practical involvement of as many people as possible in the liturgical act and in a
way that is fully graspable for those involved. In this framework, the sacramental rituals are
seen as acts that we do, rather than divine acts which we are made partakers of. And though the
sacraments themselves are still seen as divine gifts, this concept is added almost as a kind of
‘bonus,’ as noted above, where God acts alongside us to ‘frame’ our actions.73 The sacramental
gifts, then, i.e. the body and blood of Christ or the salvation given in Baptism, stands along-
side our human ritual actions, framing them. Perhaps we are back to Lathrop’s position, where
our acts and God’s are juxtaposed and the former received meaning through this juxtaposition.
Furthermore, as noted, because of this position, the word ‘liturgy’ is again seen as ‘a work done
by the people’ and not ‘a work done for the people’ which nonetheless creates the condition of
there being any ‘work by the people’ in the first place.74
This activistic notion of participation is not exclusive to the CoN reform, however. In Sacro-
sanctum Concilium, while this is rooted in the act of Christ,75 the main focus is still on the way
in which people can be involved, practically, in the rites: “To promote active participation,
72 In CoN, these are often called ‘Church hosts’ (No. kyrkjevertar or kirkeverter).
73 “But saying that the divine service is something people do alone is still not exhaustive of the divine service. It
can also be seen as a gift which creates a frame around the means of grace, i.e. the Word and the sacraments,
where God acts with us” (Liturgi – Bokmål, 15, my translation). See n28 above (p.207).
74 See chapter five, pp.182-183.
75 SC, 7.
217
the people should be encouraged to take part by means of acclamations, responses, psalmody,
antiphons, and songs, as well as by actions, gestures, and bodily attitudes. And at the proper
times all should observe a reverent silence.”76 And for some, this is understood in principally
external and practical terms. Anscar J. Chupungco, who is a central actor in the liturgical work
of RCC,77 notes that some, following the Constitution “envisioned a type of Roman liturgy
that would encourage active participation” and that to “this end it was felt that the rites had
to be simplified so that they could be easily understood.”78 Later, citing the Constitution, he
notes that “intelligent, active, and easy participation by the faithful is the “primary criterion”
to be observed when revising the rites of sacramentals.”79 And when the Constitution states
that in order for the Church to “promote active participation, the people should be encouraged
to take part by means of acclamations, responses, psalmody, antiphons, and songs, as well as
by actions, gestures, and bodily attitudes,”80 Chupungco envisions this active participation as
external, stating that it “consists principally of such external activities,” and that “[t]he Latin
substantive actuositas, adjective actuosus, and adverb actuose refer primarily to external action
done with energy, though of course they do not exclude inner disposition.”81 For Chupungco,
and others, participatio actuosa is first and foremost a practical notion, concerned primarily
with human activity, focusing on the various ritual acclamations, responses, gestures, ‘players,’
etc. He defines ‘active’ to mean primarily being externally and practically involved in the con-
crete liturgical act, principally outwardly but also inwardly.82 Someone like Chupungco would
76 SC, 30.
77 Peter C. Phan, “Liturgical Inculturation: Unity in Diversity in the Postmodern Age,” in Liturgy in a Post-
modern World, ed., Keith Pecklers (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark/Continuum, 2003), 55-86 (esp. 75-79),
cf. Anscar J. Chupungco, Cultural Adaptation of the Liturgy (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1982); Anscar
J. Chupungco, ed., Handbook for Liturgical Studies, 5 vols. (Pueblo Books. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical
Press, 1997-2000).
78 Chupungco, “The Vision of the Constitution on the Liturgy,” 262, cf. SC, 34. Also see Reid, “After Sacro-
sanctum Concilium”, 307-310.
79 Chupungco, “The Vision of the Constitution on the Liturgy,” 266, cf. SC, 79.
80 SC, 30.
81 Chupungco, “The Vision of the Constitution on the Liturgy,” 267.
82 Chupungco, “The Vision of the Constitution on the Liturgy,” 266–267, cf. SC, 14, 30, 79. It should be noted,
though, that Chupungco, interpreting participation principally as external involvement, seems, to distinguish
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not, of course, disagree with the fact that we participate in God through the liturgy, as this is
central to the Constitution,83 but his focal point is different from those who principally emphasis
this metaphysical interpretation. Ratzinger, for example, agrees with Chupungco about what
happened during the implementation of SC, but he sees it as problematic, noting that the term
‘active participation’ was “very quickly misunderstood to mean something external, entailing a
need for general activity, as if as many people as possible, as often as possible, should be visibly
engaged in action.”84 For him, liturgy is always first the work of God.
Likewise, this activistic notion of participation can be found in the CofE, as we see from one
of the documents from the Liturgical Commission: “Words are not only spoken in worship, they
are embodied, through posture, symbols, and ritual actions. Through a faithful participation in
worship, Christ seeks to ‘dwell in us’ that the worshippers themselves may ‘present their bodies
as a living sacrifice’ (Romans 12.1).”85 Here, worship is seen principally within an activistic
framework. The Commission, it seems, says that Christ’s indwelling, which allows for further
action, is not the cause of our “faithful participation in worship,” embodied in ritual, but its
result. It is true that we are made one with Christ in Baptism, in a liturgical act. But in Catholic
theology, this act is primarily an act of God. By being baptised into Christ, St. Paul notes, we are
baptised into His death and are raised with Him, by the power of God.86 And by using the word
‘worship,’ the Commission is very close to turning Christ’s indwelling in us into something we
instigate. Rephrased to indicate that our worship follows fromChrist’s indwelling (cf. Galatians
2:19-20), this could be seen as similar to Aquinas’s middle voiced notion of repentance, where
God gives everyone ‘sufficient grace’ (“convert me”) that can, by their free conversion, become
between this and our inner dispositions, while I would argue that both are consequences of our fundamental
participation in God through Christ.
83 SC, 7.
84 Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 185, cf. 185-191; Ratzinger, Theology of the Liturgy, 541-568, 574-594;
Schuler, “Participation.”
85 Transforming Worship, 2.6, cf. 2.6-7, 2.15, 2.20, 3.5, 5.6.1, 6.9.2, 6.10.
86 Romans 6, cf. Davison, Why Sacraments?, 1-14; Harald Hegstad, Dåpen: En nådens kilde (Oslo: Verbum
akademisk, 2019), 38-45, 51-90.
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‘efficient grace’ (“God lets me convert myself towards Him”).87 But where Aquinas is very
careful to point out that this only comes to be because we participate in God and receive His
grace,88 the Commission seems to presuppose this knowledge, and therefore it ends up creating
the assumption that we facilitate the presence of Christ in us, which in turn allows for further
action. It is, however, the other way around. Because of Christ’s indwelling, given to us as a
gift, we are oriented towards God in Christ. Any ‘faithful participation’ that we do follows from
this, it does not produce it. We participate in the divine act, the theurgy, through Christ, and
only then can we act. To point again to my definition of theurgy,89 the liturgy is a divine act put
into use by Christ and by the Church, through participation in Him, which reconciles the world
to God and makes us capable of worship and service. As Christ notes: “I am the vine, you are
the branches. Those who abide in me and I in them bear much fruit, because apart from me
you can do nothing” (John 15:5). The focus, therefore, must first be on the divine act, without
which everything else would be null. We can only offer worship by first participating in this
act.
This metaphysical notion of participation, however, is downplayed (and at times missing) in
the reforms. Yes, an argument can bemade that reforms documents need to be read contextually,
in light of the overall theology of the Church in question. And while that is true, I do not
think that we should assume the religious literacy required to interpret such texts correctly. By
emphasising what we should do, and obscuring the gifted nature of the liturgy, especially the
sacraments, we end upmisrepresenting the nature of the liturgy, treating it as a human act that we
are capable of doing on our own. What is lacking is an analogical and participatory perspective,
emphasising the divine act primarily and the the congregation’s participation in (or orientation
87 ST I-II, q.109, a.6, ad 1, cf. Rudi A. te Velde, ““Partnership with God”: Thomas Aquinas on Human Desire
and God’s Grace” (Nova et vetera 15:4, 2017), 1174, n38. See chapter one, pp.52-54.
88 ST I-II, q.109; q.112, cf. De pot., q.3, a.7.
89 Introduction, p.18, cf. Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 30; SC, 7.
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towards) this act secondarily. To explore this further, I will engage Catherine Pickstock’s notion
of the impossibility of liturgy.
Pickstock notes that liturgy is only possible if we participate in Christ, that even then it
still reminds us that it is impossible, but that this perspective is lacking in many of the modern
reforms, which tend to smooth out the liturgies in order tomake themmore ‘understandable’ and
‘doable.’90 They do so by flattening out the staccato like performance which is typical of older
rites. These are full of beginnings and re-beginnings, non-identical repetitions, and ‘liturgical
stammer,’ which help remind us that we cannot fully grasp or do liturgy. In a Norwegian liturgy
from 17th century, for example, the Lord’s prayer was prayed four different times, while in the
current liturgy of CoN it is said that if there is both Baptism and a celebration of the Eucharist,
the prayer may be omitted from the former.91 And in the older Roman rite and the Eastern
liturgies repetitions abound.92 Pickstock notes that these repetitions, which aim to dispossess
us, remind us that liturgy is not principally our work:
In the Roman Rite … the worshipping “I” is both designated and realized by self-dispossessing
acts of doxological impersonation which displace any sense of enclosed autonomy in the subject
in favour of that which is impersonated. However, this does not result in a radically discontinuous
subject, but rather intensifies his continuity, by revealing the zenith of differential continuity to
reside in God.93
We can only do liturgy by entering into something and ‘impersonate’ God (and the Angels).
When we praise, when we offer “faithful participation in worship,” embodied in ritual, to quote
90 Pickstock, After Writing, 170-176, cf. Catherine Pickstock, “A Short Essay on the Reform of the Liturgy”
(New Blackfriars 78:912, 1997), 56-65. Also see Nathan Mitchell, Real Presence: The Work of Eucharist,
new and expanded ed. (Chicago, IL: Liturgy Training Publications, 2001), 135-138; David Torevell, Losing
the Sacred: Ritual, Modernity, and Liturgical Reform (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 146-169.
91 Kirkeritualet 1685, the Church of Norway liturgy from 1685, found at Oddvar Johan Jensen, ed. Kirkens
liturgi (Bergen: NLA Høgskolen), cf. GDNK 2020, 270.
92 See The Divine Liturgy of our Father among the Saints John Chrysostom, English and Greek (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1995); Messeboken – Missale Romanum, Latin and Norwegian (Oslo: Oslo katolske
bispedømme, 1961);Missale Romanum, Editio Typica (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1962).
93 Pickstock, After Writing, 208, cf. 180-192, 208-213; Mitchell, Real Presence, 142-144. Also see Jose Isidro
Belleza, Lex Loquendi, Lex Orandi: Pickstock, Aquinas, and the Reform of the Roman Offertoria (Master’s
Thesis, the University of Berkeley, 2019).
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the CofE Liturgical Commission,94 this is only possible because this worship participates in
God, as all we do is rooted in Him (Acts 17:28). As Pickstock notes: “The human being is in
the image of God as God’s worshipper, a sharer in his Trinitarian self-praise.”95 In an age of
self-help and self-discovery, what we need is not a liturgy expressed throughwhat are essentially
Christianised neo-capitalistic slogans (flexibility, involvement, and localised contextuality).96
We need a liturgy in which we are reminded that the praise which we offer God is, ultimately,
God’s gift to us, as we express in one of the Offertory prayers: “Eternal God, yours is the earth
and all that is in it. Everything we have belongs to you. Of your own, we return to you. Receive
us and our gifts in Jesus’s name. Amen.”97 Before God, we always remain receivers and He
will always remain the one who gives, as St. Paul notes (1 Corinthians 4:7): “For who sees
anything different in you? What do you have that you did not receive? And if you received
it, why do you boast as if it were not a gift?” It is a participation in the divine act through
Christ, the ultimate act of theurgy, which is established by the divine and participated in and
re-enacted in the Church. The liturgy we participate in, however actively, is principally a divine
act and our involvement is only possible because we are initiated into it and made capable for it.
To rephrase the CofE the document from the Liturgical Commission,98 we can say that because
Christ ‘dwells in us,’ we, as worshippers, may ‘present our bodies as a living sacrifice’ (Romans
12:1) and offer a faithful participation in worship. Andwhat is interesting here is that, regardless
of the express goals of the CoN reform, the liturgy itself, following the classic structure of the
94 Transforming Worship, 2.6.
95 Catherine Pickstock, “Ritual. An introduction” (International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 79:3,
2018), 220.
96 Njå, “Messen som Guds nåde og Kirkens takksigelse,” 196-201.
97 GDNK 2020, 171 (my translation). Original text: “Evige Gud, di er jorda og det som fyller henne. Alt vi
eig høyrer deg til. Av ditt eige gjev vi deg attende. Ta imot oss og gåvene våre i Jesu namn. Amen.” This is
based partly on Psalm 24:1. Compare this to the prayer in CW, 291 (which is based partly on 1 Chronicles
29:11): “Yours, Lord, is the greatness, the power, the glory, the splendour, and the majesty; for everything in
heaven and on earth is yours. All things come from you, and of your own do we give you.”
98 Transforming Worship, 2.6.
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Western liturgical tradition, counteracts a principal focus on human agency.99 We start off by
a kind of ‘impersonation’ (“in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit”),100 we
confess our sins and our weakness, sing the Kyrie and join in not in our own hymn of praise but
that of the angels, confess our faith in God as Creator, redeemer, and sanctifier, pray, offer back
to God from the things he has given us, receive back the offering of Christ for our blessing,
give thanks, commune with God, and with our fellow believers, through the sacred meal, are
blessed, and are sent out to witness to God as Lord. The liturgy argues against a principally
cultural and anthropological understanding of its character by consistently pointing to God and
Christ as its source and its principal agent (or the ‘master theurgist’).101 And such a Christian
theurgic perspective on liturgy, where the focus is first and foremost on God as actor, and not
on us, as either ‘performers’ or ‘students,’ has important implications for how the Church meets
(and integrates) people in worship, perhaps particularly people with disabilities.
While modern reforms tend to turn the divine mysteries in the liturgy into solvable riddles
which often presuppose a certain level of intellectual life,102 and sees the ideal worshipper as an
‘able-bodied’ person who ‘actively’ participates in liturgy through words, gestures, actions,103
a properly Christian theurgic perspective, informs us that while these elements, both the intel-
lective and the active, are important, the central import of the liturgy is the presence of God and
His gift of participation.104 When we participate in the liturgy, the primary point should not be
99 GDNK 2020, 154-192.
100 Pickstock, After Writing, 183-184, 203-213.
101 Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 31-33, 37-38, cf. chapter four, pp.140-146.
102 We see this particularly in the idea that the liturgies should be simplified to make them understandable (SC,
34; UKM 05/03 Hva slags gudstjeneste vil vi ha, 2). This obscures the fact that liturgy, being an orienta-
tion towards God Himself, cannot be fully comprehendible. This can also be found, as I have noted in the
introduction and in chapter three, pp.15, 115-116, in Pagan notions of theurgy, where distinctions are made
between ‘the theurgists’ and ‘the herd’ or ‘the mass of men.’ See Ruth Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles:
Text, Translation, and Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 1989, hereafter: TCO), frag. 153-154, 194, cf. pp.20,
198, 212; DM V, 18. For notes on the Chaldean Oracles, see abbreviations, p.5, n5.
103 Njå, “Messen som Guds nåde og Kirkens takksigelse,” 196-201.
104 For some perspectives on disability and the problem of ableism in liturgy and theology, see Inger Marie Lid
and Anna Rebecca Solevåg, eds. Religiøst medborgerskap: Funksjonshemming, likeverd og menneskesyn
(Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk, 2020), especially the chapter by Therese Marie Ignacio Bjørnaas,
“Imago Dei og kroppsliggjort væren: En funksjonshemmingsteologi i lys av Thomas Aquinas,” pp.269-286.
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our level of ‘understanding’ or ‘contribution,’ although these things are not unimportant, but
that we are made partakers of the divine act and of God Himself. While a Wiccan or a Buddhist
may be able to say the words of the liturgy and extrinsically perform its acts or gestures, this
does not constitute ‘active participation,’ grounded in Baptism. But a baptised Christian who
cannot do any of the acts or gestures, may still be actively participating in the liturgy, precisely
through his baptismal character.105 How participation manifests itself in life and in liturgy (how
a person imitates God, be it through singing, praying, reading, contemplating, or a myriad of
other things) is not unimportant but it is always secondary to that person’s participation in or
incorporation into Christ. A Christian theurgic perspective on the liturgy helps us to keep a cor-
rect balance between these things and it focuses on the one thing needed; on Christ, our Saviour
and Lord, and not on how ‘able’ we are to worship Him. In fact, this perspective tells us that
outside Him, we are not able to worship at all. Now, having argued that the reform espouses
an overly activistic notion of participation, I turn to the value of contextuality, arguing that this
envisions an overly local conception of communion.
4 Contextuality and communion
Where the first two of the core values of the CoN reform (flexibility and involvement) concern
the act of liturgy itself, by creating a larger ‘pool’ of alternatives to choose from and by facil-
itating the external involvement of as many people as possible in the liturgical act, the third,
localised contextuality, concerns the local place in which this manifests. The word, which in
Norwegian is stadeigengjering or stedegengjøring, was introduced as the equivalent of ‘contex-
These are all written in Norwegian but they have English abstracts. For some suggestions of involvement
of people with disabilities in the liturgy, see two books (in Norwegian) by Rune Rasmussen; Bønn med alle
sanser: Bønnestasjoner til bruk i trosopplæring, gudstjeneste og smågrupper (Oslo: IKO-forlaget, 2010)
and Se, smak og kjenn! Tilrettelagt konfirmantopplegg med bakgrunns- og metodestoff (Oslo: IKO-forlaget,
2006).
105 Schuler, “Participation,” 8.
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tualisation.’106 But unlike ‘contextualisation,’ which is applicable to multiple different circum-
stances (private, public, local, regional, national, denominational, or universal, to name a few),
the Norwegian term is decisively local. Stad means ‘place,’ while eigengjering means to make
something your own. To contextualise the liturgy in this sense, then, is to treat it as a principally
local and congregational phenomenon. And when combined with the value of flexibility, this
indicates much variation from congregation to congregation or even within congregations.107
In some ways, this may be a Norwegian version of the fresh expressions movement, though
with a more local and parochial ‘flavour.’108 While some of this predates the reform (and said
movement), we have seen an increase in ‘seeker friendly’ or ‘seeker-sensitive’ services,109 to
use language more common in evangelical circles.110 What was new in the reform, however,
was that it envisioned that each parish should have its own distinct liturgy, within the confines
of the official texts, with all its variants. Each parish, then, could be its own ‘fresh expression,’
though rooted in the place, rather than in a shared interest. And while I think this is better than
fresh expressions, as it emphasises the importance of the parish,111 such localisation still has
106 KR 10/04 Reform av Høymessen, 9-10.
107 Raddum, Variety, esp. 24-29, 42-45.
108 Croft, Mobsby, and Spellers, eds., Ancient Faith, Future Mission; Nelstrop and Percy, eds., Evaluating Fresh
Expressions. Part of the reason for its local and parochial ‘flavour’ is that the Norwegian unity culture is
still relatively strong but also because in many places the local CoN parish is the only Christian congre-
gation (or even the only religious community), as CoN still counts about 69% of the population as mem-
bers. See the website of the central bureau of statistics, Statistics Norway (https://www.ssb.no/en/kultur-og-
fritid/statistikker/kirke_kostra, accessed 8 March 2021). And even though surveys indicate that about 25%
of Norwegians identify as non-religious, many of these are still members of the Church, and still attend their
local churches for reasons of tradition. See Atle Christiansen, “Most non-religious Norwegians are mem-
bers of the Church of Norway” (University of Agder News, 22 August 2018); Sivert Skålvoll Urstad, “The
Religiously Unaffiliated in Norway” (Nordic Journal of Religion and Society 30:1, 2017), 61-81.
109 Examples can be ‘Young Mass’ (no. ung messe), youth services aimed specifically at youth under 18, often
those who are getting confirmed, Thomas Mass (no. Tomasmesse), where the target audience are young
people and particularly those with doubts, or aMass were you invite those who were confirmed 40+ years ago
(No. konfirmantjubileum). See Gudstenestebok, II, 84 (cf. 71-84); Ung messe: Håndbok med melodihefte
for menigheten (Oslo: Verbum, 1997). The tradition of the ‘Thomas Mass’ started in Finland and while it
is connected to St. Thomas the Apostle, and his doubt, it is not connected directly with his feast day, which
bears the same name. See https://www.tuomasmessu.fi/english/, accessed 22 February 2021.
110 For an example of this in an evangelical context, see Ed Dobson, Starting a Seeker Sensitive Service: How
Traditional Churches Can Reach The Unchurched (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1993). For a partly critical
take, see Matthew Wade, “Seeker-friendly: The Hillsong megachurch as an enchanting total institution”
(Journal of Sociology 52:4, 2016), 661-676.
111 For arguments, see Davison and Milbank, For the Parish, 41-223, esp. 64-92, 144-223.
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serious implications for our understanding of communion. And to argue this, I will take as my
starting point 1 Corinthians 10:16-17:
The cup of blessing that we bless, is it not a sharing in the blood of Christ? The bread that we break,
is it not a sharing in the body of Christ? Because there is one bread, we who are many are one body,
for we all partake of the one bread.
In this passage we find two central terms, ‘sharing’ (Gk. koinōnía) and ‘partake’ (Gk. metechō).
These terms are connected, as partaking or participation (metechō ormethexis) indicates a shar-
ing in something universal.112 There is a difference, however, as koinōnía and its cognates
give explicit expression to the communal aspect of participation.113 We can see this when St.
Paul uses the word to denote a ‘contribution’ (or better, a gift) from one Christian community
to another (Romans 15:26; 2 Corinthians 9:13). According to him, our interpersonal ecclesial
communion comes through the sacrament, i.e. through Christ. The Church, partaking of the
body of Christ in the sacrament, is thereby established as a community, as a body (1 Corinthians
10:16-17; 1 Corinthians 12:12-31).114 But how should we understand this? And what can this
tell us about the picture of communion envisioned in the CoN reform? What is the relation
112 In De Hebd., c.2, 70, cf. Rudi A. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill,
1995), 11; John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated
Being (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 96. This, however, does not
mean that we exhaust that which we partake of. See ST I, q.75, a.5, ad 4: “Now participated existence is
limited by the capacity of the participator.” Whilemethexis is a cognate ofmetechō, and is central in Platonic
thought, it is not used in the New Testament.
113 Walter Bauer, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, 3rd ed.,
rev. and ed., Frederick William Danker (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 552-554, 642-643.
Metechō and its cognates occur fifteen times in the New Testament, while koinōnía and its cognates occur 42
times.
114 See chapter three, pp.121-123, for Pickstock’s arguments in favour of a eucharistic ecclesiology which up-
holds a connection between Christ’s historical body, the sacramental body, and the ecclesial body which
are, in a mysterious way, one, without collapsing into each other. See Pickstock, After Writing, 158-166,
259-261, cf. Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009), 242-287; Hans Boersma, “Sacramental Ontology: Nature and the Super-
natural in the Ecclesiology of Henri de Lubac” (New Blackfriars 88:1015, 2007), 242-273; Henri de Lubac,
Corpus Mysticum: The Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages, 2nd ed., trans. Gemma Simmonds with
Richard Price and Christopher Stephens (London: SCM Press, 2006), esp. 13-119, 248-262; Simon Oliver,
“Henri de Lubac and Radical Orthodoxy,” in T&T Clark Companion to Henri de Lubac, ed., Jordan Hillebert
(London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017), 393-418; Gemma Simmonds, “The Mystical Body: Ecclesiology
and Sacramental Theology,” in T&T Clark Companion to Henri de Lubac, ed., Hillebert, 159-179.
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between the parts, between the communion, koinōnía, and the individual, and between locality
and universality?
On an etymological level, an individual indicates being a basic member of a class of beings
which is, in some way, indivisible. And individual has its own existence and can, if sentient,
act independently.115 We find this, to a certain extent, in Aquinas. For him, the central term
is suppositum, a concrete essence which subsists in being, underlies the changes, and is the
subject of its acts.116 Aquinas notes, in De potentia Dei, that “the supposit (Lt. suppositum) has
a nature, for instance, a man has human nature: for the nature is not beside the essence of the
haver, indeed it is his essence: thus Socrates is truly that which is a man.”117 The suppositum is
the individual substance or the subject. And in the case of rational creatures, notes Aquinas, this
entails personhood, as a person is “an individual substance of a rational nature” (Lt. rationalis
naturae individua substantia).118 By these termswemight get the sense that Aquinas’s emphasis
is on individuality, on the suppositum, being undivided, existing in itself. In one sense, that is
true. Although created things have their being and operations by participation, this is still real.
As AndrewDavison notes, it is ‘derived solidity.’119 What we see in Aquinas is that even though
he affirms a broadly Aristotelian emphasis on substantiality, he still understands this within a
participatory framework.120 As we see from his discussion of love and particularly self-love,
Aquinas sees this substantiality in relational and participatory terms.121 A human being can
love himself out of charity because he is “one with himself which is more than being united to
another.”122 Note that individuality is here expressed in relational terms. For Aquinas, persons
115 See ‘individual, adj. and n.,’ in Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
116 te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 201-202; ST I, q.29, a.2, corp., cf. chapters one and four, pp.35-36,
140-146.
117 De pot., q.2, a.1, ad 2, cf. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 202-203.
118 ST I, q.29, a.1.
119 Andrew Davison, Participation in God: A Study in Christian Doctrine and Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2019), 65-83.
120 te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, esp. x-xiv, 3-83.
121 ST I-II, qq.26-28; II-II, qq.23-27.
122 ST II-II, q.25, a. 4, corp.
227
are what they are because they relate, not just to others but to themselves.123 The suppositum,
then, which underlies the common nature and has a degree of self existence, is still essentially
relational. When we analyse the word person, we see that while it denotes individuality, as we
see from the Greek hypóstasis, which indicates individuality or substance (‘that which stands
under’), it is also intersubjective. To be a person is not to be absorbed into something else and be
‘cancelled out,’ but equally it is not isolating. The Latin persona, as well as its Greek equivalent
prósōpon, which both mean ‘face’ or ‘countenance,’ indicate communion and relationality. In
ancient Greco-Roman society, they were also used for the masks of actors through which they
spoke, and thus conveyed communion or relation. An actor would ‘don a persona,’ and act out
his role. So, while personhood is individual, it is only fulfilled in communion.124
How is this grounded, however? My argument is that this follows from our relation to
God, in two ways. First, while we are, of course, more fundamentally related to ourselves on
a creaturely (and horizontal) level, as we are more fully united with ourselves, we are more
fundamentally related to God, as we only exist through this relation. As He is the one who
keeps us, our very personhood, and everything else, in existence, our analogical relation to
Him is more fundamental than our substantiality. Our being, therefore, is relational before it
is substantial. Whilst we are individuals, we are so only through participation in Him, which
indicates that our individuality, while having its own integrity, is derived or participated.125
123 For a thorough treatment, see Anthony T. Flood, “Love of Self as the condition for a Gift of Self in Aquinas”
(Studia Gilsoniana 7:3, 2018), 419-435.
124 See Eugene Webb, “The Hermeneutic of Greek Trinitarianism: An Approach Through Intentionality Anal-
ysis,” in Religion in Context: Recent Studies in Lonergan, eds., Timothy P. Fallon and Philip Boo Riley
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988), 141-158, cf. Else K. Holt, “The Prophet as Persona,”
in The Oxford Handbook of the Prophets, ed., Carolyn J. Sharp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016),
300-302. In Norwegian, we have an equivalent of this; framtoning. It means ‘appearance’ or ‘presentation’
(the way you present yourself) but is constructed from the verb tone (‘to sound’) and the adverb fram (‘for-
ward, forth’), and literally means ‘to sound forth’ (i.e. to communicate). For discussions of the liturgical
self, see James G. Leachman, ed. The Liturgical Subject: Subject, Subjectivity and the Human Person in
Contemporary Discussion and Critique (London: SCM Press, 2008).
125 W. Norris Clarke, “Person, Being, and St. Thomas” (Communio 19, 1992), 601-618; Davison, Participation
in God, 65-83; Milbank, Pickstock, and Ward, eds., Radical Orthodoxy, 1-20; Adrian Pabst, Metaphysics:
The Creation of Hierarchy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), 5-53.
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Secondly, as the God in whom we participate, and in whose image we are created, is triune, we
are created for community and relationality,126 the telos of which is communion with God in
Christ. “The consummation of creaturely existence, to participate in God,” writes Davison, “is
to participate (in a creaturely way) in the Trinitarian Persons’ own participation in one another.
If that sounds complicated, the point is simply this: God is relational, and God draws us into
this relationship.”127 Our very being is first and foremost rooted in our participation, methexis,
in the Triune God but is also made complete in our communion with him. Our focus should
not first be on the individual worshipper but on the divine work, His theurgy, which draws us
in and establishes our liturgical selves, through participation.
As beings in the image of God, we are created for communion and created within a commu-
nity. Though individuality is central for Christianity, because God knows, meets, and re-creates
us as individuals,128 this does not propose individualism, as we are created for fellowship and
find fulfilment by relating outwards, not just to God, but to other human beings and to cre-
ation as a whole. And, as I have argued,129 this finds its central expression in the Eucharist
(1 Corinthians 10:16-17). But while locality is central here, because the Church is constituted
in the liturgical celebration,130 this does not propose congregationalism. When we quote 1
Corinthians 10:17 in the liturgy, saying that “[t]hough we are many, we are one body, because
126 It is important, though, to understand this analogically and not to read too much of this human interper-
sonality back into God, as if the divine persons were united in the same way that creatures are. See Karen
Kilby, “Perichoresis and Projection: Problems with Social Doctrines of the Trinity” (New Blackfriars 81:957,
2000), 432-445; Simon Oliver, “The Holy Trinity and the Liturgical Subject,” in The Liturgical Subject, ed.
Leachman, 229-240.
127 Davison, Participation in God, 129, 130, cf. 126-130. Davison notes that this is properly the work of the
Holy Spirit. Aquinas makes a distinction between our fundamental participation in God, as creatures (ST I,
qq.44-45), and our friendship with God, through Christ, which grants a participation in the divine nature, as
we see in 2 Peter 1:4 (ST I-II, q.112, a.1). See te Velde, “Partnership with God,” 1153-1158.
128 Exodus 33:12-17; Psalm 39; Jeremiah 1:4-8; John 10:14-18; 10:27; 1 Corinthians 8:3; 1 Corinthians 13:12;
Galatians 4:9; 2 Timothy 2:19; Revelation 2:17.
129 See chapter five, pp.188-196.
130 CA, VII, cf. Aidan Nichols, The Thought of Pope Benedict XVI: An Introduction to the Theology of Joseph
Ratzinger, new ed. (London: Burns & Oates, 2007), 94-109, esp. 96-105 (on eucharistic ecclesiology and
the unity of the Church).
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we all share in one bread,”131 the one bread is not just the single host (or hosts) of that particular
celebration, but the Eucharist in every Church. This is Christ Himself, “the bread of life” (John
6:48). All our particular celebrations participate, analogically (pròs hèn),132 in the one heavenly
celebration or the wedding feast of the Lamb.133 And because of this relation to Him, who does
not belong exclusively to any local congregation, we have communion with all those whom He
calls His (cf. John 17).134 And furthermore, since liturgy is first and foremost an orientation
towards God, in whom all of reality participates, liturgy should remain universal or Catholic,
though it manifests itself in various ways.
Part of the reason why this has been toned down in the CoN reform is that the universal and
Catholic aspect, the ordo, which is supposed to provide the framework of the liturgy, is under-
stood in a purely formal manner and on a horizontal level. It is understood in a quantitative
sense as extension, rather a qualitative catholicity rooted in Christological participation. And
because of this, locality becomes more basic than universality. This, I maintain, is problem-
atic because it tends to take the starting point in the individual worshippers rather than God or
Christ. Liturgy is not principally an expression of human emotion or experience but our com-
mon participation in God through Christ, made manifest most fully in the sacramental life of the
Church. The Church is the body of Christ and He is not ‘divisible.’ Rather, we becomemembers
of the Church by being incorporated in to Him.135 Universality, then, while being manifested
locally, has priority.136 By emphasising localised contextuality and flexibility, and by reduc-
131 CW, 179, cf. GDNK 2020, 188.
132 Cf. chapters one and four, pp.40-44 (esp. 40-41), 155-156.
133 Cf. Kringlebotten, “Do this…,” esp. 130-136.
134 This means, interestingly, that the standard practice in CoN, of using multiple hosts, instead of one, for the
Eucharistic celebration, may indeed be a symbol of the universal character of the ‘one bread.’
135 John 15:1-11; 17; Romans 11:11-24; 12:1-8; 1 Corinthians 12:12-31. For my argument for how we relate to
Christ, and to God in Christ, see chapter four, pp.153-162.
136 Ratzinger similarly argues that the universal Church is prior to its local manifestations, as it is rooted in
Christ. For a discussion of his view and his debate with Walter Cardinal Kasper, see Kilian McDonnell, “The
Ratzinger/Kasper Debate: The Universal Church and Local Churches” (Theological Studies 63:2, 2002),
227-250.
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ing catholicity and universality to something formal, the reform has downplayed the universal
character of the Church. Interestingly, however, this is also where it ‘failed,’ as we have seen
above. It envisioned one kind of liturgical participation, focused on locality and flexibility. The
liturgy itself, however, became more ‘conservative’ and much less flexible and contextual, be-
cause people valued universality, givenness, recognition, and stability over flexibility and local
contextuality.137 From a ritual perspective, this is not surprising. People (and cultures) are de-
fined through their acts, and particularly through their communal rituals, whether religious or
secular, something which participates in the being and the agency of God.138 And this, while
manifesting itself locally, is principally universal or Catholic, at least in the case of Christian
liturgy, because that is rooted in Christ, not just horizontally but also vertically.
5 Conclusion
In this thesis, I have argued for a Christian theurgic perspective on liturgy, where the focus
is first and foremost on God as actor, and not on us, as either ‘performers’ or ‘students.’ I
have argued that this has important implications for how the Church meets, and integrates,
people in worship, perhaps particularly people with disabilities. Where the latest reform in
CoN tends to turn the divine mysteries into solvable riddles which presuppose a certain level of
intellectual life, and envision the ‘average worshipper’ as an intellectual and able-bodied person
who ‘actively’ participates in liturgy through words, gestures, and actions, a properly Christian
theurgic perspective, however, informs us that while these elements, both the intellective and
the active, are important, the central import of the liturgy is the presence of God and His gift
137 KR 47/18 Presentasjon av høringen, 2, 9-26, cf. Morland, “Fritt og fast”; Raddum, Variety, 24, 42-45.
138 See chapter one, pp.44-49, 54-58. Also see Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 3rd ed. (London: Duckworth,
2007), x-xiv (esp. x-xi), 181-225; James K. A. Smith, Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and
Cultural Formation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009), 17-129, esp. 19-27, 39-110.
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of participation.139 When people participate in the liturgy the important point is not whether or
not they understand it or what they ‘contribute,’ in a superficial manner, although these things
are not unimportant, but that they are made partakers of the divine act and of God Himself.
How that manifests itself in life and in liturgy – how a person imitates God through singing,
praying, reading, contemplating, or a myriad of other things – is not unimportant but it is always
secondary to the way in which that person participates in God, in the ground of Being, and in
Christ.
I have argued that a Christian theurgic perspective on the liturgy helps us to keep a correct
balance between these things and it focuses on the one thing needed; on Christ, our Saviour
and Lord, and not on how ‘able’ we are to worship Him. In fact, this perspective tells us that
outside Him, we are not able to worship at all. Christ’s own theurgy is available to everyone
who has been initiated through Baptism, regardless of age, capability, or anything else. But as I
have also noted above, this does not negate the distinction between elite and non-elite. Rather, it
consummates it in Christ. Scripture does not distinguish between ‘the herd’ and ‘the theurgists,’
but between Christ on the one hand and all humans on the other, equally subject to sin and
fallenness.140 Christ, however, does not keep this to Himself. He allows us to participate in it
through Him, by means of the sacrament of Baptism, regardless of age, capability, or anything
else. And although a Christian conception of theurgy is in a sense more elitist than a Pagan
one, where Christ is the only true theurgist, this is a proper and true elitism. It is not between
creatures, but between God and creation.
What is interesting, though, is that there is a discrepancy between the ideals expressed in
the reform, which tend to overemphasise the intelligent and able-bodied worshipper, and the
actual liturgies that resulted from the reform. We see it in the liturgy itself, which counteracts
139 Bjørnaas, “Imago Dei og kroppsliggjort væren”; Njå, “Messen som Guds nåde og Kirkens takksigelse,” 196-
201; Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, 185-191.
140 Romans 3:23: “…all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God” (cf. Roman 3:9-31; 5:12-21).
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a principal focus on human agency by emphasising confession of sins, the Kyrie, the Gloria,
confession of faith, and prayers, to name a few. But more importantly, we see it in the fact that
the visions of flexible and contextual involvement actually failed. When the reform in CoN,
for example, emphasises the three core values,141 this emphasis on the concrete involvement
of the faithful shifted focus from God to us, focusing primarily on us as actors.142 But having
tried out the liturgy after 2011, the Church discovered that people valued recognition over local
contextuality.143 The resultant liturgies in 2020 were different from their predecessors, but they
had grown organically, and they gave expression to our fundamental dependence on God. Con-
sequently, the actual texts themselves gives a better expression to the theurgic nature of liturgy
than the reforms. But, as Gregory Dix notes, this is not surprising. Liturgies and liturgical
traditions have been written, rewritten, codified, decodified, changed, omitted, improved, and
enriched through the centuries. And no matter how many liturgical committees that have been
erected, the actual result tend to be more ‘conservative’ when they are actually celebrated:
The depth and breadth and allusiveness of the classical rites comes just from this, that their real
author is always the worshipping church, not any individual however holy and gifted, any committee
however representative, or any legislator however wise. … No one man is great enough or good
enough to fix the act of the Body of Christ for ever according to his own mind and understanding
of it. The good liturgies were not written; they grew.144
141 KR 10/04 Reform av Høymessen, 9-10; KR Protokoll 01/04, 9-12; UKM 07/08 Gudstenestereforma, 2-3;
UKM 07/14 Innspill til evaluering av gudstjenestereformen, cf. Christoffersen, “Sammen for Guds ansikt,”
62-64; Wagle, “Etterord,” 287-289.
142 Njå, “Messen som Guds nåde og Kirkens takksigelse,” 196-201.
143 KR 47/18 Presentasjon av høringen, 2, 9-26, cf. Morland, “Fritt og fast”; Raddum, Variety, 24, 42-45.
144 Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, 718-719, cf. 699-720; SC, 23.
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CONCLUSION
In this thesis, I have discussed how we ought to understand the notion of active participation
in the liturgy, as this comes to expression in the Second Vatican Council’s constitution on the
Sacred Liturgy.1 In critical dialogue with Thomas Aquinas, Joseph Ratzinger, and Catherine
Pickstock, I have argued that this should not be reduced to external activity but that it is, in
Ratzinger’s words, principally a divine work in which we are allowed to participate: “The
uniqueness of the eucharistic liturgy lies precisely in the fact that God himself is acting and that
we are drawn into that action of God.”2 Our participation in God is the foundation of our lives
and our actions, as St. Paul notes: “In him we live and move and have our being” (Acts 17:28).
I should note again that by ‘participation in God’ or ‘participation in the divine,’ I do not mean
that we participate directly in the divine essence, which is uncommunicated, incommunicable,
and unparticipated (Wisdom 14:21), but that we participate analogously in the likeness of God,
‘through similitude,’ by receiving being fromGod.3 Aswe read in James 1:17: “Every generous
act of giving, with every perfect gift, is from above, coming down from the Father of lights,
with whom there is no variation or shadow due to change.” From this, I have emphasised the
paradoxical importance of focusing both on the primacy of the actio divina over human agency
and expressions, and on the crucial importance and substantial nature of human agency and
expressions. Though our being is derived, it is real, but it is so precisely because it participates
in the ground of being.
Participation, however, can be understood in two related senses: the ontological participa-
1 Sacrosanctum Concilium (hereafter: SC), 14. On Vatican II documents, see abbreviations, p.5, n4.
2 Joseph Ratzinger, The Spirit of the Liturgy, commemorative ed. (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 2018), 188,
cf. 185-191.
3 See chapter one, pp.32, 40-44, cf. Andrew Davison, Participation in God: A Study in Christian Doctrine
and Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 155-164; Gregory T. Doolan, “Aquinas
on esse subsistens and the ThirdMode of Participation” (The Thomist 82:4, 2018), 611-642; Thomas Aquinas,
Summa Theologiae (hereafter: ST) I, q.13, a.9; II-II, q.94, a.4; q.97, a.4 ad 3. For notes on the Thomistic
corpus, see abbreviations, p.4, n1.
234
tion in God, expressed through the notion of méthexis, and our non-identical imitation of this,
expressed through the notion of mímēsis. Our practical involvement in the liturgy, whether in-
wardly (for example through meditation or inwards prayer) or outwardly (for example through
singing, gestures, or assistance during Mass), is a kind of mímēsis. It follows upon, and is and
expression of, our fundamental participation in God through Christ but it is not identical, nei-
ther to the divine act nor to other expressions or rites.4 And as I have argued, this is fulfilled
only in Christ. We can only truly relate to God, analogously, and become “participants in the
divine nature” (2 Peter 1:4), which, by the grace of God, moves beyond our general participa-
tion in God as creatures,5 by becoming “partners of Christ” (Hebrews 3:14). He is the “one
mediator between God and humankind” (1 Timothy 2:5), precisely because He is the God-man.
Through Him, we are not only related to God as creatures but have a real metaphysical union-
in-distinction with Him.6
In order to hold these elements together, I have argued that this ought to be understood both
in terms of theurgy, with Christ at the centre as ‘master theurgist,’ and through an adequately
participatory and analogical understanding of created reality, which is central both to Christian
and Pagan Neoplatonism.7 In Christ, the God who keeps us in existence from moment to mo-
ment, descends, incarnationally, for us, allowing us to be incorporated into the divine life and
to participate in the divine act. To point back to my definition of theurgy,8 theurgy is an act
4 Gregory Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, 3rd ed. (London: Bloomsbury T&TClark, 2005), 718-719; Confessio
Augustana (hereafter: CA) VII. For notes on the Lutheran confessions, see abbreviations, p.5, n3. If not
otherwise noted, quotations from CA follow the translation of the Latin text.
5 ST I-II, q.112, a.1, cf. chapter one, pp.49-54.
6 See chapter four, pp.140-146, 153-162.
7 Iamblichus,De mysteriis, Greek and English, intro. and trans. Emma C. Clarke, JohnM. Dillon, and Jackson
P. Hershbell (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003, hereafter: DM) I, 8; John Milbank, Catherine
Pickstock, and Graham Ward, eds., Radical Orthodoxy: A new theology (London: Routledge, 1999), 3-11,
19; Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 2nd ed., reprint, ed., trans., intro., and comm. E.R. Dodds (Ox-
ford: Clarendon, 1971), props. 1-13, 23-24; Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names (De Divinis Nominibus,
hereafter: DN), IV, 7 (701C-704C); Peter T. Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies: Iamblichus, Pseudo-
Dionysius, Religion and Magic in Late Antiquity” (Ancient World 32:2, 2001), 25-38 (esp. 30-38). For notes
on the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus, see abbreviations, p.4, n2.
8 See introduction, p. 18, cf. SC, 7; Struck, “Pagan and Christian Theurgies,” 30.
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of the triune God for us, put into use by Christ as the God-man, and the Church as His body,
whose effect is to reconcile the world to God and make humans capable of worship and service
through participation in Him.
This participation, however, is not granted directly but mediated through the liturgy, through
concrete means of grace.9 The liturgy and its symbols, as theurgy, become truly anagogical
through Christ, in the Holy Spirit, because it lifts us up to God.10 This anagogy happens, how-
ever, in a paradoxical manner by God’s descent, and it happens in the created world. This way,
Christian anagogy is different from its Iamblichan counterpart. Though the latter tradition holds
that matter is not bad or evil, and emphasises human descent into creation through theurgic rit-
ual,11 the ultimate goal of the ritual is the exclusively spiritual ascent to, and union with, the
gods, reserved for those who are able to achieve it.12 Christian theurgy and liturgy, however,
while being anagogical is not so in the sense that we are, as individuals, ‘whisked away’ to
some ‘spiritual realm.’ No, in the Spirit and through Christ, we are given communion with God
here and now, by means of specific rituals,13 and this participates not only in the transcendent
(yet immanent) God or in the heavenly liturgy of Christ (Hebrews 8:1-3), but anticipates God’s
eschatological descent to the world: “See, the home of God is among mortals. He will dwell
with them; they will be his peoples, and God himself will be with them” (Revelation 21:3).
In a way, we can say that the whole cosmos is lifted up to God, but it is so precisely as
nature, and it is so not by ‘ascending’ the hierarchy but by achieving fuller unity with God
9 See chapter five, pp.176-188, cf. CAV, VII-XIV; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles (hereafter: SCG)
IV, 56:7.
10 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial (or heavenly) Hierarchy (De coelesti hierarchia, hereafter: CH), II, 4
(144B), cf. Peter T. Struck, Birth of the Symbol: Ancient Readers at the Limits of Their Texts (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 262.
11 John Milbank and Aaron Riches, “Neoplatonic Theurgy and Christian Incarnation,” foreword to Gregory
Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus (2nd ed. Angelico Press/Sophia Perennis,
2014), xiv-xvi, cf. Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson, “Plotinus’ doctrine of badness as matter in Ennead I.8 [51],”
in Platonism and Christian Thought in Late Antiquity, eds., Panagiotis G. Pavlos et al. (London: Routledge,
2019), 78-99.
12 DM, V, 18; VI, 6, cf. TCO, frag. 153-154, 194 (cf. pp.20, 198, 212).
13 John 3:3-5; 6:48-59; Romans 10:14-17; 1 Corinthians 10:16-17; 11:23-26; Colossians 2:6-15; Romans 6:1-
14; Galatians 3:27-28.
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through Christ, who opens this for all, not just those ‘able.’14 God, while being transcendent, is
not so because He is ‘far off’ as a distant object in some inaccessible ‘spiritual realm,’ but simply
because he is God. His transcendence is a ‘transcendence in the immanence.’15 As Ratzinger
reminds us, “God does not become more divine when we push him away from us in a sheer,
impenetrable voluntarism.”16 Furthermore, He comes to us in concrete rituals, analogously to
the way He descended in the Incarnation, as Pickstock notes: “Theurgically to instigate the
divine re-descent in baptism and the Eucharist, just as Mary instigated the theurgic descent of
God become Man, is to repeat a drama which is both heavenly and historical.”17
This metaphysical perspective, however, has often been neglected. Though no one denies
the primacy of divine agency, liturgy is frequently seen as a more or less flexible series of acts,
rather than a concrete ritual and rational participation in God through Christ, an action which
orients us towards God, through Christ, in the Holy Spirit.18 By downplaying this, we risk
preaching to the world that with regards to praise, human agency is simply autonomous. Yes,
it is autonomous in a sense, as we are not ‘collapsed’ into God, but it remains a participated
and derived autonomy.19 What we have seen, though, is that even if reforms are more ‘radical,’
liturgies tend to become more ‘conservative.’ More than anything else, the liturgies highlight
the relation between God and creation, emphasising our dependence on God but also the very
real nature of human acts. If we overemphasise human agency, we may find as an unintended
14 Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys, 2nd ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007), 166; Charles M. Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity in Dionysius the Are-
opagite: “No Longer I” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 115-117, cf. chapters three and five,
pp.126-127, 167-169.
15 Rudi A. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 164.
16 Benedict XVI, The Regensburg Lecture, §27. For the text, see James V. Schall, The Regensburg Lecture
(South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2007), 130-148.
17 Catherine Pickstock, Repetition and Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 177-178.
18 Liturgi – Bokmål: Forslag til Ny ordning for hovedgudstjeneste i Den norske kirke (Bergen:
Eide/Kyrkjerådet, 2008), 15, cf. chapter six, p.207. Also see chapters three and four, pp.106-118, 153-162,
cf. Ådne Njå, “Messen som Guds nåde og Kirkens takksigelse: En refleksjon over Luthers messeforord-
ninger med et drøftende sideblikk på liturgi- og trosopplæringsreformen i Den norske kirke,” in «Hva betyr
det?» Luthers katekisme i trosopplæringen, eds., Knut Alfsvåg and Joar Haga (Prismet bok. Oslo: IKO,
2013), 185-202, esp. 196-201.
19 Davison, Participation in God, 65-83.
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consequence that we, or those to whom we are sent to preach, end up forgetting that God is
the primary agent. But likewise, if we overemphasise divine agency, we might end up with a
liturgically pacified Church. The balance between these, understood hierarchically, comes to
expression precisely through a theurgic, participatory, and analogical framework.
In the introduction, I pose a series of questions:20 who is active in the liturgy, and what does
it mean to engage in it? How should we understand the relationship between divine and human
agency in Christian practices, and particularly in the liturgical action? If God is the supreme
agent of the liturgical act, how do we understand human participation in the same? How is it
even possible to speak of human agency in this context, and why is it even necessary?
In an absolute sense, God is the one active in liturgy. Human agency, however, is real,
though only because it derives from, and participates in, divine agency. A theurgic perspective
manages to provide a rational grounding for this, preserving the nature of creaturely agency,
and liturgy in particular, as an objective divine gift while simultaneously opening up to flexi-
bility and non-identity. If liturgy is a participation in, and an imitation of, God, it will therefore
always remain analogical and non-identical. Our participation in God, for being, life, praise,
etc. can take on numerous forms, precisely because God, being infinite, “can be participated
in an infinite number of ways.”21 But even if we can participate in God in infinite ways, or
rather that God may provide infinite ways for Himself to be participated, by different species,
he nevertheless governs the world through each of these numerous beings through their form.22
This thesis has emphasised that while liturgies have ritualistic, anthropological, or sociological
perspectives, these important elements should not overshadow their theological and metaphysi-
cal grounding in divine agency. Participation is transformative. It is a gift of God which allows
20 See introduction, pp. 8-9.
21 SCG I, c.81:4.
22 Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Power of God (Quaestiones Disputatae de potentia Dei, here-
after: De pot.), q.3, a.7.
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us to grow. But it does so organically, through our form. And that is probably what more than
anything characterises the liturgy: it is a non-identical repetition which remains old, tested, and
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